

IR 401
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ISTANBUL KEMERBURGAZ UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FALL 2015

Assoc. Prof. Alper Kaliber
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Classes: Friday @ 11:40-14:30, D-201

Office: D-217

Office Hours: Thursdays, 13:30-15:30

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Course Description

The objective of the course is to introduce major theoretical approaches to international security to discuss conventional (military based) and non-conventional security issues and challenges and to explore the effects of globalization on the transformation of security understandings and instruments.

Learning Outcomes of the Course

Upon successful completion of this course:

The students will be able to develop a more thorough understanding of conventional understanding of security.
The students will be able to gain a deep understanding of positivist and post-positivist approaches to international security.
The students will be able to familiarise with new concepts and issues that define the post-C international security order such as securitization, human security, migration, global v environmental degradation, organised crimes and terrorist networks.
The students will be able to utilise diverse approaches to security to analyse selected international security.
The students will be able to acquire an in-depth understanding of the major epistemological methodological debates in the study of international security.

Course Requirements

In the first part of the semester, the instructor will deliver lectures which will be followed by a general class discussion. It is important that all students should read the recommended readings before each meeting to ensure that the class discussions will be lively and stimulating. Students are supposed to prepare a presentation and write a term paper on issues that they will choose. Yet, the topic of the presentation and the term paper should be consulted to and approved by the course instructor. In the second part of the semester, students will give an individual presentation in class in which they will present their initial findings on their term project. The final findings of this term project should be provided in a written text (properly noted and referenced) of around 3000 words. The deadline for the term paper will be announced by the instructor in due time.

Grading

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|--------------------------------|------|
| • Attendance and participation | 20 % |
| • Mid-term | 30 % |
| • Paper and presentation | 50 % |

Course Policies

Students **must** adhere to the following principles of **academic honesty**:

- (1) Individual accountability for all individual work, written and oral. Copying from others or providing answers or information, written or oral, to others is **cheating**.
- (2) Providing proper acknowledgment of the original author. Copying from another student's assignment or from another text without written acknowledgment is **plagiarism**. The same is true for paraphrasing - the simple modification of such material without changing the course of thought or crediting the source.
- (3) Unauthorized help from another person or having someone else write one's paper or assignment is **collusion**.

Cheating, plagiarism and collusion are serious offenses resulting in an F grade and disciplinary action.

Presentations must be taken when scheduled. Individual exceptions are granted only in cases documented to the satisfaction of the instructor. Unexcused absences from presentations and late assignments may result in a score of zero. Late assignments will be accepted at a significant penalty to the student's grade.

While the readings and lectures are designed to complement each other, they will not cover identical material. Students are responsible from both the lectures and the readings. Thus, regular class attendance is strongly advised. Students are also required to come to classes **on time**. Latecomers may possibly disturb concentration of their classmates and their professor. In addition to attending classes, students who read class material before class and actively participate in classroom discussions will receive bonus credits that may positively affect their course grade.

Course Outline

SESSION ONE (September 18) Introduction

- A) Introducing the course, its objectives and requirements, the issues to be covered throughout the course, and grading policy.
- B) What is security? Discussing security as a contested concept.
- Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?”, in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, Harper Collins, chapter 1, pp. 31-53.

SESSION TWO (September 25)

Holiday

SESSION THREE (October 2)

Realism and Strategic Studies: Traditional approaches to international security

- Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), chapter 2, pp. 5-23.
- Terry Terriff et al., *Security Studies Today* (Polity Press, 1999), chapter 2.
- David J. Dunn, “Peace Research Versus Strategic Studies”, in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, Harper Collins, chapter 2, pp. 56-72.

SESSION FOUR (October 9)

Liberalism and International Security

- Michael Sheehan, (2005) *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). chapter 3, pp. 25-43.

SESSION FIVE (October 16)

Constructivist and Critical Approaches to International Security

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Constructivist Theories”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 1, pp. 15-28.
- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Securitisation Theory”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 2, pp. 29-45.

SESSION SIX (October 23)

Security as Speech Act and Securitisation

- Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), chapters 1 and 2.
- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, "Securitisation Theory", in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 6, pp. 92-106.

SESSION SEVEN (October 30)

Post-structuralism and Foreign Policy as a Means of Securitization

- David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (rev. ed.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 1-12.
- Alper Kaliber, 'Securing the Ground Through Securitized 'Foreign' Policy: The Cyprus Case Revisited', *Security Dialogue* 36 (3) 2005, pp. 319-337. *moodle*

SESSION EIGHT (November 6)

Regional approaches to International Security

Required reading:

- Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 40-89.
- Alper Kaliber, 'Re-imagining Cyprus: The Rise of Regionalism in Turkey's Security Lexicon', in *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads*, T. Diez and N. Tocci (eds.), (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009): 105-123.

SESSION NINE (November 13) -- Midterm exam

SESSION TEN (November 20)

Global war on terror

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, "Securitisation Theory", in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 9, pp. 139-153.

SESSION ELEVEN (November 27)

Human security

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Securitisation Theory”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 10, pp. 154-167.

SESSION TWELVE (December 4)

Migration

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Securitisation Theory”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 11, pp. 168-183.

SESSION THIRTEEN (December 11)

Environmental security

Required reading:

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Securitisation Theory”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 7, pp. 109-122.

SESSION FOURTEEN (December 18)

Technology and security

Required reading:

- Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan Williams, “Securitisation Theory”, in *Critical Security Studies An Introduction*, (Routledge, 2015), chapter 12, pp. 184-201.

SESSION FIFTEEN (December 25)

Globalisation and security, overview of the course

Titles of Related Interest

Soviet Strategy in the Middle East
George Breslauer (ed.)

British Security Policy
Stuart Croft (ed.)

The United States and Multilateral Institutions
Margaret P Karns and Karen A Mingst (eds)

The USSR and the Western Alliance
Robbin Laird and Susan L Clark (eds)

Paradoxes of War
Zeev Maoz

The Onset of World War
Manus I Midlarsky (ed.)

War and State Making
Karen A Rasler and William Thompson

British Foreign Policy
Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds)

New Thinking About Strategy and International Security

Edited by
KEN BOOTH
University College of Wales



HarperCollins Academic
An imprint of HarperCollins Publishers

1

Is international security possible?

BARRY BUZAN

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Security is a complex concept. In order to get to grips with it one needs, at a minimum, to be aware of three things: (1) the political context of the term; (2) the several dimensions – political, military, economic, societal, environmental – within which it operates; and (3) the logical contradictions and ambiguities that are inherent in any attempt to apply the concept to international relations.

Anarchy as the context for international security

The main political context for international security is the anarchic structure of the international system. In this usage anarchy means the absence of central government. In the international system, anarchy does not mean the absence of government per se, but rather that government resides in the units of the system. If those units are states, then they will claim sovereignty, which is the right to treat themselves as the ultimate source of governing authority within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. Since the claim of sovereignty automatically denies recognition of any higher political authority, a system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as an anarchy.

In the international system, anarchy is thus a decentralized form of political order. It does not necessarily, or even probably, merit

the Hobbesian implications of disorder and chaos that attach to the concept of anarchy as applied to relations among individual human beings. On the individual level, anarchy means the absence of all government. A political system structured in that way could only avoid chaos if human society had evolved to far higher levels of cohesion and responsibility than any yet attained. Indeed, no greater indication of the difference between anarchy at the individual and international levels is possible than the fact that the former requires the abolition of the state, whereas the latter finds its clearest and most perfect expression in the state.

The anarchic context sets the elemental political conditions in which all meanings of international security have to be constructed. Anarchy can be seen fatalistically as a product of history, representing either the current limit of the ongoing human attempt to create stable political units on an ever larger scale, or the natural political expression of an ethnically and culturally diverse population. It can also be seen as a preferred form of political order, representing values of ideological and cultural diversity, decentralization, independence and self-reliance. Either way, the structure of anarchy is highly durable, because the actions states take to preserve their independence and sovereignty automatically perpetuate the anarchic system. In turn, that structure generates system-wide effects on relations among states (Buzan, 1989a; Waltz, 1979). An anarchic structure imposes competitive, self-help conditions of existence on the states within the system. To say this is not to say either that relations between states are inevitably, or even probably, violently conflictual under anarchy, or that international anarchy makes co-operation unlikely or impossible (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Jervis, 1985; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1985). Violent conflict is possible, and in some circumstances likely. Competition, however, is pervasive, and takes political, economic and societal forms as well as military ones.

Some analysts make a potent link here between anarchic political structures and capitalist economic ones (Chase-Dunn, 1981; Kennedy, 1988; McNeil, 1982; Wallerstein, 1974). The argument is that the fragmentation of political authority in a system of states is both a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism, and/or the natural political expression of an operating capitalist world economy. Suggestive historical evidence for this view can be drawn from the contrast between the fragmented, anarchical

political experience of Europe, which generated capitalism, and the much more centralized, hierarchic tradition of China, which did not, despite similar, or even superior, levels of science and technology on the Chinese side.

This link between political and economic structure makes competition under anarchy double-edged. On one side, international political fragmentation supports the competition of the market, in which producers are forced to vie with each other in terms of innovation, quality and price in order to pursue their own economic welfare. The political structure of anarchy creates more freedom for economic actors, both because they can move from less to more congenial governments and because at least some governments will come to see the power advantages of hosting them. Insulated imperiums like that in China can more easily decide to suppress the disruptive challenge from rising economic classes. On the other side, international anarchy creates the pervasive unease of the power-security dilemma, in which the measures states take to preserve their security are easily, and often rightly, seen by others as threatening to their own security (Buzan, 1983, ch. 7). Competition for strength in the qualities of survival thus has to be added to competition for wealth in the market. Both types of competition stimulate technological innovation, which in turn continuously redefines the requirements for successful (and unsuccessful) behaviour (Buzan, 1978b, chs 2-4).

Competition under anarchy, as Waltz (1979, pp. 76, 128) argues, tends to produce units that are similar in function. Successful states have a demonstration effect on those seeking to emulate their success. If differential rates of success, and therefore of power, grow very large, as they did in the eighteenth and even more in the nineteenth centuries, then the processes of alignment become more forceful. The strong simply take over the weak, reconstructing them in their own image. The European states did this to most of the world, in the process expanding the anarchic structure from one continent to the entire system. As well as encouraging (though never reaching) functional homogeneity, the 'showing and shaping' influence of anarchic structure generates balance of power behaviour. In seeking to preserve their own sovereignty and security, states will behave in such a way as to prevent threats from any one expansionist centre of power from dominating the system (or subsystem). This behaviour preserves the overarching

structure of anarchy even though it may fail to preserve a particular state (Austria-Hungary, Tibet) or lead to a variety of local mergers between states (Italy, the Soviet Union, the European Community).

4 The context of anarchy thus imposes three major conditions on the concept of international security.

- (1) States are the principal referent object of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority. This explains the dominating policy concern with 'national' security.
- (2) Although states are the principal objects of security, the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent between states. Domestic insecurities may or may not dominate the national security agenda, but external threats will almost always comprise a major element of the national security problem. The idea of 'international' security is therefore best used to refer to the systemic conditions that influence the ways in which states make each other feel more or less secure. With this usage, individual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in relation both to each other, and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole (Buzan, 1983, chs 8 and 9).
- (3) Given the durability of anarchy, the practical meaning of security can only be constructed sensibly if it can be made operational within an environment in which competitive relations are inescapable. If security depends on either harmony or hegemony, then it cannot be lastingly achieved within anarchy. Among other things, this means that under anarchy, security can only be relative, never absolute.

So long as anarchy holds, these conditions will obtain. If there is a structural shift out of anarchy, then the entire framework of the security problematic would have to be redefined.

Dimensions of security

International security embraces at least five dimensions: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and

defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, and both religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. It is well understood that these dimensions do not operate in isolation from each other. They interact in myriad complex and often contradictory ways.

Of these five dimensions, the military one attracts disproportionate attention in thinking about security. This is partly because an expensive, politically potent, and highly visible sector of state behaviour is generated by the need to respond to the possibility of armed threat, attack or invasion. Mostly, however, it is because military means can dominate outcomes in all the other sectors. A state and its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure. In one sense, this primacy justifies the amount of attention paid to military security. But the cost of a military-dominated view is too often that the other elements of security end up playing too small a role in both analysis and policy. This tendency becomes increasingly regrettable as the rising tide of communication, interaction and interdependence in the international system gives some states very potent economic, societal and political levers over the affairs of others.

One consequence of military primacy is that thinking about international security is excessively concentrated in the sub-field of strategic studies. This is unwelcome for two reasons. Firstly, strategic studies does not contain the breadth of expertise necessary for security analysis. The field is mostly, and rightly, populated by people who know about military technology, military relations between states, and the interplay between these two. As a result the study of security gets skewed towards the military dimension, leaving the other dimensions inadequately developed. Secondly,

because it has immediate policy linkages, strategic studies contains strong ethnocentric tendencies (Booth, 1979). This pushes its analysis towards national security perspectives, where competitive self-interest dominates perceptions, and consequently discourages analysis of security interdependence and the systemic aspects of the concept. Identification with strategic studies has thus doubly curtailed development of the concept. The proper home of security is in the much broader field of international relations. Only there can be found the range of expertise and the scope of interest necessary for its full development.

It is not my aim in this chapter to dispute the centrality of military factors in security. Instead, it is to set these military factors into the broader context of a holistic security perspective. The logic behind this exercise can be illustrated by the cold war security problem in Europe, where the interplay of military and non-military aspects of security is conspicuous and well understood. The longstanding armed tension in Europe makes it impossible to deny the importance of military security. But although the military dimension carries the urgency of its potential for massive and rapid transformations of relationships across the board, and the threat of extremely high costs, it is not necessarily the only, or even the principal, driving cause of insecurity. That military factors are not, by themselves, determining forces is evident from the major role that ideological hostilities played in both the Cold War and the run-up to the Second World War (Jahn, Lemaitre and Waever, 1987, ch. 3). This point can also be illustrated by the way in which armed states can avoid the power-security dilemma if their relationships are secure in the other dimensions. Britain did not find it necessary to respond to the rise of the United States Navy during the late nineteenth century. Sweden and Finland have made their self-defence mutually supportive because of the political harmony of their neutrality. France and Britain do not fear military attack from each other's nuclear arsenals.

Nevertheless, when they do get established, the reciprocal interactions of the arms dynamic are almost always *partly* autonomous: that is, self-driving within the military dimension. As in the Anglo-German naval race before the First World War, and the post-1945 military rivalry between NATO and the WTO, arms levels on one side become a key referent for research, acquisitions and deployments on the other. But the insecurities of the military

dimension seldom, if ever, arise without being driven by more fundamental insecurities in the other dimensions. In the case of Europe, the military confrontation was called into being, and sustained by, a host of non-military insecurities. The clash of incompatible ideologies provided a framework in which many kinds of political, economic and societal insecurities were linked together.

As with India's secular federal constitution, and Pakistan's Islamic one (Buzan and Rizvi, 1986) the basic construction of government on either side of the cold war lines in Europe stood as a permanent challenge to the political legitimacy of the other side. The organizing philosophy and political practice of Marxist-Leninist and democratic pluralist states were in such profound contrast as inevitably to make each feel uncomfortable and insecure in the presence of the other, a fact already evident in Western-Soviet relations during the interwar years. In such conditions, it can become nearly impossible for principled opposition within either system to escape identification with the rival system.

These basic political incompatibilities extended into the economic and societal dimensions. The imposition of cold war boundaries not only cut off longstanding trade and financial links between Eastern and Western Europe, but also created another sector of rivalry to multiply the political insecurities. The Cold War was in large part about a socio-economic challenge as to which system could most efficiently produce and distribute the conditions for material welfare. Khrushchev's much quoted line 'we will bury you' was a reference to Soviet production aspirations, not to its capacity for nuclear destruction. This politicization of economic performance drove a rivalry, which in turn amplified the fears and obstructions that the two economic systems placed in each other's way.

For the capitalists, the communist system denied access to both markets and resources. In so doing, it identified itself with the militaristic neo-mercantilism of the 1930s (of which the Soviet Union was the only survivor) as posing a threat to both prosperity (and therefore domestic political stability) and peace. By enclosing their economies, the communist states threatened the liberal capitalist project of constructing a global market economy as a means of promoting not only peace and prosperity, but also pluralist democracy. Any success for communism restricted the potential of the capitalist project, so creating the deep insecurity of a zero-sum game.

For the communists, capitalism was also hostile by definition, and also threatened a project for global peace and prosperity. Marxist-Leninist ideology emphasized this opposition and, until revised by Khrushchev, officially expected it to result in war. Capitalist practice was self-evidently contradictory to the maintenance of communist government – or at least to the type of totalitarian bureaucratic rule that Stalin and his heirs defined as communism. The operation of capitalism could not but penetrate state and society, creating both conceptual and administrative challenges to the commanding control of the communist party. This politicization of economics on both sides made significant economic interaction between them extremely problematic. Each feared that dealing with the other would worsen its own position in the political and strategic rivalry.

In the societal dimension the overall ideological rivalry between East and West heightened the contradictions already inherent between the overarching cosmopolitan ideologies on both sides, and the more parochial religious and ethnic identities of the indigenous societies in Europe. In the East, homogenizing communism faced resistance from both local religious forces, as in Poland and Georgia, and local national ones, as in Hungary and Estonia. In the West, France perhaps best exemplified the widespread national level of resistance to the equally homogenizing effects of liberal capitalism in terms of universal product brands, financial systems, cultural styles, music and language. In the East, societal insecurities linked directly to the Soviet-dominated political and military structures. In the West, the picture was and is more complex and less fraught, because the homogenizing ideology is not almost solely, as it was in the East, an imposition of the dominant superpower, but also stems powerfully from the indigenously driven forces that are constructing the European Community. In between the two systems lay the German problem, where a powerful national identity was riven into two states lying uncomfortably on opposite sides of the ideological divide.

→ In Europe, the military confrontation was substantially sustained by the political, economic and societal insecurities that underlay it. In the late 1980s, however, quite massive changes in non-military factors began to break down the fixtures of the Cold War, in the process redefining the conditions of European security across all dimensions. In the East, Gorbachev's twin revolutions of *glasnost*

and *perestroika* seemed to open up real possibilities of defining economic and political relations in other than zero-sum game terms (Lemaire, 1989). By the end of 1989, oldstyle communism had either collapsed or was in headlong retreat all across Eastern Europe. The Berlin Wall was broken, and there was open and serious talk about German reunification. In the face of these sweeping political and economic changes, decades of military tension melted away with such astonishing rapidity that the two alliances had to cast about to find reasons to keep themselves in existence. In the West, the European Community gained both political and economic momentum with its 1992 project, becoming a major magnet for the newly liberated states in Eastern Europe. At the global level both superpowers weakened in will and capability to sustain their global rivalry. The system as a whole moved increasingly swiftly away from the rigid bipolar structure of the post-Second World War era, and towards the more fluid multipolar structure of the twenty-first century. What the consequences of all this are for security in Europe is one of the foremost questions for the coming decade. What is certain is that the old military arrangements are deeply inappropriate to the new political conditions, and that major rethinking and restructuring will be necessary.

The European case illustrates not only the many dimensions of security, but also the way in which the non-military dimensions interweave both with each other and with the military dimension. This complex interweaving is characteristic of security in all parts of the international system, although the composition of the mixture naturally varies.

The ambiguities of security

human condition

Like many of the major concepts used to discuss the human condition – justice, equality, love, power – security is plagued with ambiguities. The idea of 'international security' embraces many different types of units ranging from individuals, through states, nations and firms, to coalitions such as alliances and blocs. This diversity requires that care be taken to specify the referent object to which security analysis is being applied, often a difficult task given that some referent objects, such as states, are far less concrete and more metaphysical than they might at first appear. In quite different ways the recent histories of Poland and Lebanon

exemplify this problem, pointing to the conclusion that the stability and security of the whole state is vitally dependent, *inter alia*, on the security of all the major political forces in play within it. Whatever units are chosen, there is still the problem of working out how an essentially preservative idea like security can be applied to entities that undergo many types of change as a result of their natural interaction with their environment. There is also the difficulty of distinguishing between objective and subjective security (is one secure versus does one feel secure). Those who wish to apply the idea of security systematically need to be aware of its ambiguous quality if they are to make any useful progress.

One such ambiguity that is particularly relevant to the question under consideration here is: if the anarchic environment is irretrievably competitive, then how can any units within it ever be meaningfully secure? Competition implies an ever-present danger of becoming a loser. For states as for individuals, being subjected to continuous assessment of relative performance in a highly dynamic economic, military and political environment means living with continuous insecurity.

This conundrum is most evident in the realm of economic security under capitalism, though it applies more subtly to many other dimensions of international security. A capitalist economy only works if market competition is allowed to shape behaviour. Individuals and firms within it prosper only if they can compete, and the overall productivity and prosperity of the system depends on the less efficient and less innovative producers being driven out of business by the more efficient and more innovative ones. In one sense, capitalism is founded on the permanent insecurity of producers, making the idea of economic security within capitalism seem a contradiction in terms. But inasmuch as capitalism can claim to be overall an effective generator of wealth, it offers a kind of macro-security in the prospect of ever-expanding growth, and ever-unfolding opportunity. To the extent that growth alleviates both the economic and the political problems of shortage and uneven distribution, capitalism can be seen to offer a trade-off in which a measure of insecurity on the unit level is endured in return for a measure of security on the level of the economic system as a whole.

This type of logic points to the inescapable relativity of security under anarchy. In a capitalist economy, absolute security requires

monopoly, which is undesirable. In the political and military sectors, absolute security is conceivable for any one unit, but only at the cost of making all the other units in the system absolutely insecure. In the previous section it was shown how the zero-sum logic of the power-security dilemma operated politically, militarily and economically in Europe. The measures that each side took to make itself secure made other units within the system feel less secure. The resultant competition itself becomes part of everyone's insecurity, both because of the continuous threat of losing (the power-security dilemma), and because of the overall threat to survival posed by some of the military means with which the competition is pursued (the defence dilemma) (Buzan, 1983, chs 6-7).

The many ambiguities and contradictions inherent in the concept of security reinforce the argument made above that the idea of international security is best deployed to focus on the systemic conditions that influence the way in which states make each other feel more or less secure. If international security can only be relative, never absolute, the necessity is to identify the factors and conditions that might ameliorate the insecurities that arise naturally out of the inherently divided and competitive structure of the anarchy. The most obvious place to begin such a search is the still fashionable idea of interdependence.

INTERDEPENDENCE, ANARCHY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The principal driving force behind interdependence is the rising density of the interaction networks that tie the international system together. In raw physical terms, rising density is driven by a combination of increasing population, and increasing technological, organizational and financial capabilities and incentives for action. Given the sustained pace of an apparently open-ended technological revolution, density could be expected to increase even if the human population became static in numbers. Because of the age/fertility structure of the population, this event is still several decades distant at the earliest. Density, then, is about more people doing more things. It means that people's activities are more likely to impinge on the conditions of other people's existence,

density of the interaction

both intentionally and unintentionally, and positively as well as negatively. Inasmuch as the whole idea of an international system depends on interaction (without interaction there are parts, but no system), increasing density raises the importance of the whole in relation to the parts.

In concrete terms, rising density is measurable across all of the dimensions of security. Military capabilities have reached levels where it is possible for the major powers both to involve the whole planet in conflict, and to inflict levels of destruction that could well eliminate the human species. In the political sphere, ideas now circulate globally, many issues are discussed in global or semi-global forums as a matter of routine, and the model of the industrial democracies has emerged as a kind of universal holy grail of development, albeit by very different routes (Von Laue, 1987). Economically, the world is increasingly tied into a global market of production, trade and finance, whose circulation system is an ever more efficient transportation network by land, sea and air, and whose nervous system is a worldwide web of electronic communication and data processing facilities. Societally, the international system is still profoundly parochial, although superficial elements of a global society are emergent in such things as the use of English as a common language, and in the spread of common materialist values and styles. Environmentally, the collective impact of human activity is producing effects of a regional and global scale, in the process creating both common fates and a need for collective action. Should global warming produce a significant (over one metre) rise in sea level, as seems far from impossible, the environmental sector may well confront humankind with its first truly systemic challenge some time in the next century. Barring massive global disasters the pattern of density can be expected to continue its relentless increase.

The major theoretical question arising from density is how its increase affects the general character of international relations within an anarchic structure. The principal political impact of rising density is to increase the levels of interdependence among states across a broad spectrum. In the military sphere, the dominance of long-range strike weapons means that states depend for their survival on the restraint of their rivals, nowhere more so than in the context of mutual nuclear deterrence. In the economic sphere, they depend for their prosperity and development on complex

patterns of access to external markets, resources and credit. In the environmental sphere, they increasingly depend on each other to adopt restraint towards ecologically damaging activities.

Interdependence is unlikely to reduce conflict, and may increase it by giving states a broader agenda of issues over which their interests and circumstances will differ. But where interdependence is strong, it should reduce incentives to resort to armed force. Interdependence makes relationships costly to disrupt. It also gives states an expanded repertoire of instruments with which they can influence each other's behaviour. Force is increasingly costly not only in itself, but also in its consequences. This is true regardless of whether the motive for using force is greed or justice. Force is best used to determine control of territory, but in an interdependent and technologically sophisticated world, control of territory is not an attractive solution, as it once was to a wide range of problems. Armed force is a poorly tuned instrument for many interdependence issues (Keohane and Nye, 1977, 1987).

This line of reasoning points towards the conclusion that rising density will, other things being equal, tend to have a mitigating effect on the possibility of violent international relations under anarchy. The natural pressure of rising density is away from the security-driven anarchic imperative of 'look after yourself, and towards the more economic imperative 'specialize'. This logic is apparent in the current diffusion away from advanced industrial countries of basic industries such as steel and shipbuilding, and in the international stratification of production for major goods such as computers, aircraft, cars, and even armaments. Both movements work powerfully against the logic that states should seek security by retaining a broad-spectrum capability for self-reliant military production.

The divergent logics of anarchy and interdependence are both powerfully at work in the contemporary international system. The tension and interplay between them are major elements in the conditions that define international security. Among other things, rising density makes it more difficult for states to pursue national security in the traditionally preferred fashion of seeking unilaterally to reduce their vulnerabilities to outside pressure. Instead, states are pressured by circumstances into relying more and more on collaborative measures to reduce threats by dealing with them as multilateral international issues. Even the superpowers are now

accepting that their security is interdependent, and that arms control is a serious alternative to arms racing as a national security strategy.

The interplay between anarchy and interdependence thus sets the major framework within which thinking about international security has to take place. Anarchy tells us important things not only about the international system (that it has no central government, and that relationships within it are competitive), but also about the units (that security is a high policy priority for them, that they have to look after themselves, and that consequently they are likely to be functionally similar). Interdependence directs our attention to the specific conditions that shape the way states interact with each other. In part it points to issues where either the scale of problems transcends the abilities of individual actors to make effective policy by themselves, or where the linkages are so strong that independent action by any unit cannot avoid engaging the concerns of others. Interdependence also points to the general conditions of interaction, especially the capacity of the communication, transportation and organizational networks that not only tie the system together, but also determine the speed and volume of everything from trade and finance to military attack. The prospects for international security have to be located within the complex dialectic that results from the dividing tendencies of anarchy interacting with the binding ones of interdependence.

One idea to emerge from this interplay has been 'common security' (Buzan, 1987a; Møller, 1988; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982; SIPRI, 1985; Vayrynen, 1988; Waever, 1988; Windass, 1985), which seeks to combine the self-reliance, self-preservation imperatives of anarchy with the idea that the only rational approach to security under contemporary political, military, economic and environmental conditions is through the logic of interdependence. Common security emphasizes both the relational and the relative character of security in the international system. Its advocates are realist in that they accept the need to work within the existing anarchic political framework, and idealist in that they see plenty of room for improving international security within the limits set by prevailing conditions in the system.

Common security invites us to consider what military, economic, political, societal and ecological conditions in the international system might work to ameliorate (or exacerbate) the

power-security dilemma. How, in other words, can the international anarchy be made more 'mature'? (Buzan, 1983; 1984) This question leads down two paths of inquiry. The first requires identification of the apparent trends in the system, and assessment of whether they promote or vitiate the operation of the power-security dilemma. The second path focuses on the level of state policy, and requires identification of options that are both helpful in improving international security conditions, and 'realistic' (in the sense of (a) capable of being implemented without the necessity of a political transformation, and (b) not obviously counter-productive in effect). This approach opens up an agenda much too large to be fully explored, or even fully outlined, in this chapter. It is, however, possible to indicate a few highlights, and to suggest the flavour and direction of the arguments. Three crucial areas of inquiry are the characteristics of states, the strength of international society, and the shape of the international system structure.

CONDITIONS FOR COMMON SECURITY

The characteristics of states

It is obvious that the character of states is a major factor in shaping international security. The many traditional theories linking the domestic political structure of states – whether monarchical, autocratic, fascist, communist, capitalist or theocratic – to propensity for aggression clearly make this link. In the contemporary system, three state characteristics stand out as centrally important to security relations: the political cohesion of states, the nature of their military policy, and their transparency to observation by others.

THE POLITICAL COHESION OF STATES

Whether states are *weak* or *strong* (Buzan 1983, ch. 4; 1988a, pp. 17–27) in terms of their degree of socio-political cohesion is crucial both to their own security and to that of the regions within which they are embedded. Whether a state is weak or strong by this definition has little to do with whether it is weak or strong as a power. Strong states can be weak powers (Denmark) and weak states can be quite strong powers (Argentina, Pakistan, even the Soviet Union in some ways). The international anarchy is a decentralized system

of order, and therefore depends for its stability on the robustness of its component units. Weak states are like holes in the fabric of international order. Their internal politics are often violent, and their domestic insecurity frequently spills over to disrupt the security of neighbours (South Africa, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Pakistan in 1971). Weak states easily draw in competitive outside interventions (Angola, Chad, Cambodia, El Salvador, Grenada, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Panama), and they may offer tempting targets to opportunistic neighbours (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Chad, Mozambique).

In an international anarchy, strong states are a necessary but not sufficient condition for international security. They are necessary because without them the insecurity of political fragility and disorder prevail almost by definition. They are not sufficient, because as the recent history of the European states in the first half of this century shows all too clearly, strong states can easily generate an environment of exceptional insecurity. The present international system contains more states on the weak than on the strong end of the spectrum, and thus has a massive element of international insecurity built into itself. Rectifying this problem will be a long job, in which the stronger states can only intervene up to a limit without being charged with neo-colonialism. It is not yet clear whether the momentum of decolonization will tend naturally, if slowly, towards the emergence of stronger states, or whether it will, in some places, result in stagnation or even a collapse of local self-government. The Brandt Report (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980) is clearly right to argue that international security depends in part on strengthening the political economies of the weak states. Whether its prescription is an effective way to proceed is much more arguable. Existing strong states are gifts of history, and as yet we have little knowledge about how to create others like them where it has not happened naturally.

THE NATURE OF MILITARY POLICY

The nature of military policy lies at the heart of the power-security dilemma. The problem is how to bring domestic and foreign perceptions of reasonable defence needs into some sort of balance. If states are seen by others to be inadequately defended, like China was during the period of Western and Japanese imperialism, they run the risk of inviting aggression from opportunistic

expansionists. If they are seen by others to be over-defended, like the Soviet Union has been since 1945, they risk appearing threatening, and so triggering fruitless and insecurity-generating cycles of arms racing. The inherent ambiguity of military means (whether given weapons can be designated as offensive or defensive), and the strategic advantages of surprise attack (Pearl Harbor, Barbarossa, Falklands) have always made it difficult to find a balance between legitimate military defence and a militarily threatening posture legitimately seen by others as aggressive.

During the 1980s, a useful school of thought has emerged which has tried to tackle this dilemma with the idea of non-provocative (or non-offensive) defence (Agrell, 1987; Buzan, 1987a, pp. 271-8; Galtung, 1984; Möller, 1987; Windass, 1985). Inspiration for this work has been drawn from several sources. In part it comes from the practice of some states, most notably the European neutrals, Japan, and in some ways China. In part it comes from so-called 'emergent technologies', which offer the prospect of extremely accurate and 'intelligent' munitions married to powerful systems of observation and control. The hope is that these technologies will restore advantage to the defender by making any large, moving object highly vulnerable to destruction. Since invaders (though not always attackers) depend on a host of large moving objects, these new weapons may tip the balance in favour of well-prepared defenders - and do so without necessarily giving the defenders a significant counter-invasion capability. In part it comes from the desire to reduce military tensions and capabilities in Europe, and it is no accident that much the biggest and best developed literature exploring 'structural incapability for attack' has been produced in West Germany. Judging by the promises of Mikhail Gorbachev's December 1988 speech to the UN, and subsequent Soviet actions and proposals, non-provocative defence has also made significant converts in the Soviet Union (McGwire, 1988). There are, of course, sceptics (Freedman, 1987; Gates, 1987). Non-provocative defence is far from being an orthodoxy, though it does have a firm historical record of practice, and looks set to play a major role in the defence debates of the 1990s and beyond.

The basic principles of non-provocative defence are:

- (1) that national defence is necessary in an anarchic international system;
- (2) that under modern conditions national securities are highly interdependent, and that rational national security policy must therefore balance the legitimate needs of the state with the legitimate security concerns of other states;
- (3) that all countries have the right to live free from the fear of either invasion or disarming first strikes, and national security policies must therefore be designed to minimize these capabilities.

To the extent that these principles can be put into operation without unacceptable costs in vulnerability, the power-security dilemma could be broken, and international security thereby improved very markedly.

TRANSPARENCY TO OBSERVATION

Transparency to observation is part of what makes non-provocative defence feasible. In this respect, improvements in space-based observation since the early 1960s have worked a remarkable and under-recognized, transformation on security relations. Using national technical means, states can now observe each other's military dispositions and behaviours much more accurately and continuously than ever before. These capabilities make surprise attacks, especially those requiring the mass mobilization and movement of military and naval forces, much more difficult to achieve than in the recent past. Where there is the political will, these national technical means can be bolstered by agreed confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs of the kind that have developed in Europe involve increasing transparency by a system of agreed reporting and inspection measures that give each side the ability to reassure itself about the other's military deployments.

Transparency also has a broad political-economy dimension that parallels, and interacts with, the military one. The Soviet Union, for example, traditionally sought advantage in its vigorously promoted non-transparency. Being a closed state enabled the Soviet leadership to hide everything, from the size of its nuclear forces (Khrushchev 1957-62) to the extent of its military budget. This closedness greatly exacerbated the power-security dilemma for the West, and therefore subsequently for the Soviet Union, by forcing NATO to react to worst-case assessments about Soviet military capability.

It is also obvious that one of the advantages of capitalist (or at least market-based) political economies is that their very operation generates high levels of transparency. Extensive trade and investment naturally make societies relatively open to each other. Because extensive interaction forces adherence to standard units of account, reliable and comparable statistics are readily available on a wide variety of activities within and between such states. This socio-economic interoperability avoids serious problems of opacity like those that the West has had in trying to estimate Soviet and Chinese defence expenditure. The lack of tradeable currencies in the communist powers, added to their governments' more than usually self-serving way with statistics, has been an impediment to broadly based transparency, and thus an obstacle to international security. The apparent triumph of market over centrally planned economies in the late twentieth century would seem to be a powerful stimulus to greater transparency, and therefore to the easier achievement of international security.

The strength of international society

The condition of international society is an important element of international security. To the extent that an international society exists, it not only makes it easier for states to accept each other's legitimacy, but also facilitates civilized (that is, non-violent) inter-action among them. Anarchical society, in other words, is capable of generating order only if the units within it can adopt norms against which their own and others' behaviour can be communicated, regulated and judged. This is especially so when the density of the system is high enough that the units cannot ignore each other's presence and activity. Hedley Bull (1977, pp. 38-40, 257-60, 315-17) worried that the common norms underlying international society had been seriously weakened by the expansion of a culturally cohesive European system into an incoherent multi-civilizational global one. It can be argued that Bull's portrait was an excessively gloomy one, and that, even to the extent that he was right, his analysis is now dated.

There are several reasons for thinking that international society is in fairly good shape by the standards of most of this century, and that the trends are improving ones. Most basic is the near-universal acceptance of the territorial state as the fundamental unit of political

legitimacy. Except for Islam, all of the universalizing political ideologies have been firmly nationalized. As the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated, even Islam is heading in that direction. Mutual recognition of sovereignty is the system norm, and the number of serious boundary disputes – perhaps the major source of international insecurity in an anarchic system – is declining as the now universal state system settles down.

In theory, the state system can be a stable depository for the natural diversity of human culture. Provided that there is general agreement on boundaries, the system of sovereign states is well designed to handle the legitimization of relations among diverse social and political cultures. Indeed, given the range and intensity of that diversity as an undeniably dominant historical reality, a system of sovereign states may be the only way of constructing a stable international political order for many decades to come. In such a system, peace can be conceived in terms of 'non-violent conflict culture' (Jahn, Lemaire and Waever, 1987, p. 55). In this conception, peace does not require harmony. Disagreement and conflict are assumed to be part of the human political condition both within and between states, but war is ruled out as a legitimate instrument of policy except for the purpose of defence against a military attack. If international society is strong enough to support legitimate mechanisms for change, then anarchy can become a framework within which international disputes and conflicts can be both carried on or settled without large-scale violence.

In addition to the basic consensus on the state system, it could be argued that three other norms are emerging as major elements of international society. The first is the consensus amongst the major powers that wars between them are no longer a desirable or fruitful way of settling differences. In some of the great powers – most notably the major sufferers of the last war in Europe and Japan – this norm is quite deeply embedded in their societies. In others, it is more a function of nuclear deterrence, and the fear that victory and defeat will be indistinguishable. This norm has emerged with exceptional strength in some regions, notably North America and Western Europe, and for rather different reasons among the ASEAN states (Buzan, 1988b, pp. 12–13). In these regions, the existence of security communities offers micro-demonstrations of what mature anarchy looks like. To the extent that this norm depends on nuclear weapons, however, it raises the divisive and

unresolved question of whether or not nuclear proliferation is desirable as a way of spreading the constraint on the resort to war. The role of nuclear weapons in non-provocative defence is also a matter of controversy (Buzan, 1987a).

The second norm concerns the desirability of market-based economies both within and between states. When Bull wrote, the international system was so deeply divided on this question as to make it the major cause of threats of war involving superpower rivalry. But during the 1980s, market economies moved decisively into a position of intellectual and practical dominance over centrally planned ones, and this took much of the heat out of the Cold War. As the twenty-first century approaches, the international community – or at least the group of major powers at its apex – is beginning to look less ideologically divided than at any time since 1914. As this new norm consolidates, it will spread the benefits of transparency discussed above. It will also weaken, and perhaps even eliminate, the zero-sum ideological divide that was such a powerful driver of the power-security dilemma during the post-Second World War era.

The third norm arises from increasing concern over ecological issues. Because of the nature of the issues, this concern carries with it a strong global consciousness. Changes in the planetary atmosphere affect everyone in a way that distributes burdens and concerns much more evenly than is the case with the longer-running issue of overpopulation. This is an exceptionally useful counterweight to the deeply ingrained societal parochialness that almost everywhere still dominates the human condition. Ecological, or green, consciousness is by no means universal. But its rise has been dramatic, and it looks well set to be ever more widely promoted as the issues on its agenda begin to impact on people everywhere in their daily lives.

All of these norms both reflect and promote interdependence, and on balance might be taken as useful developments towards greater international security.

The shape of international system structure

Historically, power is always very unevenly distributed in the international system. In particular the number of great powers is always measurable in single figures. Great powers, almost by

definition, dominate life in the anarchy because they control the bulk of the capability necessary for action in the system. The number of great powers, usually between two and seven, defines the degree of polarity in the system. Variations in the degree of polarity, especially when the numbers are low, make a big difference to the overall character of relations in the system (Waltz, 1979, chs 5-6). It can be argued that a structural change of this type is fundamentally altering the political conditions of international security as we approach the end of the twentieth century.

There can be no doubt that the bipolar structure is evolving towards a multipolar one. For those European and Asian centres of power temporarily knocked out by the Second World War, the process of recovery has long been complete in the economic sector. As living memory of the war fades away, there is good reason to think that political recovery is now moving into its final stages. The post-colonial rise of new centres of power such as China, India and Brazil is, of course, an open-ended process that will not peak and fade from significance. There is much room for argument about the precise degree to which the system has already become multipolar. Some still think of it as bipolar because of the military superiority of the superpowers. Others see it as tripolar because of the rise of China as a centre of military and political power independent of both superpower camps (Bull, 1977, pp. 200-5). Yet others see it as already multipolar, though mostly in the economic sector where Japan and the European Community play roles in the top rank.

Strong supporters of bipolarity, such as Waltz (1979, chs 7-9), and those who worry about the difficulties of managing a polycentric political economy, will see this development as negative for international security. Others might argue that the merits of bipolarity are more than offset by the intense and immovable hostility that it generates between the two rival superpowers, and that consequently a move towards multipolarity should create an easier international security environment (Buzan, 1987b, ch. 12; 1989b). Among other things, a multipolar system should exhibit lower levels of hostility among the great powers, more flexibility in international relations, more locally based security management, and consequently less competitive intervention in regional affairs and fewer problems with extended deterrence. This debate is not as well developed as it should be, but in my view the trend

towards multipolarity will yield large net gains for international security.

CONCLUSIONS

Is international security possible? In absolute terms, the answer has to be no. There are plenty of facts available to point to the enduring presence of insecurity in the international system, ranging from the threat of accidental nuclear war, and the existence of many local wars, through the wealth of religious and ethnic hatreds, and political instabilities, to the dismal array of economic and environmental catastrophes that afflict many peoples.

In relative terms, the answer is yes. The international system already provides historically high levels of security for many of its states and vast numbers of its people. Many of its main trends are improving ones. There are certainly no grounds for complacency about international security, and given the many contradictions within the concept, some improvements will carry negative side effects. Socialists, for example, might see the triumph of market economies as exacerbating some kinds of security problems whatever other benefits it might have. But there are compelling grounds for optimism that in some vitally important respects the conditions for international security are improving. Anarchy can increasingly be seen not as the source of the security problem, but as the framework for solutions to it.

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Michael Sheehan

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Contents

Acknowledgments

ix	
1	Introduction
5	Realism and Security
25	Security Communities and Democratic Peace
43	<u>The Broader Agenda</u>
65	5 Economic Security
83	6 Societal Security
99	7 Environmental Security
115	8 Gender and Security
133	9 Postmodernism and Security
151	<u>10 Critical Security</u>
169	<u>11 Conclusions</u>
181	<i>Bibliography</i>
197	<i>Index</i>
201	<i>About the Book</i>

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International
Security

ONE

Introduction

The subject of security has been at the heart of the study of international relations for the past fifty years. Its political significance has been enormous during this period. It helped shape the way in which the Cold War was contested by the two superpowers and their allies, and in the post-Cold War era it has remained central to the debates over government policy agendas and the priorities they should reflect. At the same time it has been pivotal to the way the scholars of international relations have thought about the core purpose of the discipline and the location of its boundaries. For many students of international relations, it is the security aspect that makes the study worthwhile, for in the final analysis, the study of international relations is "the art and science of the survival of mankind" (Deutsch, 1968: ix).

"Security" is a term widely used in both the analysis and the practice of international relations. Issues such as war and peace, the balance of power, arms races, arms control, and disarmament have been at the heart of the university discipline of international relations since its inception at Aberystwyth in 1919. Indeed, it can be argued that the central concern with these issues, and particularly with the origins and conduct of war, was both the cause of the creation of the field and the defining core that subsequently enabled international relations to continue to distinguish itself from related disciplines such as history, economics, geography, and international law. Moreover, the concept of security has proven to be an extraordinarily powerful one: "no other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of 'security'" (Der Derian, 1995: 24-25).

It might be expected therefore that, given the traditional academic obsessions with precision and definition, the core concept of "security" would have been analyzed and defined *ad nauseam* over the decades since 1919. Curiously, this has not been the case. Barry Buzan has argued that "security" falls within the category of an "essentially contested concept" characterized by "unsolvable debates about [its] meaning and application" (1991a: 7). Yet it

would be more accurate to argue that, historically, security has patently failed to be subjected to such debate. When thinking about the meaning of security, it is necessary to be very aware of "the conspicuous silences of what is not being said, but is being taken for granted as part of the discourse" (Klein, 1988: 295). The beginning of a genuine debate about security and perhaps its emergence as an essentially contested concept are developments that have only occurred since the early 1980s, to a significant extent as a result of the writings of Buzan himself.

As late as 1975, Richard Smoke could argue that the field had "paid quite inadequate attention to the range of meanings of security" (Smoke, 1975: 259). This was the key point. Despite its willingness to agonize over the possible definitions of other concepts such as sovereignty, limited war, and nationalism, and to explore alternative interpretations, the meaning of "security" was treated as a given. Security theory became based on an unacknowledged consensus about what constituted legitimate knowledge about the social world. This had implications both for the way the subject was thought about, and for the policy prescriptions that could flow from it, and these in turn had fundamental consequences for people in the real world.

During the Cold War period the prevailing Western conception gradually shifted from "national security" to "international security." The former was oriented around the development of policies designed to allow states to increase their military security, either through unilateral force improvements or through membership of alliances. As the Cold War evolved toward the superpower détente of the 1970s, the prevailing terminology was increasingly that of international security. This reflected the belief that in the context of the mutual nuclear hostage relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the massive military capabilities of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, it was necessary to seek ways of enhancing one's own security without necessarily threatening to reduce that of the potential adversary, and to seek also to maintain the overall stability of the international system. For most of this period however, the *content* of security was seen as being fixed—military security against the military power of other states.

Since 1991, security has become a contested concept in international relations in a way that was not the case during the Cold War period of realist hegemony in security discourse. The traditional realist conceptualization has come under sustained attack from a number of directions, both because it was increasingly seen as unsatisfactory in its own terms, and because it was ignoring important aspects of an emerging international policy agenda.

During this period there has gradually emerged a consensus that the classical approach to security is inadequate and that a broader, multisectoral approach to security is preferable to the traditional understanding of seeing security concerns as relating only to issues of militarized relations between

competing states. This is reflected at both the academic and the policy levels. A survey of contemporary international relations literature reveals that it is now conventional for international relations books on development, the environment, gender, and so on, to routinely include a chapter on security, and for books on security to include at least a genuflection in the direction of gender analysis, environmental security, and other features of a wider approach.

International organizations such as the United Nations and NATO now also operate with a definition of security that is multisectoral and embraces the broader agenda, and not just the military dimension. This represents a major change from earlier decades where the emphasis was on force projection, deterrence, and the maintenance of the balance of power. This reflects an increasing recognition by bodies such as the UN that, while the focus on military power during the Cold War was understandable, by defining security in purely military terms and giving it privileged status as "high politics," there was a massive failure to address human suffering in other areas, such as poverty, and a failure to counter environmental degradation.

The debate during the 1980s and 1990s opened up the concept of security to processes of widening and deepening, including exploration of its meaning and application to a broader range of areas. Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen school pioneered the widening aspect, in terms of identifying a number of new domains that it is appropriate to think of in terms of security, such as the economic and environmental realms. Ken Booth, Richard Wynn Jones, and others in turn explored the deepening aspect—that is, the epistemological and ontological implications of an extended security concept.

Critics of the traditional approach were keen not only to see a wider range of issues addressed as part of the security agenda, but also to see them prioritized by governments with the same sense of urgency and the same commitment of national resources that had previously been reserved for the military security sector. This inevitably triggered a profound debate over whether such an expansion of the concept was needed, and in what directions and to what extent it should be taken. The debate was centered on the question of what links certain threats, so as to make it reasonable to assume that they could all be discussed under the common rubric of security. What kinds of threats are simply "problems" deserving government attention and what are specifically "security issues"? Why are some issues "securitized" in this way, while others are not? For the advocates of a much broader approach to security, such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, this process of securitization has a "metatheoretical" function, because it makes clear that what counts as a security issue is always a result of political and social discourse (2003: 86).

There are now a wide variety of ways of thinking about and implementing security in international relations. The purpose of this book is to survey and critique these approaches and to analyze their similarities, differences, and relative utility. The objective is not to produce a final synthesis from the

different approaches. This is ultimately not possible, because many of them are underpinned by epistemological and ontological differences so fundamental that they cannot be reconciled. Rather, the purpose is, first, to bring together for analysis the various traditional and postpositivist approaches, as well as the sectoral studies of security, in order to make possible a deeper understanding of the meaning and political purpose of the concept of security itself.

A second objective is to contribute to the debate about where the boundaries of an understanding of security might lie. Other than realism, all the approaches studied in this book are "critical" in the sense that they critique the traditional approach to security and put forward alternative ways of thinking about and operationalizing the concept. However, by no means all of them represent a fundamental break with traditional realist ways of interpreting the subject. Several embody an approach that engages with a sector in such a way that, while it is capable of being developed in novel and even postpositivist ways, it is equally capable of being discussed in a framework that is little, if any, different from a neoliberal approach. This vulnerability to colonization by neoliberal analysis and policy recommendation means that the multisectoral approach need not necessarily represent a decisive break with traditional security thinking, so that certain sectoral areas, such as the economic and environmental domains, remain battlegrounds between those with very different ways of thinking about security.

The book therefore looks at what meanings have traditionally been attached to security and the implications of various alternatives. Realism and realist-derived approaches are explored both because realism remains a powerful construction for thinking about security and because the various alternative understandings continue to define themselves to a large extent in contradiction to the traditional realist interpretation.

The "broader" agenda is then analyzed, both in terms of its own theoretical origins in the Copenhagen school and by way of the various sectoral approaches to security that have reflected this approach in the economic, social, and environmental domains. The strengths and weaknesses of the postpositivist approaches to security are then examined in terms of their ability to constitute a genuinely alternative form of security analysis. The final chapter draws conclusions about which approach has the most to offer for the study of international security.

TWO

Realism and Security

For much of the twentieth century, realism exercised a hegemonic position in the study of international relations, dominating the analysis and teaching of security at universities, to the virtual exclusion of alternative perspectives. Indeed, the field of security studies has been described as "a child of Machiavellian and Hobbesian realism" (Crawford, 1991: 292). Outlining the key elements of the realist approach is necessary both to contrast it with the postpositivist approaches examined in later chapters, and also in order to identify the degree to which realist thinking can be, and often is, present in the approach represented by the "broadened" security agenda.

During the long domination of academic international relations by realism (approximately from the late 1930s to the late 1970s), the working definition of security was a strictly limited one, which saw its nature as being concerned with military power, and the subject of these concerns as being the state, so that the concept was routinely referred to as "national security."

These are rather large assumptions. Like all other concepts used in human thought, "security" is a social construction. The term has no meaning in itself (Krause and Williams, 1997: ix); it is given a particular meaning by people through the emergence of an intersubjective consensus. Over time the term becomes understood to have a particular meaning, though that meaning may continue to be questioned by some, and may evolve over time, rather than remaining static. A term such as *slavery* for example means the same thing in practice now as it did 200 or 2,000 years ago. But the way we understand it now and the moral standing we give to the institution of slavery are quite different. It is socially unacceptable now in a way that was not true 2,000 years ago.

It is therefore striking and important that the term *security* received so little serious scrutiny in the middle decades of the twentieth century. While its meaning was being treated as obvious and commonsensical, it was in fact the result of specific choices from a range of possible alternative conceptions.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the expression "national security" was coined to describe the area of public policy concerned with the preservation of state independence and autonomy. National security, deemed synonymous with security as such, was seen as being related to the need for states to maintain their political independence and freedom of national decisionmaking. The instruments for pursuing this objective included the armed forces, the diplomatic service, and the intelligence services. In addition, other levers of influence could be brought to bear, such as a state's economic strength or the symbolic strength represented by cultural influence. However, diplomacy and conventional warfare were seen as the primary means by which states sought to protect themselves from the threat represented by the armed forces of other states. During the Cold War, "deterrence" of nuclear and conventional attack through contingent threats of nuclear retaliation was added to the repertoire of the nuclear weapon states and their alliance systems. This was a clear, straightforward, and limited approach to security. That which needed to be secured (the object of security) was the state, and the mechanism by which security would be achieved was the manipulation of military capability in relation to actual or potential adversaries. David Baldwin argues that security was not what Cold War security specialists were actually interested in. Their focus was on military statecraft and they saw as security issues only those for which military statecraft was relevant (1997: 9).

This was a very narrow and limited way of thinking about security. It underpinned decades of military confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, in which governments based their policies of deterrence upon contingent threats to incinerate the civilian populations of the opposing alliance. It was an interpretation that denied to the vast majority of the world's population the resources and attention from governments that might have dramatically improved their quality of life.

While it is true that for most of the Cold War period this conception of security was not successfully challenged from within the mainstream academic and policy communities, it is not true that there were no such challenges at all. Attempts to explicitly or implicitly broaden the approach to security were made during this period, and significantly these included efforts made by scholars working within an essentially realist approach to the study of international relations.

An early treatment of the subject was made by the realist Arnold Wolfers in 1952. Wolfers made a crucial distinction between objective and subjective security, the absence of threats to acquired values as against the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. Wolfers also made the point that the realist conception of security was no less idealistic than conceptions proposed by its critics, since "the demand for a policy of national security is primarily

normative in character" (1952: 483). Demands for a policy of strength based on armaments are no less normative than calls for disarmament or world government. They reflect value judgments and an ordered set of priorities about which social objectives should be pursued, and which should be prioritized terms of government attention and spending. Realist treatments of security and defense policy tend to contrast it with normative claims for value-driven policies or changes in the nature of international relations. Yet traditional security concepts are themselves value-driven, although the values are largely unstated.

This is true for all approaches to security and to policies derived from them. It is never possible for a state or an individual to attain absolute security; there are always threats that may or may not materialize. It is a question of which security threats should be given most attention, and to what degree States and other actors have choices regarding the kind of security they want to achieve, and how much they want, in relation to the resources they have available to pursue it.

During the Cold War the dominant Western paradigm of security with strategic studies was open to the criticism of being ethnocentric and based on a narrow, conservative self-interest. But as the realist strategic analyst Jo Gannett noted in 1975, "for millions of underprivileged in Africa and Asia, support the status quo is to prop up an unjust system. Those who are desperately poor naturally accuse Western states of caring everything for peace at nothing for justice" (cited in J. Baylis et al., 1975: 14-15). This is an important point. The conceptualizations of security prevalent among the key actors of the international system arise from a "specific cultural context: the highly industrialised democracies of the West" (Haftendorn, 1991: 5). Not only a result of a highly specific process of social construction during the middle decades of the twentieth century, but they are also deeply embedded in Western metaphysics.

Indeed, the construction of security generally is crucially influenced by national and regional culture, because these help shape the way actors understand security and the threats they believe exist, and also shape their particular responses to these understandings (Katzenstein, 1996: 1-2). Western metaphysics has constructed a state-based meaning of security that is based upon a particular understanding of the meaning of power and violence. "It is a form of alienated power, power by someone over something or someone else. Security is something imposed by the power of the state and its military organizations" (Dalby, 1992: 105).

Contemporary realism is not a monolithic approach. There are a number of different schools of thought within realism, and these differences can have important consequences in terms of shaping approaches to security. However, there are certain operational assumptions that are common to all the variants of realism.

The realist understanding of international security is structured by specific ideas about the nature of politics at the international level. For realists, the central reality of international relations is that the system is anarchic. That is to say, there is no world government analogous to the national government of states, which can maintain the law, administer justice, and prevent large-scale outbreaks of violence. In a state, the government and legislature define policy, draft and implement laws, establish a system of courts, prisons, and police, and thereby create and maintain a relatively secure framework within which citizens can go about their daily lives. There is a body both responsible for and capable of maintaining a reasonable degree of security within the boundaries of the state. In the international system, however, there is nothing analogous to this body and therefore states are compelled to rely on their own efforts and capabilities to generate national security.

As Alasdair Murray (1997: 184–185) has noted, in classical realism, the existence of anarchy is not part of a materialist explanation of reality, but is an intersubjective construction, the path-dependent result of choices made throughout the historical past. It is therefore, at least in principle, a situation, or an interpretation of that situation, that can be altered by human agency in the future. Hans Morgenthau himself, along with other classical realists such as Herbert Butterfield, believed in the virtue of humanity, eventually widening its conception of community beyond the nation-state.

In the anarchic international environment all states maintain military capabilities for their own defense. In wartime there is a clear military advantage gained from having larger armed forces and superior weapons systems or military doctrine. Other states can use methods such as spying to try to uncover the secrets of potential enemies, but failing that they are forced to estimate as best they can what the true military capabilities of these potential enemies are. When they are not sure just how great the threat or capabilities are, they assume the worst, believing that it is safer to overestimate a threat and plan for it, than to underestimate it and be overwhelmed if it materializes.

This situation gives rise to a fundamental element of realist security thinking, the security dilemma. In the international anarchy, “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend, regardless of intention to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening” (Herz, 1950: 157). States cannot escape the security dilemma; because military power is not inherently defensive, it will always appear offensive to others, regardless of whether or not it is being acquired for offensive purposes.

Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth define the dilemma in terms of the unresolvable uncertainty “that exists in the minds of one set of decision-makers as to whether the intentions of another set are benign or malign” (Wheeler and Booth, 1996: 4). The armed forces of other states in the system always appear to be threatening, and any change in their size or capability triggers a

rise in feelings of insecurity. States cannot be certain about the intentions of other countries and therefore they err on the side of pessimistic caution and shape their policies in relation to the capabilities possessed by other states, rather than in relation to possible intentions. Bradley Klein has called this the grand master narrative of Western strategic discourse, “the Gothic Hobbesianism of a tightly structured, statist ‘state of war’ in which all states find themselves confronting an ineluctable security dilemma” (Klein, 1988: 297).

Robert Jervis also addresses the security dilemma issue, arguing that the “worst-case assumptions” noted above tend to produce self-defeating efforts to achieve national security. This is because, by triggering responses in other states, such efforts tend to produce a rise in subjective and even objective insecurities. The problem is made worse because of the inflexible images that the security dilemma creates. Even a state that wishes to achieve no more than the continuation of the existence of the prevailing status quo “will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor. For this reason others cannot infer from its military forces and preparations whether that state is aggressive. States therefore tend to assume the worst” (1976: 64).

The realist approach tends to take for granted the answer to the question of whether or not such threats arise in an objective reality, rather than being social constructions, “the worst case result of a dialectic between what is observed and what is imagined” (Lipschultz, 1995: 2). Threats are real because realists believe the pursuit of power by states to be “ubiquitous and inescapable” (Smith, 1986: 220), and this generates between states inevitable conflicts of interests that can be mitigated, but that cannot be avoided.

The security dilemma is seen by realists as an “absolute predicament,” and Jervis argues that seen in this light “the central theme of international relations is not evil, but tragedy. States often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation” (1976: 93). This theme of tragedy runs through the work of many of the classical realist writers. George Kennan described statesmen as “actors in a tragedy beyond their making or repair” (1951: 78). The tragedy motif is particularly prominent in the writings of Raymond Aron, because he saw war as a human institution that could not be eliminated and that was in fact legitimate in particular circumstances, notably for the defense of the state. International relations was simultaneously a social and an antisocial environment, and this formulation in turn led him to advocate for statesmen an “ethics of responsibility” characterized by prudence rather than the “ethics of conviction” (Thompson, 1980: 175).

An obvious problem with this logic is that it clearly does not influence all states at all times. The relationships between the United States and Canada, or Norway and Sweden, are not characterized by this kind of paranoid insecurity about the purpose of each other’s armed forces. Stephen Walt (1987), has attempted to refine realism in this regard with “balance of threat” theory. This

approach seeks to modify balance of power theory to explain why states do not always align against the most powerful state in the system. This is because material power balances are not the only consideration; subjective judgments about postures and intentions also come into play. The same is clearly true about security relationships generally, but for the most part the basic assumptions of realism do not allow it to deal easily with these kinds of exceptions to what is considered a general rule.

For many realists, an inevitable effect of the operation of the security dilemma is that there is a clear limit to the degree of interstate cooperation possible in an anarchic international system. Cooperation is limited because of the "dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate" (Mearsheimer, 1990). Because states exist in an environment of intense security competition, they are not generally inclined to cooperate with other states unless there are compelling reasons to do so.

Realism operates with a number of key assumptions. The universe is seen as a collection of facts out there waiting to be discovered. The role of the analyst is to uncover and describe the workings of this reality, not to pass judgment on it, for its central features are seen as timeless and immutable. This is not to argue that realism is therefore unable or unwilling to engage with abstract moral principles or normative issues. On the contrary, much of classical realism has been concerned with precisely this and demonstrates a concern to make clear the conflict between the pursuit of the abstract ideal and an environment characterized by cruel realities (Murray, 1997: 2).

The most important actor in the realist system is the sovereign state, which is governed by rational decisionmakers and institutions. The decisionmakers are obliged to accept the environmental constraints within which the state must attempt to achieve its objectives; "the task of the statesman is to work with such forces, rather than against them" (Thompson, 1996: 144). States are seen as unitary rational actors skilled at calculating the risks and advantages of different policies aimed at amassing power in a dangerous environment.

More generally, it can be argued that many realists operate with a conceptual apparatus put forward in Kenneth Waltz's 1959 book *Man, the State, and War*, in which the key dynamics of international relations are seen in terms of three levels, the individual, the national (or state), and the international. While this was a reasonable way of structuring his study of the origins of war in order to group similar explanations together, as a general explanation of the operation of international relations it is far too limited. Yet many realists have adopted this typology to the exclusion of alternative models of ordering and explanation. Critics see this limitation as having the effect of excluding other possible nonstate forms of security provision, and thereby making it almost impossible to discuss security without taking the state for granted (Dalby, 1992: 106).

Realists share the political perspective that the central purpose of the state is to protect the citizen against internal and external danger. The requirement to defend national interests results in the conception of national security being tied to military strength. The need to ensure state survival is seen as overriding all other policy considerations. Realists see governments and states as operating in terms of a clear hierarchy of issues when it comes to determining and implementing government policy. There are any number of issues to which a government might choose to pay attention and for which it will wish to develop policies—healthcare, agricultural production, reduction of unemployment, construction of transport networks, environmental protection, education, and so on. Defense and national security compose one of these categories. But realists argue that in the hierarchy of issues competing for the attention of government, national security always comes first; it always wins out in the competition for limited governmental resources. This is because it is seen as determining a country's ability to have such a hierarchy in the first place. National security determines whether a state or people are free from foreign domination or occupation. Only if they are free can they take decisions about what their social or political priorities should be. National security therefore has to take precedence over all other issues in order to maintain national independence. Security is a value that states pursue, but the question of how important security is for any collectivity is, and should be, open-ended. Realists, in contrast, foreclose such discussion by allowing the pursuit of security to take precedence over all other possible objectives, and by then defining security in a very specific way.

Realism takes a number of forms, and during the 1990s a version was elaborated that approximated more closely the actual experience of states within the international system. "Offensive" versions of structural realism see security as a scarce resource, which states pursue in a threat-filled environment. So-called defensive realism, however, acknowledges that for many states the external environment may not be necessarily threatening in terms of the traditional state-to-state military agenda. The need to respond to military security threats in the external environment is an unusual occurrence to which states only rarely have to respond. The security dilemma in the international anarchy is therefore not something that all states face at all times, but is rather a contingent and comparatively rare reality (Rose, 1998: 149). Defensive realism does not see security as being in chronically short supply, and therefore neither intense international competition nor war are inevitable features of international relations.

The Struggle for Power

Realists tend to see power politics and international relations as being synonymous. Influence is not power. For realists, it is concrete power that deter-

mines the outcome of international politics, and therefore states seek to maximize the power available to them. While accepting that the urge for power is not the only significant feature of international politics (Spykman, 1942: 7), it is nevertheless seen as the primary motivation of governments. Martin Wight (1979: 29) also noted that the term "power politics" had sinister overtones. It is a translation of the German word *machtpolitik*, meaning "the politics of force." It superseded the older phrase "raison d'état," which implied that statesmen cannot be bound by private morality, that there was a "reason of state" justifying unscrupulous action in defense of the national interest.

When realists use the term "power," they are invariably thinking of military power. Other forms of power (in the sense of mechanisms to produce influence over outcomes) are recognized, but the military is seen as the most important by far, though in the "defensive" realist version it is comparatively less important and forms of "soft" power have correspondingly greater utility and importance. For classical realists and neorealists, however, there is a difference between the perception of domestic and international politics. In domestic politics a wide variety of forms of influence are seen as being effectively at work, but in the international environment the use of force is the crucial weapon of last resort. The possibility of war is seen as a brooding presence in international relations, which no government can afford to discount. Realist calculations about a state's true power, even when they discuss other features such as economic strength, are essentially assessments of a state's capacity to fight wars effectively, or to prevent them from occurring through the deterrent power of its armed forces.

The realist conception of power and its relation to security are located in the idea of the "international anarchy." The latter simply means a world without central government and in principle the implications of this can be theorized in many ways. There is no inevitable logic that decrees that in the absence of world government the operation of a security dilemma is inevitable, and that this will give rise to the frequent use of military force. The absence of a world government has not prevented the development of an international order in which states are able to pursue their objectives peacefully most of the time. For realists, however, international anarchy means a fundamental contrast between a settled and peaceful domestic order and a violent and dangerous international order. Crucially, in this violent, unstructured and external anarchy, it is impossible to construct political community. "As a result, security is ultimately about force and violence, matters over which the state has control, the state being defined in terms of the sole possessor of the right to use violence" (Dalby, 1992: 105).

The traditional realist conception of power is far too broad and undifferentiated, particularly in the writings of early realists such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Power is treated as an end, both ultimate and immediate, and also as a means. But little attention is paid to the question of how a state

chooses which ends to pursue. Classical realists like Raymond Aron argue that states as actors define their goals, which in turn affect the system. Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz believe that the international system structurally imposes goals on states.

In addition, in terms of general theory, realists tend to ignore or at least pay insufficient attention to the circumstances under which particular forms of power might, or might not, be appropriate. Often, "power" is simply said to be what decides the outcome of a particular issue, and the varieties of power and the importance of context are not explored. However, when applying their general theory to particular policy debates, realists have often operated with a more differentiated conception of power. Kennan, for example, advocated a political, not a military containment of the Soviet Union, while Carr noted the importance of economic strength in determining outcomes in certain situations. Nevertheless, it has been military power that realists have normally emphasized.

As an instrument of policy, military power is seen as having a wide variety of uses, including demonstrating strength, breaking up threats, instigating or intervening in civil wars, deterring attack, supporting allies, acquiring territory and resources, subjugating foreign populations, acquiring prestige, and peacekeeping and peace enforcement, among others. Military power is also seen as the shield behind which all the other tools of influence can be wielded, such as diplomacy, economic instruments, propaganda, and so on. The effectiveness of military power is always relative to the situation in which a state is contemplating using it, but nevertheless war and military violence are seen as being rational tools of foreign and security policy. There is a clear recognition of its ultimate reality as the power to control through destruction and killing.

The very range of uses of military power contribute to the operation of the security dilemma. States maintain armed forces for a wide variety of reasons and may select appropriate forces to deal with particular problems. Yet to nervous neighbors it is the overall dimensions of another state's military capability that raise concern, and states are seen as invariably assuming that force buildups are directed against them. During the Cold War, NATO tended to be fixated by the overall size of the Soviet armed forces and their potential offensive capability against Western Europe. What was not always remembered was that a third of the USSR's forces were stationed facing the unstable border with China, while many other divisions were garrisoned in Eastern Europe, rather than threatening the West.

In their conception of the place of war in the international system, realists owe an intellectual debt to Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). In his classic work *On War* (1968), Clausewitz argued that war is part of the social and political totality, differing only in its means from peace. He began by defining war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our

will." For Clausewitz, all wars were the product of the societies that fought them and therefore each age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. War was an act of policy. Policy was the guiding intelligence, war only the instrument. It was subordinate to policy, "a continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of other means." War was politics, and could not be divorced from political life. This was a quite different perspective from that which sees war as the breakdown of order. Realism is deeply rooted in Western metaphysics and modernity. Its approach to the instrumentality of war reflects this, with a Clausewitzian attitude that military violence is simply a tool of state policy, very different from premodern understandings of war as a breakdown of order in the *Res Publica Christiana*. For realists, therefore, security "means a somewhat less dangerous and less violent world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one. Statesmanship involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict" (Donnelly, 2000: 10). Absolute security is unattainable, because the operation of international anarchy does not permit it.

Historical Antecedents

One of the features of realism that distinguishes it from poststructuralist approaches to security is an assumption that the nature of international relations has changed little, if at all, over the millennia. The foreign policy of states is seen as being "characterised by continuity, regularity, and repetition because states are constrained by the international system's unchanging (and probably unchangeable) structure" (Layne, 1994: 10–11). Realists therefore like to lay claim to a distinguished historical pedigree that can be traced back at least as far as the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. Thucydides (471–400 B.C.) was the author of *The Peloponnesian War*, a classic account of the great war between Athens and Sparta. Realists such as Wight and Morgenthau saw the writings of Thucydides as crucial in indicating that recurring patterns of human behavior are identifiable in all historical eras. According to Thucydides, what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta (Wight, 1979: 138). He is seen as the founding father of the realist perspective because the cause of the fear he identifies comes not from humanity's innate nature, but from the nature of interstate politics. To that extent he might be considered more of a neorealist than a realist.

Thucydides himself was not a proponent of naked realpolitik. He rejected the arguments of those who claimed that "might makes right," while recognizing that weaker states will invariably have to concede to the wishes of the more powerful. Instead he argued that those who deserve the most praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they are required to by the situation. Great states-

manship, he felt, consisted in finding ways to reduce the conflict between the good and the prudent. Thucydides is in another sense more a precursor of classical realism than of neorealism, in that he believed that there was a certain continuity in political behavior and that this was explained by a similar continuity in human nature, which "being what it is" makes it possible to understand clearly the past and the future (Thucydides, 1972: 48). According to neorealists, international structure determines decisions, but Thucydides held that neither a state's ends nor its means, nor therefore its choices, could be adequately determined solely through an analysis of international structure. Rational strategic action relied on both domestically and structurally determined attributes.

Classical realism sees behavior as being significantly shaped by "human nature" (Donnelly, 2000: 43–50). There are features of the characters of all human beings that are unlikely to change because they have proven to be so long-lasting. They reflect basic human needs. Thompson argues that these are the result of a basic human need for power and security that exists at all levels, down to the parents who assert themselves over their child in defense of an authoritative value system (Thompson, 1996: 89). Neorealism posits different but equally effective constraints through the structures that compose the international system, compelling states to pursue balance of power policies in order to survive (Waltz, 1979: 113).

The realist approach sees the world as anarchical and as dominated by a struggle for power and security against the military capabilities of other states in the system. This approach is sometimes described as Hobbesian, incorporating the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century philosopher and scientist, as another key figure in the realist historical pantheon. Hobbes described the state as essential, because without it there are "no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 1946: i, xiii). For Hobbes, the citizen looks to the state to provide protection against domestic and foreign threats. Hobbes himself emphasized the dangers arising from domestic turmoil within a country, but modern realists, while embracing Hobbes within their pantheon, have emphasized external military threats from other states, which seems to suggest an assumption "that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous than threats arising within it" (Ullman, 1983: 133).

Classical realism is rooted in a particular conception of human nature, seeing it as destructive, selfish, competitive, and aggressive. Thus for John Garnett, "the realists take exception to those who put too much faith in human reason, to those idealists who refuse to recognise the world as it is, and who talk in pious platitudes about the world as it ought to be." Although Garnett stresses that this acceptance does not necessarily imply approval of such a world, he notes that "a student may be forgiven for seeing pessimism, even

cynicism, in realist writing, and perhaps even a detached observer would detect in it a note of quiet satisfaction at the predicament of mankind" (1975: 11). In this respect, one influential realist described realists as "the children of darkness" (Herz, 1950: 159).

Certainly, realists tend to be conservative in outlook, to see the sovereign state as the norm in international relations, to see *realpolitik* as inevitable, and to be dubious about the possibility of overcoming the security dilemma (Garrett, 1975: 9–10). John Herz, for example, declared that "realist thought is determined by an insight into the overpowering impact of the security factor and the ensuing power-political, oligarchic, authoritarian, and similar trends and tendencies in society and politics, whatever its ultimate conclusion and advocacy" (1950: 158).

The worldview of this perspective is based on a rigid distinction between inside and outside. Outside, the environment beyond the state's boundaries is marked by a variety of dangers, and violence is unsanctioned. Inside the state, the government provides the necessary degree of security, and is the sole legitimate wielder of force. Therefore, except in the unusual circumstances of rebellion or civil war, the main threats to security come from beyond the state's borders. Since conflict is seen as a natural and inevitable feature of international relations, the assumption is that states will always seek to increase their power and capabilities if the opportunity to do so presents itself. Power vacuums need to be immediately filled, otherwise other states in the system will take advantage of the opportunities and thereby reduce the security of one's own country. Security inside, within the territorially bounded community, means guarding against dangers outside. State sovereignty is based on Weberian claims of the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force and this has the effect of marginalizing other expressions of political identity (Peterson, 1992: 31).

Bradley Klein has called this realist tendency, to project contemporary conceptual models back in time, "chrono-centrism" (1988: 296). Contemporary categories are seen not as contingent perceptions molded by the myriad factors that shape thought in a particular era, but as transcendental principles, which can be identified throughout human history in all times and all places.

Neorealism

In discussing the "realist" approach to security it is necessary to note the distinction between classical realism and neorealism (also known as "structural realism"). The worldviews of both forms have much in common, but there are also significant differences.

One fundamental difference lies in the determining factors of the security dilemma. Classical realists such as Morgenthau saw this as originating in a flawed human nature, which was power-seeking and prone to violence. For

Morgenthau there were biological and psychological compulsions, "to live, to propagate and to dominate [that] are common to all men" (1948: 16–17), a view shared by Reinhold Niebuhr (1932: 18–19, 23).

One obvious philosophical problem with this assumption is that, if human nature is a constant, then how does one explain variations in international political behavior? The same unchanging human nature is presumably responsible not only for the international reality marked by competition, arms races, and war, but also for those areas of the world and periods of history characterized by cooperation and peace. The same human nature held responsible for the outbreak of world wars in 1914 and 1939 was operating in peaceful years such as 1924 and 1989. The classical realist view as an explanation of human political behavior is patently flawed, leading a later generation of realists to seek an alternative grounding for their explanations of international behavior.

Dissatisfied with the flaws in the "human nature" explanation, structural realists, beginning with Kenneth Waltz in 1979, argued that the explanation for the security dilemma lay instead with the structure of the international system and the patterns of behavior it compelled states to fall into. This explained the striking similarities in defense and foreign policy behavior displayed by states with very different political systems and ideologies, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Waltz, in surveying the long history of international relations, felt that it was characterized by recurring patterns and repetitive events. He explained this in terms of the systemic constraints operating on all states. These constraints were seen as being so powerful that they overrode the intentions of individual state actors. Structural realists believe that states and statesmen are virtually powerless to alter the system in which they find themselves.

Like classical realists, structural realists believe that the fundamental feature of the system is anarchy, the absence of any central control. They also believe that the primary objective of states is survival. Because the system is an anarchy, it does not provide individual states with protection or help. This, together with the belief that there is no international harmony of interests and that there is a capacity for evil and desire for power present in at least some human beings, "reinforces the system argument: not only do states not have protection, they are also in danger and so need it" (Taylor, 1978: 130).

Waltz argues that in this kind of system, governed by the principle of self-help, the units are compelled to be functionally alike—that is, alike in terms of the tasks they pursue, rather than in terms of their size or capabilities. States are forced by the realities of the system to acquire security through their own efforts. They can do this either by building up their own military strength or by developing clever strategies that will give them advantages over the other states in the system. They can join alliances and work to strengthen them, and they can act to weaken opposing alliances. This necessity to conform to the

realities of the international system structure justifies the particular ordering of state priorities in the security field. For realists, it makes possible a better understanding of *why* rational policymakers "may make seemingly irrational commitments of scarce resources to armies and weaponry at the same time that manifest human needs go unmet" (Lieber, 1991: 6).

Not all structural realists believe that the existence of the international anarchy inevitably drives states toward competition and war, and ensures that any international cooperation will be "tenuous, unstable and limited to issues of peripheral importance" (Weber, 1990: 58–59). Charles Glaser, for example, argues that competition is not an inevitable consequence of realism's assumptions, but rather that structural realism predicts that there will be circumstances where a state's best security strategy will be cooperation rather than competition (1994–1995). For Glaser, cooperative policies can be seen as an effective example of a self-help strategy under certain conditions.

There is an important sense in which the terms "neorealism" and "structural realism" are seriously misleading; in fact, the post-1979 approach is different from classical realism in so many ways that it is not truly realism at all, but a different approach entirely, albeit sharing certain features. This is significant in terms of the relationship between realism and other approaches to the subject of security, where classical realism, while very different in outlook from the neorealist approaches, nevertheless shares some crucial features.

Murray (1997), for example, has made a powerful case for the argument that classical realism represents a strongly normative approach to international relations in which the current international structures and processes are seen as being contingent and, to an important extent, path-dependent. Morgenthau, while stressing the idea of the national interest in his work, argued that "in the absence of an integrated international society, the attainment of a modicum of order and the realisation of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realising moral values within the limits of their power" (1952: 38). In other words the state serves as the receptacle for these values only in the absence of a higher order based on universally accepted moral principles.

The key feature for neorealists is that states must adopt the prevailing "best practice" or fail. As states adopt successful strategies "others will emulate them or fall by the wayside" (Waltz, 1979: 178). As states copy each other's successful practices, a balance of power emerges. Thus the international order is governed by balance of power politics. Waltz argues that the two basic elements of the system, international anarchy and states that wish to survive, are all that is required to generate balance of power politics. Whether actual balances will appear will depend on a number of different factors. What neorealism predicts is not so much finished balances of power, which are inherently difficult to sustain over very long periods, but rather the process of balancing.

■ Balance of Power

The balance of power is central to realist conceptions of international security. According to Morgenthau, "the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status-quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power, and to policies that aim at preserving it" (1978: 173). For Morgenthau, the balance of power system was not only inevitable, but also an essential stabilizing factor in international relations.

Realism sees states as existing in a highly competitive and dangerous environment in which they must do whatever is necessary to survive. States are therefore forced to play the balance of power game. This systemic pressure is fundamental to the neorealist account of balance of power put forward by Waltz (1979: 118).

However, although fundamental to both classical realism and neorealism, balance of power is seen quite differently in the two approaches. In the classical account, balances occur because of the consciously directed policies of the governments of the states that make up the system, which do not wish the system to be dominated by a single state or alliance that would be in a position to dictate to them. For Waltz, however, it is an error to suppose that if a balance of power is to come into existence, the states must act so as to create one. In the neorealist conception, balances of power form *despite* the efforts of the component states, which are in fact seeking to maximize their power and even achieve hegemony over the system, but their simultaneous efforts to do so effectively cancel each other out. In the neorealist logic, "if a state is to succeed, it has little choice but to make the acquisition of power its central, immediate aim" (Taylor, 1978: 122). Even Morgenthau believed that, in reality, what states were seeking was not "a balance or equality of power, but a superiority of power on their own behalf" (1978: 227).

In this calculation of power, it is military power that is being envisaged by realists. The early realist E. H. Carr argued that the military instrument is fundamentally important, that "the ultima ratio of power in International Relations is war. Every act of the state in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use" (1946: 109).

Moreover, war is seen by virtually all writers on the balance of power as a fundamental instrument for achieving and defending such a balance. The prevention of war has not generally been seen as a purpose of the balance of power. The goal has been to prevent the domination of the system by one state or alliance, using war as the mechanism to achieve that end whenever necessary (Gulick, 1955: 89; Liska, 1957: 38; Wright, 1979: 184). Even preventative war can be justified using balance of power logic (Liska, 1957: 34). That logic can also provide a rationale for frequent resort to war. A "balance" of

power is an objective, but for a wide variety of reasons a permanent balance is an impossibility. International relations is characterized by change. Power is therefore never permanently balanced and the states in the system must be continuously engaged in the balancing process in order to prevent the emergence of an irresistible hegemonic power. It is a system that, critics argued, led to "innumerable and fruitless wars, a cause of infinite contention and bloodshed" (Luard, 1992: 16). In many ways, balance of power theory is central to the realist explanation of international security, and the explanation of international relations generally. Waltz insisted that, "if there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it" (1979: 117).

Balance of power is not synonymous with realism. It is a modernist and rationalist theory, but it can be explained within a liberal or neo-Grotian framework as well as within the realist perspective. In the Grotian perspective, the international equilibrium was not a crude military balance, but rather represented an approximate equality of capabilities between the leading states such that none could dominate the others, thereby enabling the "social" aspects of the international system to operate, such as international law, mediation, a balance of threats and dignities, and the pursuit of limited foreign policy objectives. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, the balance of power concept always involved more than just the minimalist commitment to oppose hegemony. It had a positive, normative connotation as well, standing for the commitment to the idea of the states of Europe forming a society, however rudimentary. Nevertheless, in its more conservative conceptualization, balance of power is at the heart of realist understandings of international relations.

The realist approach to the instrumentality of war has also been fundamental since the emergence of the approach in the 1930s. Carr, for example, strongly criticized the idea that states share a common interest in peace, so that any state that disturbs the peace is both irrational and immoral (1946: 51). Carr identified another realist precursor in Machiavelli. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli argued that the "main foundations of all states . . . are good laws and good arms" (Williams, 1992: 48) and that a prince should have no other aim or thought except the prosecution of war, its organization and discipline. Machiavelli viewed conflict and preparations for conflict as the norm, rather than as being exceptional. History was the repetition of cause and effect and conflict was the motive force. The security of the state was seen as justifying any means to achieve that end. Machiavelli's "realism" reflected a belief in the immutability of the security dilemma.

In the era of Western thought dominated by realist thinking on international relations, there also emerged a dominant technocratic discourse of strategic policy study. The purpose of this body of thought was the maintenance of the power structures and social order of the West. Strategic deterrence, counterinsurgency, military intervention, terrorism, crisis management,

and so on, fitted into a worldview that believed that "a prevailing international structure of tightly bonded sovereign states is the preferred norm for world order. Challenges to that structure, whether by way of popular social resistance or revolutionary violence, are thereby relegated to the status of aggressive acts against a rational world order" (Klein, 1988: 300).

Realism focuses on state-to-state violence. It is "the occurrence of war, the use of mass, organized violence as a method for resolving conflict among states, that concerns us here" (Lieber, 1991: 248). However, in the 1990s, major armed conflicts tended to be intrastate rather than interstate. Of fifty-seven major armed conflicts from 1990 to 2001, only three were interstate (SIPRI, 2002: 63). Some authors went further to suggest that recent wars were non-Clausewitzian, that they lacked political objectives (Snow, 1996: 26).

Geopolitics

Neorealism operates at a high level of abstraction. In pursuing the goal of parsimony, Waltz ignored or underplayed any features that were problematic for the theory. This was achieved by simply relegating inconvenient aspects to the unit level of analysis and explaining everything in terms of the operation of the structural level. The unit level is made "the dumping ground" for anything that cannot be otherwise explained in the theory (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 746). The theory does not allow for structural change, and even the fall of communism in Europe and the end of the Cold War are not seen as representing change in terms of the "deep structure" of the theory. In the sense that realism prides itself on a workable engagement between theory and practice, neo-realism is barely "realist." Nevertheless, it lends itself to broad generalizations about international security.

A politically influential security perspective reflecting the abstract structural realist worldview is geopolitics. Geopolitics as an approach is inextricably linked to Halford Mackinder, who outlined it in "The Geographical Pivot of History," published in 1904. The geopolitical approach stresses that "political predominance is a question not just for having power in the sense of human or material resources, but also of the geographical context within which that power is exercised" (Sloan and Gray, 1999: 2).

Geopolitics attempts to dramatically simplify international politics by reducing it to the struggle for control of a limited number of key areas. Although the geopolitical approach enjoyed a measure of popularity in the three decades after Mackinder's publication, the limitations of his ahistorical generalizations meant that it remained a minority perspective and was brought into disrepute from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s through its close association with the Haushofer school and the Nazi Party in Germany.

During the Cold War period, balance of power and geostrategic reasoning were dominant approaches and there were clear geopolitical overtones in

the reasoning behind the construction of the NATO alliance in the 1940s. From the early 1980s onward, however, a number of influential scholars in the United States could be identified with a reemerging geopolitical approach. Notable among them were Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, who served as the national security advisers to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Richard Nixon, and Colin Gray. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union encouraged an effort to define the new geopolitical realities by this emerging school. For Sloan and Gray, geopolitics attempts to draw attention to the way in which location, space, and distance influence the projection of political power and to restore geography to a central place in the study of strategy and security.

Geopolitics attempts to link historical causation with spatial relationships. However, geopolitics is not just about the relationship between geographical space and international politics. In an important sense it is also about the creation and consolidation of the domestic political identity of the key units in international relations. Geopolitical discourse operates by envisaging a dangerous external reality that can be contrasted with the internal stability and absence of threat associated with the Hobbesian realist worldview. In this sense it is also about "creating the political identity of the domestic community" (Dalby, 1992: 107), and is a natural extension of the realist conceptualization of international relations and security.

Mackinder believed that while the geographical environment does not define the choices of decisionmakers, it nonetheless provides an important, if not conditioning, influence. However, Mackinder himself warned against the temptation of geographical determinism, arguing that the balance of power at any particular moment was "the product on the one hand of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, on the other hand of the relative numbers, virility, equipment and organisation of the competing peoples" (1904: 437).

Geopolitics as an approach has always been controversial, attracting fierce critics, even from within the realm of realism itself. Morgenthau argued that geopolitics was an example of the "fallacy of the single factor," attributing overriding importance to a single variable, to the detriment of all others. For Morgenthau, geopolitics was "a pseudo-science, erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power and hence the fate of nations" (1978: 164). However, Barry Buzan argued that in the 1980s the study of international relations had lost sight of the importance of geography in its search for abstract generalizations, and that this was something that clearly needed to be remedied. In classical geopolitics and in security complex theory the geographical element is crucial, because the sense of "threat" is crucially shaped by geographical distance and terrain.

Despite the criticisms, the geopolitical approach has been extremely influential for half a century. As the Cold War began, Mackinder's concepts

played a vital part in the Western conceptualization of the communist military threat and the geostrategic policy of "containment." All the post-1945 presidents had an overarching vision of U.S. national security that was explicitly geopolitical and directly traceable to Mackinder's heartland thesis, that the great power that dominated Eurasia would effectively dominate the world. The approach remained influential through the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The popularity of the approach lies in its promise of simplifying the complexities of the world down to certain transcendent truths about strategy and this makes it particularly congenial to a neorealist approach to international security.

Conclusion

Realism operates on the basis of a limited number of key assumptions, about the nature of the international anarchy, the central role of the state as international actor, and the primacy of military power as an instrument of state policy in the international context.

The end of the Cold War accelerated a number of changes in the structure of international relations. The membership of the state system altered, but in addition the role of the global market economy became more significant. The process of globalization and the effects of the information revolution meant that states found it increasingly difficult to deal with the new nonterritorial security problems through traditional state-centered responses.

During World War II and the Cold War the evident militarization of international politics and the domestic disciplining of the frontiers of debate that accompanied it ensured that realist security discourse exercised a hegemonic role in the practice and analysis of international relations. However, from the early 1970s onward the evolution of international politics increasingly exposed the limitations of the realist approach in understanding, explaining, and generating effective solutions to an increasing range of problems emerging onto the international agenda. Despite the renewed Cold War in the early 1980s, these dissatisfactions with existing concepts triggered a radical reevaluation of the concept of security. But even prior to this reevaluation, contributions to the study of international security had generated substantial research arguing that security and insecurity were to a very large extent socially constructed. Particularly influential in this regard were theories on security communities and democratic peace.

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desecuritization of relations, moving conflicts into civil political society, the realm in which problems may be resolved and there is space for non-state actors to play important roles.⁹¹ As Buzan describes this view, 'The ideal world is not one in which everyone successfully achieves security, but one in which there is no longer any need to talk about security.'⁹²

There is, as indicated in the overview presented in this chapter, a considerable range of approaches to the study of international relations. There is much argumentation and dispute in the field about the relative merits of the various approaches. The study of international relations is deeply divided, and so is the study of security as a consequence. This book will now proceed to examine in turn the major categories of thought on security studies.

2

Traditional Views of Security in International Politics

The dominant schools of thought about international relations in the second half of the twentieth century have been realism and neo-realism. Realism dominated theory and practice after the Second World War when an influential group, including Morgenthau, Aron, Neibuh, Kennan, Herz and Wight, produced major texts.¹ They styled themselves as 'realists', willing to look at the world as it was rather than as they would like it to be. Beginning in the late 1960s, the theoretical foundations of realism were subjected to critical questioning on a number of grounds and neo-realism emerged in part as an outgrowth of this. In 1979, in an attempt to identify and elaborate a scientific basis for the study of international relations, Kenneth Waltz published *Theory of International Relations*, in which he developed a structural explanation for the logic of power politics. In the 1980s Waltz's book generated a critical literature and attempts by others to apply his theory so as to develop and refine his ideas. Neo-realism has greatly expanded since then in influence and today is seen by many as the dominant theoretical paradigm. Mearsheimer goes so far as to argue that it is the only theory of international relations with significant explanatory power.²

Realism and neo-realism are related yet different. Waltz accepts that he is a neo-realist but would object to being characterized as a realist, for he sought to distance himself from the older traditions of realism, what many now term 'classical realism'. There are also some clear similarities between realism and neo-realism, especially in many of their

key assumptions. Neo-realism can be seen as an important contribution to a coherent tradition of thought going back through Hobbes and Machiavelli to Thucydides. Classical realism and neo-realism are not the only ones to claim this distinguished lineage. In the 1990s a number of writers have put forward an alternative to these two 'realisms' in the form of 'structural realism'.³ Nor do these perspectives encompass all the variations which can legitimately lay claim to the realist tradition. When one includes its variations, realism is a broad theoretical church, quite ecumenical in scope and detail.

In this chapter, we focus on realism and neo-realism⁴ and address neo-liberalism/neo-institutionalism. We do not, however, try to identify and sharpen their distinguishing features; rather we try to blend realist and neo-realist perspectives in order to emphasize what they have in common. In conflating the two perspectives we can be accused of oversimplification, of glossing over important distinguishing features and nuances. But our purpose is not to explain and elaborate fully the two perspectives and how they can be used. Our concern is security and what these perspectives indicate about this concept. Both perspectives have security as their primary concern, and their approach to security derives ultimately from their common assumptions about the world, from what we call the 'realist world'.

The Nature of Realism and Neo-Realism

Classical realism arose from the effort of a number of writers to develop a theory of international relations that would explain state behaviour. They recognized that the study of history could usefully illuminate how political actors behaved. The point of their historical inquiry was to delineate the important determinants of political behaviour in the past which were not situation-dependent, that is, which could be seen to have applied throughout history. They ultimately identified a number of perennial factors; in particular they isolated and focused on 'power' as a key variable in political behaviour and central in the development of international relations.⁵

The starting point of realism is the nature of the international system. Political groupings – tribes, city-states, kingdoms,

empires or states – exist and interact in an international system that can be characterized as anarchic. 'Anarchy' in its common usage implies chaos and disorder, but this is not what is meant; when analysts label the international system as anarchic, rather it is that there is no overriding authority or government to discipline the interaction of its constituent parts. Each constituent unit – in the modern era the state – is autonomous, exercising sovereign authority over its own affairs. In this sense, the international system is quite different from typical domestic political systems where the state, whatever its nature, regulates – with the power to enforce those regulations – the interaction of individuals and domestic groupings. The international system has no governing system with enforcement power to regulate the behaviour of states.

The fact that the international system is anarchic has significant implications. To say that each state is autonomous or sovereign is not to say that states can do as they please, that they are free of others' influence or that they are able to get what they want. States are constrained, particularly in their external behaviour, by the effects of other states' actions. To say that each state is autonomous, or sovereign, is to say that it is the final arbiter of what constitutes its interests and decides for itself how best to achieve those interests, how best to cope with the internal and external problems it confronts. Each state, then, is free to pursue its internal and external ends as it sees fit.

In pursuing these, however, a state's actions may conflict with the objectives of another state. In an anarchic system by definition there exists no reliable process of reconciling conflicting interests, as there is no overarching authority with the power of enforcement. A state may negotiate a solution to such conflicts, or seek accommodation, but it may also resort to force to secure its interests. The requirements for state action are imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist, that is, the lack of security given via law and institutions, so all states are faced with the constant possibility that any state may, at any time, use force to achieve its ends. The possibility that force will be used when states' interests conflict looms always as a threat, if only in the background. As a consequence, if they are to be secure all states must be constantly ready to counter force with force. Wars and the constant

possibility of wars make the anarchic international system, as Hobbes put it, a 'war of all against all'.⁶

That political groups or states often have conflicting national objectives, which might lead to war due to the nature of the system, is an important precept underpinning realism. Realism assumes that there is no essential harmony of interest amongst states. Realism also asserts that, unlike a domestic system where groups can resort to a higher authority to resolve conflicts, the international system is characterized by self-help,⁷ states ultimately can only rely on their own efforts to keep safe. Because any state may resort to force, all states must be prepared to do so; otherwise they are at the mercy of militarily stronger neighbours. As a consequence, the capabilities of states for using force are crucial to the outcome of international conflicts and for one state's ability to influence another state's behaviour. It is not the intentions of other political actors which are important, for actors may not know themselves what their intentions are or may readily change them, but the capabilities for force they have at their disposal. Thus, for realists, the key independent variable in shaping, and thus for understanding, international relations is the notion of capabilities, or power, particularly military and militarily relevant power.⁸

Realism further assumes that certain largely immutable factors such as geography and human nature affect international conduct. Realists generally agree that a state's location affects its national capabilities and its foreign policy orientation. Owing to geography some states are more vulnerable to attack and occupy more strategically important areas than others. Geography also affects the resources readily available to states, as position determines climate, the ability to grow crops, and the natural resources which can be transformed into economic and military capability. Hence, geographic, demographic, resource and geopolitical factors are central to realist theory.⁹

Another central factor is human nature. Realism assumes that human nature is constant or at least not easily altered. The propensity to engage in conflict cannot be changed, and the task of the statesman¹⁰ is to fashion a political framework within which it can be contained. But the frameworks and associated resources to contain conflict found in domestic politics are largely unavailable. As a consequence, realists emphasize distinctive international regulatory mechanisms,

particularly a balance of power, as the primary means of minimizing conflict and war.¹¹

Realists further assume that moral principles in the abstract cannot be applied to international political actions, because moral principles are artefacts of an established political framework and supporting authority structure. The criterion for judging a particular policy in international relations is whether its political consequences serve and preserve the needs and interests of the state. Pursuit of national interest is therefore governed by a morality quite different from that for individuals in personal relationships. The primary responsibility of statesmen is the survival of the state, and to confuse individual morality with a state's morality is to court disaster. Realists do not insist a state's policy cannot be moral, only that notions of morality understood as applying to individuals must be subordinate to the survival of the state and its people and the furtherance of the national interest.¹²

Power is the central notion that informs realist thought. Robert Strausz-Hupe perceived international relations as being 'dominated by the quest for power' and that 'at any given period of known history, there were several states locked in deadly conflict, all desiring the augmentation or preservation of their power'.¹³ Frederick Schuman argued that each nation-state 'necessarily seeks safety by relying on its own power and viewing with alarm the power of its neighbours'.¹⁴ Hans Morgenthau defined international politics, like all politics, as a 'struggle for power'. He further conceptualized power as both a means and an end, states use power to secure their interests, so their primary interest is to secure more power.¹⁵ If states depend on power for their existence, and achieve their national objectives through the application of power, then the management of power is the main problem to be solved in international affairs, which is why realism is often characterized as being about power politics.

The foregoing explanation is, in some ways, a simplification. There are many differences amongst realists regarding the details of realist theory and its implications. But realists agree on the central assumptions that inform classical realism.

Neo-realists argue that earlier theories used notions such as environment, situation, context and milieu which were too vague and variable to be useful. Realist theory, as originally

34 Traditional Views of Security

conceived, was inadequately scientific. To put international relations on a sounder theoretical basis, neo-realists focus on system structure, defined by the arrangement or ordering of the parts of the system. Structure is concerned with how units (states) stand in relation to each other, how they are arranged or positioned, not on how they interact. Kenneth Waltz argued that focusing on the structure of the system was the most fruitful basis for constructing theory. Emphasizing structure permits abstracting from, or leaving aside, the characteristics of units, their motivations and their interactions. Waltz delineated a three-tiered definition of structure: the organizing principle of the international system; plus the functional differentiation of units; plus the distribution of capabilities across units.¹⁶

The first question to answer in determining structure in a system is: what is the principle by which the parts are arranged? Domestic systems are hierarchically ordered in that units in domestic political activity, institutions and agencies stand in relation to each other in a superior or subordinate manner. The international system is not hierarchically ordered; it is anarchic. The key to understanding this anarchic system is recognition that each state can, in the end, depend only on itself to ensure its survival. The aims of states are endlessly varied but survival is a prerequisite for attaining any of them. This does not preclude the possibility that some states may value something higher than survival, and states may act with imperfect knowledge; but they can be expected to act to ensure their survival, or act in ways that do not endanger it. Structure is not an existential force; a structure that rewards behaviour that conforms to what is required in an anarchic system emerges out of the interaction of the constituent units as they take steps to ensure this and punish that which does not contribute to survival. Simply put, the environment is determined by the fact that states prefer survival over any other goal and act relatively efficiently to achieve it.

The second question is: what are the units of the system and their characteristics? In neo-realism the units of interest are states, for states are the dominant actors and it is their interaction which establishes the structure of the international system within which other actors function. States vary widely in wealth, power, size and form, yet they are characterized by

sameness, or being 'like' units. This is because all states, despite variations, perform essentially the same functions and seek more or less the same ends. They are functionally alike, whatever their form, ideology, peacefulness, and so forth, and can be treated as having the same attributes.¹⁷

The third question is: what accounts for variation across the system in terms of structure and outcomes? The answer is that states, though functionally undifferentiated, have quite varied capabilities. This is significant because a structural approach focuses on how states stand in relation to each other, and states are positioned with respect to each other by their power (the ultimate capability). The distribution of power amongst states, measured by comparing the capabilities of a number of individual units, is a systemwide concept. System structure is composed of the most powerful states, for only these determine whether the system is bipolar, multipolar, and so on. Variation in the distribution of power across the system introduces variation in structure. Capabilities, or power, strongly influence the success or failure of a state in its interactions with other, often competing, states; those with greater power are more likely to achieve their ends. The nature of the power relationship amongst states affects their expectations of success or failure. Thus, large changes in relative power across the system constitute a change in the structure, which affects the expectation of how states will behave and of the outcomes their actions will produce.¹⁸

The foregoing is a simplified version of the key elements of neo-realist thought. Subsequent work by Waltz and other analysts has refined neo-realism and has resulted in sophisticated analyses.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the foundation is in the theoretical framework described by critical elements, which may be used to generate other assumptions that help in examining and describing state behaviour. The organizing principle can only change if the international system shifts from anarchic to hierarchic, while key characteristics of the system's units - states - are unchanged as long as the system remains anarchic. In spite of greater interdependence, the growth of international organizations, and a significant increase in the number and influence of transnational non-state actors, the international system remains more or less anarchic. In other words, the ordering principle and the characteristics remain more or less

fixed. Thus, for neo-realists, the key determinant for analysing the international system and the interaction of states within that system is the distribution of capabilities or power across the system, and changes in structure can stem only from changes in this distribution.

Realism and neo-realism are part of the same continuum of political theorizing about international politics. Both have identified two variables – the anarchic nature of the international system and capability or power – as critical to any theory about international affairs, though they vary in how they utilize these variables to develop a theory. In spite of obvious distinctions, they have much in common.

Realists and neo-realists agree, as do other approaches, that the international system is anarchic and that this has important implications for state behaviour. The key to the impact of anarchy is that 'good' behaviour by states and statesmen is never guaranteed. No state can be certain that all other states will behave in a highly pacific fashion and not resort to force, or the threat of force, to have their way.²⁰ The history of international relations makes clear that states can be and frequently are dangerous: to each other, are quite capable of inflicting deliberate physical harm on each other, for whatever reason. States cannot be certain that others will be constrained from resorting to force, and indeed states resist attempts to limit their freedom to act as they see fit.

The result is that states continue to live in an anarchical international system. Indeed, they arguably have reasons to prefer it that way. Even though any state might be willing, under ideal conditions, to curb anarchy in some fashion, in the world as states find it they must live with anarchy and will sometimes go further and take steps that reproduce or sustain the continued existence of anarchy. For example, we might expect that powerful states are more satisfied with anarchy than less powerful or very weak states, because they are better able to fend for themselves and enjoy the fruits of autonomy, and – with some exceptions – this is true. So they behave accordingly, doing little or nothing to erode anarchy. Or, states find that they cannot trust each other enough in trying to agree on co-operative arrangements for many important matters, so they never give up much autonomy – anarchy forces them to be too suspicious to give it up. Hence, the attractions of

anarchy (in terms of the autonomy that is its hallmark) are reinforced, in the sense of promoting its continued existence, by the self-sustaining nature of anarchy in terms of the behaviour it strongly encourages or actually imposes on states. Actions taken in response to, or for coping with, anarchy can undermine efforts at doing away with it.

From a realist perspective, what are the responses to anarchy that have this effect? One is that states are preoccupied with maintaining autonomy, fending off restrictions on their freedom of action, particularly with respect to ensuring their security. States want as much freedom as possible to avoid being drawn into circumstances that could cause them great harm. They want as much freedom as possible to take the actions necessary to keep safe. They suspect that collusion with others on these matters might be dangerous because those others will, out of a desire for autonomy, be reluctant to restrict their freedom of action sufficiently, especially in a crunch.

Another response to anarchy is a preoccupation with the accumulation of power, particularly the capacity to use force. Since power is relative, and considered vital for security, states constantly attend to their relative power with respect to other states.²¹ In doing so, of course, they reinforce anarchy. Still another response to anarchy is the active contemplation of using force on behalf of the state's purposes should circumstances require it, taking advantage of the lack of constraints on the use of force under anarchy, and being aware that others are also likely to try to take forceful advantage of this condition for their own purposes. Finally, on some occasions states actually use force to achieve their goals.

They do all these things because they live under anarchy in a system where they have significant capabilities for doing physical harm and there are insufficient restraints on using them. If all states were basically weak, their security would not really be much of a problem. The problem is acute because there is an uneven distribution of capabilities within the system; some states have more power than others, sometimes considerably more, which they can use at the expense of the less powerful. And states have no guaranteed assistance if they are threatened or attacked. Hence, anarchy means that, in response, states must do as much as they are able *on their own* to advance their purposes or to keep safe.

As well as concurring on the implications of anarchy, realism and neo-realism also hold a number of assumptions in common about political life:

- 1 The most important actors are groups rather than individuals, especially conflictual groups (tribe, city state, kingdom, empire), it being widely accepted today that the most important group in world politics is the nation-state.
- 2 International affairs are essentially conflictual.
- 3 The prime motivation in political life is power (in that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power) and security.²²

These assumptions form the basis of the realist tradition, provide the foundations of what can be called the 'realist world'.

Security in the Realist World

In the view of realists/neo-realists, international relations is fundamentally about power and security in the relations among states.²³ The core of the subject is states, their power and, given the implications of anarchy, their insecurity. All realists hold that the manifestations and impact of power and insecurity are what give international politics, and the field of study devoted to it, a distinctive identity.²⁴ The many other aspects of international relations are regarded as of lesser importance and relevance. It was to assert that this conception most closely accorded with the activity being studied that the label 'realist' was first adopted.

The crux of international politics, indeed its defining characteristic, is *insecurity*. This is what makes it different from other sorts of politics, worthy of separate intellectual understanding. Domestic politics can be fraught with insecurity too but only when this politics is seriously distorted or has deteriorated into an inadequate condition; international politics, however, is normally and consistently insecure. This is the essence of the matter, because nothing else is so important or affects states' behaviour so deeply. A modicum of security (which is always

tenuous) is a prerequisite for everything else that states and societies might wish to pursue.²⁵

To realists power is conceived, at bottom, as resting on the capacity to do physical harm to others; whilst insecurity is defined primarily as being vulnerable to being seriously harmed by others' deliberate use of force.²⁶ Other capabilities are important only in so far as they contribute to the capacity to do physical harm. Assessments of power begin with military capabilities, and only then turn to other capabilities that contribute directly to maintaining and applying military capabilities, then to factors that more indirectly make such a contribution, and so on. The most powerful actors, therefore, are those with the greatest military strength.²⁷

States are the key actors in the realist world because they represent the greatest concentrations of power, especially in having the greatest capacity to use military force to do harm. States are insecure because they often come into conflict, sometimes very intensively, and because they can harm each other in very serious ways. Their power, and the insecurity it produces, dominates their relations. The result is that security is their constant preoccupation.

A possible implication is that states and analysts should give primary attention to determining the causes of conflicts and finding ways to keep them from arising, as the best means to enhance security and reduce the role of power in international politics. Indeed, seeking to understand the causes of war has received much attention. Contributions to this understanding have come from a wide range of fields, from biology (animal behaviourists) through anthropology, psychology, economics, sociology and history to political philosophy. The findings have shed valuable light on why peoples fight. Though the root causes of war are, in the end, extraordinarily complex, they can be clustered into three main categories: the nature of humankind; the nature of the state; and the nature of the international system.²⁸

To realists, however, trying to eliminate war by uncovering its origins is not a promising way to proceed. Political conflict is ubiquitous and cannot be eliminated. The analyst should just assume the existence of serious political conflicts amongst states and proceed from there. But must political conflict periodically result in war, or could warfare be eliminated? As

argued in the previous chapter, realists are deeply sceptical about eliminating war. They note that in the long history of relations amongst actors in anarchical systems – states, empires, tribes, city states – war is a persistent and prominent phenomenon.

What about limitations or constraints on states' ability to do harm to each other? Even if serious political conflicts remained, insecurity would be greatly eased or eliminated if states' capacities and/or willingness to harm each other were seriously, and permanently, curbed. Relations would not then be dominated by competition for, and about the distribution of, power. To realists and neo-realists, however, the available constraints are weak and unlikely to become stronger. They cannot come from human nature. Realists hold that human nature is either constant and hence unalterable to any significant degree, or is a universal background condition and thus cannot explain variation in human behaviour. As a consequence, it can be ignored. This leaves perhaps three possible types of constraint. One has to do with the domestic nature of states and their societies. Another involves states having a propensity or willingness to adhere strongly to norms of behaviour that would make doing harm to each other quite unacceptable. The third would be the existence of a higher authority with the legitimacy and/or capacity to promote and/or enforce peaceful relations. Realists/neo-realists hold that none of these constraints can be expected to work very well, and certainly not consistently.

On the Nature of States and Societies as a Possible Constraint

The first possibility is that states might be naturally peaceful in their outlook and behaviour and so not inclined to war and violent quarrels with each other. If the nature of states and societies was such that they were most unlikely ever to do grave harm to each other (that is, if they were basically pacific communities), they would hardly pose a threat even though they possessed great military power (of course, such communities would be highly unlikely to maintain large military capabilities in the first place). Many analyses of international

politics, past and present, make suggestions to this effect, asserting that democracies or communal states or societies with market economies, etc., are inherently more pacific than others.²⁹

The realists' rejection of this possibility begins with the historical record, which provides abundant evidence that states and state-like entities have frequently engaged in war and have even more regularly conducted their relations in such a hostile, competitive fashion that war was consistently plausible, no matter what their nature.³⁰ States and societies of all sorts have behaved as if war was always a realistic concern. Realists and neo-realists see few examples in history of truly successful co-operation to prevent wars, and even fewer examples when co-operation of this sort was durable, no matter what kinds of state and society were involved.

If we accept this view, then we might just end the discussion at this point. Given the way states behave, international relations is a violence-prone, dangerous arena and thus a realm of pervasive insecurity. It is what it is and we must take it that way, which is what states do. There is no real alternative to worrying about security; analysis must therefore focus on how states manage the problem of insecurity and on how their traditional methods can be better employed.

Much more interesting is to ask *why* states behave as they do. Realists often seem to 'black box' this matter, settling for the assumption that conflict is ubiquitous, but over the years a number of different answers have been offered within the realist perspective or seen implicit in it. A classic view is that power in its various forms, including the capacity to do harm, is its own reward, is something human beings care deeply about and which some will strive mightily to possess.³¹ A closely related view is that power is so attractive because it is a currency which can be readily employed to acquire many other things of great value. In a world of scarcity, there is only so much power, and only so much of other things that power can be used to get, and thus strong conflicts arise.

In any domestic political community politics is therefore a fractious, competitive process. Struggle arises over control of the state, over the power that comes with such control. Political struggle may also arise out of the efforts of those who do not control the state to evade or at least to weaken its power as

it would apply to them. Conflict over power in the domestic realm is often peaceful, constrained by institutional procedures that regulate the struggle for control of the state, but it can at times be violent and dangerous, as can the application of political power once it is attained. The power of the state can be, therefore, both an objective of competition and a means for keeping the process of political competition within bounds as part of providing the basis for sustaining a community. Politics within the international system is simply more of the same in a different arena; international relations is about the distribution of power amongst the main actors in the international system, and at times this politics can be conflictual to the point of violence.

There are other, more elaborate, explanations as to why states behave as they do; but these all lead to the same conclusion, and realists can normally be found subscribing to at least one of them. One explanation is that since human beings are interested in and highly competitive about power, the states they create and operate merely reflect this.³² A second explanation is that though all human beings are not driven to seek power, those who are drawn to politics are innately interested in and competitive about power, and these are the people who end up managing states. A third possibility is that individuals enter into politics with a wide variety of motivations but are soon socialized by their political experiences to be preoccupied with power, and this in turn affects the way they operate states. Which of these three explanations applies is not that important to realists, who hold that they lead to the same result: states in their international relations are singularly interested in and strongly competitive about power and other things of great value that power can be used to obtain.

As a consequence, states and statesmen naturally and inevitably seek to gain and exercise additional power in their dealings with each other. Power is relative; a state can make gains only at the expense of the power of other states. This zero-sum calculus produces competition and strife. There being no equivalent in international relations of a state or higher authority that is able to keep this competition within bounds, it takes the most extreme forms and involves deliberately organized violence. Ultimately, this line of analysis invites the conclusion that states will not consistently be con-

strained by their domestic natures to forgo violence. The lure of power acts to shape the politics of all states, and operates on all states in the international arena.

Closely related to power, the other side of that coin, is *autonomy*. From a realist perspective autonomy is best seen as not being subject to the power of others. Autonomy is therefore widely considered to be its own reward, something of great value in politics. It is related to power in that power can create autonomy, and the desire to maintain or achieve autonomy can be a prime reason for the pursuit of power.³³ (Power and autonomy are not exactly the same thing, since a community could consist of people with a high level of autonomy because they have little power over each other and no powerful state either.) Domestic societies are characterized in part by resistance to the power of the state in favour of the autonomy of the individual or group – the tension between state power and individual or group autonomy is what much of politics is made of.

Given the importance of autonomy, international relations is not hard to explain. Autonomy in the system is its own reward and is pursued by states and statesmen accordingly. Just as in domestic affairs, power can be used to create and sustain autonomy, and the power of other states is feared because it can be used to cancel one's autonomy. The only way ultimately to guarantee one's autonomy would be to have more power than anyone else, either individually or collectively. The ultimate in loss of autonomy is to be subject to the coercion of others, being killed or seriously harmed or being controlled by the threat of harm. Hence strife, competition for power, and insecurity as states strive for the power to enhance autonomy and ward off threats to it are ubiquitous in international politics. In this regard, too, the domestic nature of states does not act as a constraint; the desire for autonomy acts on all states.

Although the realist tradition focuses on states, realists/neo-realists readily embrace the idea that in pursuing autonomy, states often reflect the deepest wishes of their populations, that the desire for autonomy is not simply an artefact of state power. The state is often seen as an expression of the national or ethnic community; its autonomy embodies the nation's freedom from rule by 'others' who are not a part of it. This

makes the preoccupation with autonomy something a state does not just for itself but for those it rules and represents. The lure of autonomy runs deep, and in all sorts of states and societies.

Realists do make one concession to the idea that the nature of states can make a difference. They frequently suggest that a state's behaviour is tempered by whether it is primarily seeking to sustain the status quo or alter it sharply, and a desire to alter it sharply can sometimes be traced to domestic factors and not just the nature of the international environment or a generalized desire for power.³⁴ A collection of states satisfied with the status quo is less preoccupied with gaining power and less fearful about security, allowing more opportunities for co-operation on security and other matters.

On International Norms as a Possible Constraint

International norms or customary standards of behaviour are often perceived as another possible way in which states may be constrained.³⁵ In the realist perspective, the constant desire for power and autonomy makes international norms insufficient constraints. Power and autonomy make states and statesmen naturally and inevitably resist such norms when they are inconvenient and seriously constraining. Scarcity reinforces this tendency. If states are engaged in competition for scarce values of great importance, universally held norms of behaviour that effectively and consistently restrain the competition are unlikely to emerge, and those that do emerge and occasionally act as constraints will not command universal adherence all the time, for what is at stake is too vital. Politics and power are always partially about who gets to determine the norms, to determine which norms take precedence, to determine when and how they apply, and to have the ability to evade them when they are inconvenient. In the absence of any compelling, universally accepted means to arrive at decisions on these things (an effective political process), politics and power too often culminate in struggle and strife, even about norms.

The relationship between norms and power is complex. If politics and power are about who gets to determine the norms,

then the pursuit of power and its exercise can often be facilitated, not simply constrained, by norms.³⁶ Constraining the power of some can have the effect of enhancing the power of others. Even if norms constrain all states equally, those with greater power will always have more ability to establish norms that they like. Those which perceive norms as benefiting others more than themselves will chafe at the constraints. They will seek to change such norms, and those which benefit from them will resist. This dynamic has commonly operated down through the history of international politics. Thus, while the struggle for power may seem antithetical to the establishment of norms and their operation, in many ways it also occurs as a struggle for norms, making them an additional target of competition and strife and an additional source of insecurity for those that lose.

Autonomy seems particularly difficult to reconcile with norms. Norms constrain autonomy. More important, norms of real consequence are those that proscribe states from resorting to force. This makes the development of truly functional norms difficult, for sovereign states have always conceived of autonomy as including the right to use force. One cornerstone of sovereignty has been the control by a state over a particular area and the people within it *by force if necessary*, and legitimately so. A core element of the definition of the state is that within its society it has or can claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In international relations states also claim the right to use force in self-defence, to avoid harm and to preserve autonomy. And they claim the right to decide when forceful self-defence is necessary, and, as part of autonomy, the right to acquire the means to self-defence they deem necessary. It is but a small step to the further claim by the state that it has the right to use force outside its boundaries to protect its other interests. (At one time states even claimed the right to use force whenever and however they wished but, though such a claim is still inherent to states, this is now uncommon.)

There are certainly many instances, frequent now but not unheard of in the past, of concerted attacks on the sovereignty of some states – insistence that they cannot just do anything they please domestically, cannot use an infinitely elastic conception of 'self-defence' to justify the use of force abroad,

cannot acquire any means of self-defence with impunity; and insistence that when they go beyond certain limits, outside interference is justified. Such cases are not inconsistent with the realist perspective. States with great power can use allegedly universal norms, often of their own devising, to justify imposing constraints on others to get results that are in the powerful states' interests, and indeed, it is their power that produces much or all of the success that results. Such states are simply using norms as an extension of their power. What one expects to find, and does find, is that these states do not accept the universality of the norms to such an extent as to cancel *their own* autonomy.

Neo-liberal Institutionalism: On Higher Authority or International Institutions as a Possible Constraint

The third category of possible constraints on states concerns the establishment of a higher authority of some sort with the capacity to promote and enforce peaceful relations among states, or the establishment of supranational or international organizations or institutions in which states agree to abide by sets of rules that limit their freedom. In recent decades international organizations and institutions across the spectrum of state interests have increased dramatically in number. Indeed, expansion in the number of such international organizations is a central component of the neo-liberal institutionalist approach to international relations. The fact that states willingly become members of international organizations and institutions, that they co-operate under the auspices of such organizations and institutions, that states become party to limitations on their power and autonomy, is seen as evidence which challenges some tenets of realism. Whether institutions matter, whether they can mitigate the implications of anarchy, is the subject of considerable dispute between the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist schools. The centrality of this argument makes it worthwhile to provide an overview of the debate between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists.³⁷

In realist thought, states interested in power and autonomy must regard steps towards such constraints, if they are to be

carried very far, as unacceptable *in principle*. A supranational or higher authority would concentrate power in a new place at the expense of states' individual power, and would also subject states and societies to that power at the expense of their autonomy. Realists do not argue that such an authority can never exist. They maintain that states will submit to a higher authority only when it is unambiguously to their benefit, or when forced to do so. In other words, a state subordinates itself only if the benefits outweigh those of not doing so.³⁸

There is another limitation, in a realist world, on raising a higher authority to impose peace and security. States will regard the prospect of this balefully not just out of considerations of power and autonomy in the abstract, but because there cannot be universal agreement on the values the higher authority is to embody or on who should exercise such authority, and when, and how. Disagreement on just such matters is a critical element of politics and the origin of much political competition and strife. And it is not being subject to higher authority that makes peoples, and states, cherish autonomy, because they must fear that without it the values embodied and acted upon by the higher authority could be ones they would not choose themselves (either in the abstract or in terms of their application at any one time).

Another possible constraint on state behaviour could be international institutions. Institutions can be defined as sets of rules that establish the ways states should co-operate and compete with each other,³⁹ prescribing acceptable kinds and proscribing unacceptable forms of behaviour. States negotiate these rules, which entails a mutual acceptance of norms or 'standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations'.⁴⁰ Institutions or sets of rules are frequently formalized in international agreements and incorporated into an international organization. Such organizations, however, do not constitute a higher supranational power with the authority and means to compel member states to obey. Rather, they embody the 'decentralized co-operation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command'.⁴¹ Members abide by the rules because they choose to, not because they are forced to.

It would seem only common sense that states co-operate either to pool their capacities to resist the power of other,

especially more powerful states, or to achieve greater benefits than they can achieve acting alone. Moreover, if states can co-operate when it is beneficial, this might provide the basis for mitigating the conflictual nature of international politics. Yet, in spite of the proliferation of international and even supranational organizations, realists doubt that co-operation will stop states from pursuing their interests as they see fit. It is on this point – whether institutions matter – that neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists disagree.

In the IR debate, the terms 'neo-liberal' and 'realist' are misleading. This is not a replay of the first great debate in international relations theory between idealism (or utopianism) and realism in the 1930s and 1940s.⁴² The debate between realism and utopianism was between two paradigms, offering alternative conceptions of the international system. Neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism do not, however, offer an inter-paradigm debate. Realism/neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, as Caporaso notes, share a rationalist approach, viewing states as 'conscious goal-seeking agents pursuing their interests within an external environment characterized by anarchy and the power of other states. The paradigmatic question is how they pursue their goals given the constraints under which they operate.'⁴³ Thus they share the same starting point for their analysis of the world.⁴⁴

Neo-liberal institutionalism developed from theories of interdependence and international regimes, and gained credence as a coherent body of theory in the mid-1980s. The central concern of neo-liberal institutionalism is 'how institutions affect incentives facing states'.⁴⁵ The starting point is, as Keohane and Martin state, that 'liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a framework in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, and that institutionalists only expect interstate co-operation to occur if states have significant interests'.⁴⁶ In other words, they accept, like realists, that states exist in anarchy, are insecure, behave in a self-interested manner, and must rely on themselves.

There are a number of main issue areas on which realists/neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists disagree: the nature and consequences of anarchy; the ease and likelihood of international co-operation; the importance of relative versus absolute gains; the priority of state goals; the relative impor-

tance of intentions versus capabilities; and, finally, whether international institutions mitigate the constraining effects of anarchy.⁴⁷ The core issue is whether, as neo-liberal institutionalists contend, international institutions 'have become significant in world politics' in that they 'have a role in changing conceptions of self-interest'.⁴⁸

Both sides concur that the anarchic nature of the international system affects the likelihood of co-operation between states. Both do not expect co-operation to occur if states do not foresee that it will benefit them. Realists agree that states may attempt to co-operate when they have common interests and that it sometimes works, for a time. They argue, however, that co-operation is difficult and potentially perilous for a state because it can be counter-productive to its interests and survival, and hence it is hard if not impossible to sustain. Neo-liberal institutionalists contend that when states jointly benefit from co-operation they can and do create institutions which facilitate and sustain it. Institutions can mitigate the constraints imposed by anarchy because they provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible,⁴⁹ establish focal points for co-ordination, and facilitate reciprocity in state actions.⁵⁰

If it is to succeed and be sustained co-operation must overcome two major barriers imposed by anarchy: state concerns first about cheating and second about relative gains from cheating.⁵¹ Concern about cheating is endemic in any co-operation but it is acute in the realm of security. The nature of military weaponry, especially modern weaponry, makes sudden shifts in the balance of power possible. States have to be concerned that if a state defects from a co-operative security agreement, it can – if it cheats before defecting – have a military superiority that allows it to threaten others or inflict serious harm on them via an attack. States must always worry about non-compliance and try to hedge against cheating,⁵² and this limits co-operation.

Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that institutions ameliorate concerns about cheating in a number of ways. First, rules increase the amount of information available to states engaged in co-operation so that it is easier to monitor what other states are doing. This increases the likelihood that cheaters will be caught and furnishes potential victims with early warning

do with relative gains. Realists/neo-realists argue that states are most interested in relative, not absolute, gains. States fear other states which may pose a threat to their power and autonomy. Thus they worry that others will make gains that improve their relative power.⁵⁹ A state has to be careful that others do not, through mutual co-operation, make relatively greater gains, because the increasingly powerful partners of today could easily become dangerous foes in the future.⁶⁰

Neo-liberal institutionalists agree that states have to be mindful of relative gains when co-operating with other states, and ask two important questions. First, under what conditions is the issue of relative gains significant? Second, what is the role and impact of institutions when relative gains are at stake? Liberal institutionalist theory suggests that the importance of relative gains is shaped by at least two factors. One is the number of major actors in the system. In situations in which there are only two states with conflicting interests, relative gains matter a great deal and co-operation is very difficult. In situations in which there are a number of small states of more or less equal power, the states will not worry much about relative gains because they have more opportunities for forming coalitions for protection.⁶¹ A second factor is whether in military affairs the offence dominates the defence. When there is little prospect that military force will be used to resolve disputes (that is, when the defence dominates offence and hence the threat of war is low), relative gains considerations do not matter much because they do not translate into a greater military advantage, so co-operation is easier.⁶²

Realists/neo-realists concur that in such conditions relative gains considerations may not have much impact. They point out, however, that these two conditions are largely hypothetical, not empirically illustrated with historical examples. Mearsheimer argues that multipolar international systems have usually consisted of three to six great powers, with more power than the rest of the states, and with significant asymmetries in power amongst themselves. Systems with a large number of roughly equal small powers are rare exceptions that prove the rule. Realists/neo-realists are sceptical about the possibility of a world in which the military advantage lies with the defence and states are completely convinced of this. It is notoriously difficult to distinguish between offensive and

of non-compliance, enabling them to take preventative or protective measures before being harmed. Second, rules tend to increase the number of transactions.⁵³ This institutionalized iteration increases the future gains which a potential cheater stands to lose if caught, reducing cheating and lowering fear of cheating as well. Iterative transactions further permit victims to engage in a tit-for-tat strategy to punish a cheater. Finally, iterative transactions reward states that develop a reputation for faithful adherence to agreements and penalize, through exclusion, states that do not.⁵⁴ Third, institutionalized rules facilitate linking together interactions between states in different issue areas, enhancing interdependence. Issue linkage can discourage wayward states because of the prospect that the victim (and perhaps third-party states) will retaliate in other issue areas, raising the costs of non-adherence.⁵⁵ Fourth, institutions can reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements, that is, the time and effort involved in negotiating deals, if states do less negotiating and monitoring of agreements and developing of hedges against non-compliance. The costs of co-operation are lower and the profitability higher.⁵⁶

Realists/neo-realists accept that institutions centred on economic interactions may discourage cheating or at least reduce state concerns about the prospect and ramifications of cheating. However, they are dubious about whether institutions have more than a limited effect in security interactions. Realists argue that neo-liberal institutionalists assume that states are simply interested in absolute gains over the long term. The primary interest of states is survival. Improving their individual well-being is important but not crucial.⁵⁷ In the realm of security, states must fear that another's quick defection could result in their own devastating military defeat and even their disappearance.⁵⁸ In international economic affairs the prospect of retaliation can constrain cheating because the victim is harmed but will still be around to retaliate. However, a state cannot assume, given the destructive power of modern weapons, that it will survive a sudden defection and be able to retaliate. Hence, on security matters a state will not be willing to place its faith in institutions. The fear of cheating is much greater when security could be at risk and institutions cannot overcome this.

The second obstacle to co-operation mentioned above has to

defensive weapons. A state may adhere to a purely defensive strategy, but the weapons it procures and deploys will be likely to have some offensive capacity, and other states will assume that they might be attacked unless they protect against this possibility.⁶³ On balance the realist/neo-realist position is that in the real world, given potentially very serious consequences, states have to be concerned about relative gains.

Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that institutions can mitigate state concerns about relative gains in co-operation. First, institutions provide a framework within which disagreements about gains, which can serve as an obstacle to co-operation, can be resolved. In each potential co-operation arrangement there are multiple options with different distributions of gains and so states will have different preferences. Institutions provide a co-ordinating mechanism that permits states to make trade-offs to develop a stable co-operative outcome. Individual states may achieve greater relative gains in one arrangement by accepting this for others in other matters, resulting in a rough overall balance. Second, and more important, institutions provide information about other states, including information about the distribution of gains and the ends to which they are being put. This information can alert a state if others are making significant and worrisome relative gains, and the mechanisms provided by the institution may offer a means to redress this imbalance.⁶⁴

Realists/neo-realists remain unconvinced. They acknowledge that institutions may have an impact on the problem, for states do at times settle for absolute economic gains. At the same time, even in their international economic relations states will constantly seek to adjust mutually beneficial agreements if they perceive others as benefiting more than themselves.⁶⁵ Realists/neo-realists seriously question whether institutions can and will have an impact in the realm of security, where the problem of relative gains is most severe because the consequences can be quite disastrous. Realists/neo-realists maintain that co-operation is conditional; states may see it as beneficial, but they will still want to constrain it sharply in time or scope, or leave themselves ways to escape from it should this become 'necessary'. Thus, in co-operative ventures the constraints on the ability of the state to pursue its interests will rest very lightly and the state has the option of defecting if its

interests dictate this.

The debate between the realists/neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists does not obviate the underlying problem, namely that anarchy leads to state behaviour that makes co-operation difficult. The promise of institutions is that they might alleviate insecurity and lead states to change their notions of self-interest. A great many analysts believe in this and a great many policy-makers have been willing to invest considerable effort and resources in building international institutions. Yet as Keohane and Martin acknowledge, while international institutions are likely to be a component of any enduring peace, this 'does not mean that they are always valuable, much less that they operate without respect to power and interests, constitute a panacea for violent conflict, or always reduce the likelihood of war'.⁶⁶ Conceptions of self-interest may some day be changed sufficiently for states to act with restraint, but until then who cannot be absolutely certain others will be constrained from resorting to force. Nor can a state be certain that some sort of higher authority, if established, would not be used to do it serious harm in the future. Therefore, states must be sceptical about both the idea of a higher authority and the feasibility of creating it. Thus, they will continue to be wary of constraints on their sovereign authority and are likely even in co-operation always to reserve the right to defect if they deem it in their best interest to do so.

The Results

Whether states are inherently dangerous and conflictual because of the behaviour fostered by the nature of the international environment or because of the nature of states and human beings, both views converge in a common description of the results. From either point of view, international relations has certain necessary characteristics:

- 1 the unconstrained or insufficiently constrained competition of states for power (and other values obtained via power), leading to pervasive insecurity;
- 2 the pursuit of security on a self-help basis to the extent

possible (because of the absence of effective norms or higher authority or the uncertainty about getting serious assistance from other states);

3 the necessity to rely on the use of force and threats in numerous instances (the competition for power and the need to act on a self-help basis call for using one's elbows to get ahead), which promotes insecurity;

4 the very limited application of canons of morality (because of the tenuous nature of international norms), which gives rise to insecurity as well because of the unpredictability of the behaviour of others;

5 the existence of security dilemmas – each state's self-help measures erode others' sense of security, thereby reinforcing insecurity. The more capabilities a state acquires to ensure its security, the greater the perceived or real threat it poses to the others, and the greater the likelihood that they in turn will acquire similar capabilities to ensure their security, which will be perceived as threatening to the first state.

These characteristics are so compelling, so central to states' experience in the realist view, that they colour all other aspects of international politics and have more to do with shaping state behaviour than any other considerations. Reduced to essentials, international relations is a security-driven competition for the various components of power, with war always a distinct possibility.

An additional characteristic of international politics, in view of all that has been discussed thus far, is great power domination. Having the largest concentrations of capabilities, especially the ability to hurt others, the great powers inevitably dominate the system. The relative distribution and concentration of these capabilities give the international system its central character and structure. The patterns in great power relationships that flow from this structure, and the structure itself, significantly affect all other actors, constraining and shaping their behaviour.

The place to start analysis of the behaviour of the members of any international system, therefore, is with an examination of the distribution of power and an identification of the most powerful members. There are three primary systemic power structures. In a unipolar system, one state is much more

powerful than the others. It may overwhelmingly dominate, with no likely combination of states able to equal its power; or it may be sufficiently powerful to dominate but could be balanced by some combination of other states. In either case, the relationships between the dominant state and others determine the structure of the system, with the dominant state exercising a degree of hegemony.

The second system structure is bipolar, with two concentrations of power significantly greater than any others and with capabilities exceeding those of any other state by a wide margin. The relationship between the two great powers, or poles, is the dominant pattern which influences all other states and their behaviour. Each pole seeks to ensure its survival and its autonomy from the threat posed by the other's power. Central to a bipolar system is a balancing between the two giants, either through their internal efforts or through the maintenance of alliances and co-operation with lesser powers.

The third structure is multipolar, where the main concentrations of power can be found in three or more major states. Behaviour patterns in a multipolar system are more complex, and depend on the number of states considered great powers and whether their capabilities are relatively equal or somewhat unequal. Although several of these states may act in concert to dominate the system, more often there are temporary and shifting coalitions. If one state increases its relative power through self-help or an alliance, others are likely to react by balancing it through co-operation or an alliance against it. Thus the great powers often align with each other, plus lesser powers, producing two or more alignments of states. In such circumstances, the defection of an ally, especially a great power, from an alignment can destabilize the power distribution and set off realignments.

States must cope with the environment in which they exist as best they can, yet their menu of serious options is limited. They have little choice but to act within international relations as they find it, and realist perspectives depict them as forced to be preoccupied with power and autonomy. There are a number of options available, but they are all, at bottom, variants of the general strategy of acquiring and maintaining power to offset the power of others.

An obvious option, particularly when there is a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power, is to produce and maintain a 'balance of power' in the system. The concept of a 'balance of power' is central to realist/neo-realist thought, particularly in connection with notions of system stability.⁶⁷ The concept did not originate with realists, but realists/neo-realists have considerably elaborated it and analysis as to why and how states balance.

Although the concept is widely known, the term has many definitions and is used in many different ways. Ernst B. Haas found at least eight different definitions or usages: (1) any distribution of power; (2) an equilibrium or balancing process; (3) hegemony or the search for hegemony; (4) stability and peace in a concert of power; (5) instability and war; (6) power politics in general; (7) a universal law of history; and (8) a system for and guide to policy-makers.⁶⁸ The concept of balance of power can simultaneously be taken as an objective condition, a tactic in state behaviour, and a mode of system maintenance characteristic of certain international systems. All three meanings are used by realists. Of primary concern are the last two: a guide for policy-makers who would, rationally and with constant vigilance, respond to the power of other states and the threat it poses, ever ready to form countervailing coalitions against states which seek to change the current equilibrium of power in the system; and a kind of multinational society in which the essential actors seek to preserve their identity, integrity and autonomy through a balancing process.⁶⁹

States engage in balance-of-power behaviour because of their preoccupation with power and autonomy. The purpose of developing and/or sustaining a balance is to: prevent the establishment of a regional or global hegemony; preserve the current system and its constituent elements (that is, states); ensure stability and security in the system; and deter war by confronting an aggressor or potential aggressor with a countervailing coalition. Thus, states engage in balancing to preserve their security and autonomy from the depredations of other states or to preserve the prevailing balance which lends itself to their being able to sustain their security and autonomy. There are a number of methods for maintaining or restoring a balance of power: (1) a policy of divide and rule; to diminish the power

advantage of the stronger by aligning with the weaker; (2) territorial compensation after a war to offset gains by the winner; (3) creation of buffer states; (4) formation of alliances; (5) maintenance of spheres of influence; (6) intervention; (7) diplomatic bargaining; (8) settling disputes through legal and peaceful means; (9) reducing armaments or engaging in arms races; and (10) waging war, to maintain or restore a preferred balance. All have been practised by states concerned about preserving security and autonomy and are the essence of security as traditionally conceived.

In the modern world, balancing often takes the form of alliances, formal military agreements and arrangements between two or more states through which they seek either to protect themselves or to collude in expanding their power at other states' expense. Such arrangements can be effective but even if they are institutionalized and a permanent organization is created, such as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the co-operation can be limited or fluctuating. Alliances can readily evoke counter-alliances, and in a realist view are likely to do so, raising the prospect of confrontations between even greater concentrations of power and thus not alleviating insecurity. Alliances themselves impose constraints on autonomy and create patterns of dependency, and are thus uncomfortable for states in various ways. They are often beset by mistrust arising from serious or residual competition among the members and the effects of anarchy, and they are unreliable or uncertain in duration and effectiveness. Each ally must consider the possibility that the others may defect from the agreement if it looks as if they would be better off doing so, and this breeds suspicion and mistrust. Moreover, always looking out for oneself makes allies constantly try to push the burden of the alliance onto their partners, to free-ride as much as possible, which is not a good basis for harmonious and lasting co-operation. Other co-operative security associations states sometimes use – such as the United Nations – are beset with the same problems to an even greater degree. With all this in mind, realists are the foremost champions of the view that alliances are marriages of convenience and readily subject to divorce.

As a consequence, states are usually loath to rely solely on such alliances and other co-operative arrangements for

security. They will often either back-stop such strategies by, or reject them in favour of, balancing the power and threat of others through their individual efforts. Or a state may eschew working with other states and seek to increase its power and security on its own.

States often try to expand their power by enlarging and better exploiting their domestic resources. This approach can be fruitful for states with significant extractable natural resources within their boundaries or under their control, particularly when they have the population, knowledge and technology needed to exploit them. However, this strategy is of only marginal utility to those with limited domestic resources, particularly to a state directly in competition with one state much better endowed in this regard. This approach is also apt to be quite expensive and can be very slow in adjusting a state's relative power. Another option is to squeeze more resources out of the society for the state's purposes abroad – drafting more citizens into the armed forces, imposing higher taxes, etc. Of course, in poor societies there is not much to be squeezed. Moreover, extracting more resources is politically difficult, even dangerous, and can have serious consequences in terms of political unrest or damaging the economy.

States can also try to acquire additional resources through trade. The exchange of its surplus resources for resources it lacks can contribute to the development of a state's capabilities. This is also apt to be slow. Thus, states often try to improve their capability more directly by securing arms from others. This can be much quicker than developing one's own arms production but it is rarely cheap and can be very dangerous. Buying arms can incite the concern and antagonism of other states and hence become a source, not just an effect, of insecurity. It also raises the possibility of an erosion of autonomy, for getting arms from other states (for payments or as a gift) can create dependence by granting suppliers undue influence, which is another form of insecurity.

Alternatively, states can try to seize additional resources or use force to damage the power of rivals, including going to war to enhance their security. This can be quick and offers the possibility of a permanent enhancement of power and autonomy. But it is very dangerous. War is uncertain and unreliable in outcome, and failure means a relative loss of

power. Even if the war is successful, the long-term consequences may increase insecurity. The defeated state may vigorously attempt to recover its position, acquiring arms and other capabilities which breed insecurity for the victor in the long term. Other states may be sufficiently alarmed about the victor's increased power to move to oppose or offset these gains, adding to the insecurity. The victor, though now much stronger than the state it defeated, may have expended so many resources or suffered so much damage that it is vulnerable to attack by others. Thus, to employ force in pursuit of security is fraught with risks.

All such steps are variants of trying to arrange a 'satisfactory' distribution of power for a state, either in relation to another state (or states) or in relation to the system as a whole. The underlying basis for the security these steps provide can always be traced to deterrence, based on threats of serious harm, or war. Security is sought through the ability to deter and defend or (in a war) through the ability to ignore or overcome others' ability to deter and defend. The only real change in this over time has been that deterrence has been assigned a greatly increased weight in the search for security, in comparison with war or outright defence, because of great increases in the destructiveness of war. Thus, from a realist perspective it is the confrontation and containment of power with power that is needed to make states behave prudently and cautiously. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate in this, because it compels an extremely high level of prudence and caution.

As other possible constraints on states' capacities to do serious harm are inadequate, it is vital to employ power in this way. The 'satisfactory' distribution of power for a state might be one of superiority *vis-à-vis* certain other states or other coalitions of states, or some relatively even level of power *vis-à-vis* those others, or even an 'acceptable' level of inferiority that appears to offer enough constraint. It will depend on the circumstances, in particular on the degree and intensity of the threat that a state feels it must confront.

The same is true for the system as a whole. The satisfactory distribution of power for the system, to minimize the outbreak of violent conflict and contain insecurity, could be seen by states as superiority for one particular concentration of power

in the system (hegemony for one state or a set of co-operating states), or a relatively even distribution of power among the major states or sets of associated states, or for many states an acceptable level of inferiority, one that leaves them rather costly and dangerous to tackle. As to how this proper distribution is achieved, some realists believe it arises automatically – an anarchical system tends toward the kind of equilibrium appropriate to its distribution of power. Other observers think the proper power distribution is episodic, arising from a confluence of factors not readily manipulated by states, or that it can be deliberately created via successful strategic manipulation by states (individually or collectively). Thus hegemony, bipolarity or multipolarity are readily understandable in realist terms as options that states might seek, or accept, or adapt to, but the underlying principle is the same – security is shaped by the distribution of power in the system.

In the same way, all three are subject to the same realist analysis in detecting their limitations. Arranging for, or counting on, a satisfactory distribution of power is:

- 1 expensive, and anything expensive is unevenly available both across states and, for any one state, over time;
- 2 dangerous – the distribution of power can readily be misjudged, leaving a state more vulnerable than expected and a system more fragile than it appears;
- 3 less than universally acceptable – whatever the distribution there are winners and losers, and thus it is not likely to be stable over the long run;
- 4 intrinsically unstable because the relative strength of states shifts over time in uneven and unpredictable ways due to uneven rates of growth, technological change, domestic political instability, and other factors.

Ultimately, seeking security via a satisfactory distribution of power is simply the controlled application of the core elements of insecurity, that is, the capacities and willingness of states to do serious harm to each other. The search for security is best thought of as *the management of insecurity* rather than its elimination.⁷⁶ Hence international relations is intrinsically the realm of insecurity.

An example will show how all of these elements come

together. In the second half of the twentieth century the ultimate method of constraining powerful states through a satisfactory distribution of power was nuclear deterrence, and it clearly displayed all of the features just discussed. Several states accumulated nuclear weapons to gain a capacity for overwhelming destruction so that they could block, by threat of a devastating punitive response, any contemplation by other states of using force against them. A state that gained such weapons was seeking a satisfactory distribution of destructive capacities between itself and any other state in the system, one that would ensure its autonomy and survival.⁷⁷ Some of these states sought nuclear superiority, some were willing to accept rough nuclear equality, and several were willing to settle for an acceptable nuclear inferiority. Building nuclear weapons was particularly pursued by each of the 'great powers', the foremost centres of power in the system. Eventually, a systematic body of theory and related practices was developed to indicate the ways in which the distribution of nuclear weapons could produce a satisfactory distribution of power in the system, one that sustained stability and order. Hence, both by the individual competitive efforts of states and by some attempts at deliberate design, nuclear deterrence contributed centrally to the structure of the system. The high level of competition among the major states that gave rise to nuclear weapons, and the weapons themselves, became dominant facts of life for the other states in the system to which adjustments had to be made.

These arrangements for individual states and for the system as a whole turned out to be:

- 1 *expensive*. It was expensive to acquire nuclear weapons and suitable delivery vehicles. It was expensive to keep up with the competition. It was expensive to maintain non-nuclear capabilities necessitated by the uncertain willingness of nuclear powers ever to use such weapons and the uncertain credibility of their alliance guarantees to use these weapons to defend other states. The NATO allies, for example, maintained very large and expensive conventional forces despite the massive nuclear arsenal of the US. This expense made for great variations in the security states could afford to purchase.

2 *dangerous*. The distribution of power could readily be mis-

judged – nuclear-armed states might be more vulnerable to a first strike aimed to disarm their capacity to retaliate than they realized, the system might be more unstable due to accidents, misjudgements or irrationality than it seemed, or states depending on nuclear-armed protectors might find themselves exposed as their guardians proved unwilling to risk nuclear war.

3 *not universally acceptable*. States without nuclear weapons resented being inferior, feared being vulnerable, disliked being at the mercy of decisions made by the great powers, and disliked the dependence they experienced on great power allies. States in such a position might, as have India and Pakistan, develop and deploy nuclear arms.

4 *intrinsically unstable*.⁷² Three of the five nuclear-armed great powers – France, China and the Soviet Union – experienced enough internal political disarray to have caused the conceivable collapse of their political systems. One – the Soviet Union – was undone to some extent by a poor rate of growth which could be traced in part to the enormous national security expenditures of the government. In US-Soviet relations, technological change consistently raised the possibility that nuclear deterrence would be undermined.

Ultimately nuclear deterrence was a form of security for individual states in which every state and society was vulnerable to being completely destroyed at almost any time should deterrence ever collapse and bring on a general war. It was security via maintenance of a stable international system which was always poised on the edge of possible destruction. It was the height of controlled insecurity.

Realism and Security

Both forms of realism focus on the state and its interaction with other states in an anarchic system. The state is the most important political group and hence the referent of security in realist/neo-realist conceptions. What the state is being protected from is efforts by other states to get their way and threaten external interests the state sees as important to its welfare and survival. What is meant by security, then, is the

state's capacity to protect its territorial boundaries and its sovereign ability to act as it sees fit.

Both forms of realism acknowledge that while international relations is conflictual states are not always in conflict. Conflict arises when one state's pursuit of its interests, which are primarily power and security, clash with the interests of others. Thus, in the realist/neo-realist view, threat stems from the interaction of states within an anarchic system. The degree to which a state is threatened by others, whether as a consequence of its own or other states' actions, depends on its ability to impose its will or to resist efforts by other states to impose their will on it. This capacity rests on its relative power, or capability, *vis-à-vis* others.

As noted earlier, the concept of power is the subject of debate.⁷³ A simple and usable definition is that power is 'the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do'.⁷⁴ It is often perceived as synonymous with military might, which is certainly an extremely important element of power and has been the focus of much realist-based analysis. The notion of capabilities, or power, however, is not synonymous with force levels; it has military and non-military components. Power also includes levels of technology, population, natural resources, geographical factors, forms of government, political leadership and ideology, among others. Because of this, measuring power is very difficult for leaders and how best to do it is debated by analysts.

Nevertheless, a key element is military capability. In the realist world the possibility of violence is pervasive; in the realist world the central threat to security is the threat or actual use of force. Other factors can be important when thinking about security, and are ignored only at some risk. But these are usually perceived by realists/neo-realists as significant only in so far as they contribute to or hinder the development of military capabilities or the ability of the state to wield the military capabilities it has available. Thus, a strong economy determines how much military capability a state can build and maintain; geography determines the natural resources available to transform into military capability and has an impact on how vulnerable to or protected from military attack a state is; form of government affects how well a state can mobilize its

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Peace research versus strategic studies

DAVID J. DUNN

Although much studied, especially in Western Europe and Scandinavia, in the 1980s peace became a much more salient issue in political, social and intellectual debate. More directly, it has become more public and for a variety of reasons. For many Americans this might be ascribed to a process of coming to terms with the legacy of the war in Indo-China. For many Britons the debate focused, in part, on the decision to replace the Polaris weapons system. For the Germans, self-evidently, peace has been rather more of a public, political concern, as well as a subject for academic debate. For the Scandinavian states, peace has long been a component of the public political philosophy, consistent with their established status in international politics. But to explain the importance of the discussion of peace and security in the 1980s we need to go beyond these issues, important as they were.

There was in the early 1980s a sense of fear allied to protest: fear at the prospect of nuclear war, which many saw as increasing rather than receding, and protest at the increase in nuclear weapons, particularly with respect to the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe but also with respect to the sheer quantity of nuclear warheads deployed by the nuclear powers. The concern found expression in many ways. Films such as *Threads* and *The Day After*, both depicting nuclear attacks, were shown on television to large audiences and prompted debate. Likewise, *The China Syndrome*, depicting a fictional melt-down in a nuclear power station, was

shown in cinemas, and later the Chernobyl disaster demonstrated that things could indeed go wrong and that, furthermore, nuclear plumes were no respecters of national sovereignties. In the United States the 'Freeze' movement became active in an attempt to halt the nuclear arms race, and the statement of the American bishops on nuclear deterrence became a central focus for the US nuclear debate. In the UK the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament rapidly grew in membership and activity (stimulated by both cruise missile deployments and the Polaris replacement question) and the traditional bipartisan political consensus on defence collapsed. In Europe, END (European Nuclear Disarmament) activities spread and much political debate centred on the nature of peace and security in Europe after the détente of the 1970s, as well as on the role of the European theatre in any future (limited) war scenarios. However, conspicuous and novel though these efforts were, concentration on them should not obscure or neglect the existence of peace concerns and movements in many countries which served to add momentum when public concern became more focused and organized.

In summary, we can see many indicators of public concern and protest throughout the 1980s. (There was also the development of a significant literature of nuclear concern, manifested in novels and stories: this literature is important to note, and it certainly demands a full treatment which cannot be given here, though Bernard Malamud's 1982 work *God's Grace* and *Einstein's Monsters* by Martin Amis, which appeared in 1987, represent respectively American and British contributions. (This was not all. There was a significant broadening of participation in the intellectual debate about peace and security and the role of nuclear weapons as means to those ends. The moral basis of deterrence engaged a much wider nexus of philosophers and clerics alike, and what had once been the sometimes arcane concerns of the strategists alone now became the subject of wider debate (see, for example, Blake and Pole, 1983 and 1984; Hardin, Mearshmeier, Dworkin and Goodwin, 1985). And this occurred at a time when some of the basic assumptions started to be questioned from within the strategic studies community itself. For example, the collection of essays edited by Gwyn Prins (Prins, 1984) was entitled *The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security*; note *versus*—not 'as a means to'. Moreover, many of the contributors to the Prins collection were former military men. The implication to be taken from this was quite clear: there was an emerging dissensus

within the strategic community about the direction that was being followed and we shall refer to it in what follows.

At the same time there were significant developments in peace research, a field of study which had emerged years earlier but which apparently enjoyed, in the circumstances of the 1980s, something of a renaissance. Writing in 1985, Andrew Mack observed a significant renewal of interest in peace research and suggested that

this upsurge of support for peace research, and the parallel proliferation of peace studies courses in colleges and universities, is related to the increased public concern about nuclear war and scepticism about the utility of traditional approaches to national security in the nuclear age. (Mack, 1985, p. 1)

It is clear, therefore, that the 1980s represented, if not a turning point (this may or may not become clearer with the passage of time and the nature of current and future debate), then a period of increased concern in intellectual and public debate. There were evident novelties, but there were also extant forces and movements which often facilitated the public and new debates. In light of these introductory remarks and observations, the aims of this chapter are twofold. First, to put into context the recent appearance of the public discussions of the peace issue by demonstrating that peace research can be traced back to the 1950s and that, in its third decade, when the issue became public, work done in previous years could underpin the new debate. Second, to compare and contrast the development of peace research and strategic studies with a view to establishing the extent to which the 'versus' in the title might better be replaced with 'and', so stressing complementarity rather than difference.

PREHISTORIES

Both strategic studies and peace research have recognizable prehistories, generally reflecting certain assumptions or approaches to the understanding of human behaviour. The study of war is a central concern of each (as well as the more formally established field of international relations), and, as we might expect, has a long history. Clausewitz dominates the intellectual landscape, less for

what he tells us about how to win battles (for the traditional view of strategy was that it was concerned with the art of generalship) than for how he informs us about the political and philosophical aspects of war. Strategy, in its more modern guise, has become more concerned with the political role and function of war and threats than about soldiering *per se*.

In the traditional analyses of war and peace, there is an implicit assumption which represents a starting point: we accept as a given that war and force are important makers of our political and cultural landscape. Or, as John Garnett puts it in outlining the intellectual underpinnings of strategic studies, 'it is concerned with the darker side of human nature, in that it examines the way in which military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests' (1975, p. 3). Such a focus is due in no small part to the nature of the international system of states. This system is devoid of any central authority capable of presiding over the conduct of affairs and mediating interests, so that, in essence, it is a system of self-help, wherein the states comprising the system must retain for themselves the right to use force in order to enhance, if not guarantee, their own security. In these terms, we are not being too pessimistic in stressing the darker side of human nature, but rather 'Realist' in accepting that, in the absence of a central authority, it is an inescapable, and for some perhaps even fatalistic, principle of conduct of international politics that war and force will be central. Some may find this regrettable and deplorable, seeming only to stress the worst aspects of humanity. Others see it as inescapable given the organization of international politics. All of this suggests that there is a close affinity between the Realist approach to international politics and the study of strategy.

Peace research finds its prehistory in the more rationalist tradition, where the perfectibility of men and women is not beyond question and where reform of institutions and norms of behaviour is more than a remote possibility. The tradition is long established and comprises, amongst others, the writings of Kant, Grotius, the Abbé de Saint Pierre and Penn. The impulse here is to change the way men and women act and not to accept that we live in some inescapable, immutable reality. In these terms, there is no enduring reality of international politics which assumes that the darker side of human nature must always out: rather, the reality can be changed by using scientific and rationalist modes of inquiry, by discovering and

implementing aspects of belief and behaviour which make resort to war and force less likely, through the pursuit of peaceful means and more collaborative mechanisms of social and political choice.

STRATEGIC STUDIES

What changed these diverse traditions in the study of war into marked intellectual movements after 1945 was the appearance of the nuclear weapon and the transition to nuclear deterrence; deterrence in itself was not new, but the nuclear component added an extra, decisive twist to the notion of executing a threat should deterrence fail. What marked out Bernard Brodie as one of the fathers of modern strategy was his recognition, in 1945, that the primary function of military force was to be devoted to deterrence rather than pursuit of victory in the traditional sense. As Brodie put it: 'Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose' (Brodie, 1946, p. 76). Brodie was also one of the new breed of strategists, namely civilians, often from within universities, who contributed to the study of deterrence and found rationales for, and limits to, force in the new nuclear environment. Their aim was to proceed from where they were: the atomic bomb existed and the vastly more destructive hydrogen bomb soon followed; the Soviet Union acquired the nuclear weapon and a situation of *mutuality* obtained, although what some saw as *mutuality*, others saw as a balance of terror. These were the 'realities' of the situation and the situation had to be managed. In these circumstances, the strategists had to examine what conditions could contribute to successful military policies which achieved goals and minimized risks. How might stability obtain such as to prevent war on a global scale, but still permit options in foreign and military policy? How might foreign policy be conducted within an acceptable limit of risk? What types of military forces were required, how might they be defended and how much would they cost? These were the sorts of questions the new strategists addressed.

The new modes of strategic analysis soon became institutionalized and established. Throughout the 1950s institutes and departments were founded in the United States and elsewhere, though

the task was not necessarily easy. A notable milestone – in the sense that it marked the formal organization of the international strategic community – was the foundation, in 1958, of the (International) Institute for Strategic Studies.

There were also significant problems. At first it appeared that the US possession of the atomic bomb was a strategy in itself: as long as the Soviet Union did not have a nuclear capability the US task was relatively simple. But once the Soviet Union acquired such a capability, in 1949, the search for nuclear strategies on both sides led to the acceleration and development of an approach well known today. Recall that the strategists had to accept the situation as they found it: an opponent had a certain number and type of forces in the military inventory; 'hardware' became, for the many, a key concern. But what were the intentions of an opponent? Did force structures belie intentions? In taking account of capabilities, how was this to be influenced by declared or tacit intentions? Thus, much of strategic thinking focused on threat estimation and often took on a psychological dimension, not only with respect to what the opponent's intentions might be, but also how one might respond to what one presumed were the intentions of an adversary. These questions would have been difficult enough, but given the changes in technology which saw the appearance of long-range and accurate missiles allied to smaller and very powerful warheads, the degrees of difficulty were compounded.

This is not the place to recount in detail the evolution of strategies, not least because it has been done elsewhere (Freedman, 1989; Herken 1985; Kaplan 1984; Newhouse, 1989; Paré, 1986 all stand as excellent surveys). Nevertheless, three significant issues need to be identified and discussed briefly if we are to understand the public and professional concerns of the 1980s: these are flexibility, survivability of forces and extended deterrence.

The operational strategy for the United States through much of the 1950s was massive retaliation but doubts as to its credibility precipitated a search for an alternative strategy. This appeared, in the 1960s, as mutual assured destruction (MAD) and flexible response. The key here was to retain a secure second-strike capability which could survive the opponent's first strike and still inflict unacceptable pain and damage; this, it was believed, would deter a first strike. Securing a second strike led to the development of a nuclear triad, with forces based on land, under the sea and in the air,

if one or two legs were destroyed, at least one could strike back. In addition, it was thought that flexibility, having the option to meet an opponent's thrust like for like, and therefore more credibly, enhanced deterrence. Such strategies seemed sensible, but their development led to an enormous proliferation in the quantities of delivery systems and, later, warheads. More were acquired as a means to deter more, and enhance the prospects for strategic stability. But to the critics flexible response constituted matching forces for forces, with actions prompting reactions and thus fuelling an arms race.

Subsequent evolutions to these strategies appeared to many to strain credibility. An extreme example was the proposal to enhance the survivability of the MX missile by putting it in a loop within which several silos were to be located; the Soviet Union, if contemplating an attack, would have to guess which one it was in, after the logic of the fairground 'shell game'. Earlier, arms control had fallen into disrepute when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced an agreement which allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to build up to agreed limits. Of course, the logic of arms control is such that even restrained growth constitutes arms control, but nonetheless the SALT experience, allied to the dispiriting experiences in European arms control forums, pejoratively described as 'bean counting', raised serious questions about the value of the exercise.

In terms of extended deterrence, the relationship of the United States to its European allies, and more particularly how the United States could make credible its commitment to Europe in an age of bilateral superpower arms control, raised other serious questions. In part, the cruise missile was a solution (for some at least), but it produced monumental problems for the European allies. Sections of European public opinion saw the missiles as evidence of the Americans foisting not only more but also more dangerous weapons on the allies. More was not always thought to be better. Moreover, arms control was at a standstill and the relationship between the United States and its European allies was a cause for concern. Later, with the development of smaller nuclear weapons and the prospect that they might actually have utility in a limited land battle in Europe, the problems were exacerbated: limited war in Europe for the Americans was one thing, but quite another for the Europeans.

All of this suggests that throughout the 1980s the strategic theorists have been in some difficulty, at the very least, and perhaps even in crisis. There probably never was a golden age of strategy, but many of the new strategists must have thought that the problems of the 1980s were more difficult than most. Lawrence Freedman sums up their problem thus:

By the mid 1980s, therefore... the nuclear strategists had still failed to come up with any convincing methods of employing nuclear weapons should deterrence fail that did not wholly offend common sense, nor had they even reached a consensus on whether or not the discovery of such methods was essential if deterrence was to endure. The fundamental dilemma of nuclear strategy remained as intractable as ever. (Freedman, 1986, p. 778)

Yet there is a fundamental irony here, and it ought not to go unnoticed, especially in a book dedicated to assessing new ways of thinking. If there is a theme that runs through much of strategic thinking since 1945, it is the coming to terms with novelty and searching for novelty. Brodie first saw the new world as it presented itself and if there is a recurrent theme in reading Kaplan, Herken and Newhouse, amongst others, it is the search for new options; options that will give the President more than an 'allout attack or do nothing' choice, options that seek to make this strategy more credible to opponents and allies alike, as opposed to this option, and so on. Nevertheless, the net result has been a massive proliferation in the quantities of weaponry – stability at very high levels of armament. Hence, the implicit message from the Prins volume: that by the 1980s, the weapons were the problem, not the solution, and that they were making many feel very insecure.

PEACE RESEARCH

What distinguished the peace researchers from the strategists, in broad terms, was their refusal to accept the management of nuclear weapons as the realistic option; a new one had to be found and it could be found, with enough of the right kinds of effort. Several

initiatives were underway in the 1950s (Dunn, 1978). Pioneering work had already been done by Lewis Richardson in Great Britain and by Quincy Wright in the United States. Theodore Lenz, another 'father of peace research', contributed further pioneering work in the early 1950s. The critical point in the development of peace research came in 1954-5, with the meeting of several like minds at the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences based at Stanford University. Kenneth Boulding, Harold Lasswell, Anatol Rapoport and Herbert Kelman, among others, as well as Lewis Richardson's son, Stephen, met together. What they did was to shift peace research out of the realm of the possible into the probable and practical, taking steps to ensure its early institutional foundation. From the perspective of the 1990s, this meeting appears as a beginning.

Initially there was a small-scale bulletin; this was followed by the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, based at the University of Michigan. In 1964 the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was founded in London and at the same time the *Journal of Peace Research* was founded at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. In the United Kingdom, small-scale but significant activities were giving rise to the foundation of a Peace Research Centre at Lancaster, a recognizable precursor of the Richardson Institute which followed in the 1970s.

At first, the subject matter of peace research was hardly different from that studied by the strategists: deterrence, the functions of armaments, game theoretical approaches to strategy, reductions in tensions, stability conditions and so on. What mattered was that the approach to the subject was different: the issue was less one of managing the situation and more one of trying to change it: this difference became even more accentuated in the 1960s and 1970s, with the so-called radical input into peace research. The influence of the New Left in the 1960s was felt in the evolution of peace research. Emphasis tended to switch away from the nuclear dimensions of conflict and rather more to questions of neo-colonialism, underdevelopment, structural violence, liberation strategies and unconventional conflicts. Scandinavian influences were important here in stressing perspectives from outside the dominant framework of East-West bloc images, as was the effect of Vietnam on American society and the radicalizing influences to which it gave rise.

What was especially important in the development of peace research at this time was not so much the Scandinavian inputs or the radical inputs *per se*, but rather the more maximal approach to the definition of peace. What the maximal approach did was to go beyond force, war and armaments; they were not marginalized, nor displaced, but instead were seen in the context of the wider socio-economic processes of peace and war. Peace did not just mean the absence of war: peace also related to the existence of certain social conditions. Societies based on exploitation were deemed to be inherently 'unpeaceful'; there could never be, in these terms, a happy slave, for slavery is inconsistent with happiness (Burton, 1962; Galtung, 1969).

Concern about armaments was not displaced far from it. Instead there was some emphasis on the systemic consequences of, and the problems associated with, proliferation of arms, the arms trade, the motives behind weapons proliferation, the conversion of defence industries and so on. Moreover, in journals such as the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, as its title suggests, practical aspects of peace thinking were to be emphasized. In this regard, it is illuminating to compare and contrast the work of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, where there is a different approach to the subject matter. What is often clear is the complementarity of approaches, rather than competition. Over the course of thirty years, then, peace research has moved from a small-scale to a larger scale activity; it is now rather more of an alternative approach to questions of peace and security and less of an intellectual protest movement. It is not institutionally secure as a matter of routine and there are periodic reports of funding difficulties. Nevertheless, there is now an extensive network of journals, conferences and organizations (in the United States, for example, COPRED, the Consortium on Peace Research and Education, is very well developed) and the networks are global in their reach (Mack, 1985).

CURRENT ISSUES

What is particularly interesting about the recent development of peace research is the extent to which it has tended to redefine the nature of security in an interdependent world. Here the work

of the World Order Models Project is important. Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1980) has been associated with the project, and the work done by Richard Falk (Falk, 1983) and Samuel Kim (Kim, 1984) is illustrative of the approach adopted, stressing the search for a regulating mechanism in the world politics beyond a state-centric system, while at the same time highlighting the multidimensional nature of security: apart from the nuclear threat, the security agenda encompasses the need for environmental quality and the enhancement of human rights and economic wellbeing. Clearly their work draws on much that had been done in peace research, and taken together might be described as a 'new realism' in the study of security and welfare. What they do is stress the immanence and imminence of threats to security: the ecological threat is 'real', the deprivation that is characteristic of much of the globe is 'real' in its consequences and, as analysts, we must perceive these issues for what they are. First, there is a clear relationship between rich and poor states and it is not always benign. Second, there is a link between armaments and (under)development, the pursuit of one perhaps prejudicing the other. Third, for many citizens of the world the real security dilemma is how to survive through today and into tomorrow: for them, nuclear weapons are not the most pressing threat. Fourth, the international system of sovereign states is deficient in terms of its capacity to enhance the security of many citizens; indeed, the logic of state-centric security might actually jeopardize security prospects. What these brief comments try to illustrate is that there is now an alternative approach to the study of world order which can claim to be 'realistic' in stressing the new problems and processes of security in an ecologically whole and complex interdependent system of human behaviour. It is alternative in the sense that it does not accept the traditional definitions of security, nor the self-help principle enshrined in the traditional logic of international politics.

Nor should we neglect the recent studies taking place in the context of a search for 'common security'. In this, the Palme Commission (1982) was especially important as a landmark, but there are continuing studies in this area, as for example the work done at the Foundation for International Security in the United Kingdom. Windass and Grove (1988) have recently reported on the deliberations of study groups which have explored the prospects for common security in Europe.

Many of the radical inputs from the 1960s left little by way of legacies, but of real significance was the need for a maximal interpretation of the social and economic underpinnings of the peace process and, with it, a wider definition of the meaning of security and meaningful, life-enhancing structures. In short, weapons were one means to peace, but not a sure guarantee, while at the same time 'peace' was more apparent than real, in so far as people were suffering in exploitative relationships, deprivation and so on. So a new stage has been reached in contemporary peace research; this has resulted in a haziness in some of the boundaries with associated areas, notably normative studies in international relations, development studies, radical strategies and so on.

Peace research in the early 1990s stands more securely than ever. First, it is well entrenched in institutional terms in the United States, Australia, Japan, Scandinavia, India, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain, though the rates of development and the funding problems often vary. The development of these institutions has been very slow: acquiring and retaining finance has been a major problem in most cases. It is safe to say that if the search for finance to fund and run strategy and defence studies institutes was not easy, it was probably easier than the task faced by the peace researchers. Indeed, to have set up and run a peace research institute at the height of the Cold War was well nigh impossible in many places: this might help to explain why the name for the new journal of the movement was the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Second, peace research exists as a legitimate approach to the study of war and peace in the 1980s: despite some opposition and misunderstanding it is now clearer that peace research or peace studies were not novelties spawned by the resurgence of the peace movement after 1979 but represent the product of more than thirty years' intellectual development (Dunn, 1985). Third, some of the work done has filtered down into undergraduate texts and into schools: what was once radical research is now deemed to be a legitimate object of study in school and society and accepted as such, as, for example, is the study of arms control and arms races. Fourth, much of the content in contemporary peace research is convergent with the concerns in mainstream international relations and strategic studies. Fifthly, there is now a huge body of work devoted to conflict dynamics (how conflicts originate, how they worsen, why some become violent and some do not) and conflict

resolution strategies, involving mediators, third parties and so on. Much of this work has application in conflicts between states as well as between other human groups.

This shows that an approach which was once thought radical and beyond the bounds of the 'real' might one day become part of the conventional wisdom: such is the nature of paradigm change. It is challenging to consider that the traditional approach to the study of security exemplified in the Realist-strategic paradigm is under pressure and that part of the pressure is exemplified by the increased salience of what was referred to earlier as the 'new realism'. Clearly our conventional understandings are under pressure and we are embarking on new ways of thinking: how do we go about solving pollution problems, if part of the problem is that sovereign states are sole arbiters of their own interests and sovereignty? How can we enhance the prospects for global development if some states are manifestly unable or incapable of embarking on the process? Does development for the poor mean less for the rich?

CONCLUSION

It is surely beyond doubt by now that there are serious questions to be asked about the performance of the state-centric system in an interdependent environment, notwithstanding the rather more recent changes in the international environment which has seen a significant breakthrough in arms control with the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and historic changes in the European security situation. Self-help is no certain solution to pollution and ecological decay: a *me-first* approach to resource management is hardly the most appropriate. When states seek to make themselves more 'secure' through the acquisition of armaments, nuclear or conventional, the system as a whole may become less secure: hence the problems associated with the management of a situation where upwards of 50,000 nuclear warheads are deployed. Moreover, what is to be done when states charged with the obligations of self-help are manifestly incapable of helping themselves and their citizens? Is there then an obligation on the part of the well-fed and secure to assist those who are less well-fed and insecure, indeed dying? If there is not, should there be?

In the light of its often precarious past, peace research now appears much more authoritative and shows, perhaps, degrees of convergence with strategic studies. This thought is echoed by Joseph Nye in a recent comment which, though it does not displace the importance of war and force from the agenda of strategic studies, certainly puts it into a wider context. 'Security problems', says Nye, 'have become more complicated as threats to state autonomy have shifted from the simply military, in which the threat is defined largely in terms of territorial integrity, to the economic' (Nye, 1989, p. 24). Moreover: 'In a world where both goals and instruments have become more complex, a definition of strategic studies limited to issues of military operations would be severely deficient' (1989, p. 25). Convergence might be to overstate the case: but perhaps not. Overlap there almost certainly is. This is not to suggest that strategic studies and peace research are becoming one and the same: the subject matter may be similar, but the approach is different. Strategists have tended, by and large, to start from where we are and have tried to manage the situation: peace researchers have tended not to accept that constraint and to be more maximal in their approach. Because they have not been forced into the 'real', they have often been more exploratory, even creative. An excellent example of such an approach is a work of Johan Galtung, dating from the mid-1980s and written at a time when the so-called New Cold War was at its height. As Galtung put it in a book written, appropriately enough, in Berlin: 'There are alternatives' (Galtung, 1984); and he explored alternative routes to European security, informed by immediate concerns but motivated by an equally significant concern for realistic, possible secure futures. But there is surely room for a degree of complementarity. It can be taken as self-evident that, at the opposite ends of the spectrum, the peace researcher studying the optimal components of a just world order will find minimum commonality with a strategist seeking optimal roles for small nuclear weapons in a limited battle strategy. As we move away from these polar opposites we are likely to move to a situation where the 'versus' means less than 'and' in terms of the relationship between peace research and strategic studies. Put another way, the world of the late 1980s – with successes for arms control, progressive *détente*, evident interdependence, global problems, common security concerns for the superpowers and the causes of wars being found in the absence of peaceful conditions –

was complex and difficult enough as to be beyond the limits of one approach. If, for the strategist, arms control now heralds the change towards a less armed environment, work done in peace research on the nature of a warless or armamentless world is hardly irrelevant. If strategic studies is about the disposition and means of force in world politics and peace research is about the causes of war and the conditions of peace they are but different approaches, marked by different styles and different assumptions, but hardly a different language altogether. The overlap is growing. As time passes it is not always possible in conferences and seminars to identify immediately the peace researchers and the strategists.

Consideration of the new should not blind us to the value of the old. Novelty is not always a virtue, nor is age a fault. As we move into the 1990s and assess the interdependent world and the problems of security in it, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. There is, in the thirty years' work done in peace research, an effective library and store: many of the efforts undertaken in the 1960s and not taken seriously might be more relevant in the 1990s: after the events of 1989, contemporary debate about what security futures await in Europe might be usefully informed by work done in peace research on alternative security systems.

Yet in suggesting a new relationship between peace research and strategic studies, perhaps it is as well to state that convergence is not an end in itself and might not even be consciously pursued. Nor need it be. But it is happening as the strategists move out from narrower assumptions which now look like major problems in themselves, and impediments. It might be that the best way to perceive the relationship between the two approaches is as one of synergy or symbiosis.

Quincy Wright stands as one of the fathers of peace research, his *A Study of War* representing a landmark (Wright, 1942). Bernard Brodie first saw the implications of the atomic bomb in terms of the new requirements of strategy:

Bernard Brodie was Quincy Wright's star student in his graduate-school days [and] Brodie absorbed from the University of Chicago two great lessons: that political change in international relations is likely, and so is war; that there are ways to reduce the chances of war, but short of drastic and unprecedented changes in the distribution of global power,

a world government is destined to remain a feckless and ephemeral vehicle. (Kaplan, 1983, pp. 14–16.)

It is a measure of progress that the study of peace has gone well beyond the study of world government; it is a measure of the progress of strategic studies that war is but one aspect of strategy. And the juxtaposition of Wright and Brodie in these terms might prompt the thought that the differences are not as fundamental as were thought then – or now.

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PART TWO

The decline of nuclear strategy

THREE

Security Communities and Democratic Peace

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Realism operates within a clear paradigm. Nevertheless, it is an extremely broad church. Indeed, in many ways realism is not really a theory at all, but rather an ideology or worldview based upon a set of interlocking assumptions about the nature of social reality. Both prior to and subsequent to the emergence of the broader approach in the 1980s, some realist authors attempted to significantly challenge or suggest amendments to key features of the realist security canon. In the 1990s, for example, William Wohlforth (1993) and Fareed Zakaria (1998), published books that placed far more emphasis on the importance of the unit (state) level than had the neorealist works that followed Waltz after 1979. Their accounts of security significantly emphasize the importance of national perceptions of a state's power, rather than simply assuming an objective reality. Gideon Rose has referred to this approach as "neoclassical realism" (1998) in the sense that while maintaining key realist features such as the centrality of the state and of military power, there is nevertheless an attempt to treat security as a socially constructed feature, rather than simply as a "given."

In the late 1950s, Karl Deutsch and his colleagues also implicitly challenged the governing approach to security by exploring the concept of "security communities." Deutsch identified a nascent security community in the North Atlantic area. Such a community was one where the component states had come to reject the use or threat of force as a mechanism for resolving disputes. This was a clear break with traditional approaches to security, which emphasized the utility of military power and the inevitable nature of military threats. Moreover, Deutsch argued that economic and cultural cooperation was a far better route toward the formation of such a security community than was common membership in a traditional military alliance, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This contribution was a smoking grenade for traditional interpretations of security, for it suggested that ideas and realities of security and insecurity

were social constructions, the result of an intersubjective consensus that was capable of being altered by the actions of governments over time. They were not timeless realities, but contingent constructions, and human agency was restored to center stage, since the actions of states and societies could potentially transform relationships between particular states, changing them from enemies into friends.

In the development of the security community concept, the pathbreaking study was the book *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, published in 1957. This represented the findings of a large-scale interdisciplinary study designed, in Deutsch's words, to "throw light on an old problem. The old problem is the elimination of war" (Deutsch et al., 1957: vii).

The Puzzle of Security

Deutsch and his colleagues, writing at the peak of the Cold War in the late 1950s, believed that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a number of states meant that war had become such a threat to humanity that it needed to be eliminated, before it eliminated the human race (1957: 3). He was well aware of the difficulties of achieving such an ambitious goal, but believed that if human civilization was to survive, humanity would have to eliminate war as a social institution. This in itself was a fundamental challenge to realist thinking, since realism assumes that war is a permanent feature of international politics. It is a result of the basic drives of human nature and the structural determinants of the international anarchy and security dilemma, and while to some extent it *might* be limited and its frequency reduced, a feature highlighted by "defensive" realists, it could never be eliminated. This was the great tragedy of international relations.

The dangers represented by the existence of war, and concern about how to control or even eliminate it, had been a central concern for the academic discipline of international relations since it had been established just after World War I. Deutsch believed that most people who had previously looked at the problem could be located in one of two camps. The realists believed that the historical record showed a continuous narrative of warfare and that therefore war was clearly inevitable, a feature of the human condition that could not be eliminated. The idealists in contrast saw history as a process in which there was a steady increase in the size of the political communities into which human beings organized themselves. This trend was likely to continue until its final stage was reached: a world community living together in peace.

Deutsch was not convinced by either of these positions, which he felt were crude simplifications. He and his colleagues approached the problem of war from a strikingly novel perspective. All previous studies of why wars occur had focused on war itself—what makes humans violent, what national and international factors explain why particular wars break out, and so on. For

Deutsch, the interesting questions were not, why do wars sometimes occur, but rather, why is it that most of the time they do not? Not, why is it that some states have frequently gone to war with each other, but rather, why is it that for some groups of states, the idea of war seems to have become inconceivable, even when their previous historical experience has included war between them? What was it about the relationship between states like Norway and Sweden, or Canada and the United States, that had allowed them to escape from a reality that appeared to be inevitable for the rest of humanity?

The problem was therefore to understand how it was that some states appeared to have permanently eliminated war in their relationships with each other. If it could be discovered why these particular states had ceased fighting against each other, it might be possible to expand this pacific behavior to other parts of the world. What was at issue in this investigation was the question of how it was possible to build political communities wider than those previously existing. Political communities were defined as "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance" (Deutsch et al., 1957). It was obvious that not all political communities were able to prevent wars from breaking out within their boundaries, since revolutions and civil wars occurred, but some were clearly able to do so and it was this achievement that needed explaining. The focus was therefore on what came to be called security communities.

The linking of the concepts of security and community in this way was an important development. The broader security approaches that emerged in the 1980s are notable in that they are open to the possibility of the "referent object" of security going down as far as the level of the individual in some circumstances. Nevertheless, for the most part, security is something that is acquired or achieved in the social and political context of a community. A distinguishing feature of realism is its reluctance to embrace the idea of community at the international level, and this limits possibilities for building long-term stable peace and security regimes. Security and community are two sides of the same coin: neither is truly possible without the other, they are synergistically interdependent.

A security community was defined as a group of people who had become integrated—that is, a group who had achieved a sense of community, and of institutions and practices strong enough and sufficiently widespread to convince people that necessary social, economic, and political changes could be brought about peacefully. A security community is therefore one in which "there is real reassurance that the members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Clearly, if the entire planet were covered with such security communities, war as currently understood would be effectively eliminated.

For analytical purposes it is possible to identify two kinds of security community. The first is the "amalgamated" security community, where a pre-

viously warring group of societies merge formally into a single, larger political unit with a common government. Usually this occurs as a result of imperialism, with a powerful, expansionist state absorbing weaker states.

Since this involves the ending of international conflict by the method of eliminating most of the competing sovereignties, it is hardly likely to commend itself to most existing states and in any case runs counter to the political pluralism that has characterized the international system in the past two centuries, and would also represent a break with Western political theory. For this reason the second type of security community is more promising in terms of its potential capacity to reduce the amount of large-scale conflict in the international system.

The second type is the "pluralistic" security community. Here, the various states or sovereignties retain their independence and political autonomy, as with Australia and New Zealand, or Denmark and Sweden. They voluntarily cooperate and behave toward each other in a manner that precludes the resort to war as a means of resolving their disputes, but maintain their independence and autonomy. Deutsch believed that only three major conditions needed to be satisfied in order for a pluralistic security community to be brought into existence. The first was that the primary political values of the component states needed to be compatible. While two similar regimes such as Britain and the Netherlands might be able to form such a community, a democracy and a fascist dictatorship would not be able to do so.

This appears to be a relatively unproblematic point. However, it is not necessarily an obvious one. It has been historically quite common for new regime types to emerge with a belief that war with their ideological brothers would be impossible. Yet Christian states, Islamic states, and communist states, for example, all found this to be a false assumption. Ideological compatibility may be a necessary condition for a security community, but it is clearly not a sufficient one. Similarly during the 1950s and 1960s, Portugal existed in a condition of reciprocal nonthreatening attitude vis-à-vis its NATO allies, despite the fact that they were liberal democracies while it was a fascist dictatorship. The failure of Greece and Turkey to form permanently stable democratic regimes during the Cold War meant that their relations remained characterized by tension and the risk of war, and they did not become members of the security community that was characteristic of the other NATO states (Sheehan and Moustakis, 2002). Later generations of security community theorists have attempted to move beyond this limitation and explore the possibility of such communities emerging between states that are not necessarily democracies.

The second condition was that there needed to be established networks of political and other communication, so that governments and other politically active sections of society could respond to each other's messages, needs, and actions quickly and adequately and without resorting to violence. Thus, for

example, France and Germany transformed their relationship after 1945 from habitual conflict to close alliance. One way they did this was to establish networks of regular communication at all levels, both governmental and non-governmental, between the populations and officials of the two countries.

The third necessary element would be provided to a large extent by the dynamic interaction of the first two. It was argued that there needed to be a mutual predictability regarding the relevant aspects of each partner's political, economic, and social behavior. Such knowledge would emerge from similar political cultures in the sense that since each state resembled the other, they would be able to recognize this and know the other by knowing themselves. Similarly, the networks of communication would provide the information from which to build a predictable picture of the other.

The key feature is the idea of a transnational community. The existence of such a community is seen in the fact that its members share key values and understandings of reality and because of this feel a sense of shared identity. The border of a security community effectively exists at the point where cultural divisions are clear enough that intersubjective meanings are not shared between the populations on either side of the border, because "only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations and feelings" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31).

By the late 1950s the North Atlantic area, although far from being integrated, had moved a long way toward being so. Only Spain and Portugal, which at that time were fascist dictatorships, were clearly incapable of achieving full integration with the other regional states; the relationship between Greece and Turkey remained problematic; and within the region as a whole, a number of countries had already achieved pluralistic integration with each other.

Factors Promoting Integration

Deutsch sought to identify the factors that had helped particular groups of countries to move toward the status of pluralistic security communities. The first of these was pluralism itself, which he saw as a policy that "concentrates upon increasing the machinery and traditions of mutual consultation, communication and co-operation" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 200). In the context of the North Atlantic countries, it sought to eliminate all expectations of warfare among the countries, together with all specific preparations for it. Pluralistic integration is historically more difficult to achieve than amalgamated integration, but it has been just as effective in terms of eliminating war from the area integrated.

In promoting integration it was seen as essential that there be a stress on pluralism and the preservation of national sovereignty, and an emphasis upon domestic issues in each country, because the ordinary citizens would measure

the success of integration in relation to achieving domestic objectives. In contrast to what some proponents of European integration in the 1960s and 1970s would argue, Deutsch found that apart from the desire to remove the danger of war, what the citizens within the security community sought were political institutions, whether separate or common, that would provide them with a better quality of life in peacetime. They were not impressed by political arguments suggesting that integration would only provide each state with greater power than it would otherwise have.

In the long term, security would need to be more than just the absence of war—the delegitimation of war needed to be underpinned by domestic political changes leading to greater cooperation and integration of all aspects of social life. Values reflecting criteria of legitimacy would be crucial in the evolution and development of communitywide behavior.

Another finding that was important in relation to subsequent European history was that military alliances appeared to be poor vehicles for promoting the development of either amalgamated or pluralistic security communities. In themselves, they made little contribution. They provided an effective shield behind which positive community-building processes could occur, but they were not in themselves the fundamental institutional requirement. To be effective they needed to be associated with nonmilitary steps, which would provide the main dynamic in the security- and community-building process. Similarly, while the existence of external military threats could be helpful to the process of integration, it was not essential.

Integration is a process and not necessarily a unidirectional one. There can be setbacks as well as advances. The possibility of war might continue to exist for a considerable period after an integration process has begun. Political communities might in fact continually cross and recross the threshold that made war a possibility. Integration is not a simple matter of fact. It is highly dependent upon the long-term stability of the participating states and their ability to gradually embed common values and a depth of attachment to the process and the shared norms of the community. As a process, therefore, pluralistic security integration is lengthier and more uncertain than is sometimes assumed.

Communication was seen as the crucial mechanism through which political communities were built, a set of transaction flows that cumulatively built a social fabric. Communication allowed individuals and groups within society to develop shared identification and the “we” feeling that was the bedrock of a security community. Again, this was an interesting break with realism. Realism is an overwhelmingly materialist ontology, which evaluates and explains the working of the international system in terms of material forces. Deutsch’s approach, in contrast, was social constructivist, seeing community as being built through intersubjective understanding and shared knowledge.

The idea of the necessary “bases of community” is a demanding one. It includes a sense of community arising from a mutual “we” feeling, trust, and

mutual consideration of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests, of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it. This sense of community might be uniformly common to all the participating states, but significant differences in perception could occur. A key role in “social learning” would be the ability of the political elites to keep the integration process moving forward.

The key factors identified in successful integration were, first, a high correlation of values, which for the North Atlantic states were democracy, the rule of law, and social market economics; second, a slowly growing level of mutual responsiveness among political communities; and finally, a distinctive way of life characterized by growth of welfare and technological states, marked by governmental rejection of war as an instrument of policy and commitment to an economic “good life.”

Fundamentally it was the increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war that was seen as being essential to the development of pluralistic security communities. The delegitimation of war was underpinned by domestic political changes leading to greater cooperation and integration of all aspects of life. Values reflecting criteria of legitimacy were critical in the evolution and development of communitywide behavior, helping to determine what was deemed acceptable behavior. Security, which Deutsch and his colleagues generally interpreted in a minimalist way as primarily the removal of war from domestic sociopolitical cultures, was essentially a value-driven process embedded in integrated communities and nations and states.

Subsequent research in this area has supported these insights. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998: 39–48) have argued that since identities and interests are largely shaped by their transactional environment, sociopolitical practices hold the key to expansion of membership of the security community. This aspect is crucial if the extension of the definition of security is seen in the context of an intersubjective definition of “politics” and “political” (Drysek, 1990).

The boundaries of the community need not arise solely from geographical, geopolitical, or cultural factors (though these help), but can also arise from the spread of shared values and ideas. For Adler and Barnett, as individual and group (national, state) identities are increasingly shaped by membership of and participation in the community, state officials will increasingly refer to the boundaries of an expanded definition of the community. The purpose and identity of states will be increasingly derived from participation in the community. This has certainly become true of the states of Western Europe and to an extent has been seen in the interaction of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states.

Building on Deutsch’s notion of an integration “threshold,” Adler and Barnett suggest that security communities develop through “nascent,” “ascendant,” and “mature” phases, characterized by increasing types and depth of

transactions, development of shared traits and expectations, and increased trust and self-knowledge (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 49–59). In particular, tightly coupled security communities demonstrate a widespread commitment to cooperative security measures, a high level of military integration, internal security coordination, free movement of persons, and shared forms of governance and rule-making.

The security community theorists conclude that the development of loosely and tightly coupled security communities across the world, essentially based upon mutual identification, may well represent the most promising route toward peaceful, stable security.

While Deutsch's state-centric realist approach places him in a different ontological and epistemological framework than that of the postpositivists, a nevertheless striking feature of his analysis is the emphasis placed upon the social construction of both identity and beliefs about security. Deutsch's realism is unconventional in this regard and in a number of ways represents a clear break with traditional realist approaches to security.

Whereas mainstream realism sees the insecurity generated by international anarchy as inevitable, Deutsch's approach sees it as contingent and is an early example of a social constructivist approach to security. Central to this is not just the idea that notions of security and insecurity are intersubjectively constructed, but also the idea that the building of community is an effective route to security.

Democratic Peace Theory

Security community theory challenges the fundamental assumptions of much of realism regarding the inevitability of conflict between sovereign states operating in an international anarchy. It does this because it focuses on the structural implications at the state level, the unit level of analysis in Kenneth Waltz's 1979 schema. In the neorealist perspective, the unit level plays a minimal role in explaining processes and outcomes in international politics. A similar challenge to realist explanations emerges from democratic peace theory, which exerted important influences at the state policy level in the closing years of the twentieth century.

In his 1994 State of the Union address, U.S. president Bill Clinton declared, "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other." His comments echoed those of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who said during a visit to Czechoslovakia in 1990, "If we can create a great area of democracy stretching from the west coast of the United States to the Far East, that would give us the best guarantee of all for security—because democracies don't go to war with one another." Throughout the 1990s this belief that democracies are an exception to the realist belief in

an inevitable security dilemma underpinned arguments in favor of efforts to promote democratization and to expand the memberships of NATO and the European Union. The argument itself long predated the 1990s, however.

As early as 1795 in his essay "Perpetual Peace," Immanuel Kant described a "pacific union" established by liberal republics and argued that democracies were less warlike than other forms of government. For two centuries afterward, however, Kant's arguments were largely ignored. For Kant, there were three main pillars underpinning the reluctance of democracies to go to war. These were the constitutional, the moral/cultural, and the economic. Democracies were representative governments. The government was put into power by the voters and could be dismissed from office if it was seen to have failed to deliver what the voters wanted. Wars were expensive undertakings, and in wartime taxation is inevitably increased to pay for the costs of the war. The electorate are never enthusiastic about higher taxes, and governments, recognizing this, would wish to avoid the expense of war (Friedrich, 1948: 251).

War also interferes with commerce and, for the most part, the "democracies" of Kant's era were also the leading trading states, and by interfering with trade, wars put profits at risk and undermined the stability of the international trading regime. Wars are also expensive in terms of human lives. Loss of life, mutilation, and serious injury may be heavy among the armed forces engaged, and possibly also among the civilian population. In any case, the electorate will include the soldiers' parents and other relatives and loved ones, who will resent their loss in battle. Again, foreknowledge of these realities will turn the electorate against war and this will be reflected in the policies of a representative government. In a monarchy or other authoritarian government, the citizenry must accept the consequences of government decisions, and have little or no influence in shaping them. This is not the case in a democracy, which is based upon certain values such as liberty and individual rights. These values, it was suggested, also extend to foreign policy and make a democracy reluctant to engage in war, since this would infringe fundamental democratic norms (Sorensen, 1992: 399).

For more than a century after he wrote, Kant's arguments received little attention. There were few democracies in the world and therefore not much chance to check the accuracy of his prediction. The argument was revived in 1964 by a U.S. academic criminologist, Dean Babst. He examined data on 116 major wars from 1789 to 1941 and found that "no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments" (1964: 10). Once again, little was made of these results, even though by then the discipline of international relations had come into existence, with a central interest in explaining the nature and incidence of war in the international system.

Not until the 1980s did a major debate begin to unfold on the subject. A number of international relations specialists debated the issue, with propo-

nents such as Michael Doyle (1983, 1986) and Bruce Russett (1993) supporting the thesis, and Steven Chan (1984) and Erich Weede (1992) opposing it. The debate eventually produced a consensus on two points: First, that there is little or no difference between democracies and nondemocracies in terms of their proneness to war. Second, and crucially, that wars *between* democracies are rare or possibly even nonexistent. Many scholars would agree with Jack Levy that this "absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (1989: 270).

An important point to notice here is that the consensus is not fully in support of Kant's proposition. The historical record does not support Kant's argument that democracies do not want to go to war. Democracies have been just as prone to go to war as have other forms of government. During the twentieth century, for example, Britain used military force against a great number of states, including Germany, North Korea, Argentina, Iraq, Japan, and Egypt. The same was true of France and the United States. There was no reluctance to use war as an instrument of policy by these states or by other democracies.

Where there was a significant difference was in the willingness to use such force against other democracies. Kant did not make this specific argument. He wrote about a general reluctance to go to war for republican regimes. But the key fact is an apparent willingness to discriminate in terms of regime. Democracies appear to be unwilling to go to war with those states they deem to be fellow democracies.

The Importance of Definitions

In making this argument it obviously becomes crucially important to be very specific about how "democracy" and "war" are defined. Otherwise, any state that claimed to be a democracy might invalidate the argument and so might any clash of any kind between two democracies (Ray, 1993). Historical examples like the war between Britain and the United States (1812–1815), or even the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), might be seen as cases of two democracies at war, and certainly these and other cases are problematic for the argument.

In defining what constitutes a democracy, most scholars follow a variation of the general criteria laid down by Melvin Small and David Singer (1976), who call for a number of elements to be present. These include the existence of free elections with opposition parties, in which a minimum suffrage exists, with at least 10 percent of the adult population being able to vote. In addition, the country should possess a parliament that has control over the executive branch of government or at the very least enjoys parity with it.

Other analysts have accepted these kinds of criteria, but felt that the specific requirements were not sufficiently demanding. Randall Schweller (1992), for example, adds a number of other requirements. The necessary suf-

franchise should be granted within a generation of its initial demand in the country. In addition, the government should be internally sovereign over military and foreign affairs; it should not be effectively a satellite of another state. For a country to be accepted as being a genuine democracy, it must have had this system of government in place for a reasonable length of time, at least three years, and the democratic system must be seen as stable. Finally, the political rights of the citizens must be underpinned by individual civil rights. Schweller also argues that a democratic political system should be accompanied by an economic system characterized by the existence of private property and a free-enterprise economy. Freedom House in New York, a research institute, has divided states into those that are "free," "partially free," and "nonfree," based on a seven-point scale for political rights and civil liberties. However, essentially these variations in definitional criteria only change the number of democracies at the margins.

In the same way, there needs to be a reasonably clear definition of what constitutes a "war." The threshold of war is usually set at the 1,000 battle deaths used in the Correlates of War data set. A confrontation such as the so-called Cod War between Britain and Iceland, in which naval craft threatened each other but no lives were lost, would not count. Nor would small-scale clashes, even if fatalities resulted.

This issue is important, because Edward Mansfield (1988) has suggested that the particular data set chosen by investigators of this issue can have a huge impact on the conclusions reached. This includes issues such as whether or not civil wars should be included and specifically how civil wars themselves are to be defined. There are a large number of conflicts that are possible exceptions to the rule, including the U.S. Civil War, the War of 1812, the Peru-Ecuador war and the Finnish participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers (Spiro, 1994: 59–62).

A number of early contributions to this debate confused two basic propositions. First, the argument that democracies are more peaceful or less warlike than other states. Second, the argument that democracies do not fight each other. These are quite different arguments. Babst argued strictly in terms of the latter. Small and Singer, and many of those who followed their arguments in the 1980s, criticized the idea of "the innate peacefulness of Liberal democracies." A further reason that the democratic peace thesis may have been ignored is that it seems too simple to be true (Gleditsch, 1992: 371).

In practice, in the decades following Small and Singer's criticisms, no international relations scholar has identified another relationship anywhere near as strong as that between democracy and the absence of war against other democracies. Nils Gleditsch argues on the basis of this that most research on the causes of war can now be thrown on the scrap-heap, and that the link between democracy and peace can be used as the source of its elimination. However, it is one thing to confirm the statistical reality of a correlation and

■ The Problem of Explaining the Correlation

Some critics in the 1980s argued that the theory was nothing more than raw empiricism (in the case of Babst) or philosophical speculation (the arguments of Kant and Doyle), because it didn't explain *why* the correlation existed. David Lake (1992), for example, argued that no current theory explains this striking empirical regularity.

However, if there has been no definitive explanation, there have certainly been a large number of explanations put forward to explain the apparent link. Typically, theories of democratic peace are divided into structural theories that emphasize institutional constraints within democracies, and normative theories that emphasize the ideas and values held in democracies.

The first argument is the one already noted, that leaders in democracies are subject to constitutional limitations and constraints arising from their perceived responsibilities to the electorate that placed them in power. For the constraints to hold, not all citizens have to be politically active. As long as the government believes a sufficiently high number will oppose a war as to make it politically infeasible, it will be deterred from going to war.

A second explanation focuses on democracies' self-perceptions. A functioning democracy is not simply a country where there are regular, contested elections. Rather it is a place where the democratic way of life is practiced. Democracy is a pervasive norm at many levels of the society and is used to regulate that society in many ways. Elections and referenda are used to select regional and local governments, to choose trade union officials and to determine when official strike action is permitted, to elect representatives to school boards and other representative bodies, and for many other purposes. These arrangements reflect an underlying belief that in any society there will be differences of opinion on important policy issues at every level, but that it is vital that these differences be resolved through dialogue, accommodation, and compromise, rather than by dictated outcomes and the use of force to impose one side's preference.

In such a society there is an assumption that disputes will be resolved peaceably, that it is likely that each side will settle for something less than their preferred perfect outcome and that the result will be accepted and adhered to by all sides. The structural features and institutional arrangements are powerfully underpinned by a civil society accustomed to operating within a democratic system and whose activities crucially support the successful operation of that society at all levels. Democracies are an exercise in nonviolent conflict resolution. They require an intelligent and informed citizenry determined to oppose the weakening of their country's democratic structures and to extend them whenever possible, and whose day-to-day social, economic, and political interaction in an open, tolerant, and nondeferential society ensures that its democracy remains effective and vigorous.

The significance of this for international relations is that when a democracy is involved in a dispute with another democracy, its own value system is fully operational. It treats the other democracy as an extension of itself, instinctively assuming that the same logic will apply that operates when conflicts are being resolved in its own domestic context—that is, through dialogue and compromise, leading to a mutually acceptable outcome. When a democracy is dealing with an authoritarian regime, however, it does not make this assumption, and the use of force remains a possibility. In this way, democracy works to prevent war with other democracies, but not necessarily with other forms of government.

It can also be argued that the habitual conflict resolution approaches practiced by democracies in the domestic context means that democracies invariably see mutual relationships as positive rather than zero-sum. They expect interactions with other countries to normally be characterized by outcomes such as trade that benefit both parties, even if one gains more than the other. They do not assume that any gain by another country must represent a loss to themselves.

John Owen (1994: 87–125) argues that the democratic peace hypothesis also incorporates a number of assumptions about the way liberalism works, and that contemporary democracies are liberal democracies. For example, liberal democrats believe that all people are fundamentally the same: they have the same general goals in their lives and hopes for themselves and their loved ones. Their overall well-being is best preserved by pursuing self-preservation and material well-being as their primary and overriding goals. In order for these goals to be successfully achieved, freedom is required, because it makes choice possible in a number of crucial areas, notably the economic and political, and this freedom of choice produces a more responsive and efficient set of institutions. The state itself operates on the basis of the same set of assumptions to a greater or lesser extent. By the same kind of logic, peace is an important prerequisite, because without it, daily existence will be characterized by coercion and violence, which are counterproductive in terms of achieving individual and social goals.

Nondemocracies in contrast are seen as untrustworthy because they seek other ends, such as the coercion of other states to achieve local or regional domination. They tend to assess outcomes in zero-sum terms and seek diplomatic and economic “victories” over other states in the system. Democracies will claim that fellow liberal democracies share their ends and that totalitarian states do not, although this may not always be a reasonable assumption. Liberal democrats will therefore expect an “appropriate” response during a war-threatening crisis, which will be characterized by attempts at deescalation if the other state is democratic, but by preparations for the use of force if the adversary is an authoritarian regime.

An example of the way the democratic peace appears to work occurred in the 1990s with the transition to democracy of the Russian Federation. In the

1990s there was a profound change in the way that the NATO states perceived Russia following its evolution from communism to democracy. The change in attitudes toward Russia after democratization was evidence of the crucial way in which the perceptions of liberal democracies are substantially shaped by the political composition of the states with which they interact. As a rule, democracies will trust states that they consider democratic and will be suspicious of those states that they see as illiberal. Because of this, when democracies observe a state becoming a democracy in terms of their own criteria, they will automatically expect relations with it to be friendly and cooperative. This happened quite quickly in the case of Russia, even though the population of that country had no history of civil society or democratic behavior.

Against this, in the Anglo-American relationship with Iraq during the 1990s the ideological hostility became a more crucial factor than empirical realities. Despite the imposition of massive disarmament on Iraq, and the establishment of a highly intrusive arms control verification regime, Britain and the United States proved incapable of being reassured by Iraqi statements or general behavior. Overall compliance with the Western-imposed restrictions on Iraqi policy proved insufficient to satisfy Britain and the United States, which eventually adopted the military-political objective of "regime change" in order to install a more compliant government. The ideological justification for this act was the extension of democracy to Iraq.

A crucial question that follows from this is, how do democracies "know" that other democracies are equally peaceful and can be trusted, and why do they feel potentially threatened by totalitarian regimes, thereby triggering the "security dilemma" with them? An answer can be provided in terms of a social constructivist interpretation of international relations, which forms part of the social construction of reality. Social structures, rather than material structures, form actors as social individuals and as agents that are mutually constitutive. It follows that anarchy and the resulting security dilemma are social constructs as well.

The structure of the international system has not somehow fallen from heaven, but has been created by states and their interactions. As a result, anarchy and self-help as fundamental characteristics of international relations are not unavoidable. Actors' interests and preferences are not fixed, nor given. They originate and change during the process of social interaction.

This has important implications for democratic peace theory. The starting point is perceptions. As noted above, democracies assume other democracies to be "just" and consensual. Authoritarian states, in contrast, are perceived as unjust and exhibiting aggressive behavior toward their own people. Crucially, these presumptions about friendliness or hostility in international relations are not the result of the distribution of power in the international system, as realists argue. But neither are they the result of the effects of domestic structures *as such*, as many liberals argue.

Instead, the democratic peace is socially constructed. The democratic peace, as well as the frequently aggressive behavior of democracies toward nondemocracies, results from a rule "learned" through the process of interaction, which is to infer aggressiveness or peacefulness from what is perceived to be the degree of violence inherent in the domestic political structure of the other state.

What is crucial about this interpretation is that it does not require the underlying assumption that all democracies are always peaceful and that all authoritarian systems are always aggressive. Instead, complicated intersubjective perceptions are at work. Democratic leaders work through peaceful conflict resolution domestically, and instinctively prefer this option in international relations. When dealing with fellow democracies they assume that this feeling is reciprocal. Actors who trust each other start behaving accordingly. They therefore create a peaceful and cooperative order through their mutually reinforcing interactions. There are clearly important parallels here with Deutsch's ideas about how a pluralistic security community comes into existence. The presumption that the other is predisposed toward peacefulness becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if both sides act on this assumption.

Criticisms of the Theory

Critics such as Christopher Layne (1994: 8), argue that democratic peace theory must explain the anomaly that democracies are no less war-prone than other states. They do not fight democracies, but do fight any other form of regime. Actually there is no reason why democratic peace theory should stand or fall on whether it can explain this, as long as the correlation exists for relations between democracies. However, there might be a sense in which a marked difference in attitude toward the use of force in different circumstances would threaten a democracy's pacific reputation. At the turn of the twenty-first century, for example, Britain and the United States used military force to impose regime change during a number of crises, in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and declared their willingness to take similar steps against other enemies in the near future. Both demonstrated a willingness to use war as an instrument of policy in circumstances where the majority of the international community were highly uneasy about the necessity and legitimacy of such action. The ability to do so without effective domestic political opposition demonstrated a dominance of the national and international media, which raises doubts about the degree to which governments in a democracy genuinely need to be fully responsive to public opinion. In the contemporary era, with spin doctors and media manipulation, governments may well be able to so shape public attitudes that the clear distinctions in perspectives on regimes needed for democratic peace to operate might be overcome by a government determined to use force.

Neorealist opponents of the theory have argued that it is not only unproven, but also positively dangerous. It is seen as dangerous because it is a central component in the argument that there has been a qualitative change in international relations since 1989 (Layne, 1994: 48). With the end of the Cold War, many observers of international politics felt there had been a profound and historically fundamental change in the nature of international relations.

Therefore countries like the United States need not worry about future military challenges from countries such as Germany and Japan. Layne calls this "a peace of illusions," arguing that "there is no evidence that democracy at the unit level negates the structural effects of anarchy at the level of the international system" (1994: 48). This view is based upon a realist balance of power analysis, with the suggestion that if U.S. leaders believe in the validity of democratic peace theory, they will become reluctant to use force in circumstances where it is necessary, and that, for example, "The US will be ill-prepared to formulate a grand strategy that will advance its interests in the emerging world of multi-polar great power competition" (1994: 49).

Some of the arguments put forward by realists on this issue are not at all convincing. For example, David Spiro argues that the democratic peace theory has not demonstrated "that zero is statistically significant" (1994: 50–51). It is argued that "there have been few instances when democracies have been in a position to fight each other." This is an argument that does not stand up to historical analysis. More significant is that it is possible to identify cases where two democracies were clearly prepared to go to war with each other, and were not prevented from doing so by the operation of democratic peace considerations—for example, Great Britain and the United States in 1861 at the time of the Trent crisis. Indeed, the outbreak of the war between the United States and Confederate States of America in 1861 is itself a major caveat, since the political structure of the two states was essentially identical (Layne, 1994: 16–22).

For others, the argument is that the absence of war between democracies may simply be a result of the fact that, historically, few democracies have existed and therefore opportunities for war between them have been rare. Thus the absence of war between them is simply the result of random chance. When Kant first proposed the idea, there were hardly any states that fitted the description of a functioning democracy, and the number remained very low for a century afterward. In the contemporary world, not only are there far more democracies, but their numbers are increasing as well. When 50 percent of the world's states are democracies, the "separate peace" will embrace 25 percent of the world's state-pairs, and the validity of the thesis will increasingly be put to the test. The correlation is also vulnerable to the criticism that proponents simply *define* the difficult cases away, by modulating their definitions in such a way that apparently anomalous cases can be excluded (Layne, 1994: 40).

Georg Sorensen (1992) agrees with the general arguments of democratic peace theory, but with an important caveat. Democracies may be unwilling to go to war with each other, but they do appear to be prepared to use *subversion* against other democracies, the effects of which, in many cases, may be very similar to those of a war. Examples include the numerous occasions when the United States has intervened to impose "regime change" on countries whose governments have opposed its policies, such as the U.S. activities that led to the overthrow of democracy in the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s and Chile a decade later. On these occasions, U.S. economic and political interests triumphed over democratic solidarity.

Conclusion

There are significant overlaps in the security community and democratic peace approaches to security building, and the norm against using the threat or practice of force in relations between democracies can itself be seen as placing such relationships within a security community (Russett, 1993: 42). For Adler and Barnett, there is nevertheless a key divide in that the democratic peace approach does not allow for the possibility of security communities emerging between states that are not democracies (1998: 12). The security community approach, by focusing on the emergence of community, does not require democracy as a necessity, though it is clear that the particular features of democratic societies make them stronger candidates, and the historical record of peaceful interaction between nondemocratic regimes lacks the statistical frequency that is shown by democracies interacting. Amitav Acharya, however, has made a cogent case for seeing the ASEAN states as a "nascent" security community, despite their differences in political systems (1998: 219).

The research into security communities and democratic peace demonstrates that it is possible to explore different understandings of security while still operating within a paradigm that does not challenge the view of the state as the central actor, or the existence of an international anarchy shaped by the security dilemma, and research into security communities is therefore close to realism in crucial respects. However, by accepting that security is a social construction, and that the domestic form of the state can be a major contributor to the nature of bilateral and regional security relationships, these approaches embody a conception of security that is implicitly critical of classical and structural realism. For some of the proponents of the idea of security communities, the approach offers the possibility of finding a "middle way" between realism and idealism, which combines a focus on the state and military power with an acceptance of the possibility of effective evolutionary change in governing norms and institutional arrangements to provide security (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 15).

In the post-Cold War period these processes have been strongly reinforced. To a significant extent the state has undergone a "legitimacy deficit," with its territorial integrity being eroded by new forms of transnational management and intergovernmental institutions that are more effective at dealing with problems that cut across national borders (Clark, 1999: 120). John Baylis and Steve Smith argue that the ambivalence of globalization processes "reinforces the search for *national security*, and at the same time leads states to seek greater *multilateral and global solutions* as they are less able to provide security for their own citizens" (1997: 272).

These approaches explicitly draw on the same positivist and rationalist methodologies that mainstream realism draws on. Their significance is that they are indicative of a move during the Cold War period to explore understandings of security and community building in a way that clearly departed from prevailing realist orthodoxy, but without abandoning the majority of realism's assumptions and methodology.

Ole Waever has pointed out that in its original Deutschian formulation, the idea of the "security" community operated with a very limited conception of what constituted security as such, so that in effect security could be more accurately described as "nonwar." To this extent it can be seen as being "at odds with most on-going efforts to redefine and broaden it" (Waever, 1998: 76).

This is true. However, in practice, the linking of ideas of security, community, and ideology has been important not only in terms of their interrelationships, but also because their confluence in particular regions of the world has helped construct emergent security communities. These groups of states are more open to reconceptualization of the meanings of "power" and "security" in ways that enable them to embrace a broader, multidimensional approach to security itself (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 4).

FOUR

The Broader Agenda

In trying to develop a better understanding of security, a major advance was the "broadening" of the concept to encompass additional sectors, a process that took place during the 1980s, though it had been anticipated to some extent by studies published in the previous decade. "Security" is a socially constructed concept. It has a specific meaning only within a particular social context. Its received meaning is therefore subject to change as a result of material changes in the external environment and changes in the ways in which we think about issues. This process of conceptual reevaluation was clearly evident in the thinking about security that occurred during the 1980s.

During that decade, the traditional approach to security came to be subjected to a barrage of criticism. It might be thought that this was a natural result of the winding down and eventual end of the Cold War. As the super-power military confrontation faded, so it became possible to address other, previously ignored, conceptions of security. This is not the case, however. There may have been a general sense in which, as the Cold War wound down, alternative conceptions gained easier acceptance, but it is a striking fact that the breakthrough contributions to what would be sustained debate came in 1983, at the height of the renewed Cold War. In the same year that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were deploying new generations of nuclear weapons in Europe, and President Ronald Reagan was announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative, two important critiques of traditional security thinking were published: Richard Ullman's article "Redefining Security" (1983) in the flagship realist journal *International Security*, and Barry Buzan's book *People, States, and Fear* (1983; 1st ed.). Their arguments had been anticipated to a certain degree by the UN's Brandt Commission, whose 1980 report *North-South: A Programme for Survival* had "called for a new concept of security that would transcend the narrow notions of military defence and look more towards the logic of a broader independence" (1980: 124).

1 Constructivist theories

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of constructivist theories, their application in the study of security, and their relation to the field of critical security studies. Rather than portraying 'constructivism' as a monolithic theoretical approach, the chapter instead makes the case that social constructivist approaches to security are best thought of as a plurality of approaches that converge around some key assumptions but diverge on others. Although they might be argued to share, at a minimum, the assumption that security and insecurity should be conceived of as socially constructed, different variants of constructivism diverge on the precise implications and significance of that claim. The chapter reviews these issues, with a particular focus on the contributions of (critical) constructivist theories to (critical) security studies.

Introduction

Social constructivist (or now simply referred to as constructivist) theories have become an established point of reference in the disciplinary study of both international relations (IR) and security over the past two decades in particular. As the use of 'theories' in the plural above already alludes to, there is a strong case to be made for distinguishing between different variants of constructivist theories. There is even an argument that a focus on social construction within the study of security is not simply limited to constructivist theories. To try and help make sense of these various issues and distinctions, this chapter begins with a general discussion of the principle of social construction, focusing initially in particular on one of the original formulations of this idea, namely in the work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991 [1966]). Although not alone in emphasising the significance of social construction, Berger and Luckmann's work remains a touchstone in this regard and introduces a theoretical lexicon that arguably still remains foundational to later variants of constructivist theories in IR and security studies. The substantive sections of the chapter then go on to outline and discuss how different those different variants of constructivist theories interpret and apply the notion of social construction. The particular emphasis here is on the distinguishing features of 'conventional constructivism' on the one hand, which arguably seeks to refine rather than fundamentally challenge key predicates of traditional security studies, and 'critical constructivism' on the other hand, which poses more avowedly and self-consciously 'critical' questions on the social construction of threats, dangers and insecurities.

On the social construction of reality

So what is social construction? Or, to put that question differently, what is it that characterises 'constructivist' or 'social constructivist' theories such that we can speak of these as relatively distinct from other theoretical approaches? At the very broadest level of categorisation, it can be argued that constructivist theories share the contention that 'human reality' is 'socially constructed reality' (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966]: 210–211). Those terms come from Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's aptly titled book *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Berger and Luckmann's treatise takes as its main focus the ways in which 'the intersubjective common-sense world is constructed' (1991 [1966]: 34, emphasis in original). By this Berger and Luckmann mean that humans are, fundamentally, social beings: that is, humans exist (or more accurately co-exist) within societies. How we come to apprehend the world around us, Berger and Luckmann argue, is influenced by pre-existing social conventions and institutions and is filtered and mediated via pre-existing frameworks for learning and understanding, most notably language.

By claiming that human reality is socially constructed, Berger and Luckmann do not seek to deny that all members of a social group are at the same time different and distinct as individuals; nor is the claim intended to imply that human reality is completely free or independent of humans' biological being or their surrounding physical environment. Instead Berger and Luckmann argue that the formation of individuals' identities as such is crucially forged out of an individual's engagement with the social world into which they are born. And when individuals begin to adopt, consciously and unconsciously, the norms and conventions of the social world that they engage with, they undergo a process of 'socialisation'. Our notions of individual self-identity, Berger and Luckmann argue, thus emerge out of complex processes of intersubjective interaction and subtle and on-going processes of identity formation. In this context, the term 'intersubjective' means that these processes happen in the communication and interaction between different 'subjects' or individuals, each with their own constantly developing sense of self-identity (see Box 1.1).

Box 1.1 Berger and Luckmann on 'The reality of everyday life'

The reality of everyday life is organised around the 'here' of my body and the 'now' of my present. This 'here and now' is the focus of my attention to everyday life [...] [However] The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective world, a world that I share with others. [...] Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others [...] I also know, of course, that the others have a perspective on this world that is not identical with mine. My 'here' is their 'there'. My 'now' does not fully overlap with theirs. My projects differ from and may even conflict with theirs. All the same, I know that I live with them in a common world. Most importantly, I know there is an ongoing correspondence between my meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality.

(Abridged from Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966]: 36–37; emphases in original)

Berger and Luckmann do not deny that humans have certain biological drives and needs and that, for example, certain physical features of the natural environment exist. However, they take issue with the idea that these drives and physical features might determine the whole of humans' reality. You, as reader, might hypothetically feel pangs of hunger reading this text

having not eaten since breakfast; but the question of what you 'want' to eat for lunch is not simply based on a biological need to eat. All sorts of other factors come into play: social conventions as to when lunch is eaten as distinct from other meals; as to what is 'appropriate' to eat for lunch (ice-cream alone, for example, might be deemed by some to be inappropriate as a lunch meal, even if some might try to claim that ice-cream's nutritional value would provide enough nutritional sustenance...). The decision of where you might go to buy lunch is not simply an issue of how far to walk and the impeding terrain (bodily and geographical factors) but of how much to you wish to pay, and when you need to get back to work in order to meet a deadline. Of the latter, financial systems that establish rates of pay, the value of particular foodstuffs, and the nature of academic deadlines can be argued to be products of social, human-made, systems as opposed to naturally occurring physical or biological features. These would all instead fall into the category of what Berger and Luckmann term as 'socio-cultural determinants', rather than biological or physical determinants, of how humans interact with each other, and act in, the world around them (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966]: 66–67).

Security: What states make of it?

What relevance, you might be asking, does reflecting on such apparently mundane aspects of everyday life (a technique that is used recurrently by Berger and Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality*) have to the study of security? Taken as a whole, constructivist approaches to the study of security might be said to be underpinned by two key assumptions: first the observation that 'security' and 'insecurity' are categorisations that emerge out of and are applied to the realm of human activities; and second, following on from this, that many of the concepts, processes and dynamics identified by Berger and Luckmann – the social construction of reality, intersubjectivity, identity formation and socialisation – are as applicable to the study of security as they are to the study of any realm of social life.

More than this, those adopting or advocating a constructivist theoretical approach to the study of security would go further and argue that the study of security is not simply an area where the insights of social constructivism *can* be applied but where they *should* be applied. In particular, critics of 'mainstream' or 'traditional' approaches to the study of international security have argued that such approaches underestimate, marginalise or simply miss the crucial importance of social construction (Wendt 1995). Thus, for example, the editor of a key collection of essays that began to take seriously the 'sociocultural determinants' of national and international security cast that volume's purposes as part of a broader effort to '[make] problematic the state interests that predominant explanations of national security often take for granted [...] State interests do not exist to be "discovered" by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction' (Katzenstein 1996a: 1; 2). Katzenstein's volume, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, advocated that 'sociological approaches' could be used to generate new insights on the roles of culture, norms and identity formation in relation to 'traditional' security issue areas such as the proliferation of conventional weapons, national military doctrines, deterrence and military alliances, using 'culture' as 'a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law' (Katzenstein 1996a: 6). Contributing authors made the argument that, even in relation to 'hard cases' of military security issues, mainstream (neo)realist and (neo)liberal theoretical approaches to security in particular tended to miss key pieces of 'puzzles' in world politics such as the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union, which both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism are

both frequently accused of failing to either foresee or adequately account for (Katzenstein 1996a: 3, 1996b: 499). Mainstream approaches instead tended to predict either the continuation of the cold war or its violent conclusion in nuclear war. Relatedly, the continuance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Soviet Union's demise seemed to fundamentally contradict the expectation of traditional alliance theory that military alliances dissolve in the absence of a common threat (cf. Ciută 2002; Gheciu 2005; Risse-Kappen 1996; Williams and Neumann 2002). In short, mainstream approaches to the study of international security appeared to be at a loss to explain issues and developments – the trajectory of the cold war and the nature of military alliances – that had somewhat ironically been their central concern for several decades.

In the wake of mainstream security studies' apparent difficulties in explaining major changes in world politics – particularly the cold war's end – multiple scholars began to advocate variants of constructivism as a superior way of understanding key issues in the study of international security. Thus, for example, Alexander Wendt argues that the 'security dilemma', which arguably remains at the core of 'mainstream' or 'traditional' approaches to the study of international security, can only be truly understood via a constructivist framework of analysis. The concept of the security dilemma, as set out originally in the work of realist IR scholars such as John Herz and Robert Jervis, argues that in the realm of international politics a state will necessarily compete to preserve its own existence as its principal objective, but that in doing so it will inadvertently increase the insecurity of other states in the international system (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; for an extended discussion see Booth and Wheeler 2007). According to the logic of the security dilemma, particularly as read and rendered by neorealist approaches to the study of international politics, states exist in a condition of 'anarchy': that is, states are each sovereign powers within their own territorial boundaries, but exist without any overarching sovereign power above them. Traditional approaches to security, though diverse in character, thus tend to hold the baseline proposition that world politics is *international politics*: that is, it occurs 'between' separate nation-states rather than 'above' them, so to speak.

Such conditions, it is argued, give rise to the security dilemma as an endemic feature of world politics. Without any external government or guarantor for protection, states are forced to look to their own means first in order to assure their protection and their self-preservation. This necessarily means, according to the neorealist theorist Kenneth Waltz, that the contemporary international system is a 'self-help' system (Waltz 1979): states have to be self-reliant in their own quest for national self-preservation by investing in the military means to protect themselves. The problem this gives rise to, according to the logic of the security dilemma, is that in seeking to protect their territorial security, states may inadvertently create greater insecurity for others. Material military capabilities – land armies, tanks, navies, air-forces, nuclear weapons and so on – can be used for offensive purposes as well as self-protection. Scholars such as Herz and Jervis saw this as potentially problematic, for one state could never be entirely sure that a military build-up by another was intended purely for defensive purposes. To guard against the possibility that such a build-up may actually be geared towards invasion or military expansion, the logical option would be for all states to likewise arm themselves as far as possible as a preventive measure. This in turn would lead to the same and reciprocal insecurities for other states, leading in the worst cases to cyclical and potentially disastrous arms races. The 'dilemma' of the security dilemma, then, is argued to be the fact that states in world politics are faced with (only) two unappealing choices: either to arm for self-defence but risk creating cyclical insecurities and having to engage in cyclical arms racing; or remain unarmed, but then remain at the mercy of predatory states that might choose to arm and invade.

Wendt, though agreeing with the existence of the security dilemma dynamic as a potential feature of international politics, argues that traditional approaches and (neo)realists in particular crucially misunderstand the nature of security dilemmas. According to Wendt, a security dilemma is a 'social structure composed of *intersubjective* understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others' intentions, and as a result *define their interests in self-help terms*' (Wendt 1995: 73, emphases added). Although Wendt agrees on the existence of security dilemmas between states, his qualifiers make important distinctions from traditional understandings. Wendt, in a manner akin to Berger and Luckmann, does not deny the existence of material (military) capabilities. But, he contends, 'material capabilities as such explain nothing; their effects presuppose structures of shared knowledge, which vary and which are not reducible to capabilities' (Wendt 1995: 73). Wendt famously illustrates this point by noting that '500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings' (Wendt 1995: 73). Although in Wendt's illustration the material capability of the British is greater than that of the North Koreans, they are interpreted by the US as being less of a threat because the British state is regarded traditionally as a friend (amity), but North Korea is not. Whereas North Korea has a history of enmity with the US that has manifested itself in outright conflict (the Korean war of 1950–1953) and in subsequent characterisation of North Korea as a 'rogue state' in US security policy discourse, Britain is routinely characterised by US policy makers as having a 'special relationship' with it, as well as having institutionalised alliance ties via bilateral relations and as a 'friend' within NATO. The US 'interest' in preventing or containing North Korean nuclearisation on the one hand and accepting Britain's nuclearisation on the other hand is thus argued to be inseparable from their identification of one as 'opponent' and the other as 'ally'.

Wendt argues that even if states exist within a condition of 'anarchy', their actual relationships within that anarchic context can vary significantly and can evolve and change over time, leading to Wendt's much cited claim that 'Anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt 1992). While traditional accounts view the security dilemma as a 'seemingly natural social structure' (Wendt 1995: 74), Wendt argues that it is the social nature of the structure that allows scope for it to change over time. Thus, for instance, US–British relations have shifted significantly from the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in which, far from a 'special relationship' of amity, the US tended to regard the British state as a predatory imperialist oppressor and Britain likewise regarded the newly independent US as a rebellious upstart. Wendt thus contends that constructivist approaches remind us that even the most apparently intractable security dilemmas might be amenable to progressive improvement, and the efforts of human agents to assist such improvement. Thus, for example, the apparent 'inevitable' end of the cold war in nuclear Armageddon could instead give way to 'peaceful change'; and the history of Franco–German enmity that was at the crux of two world wars could instead evolve to become the basis, via the processes of integration that have ultimately constituted the European Union (EU), of a pan-European 'security community' (see Box 1.2).

Wendt does not argue that simply because the potential exists for 'security dilemmas' to give way to 'security communities' that this will always happen or be practically possible. As he puts it, 'to say that structures are socially constructed is no guarantee that they can be changed' (Wendt 1995: 80). But in Wendt's view constructivist theories can make a significant contribution to critical theoretical approaches to the study of IR more generally by making allowance for the potential of such progressive change in nation-states' security relations.

Box 1.2 From security dilemmas to security communities

Wendt makes the case that whereas a security dilemma is a 'social structure' distinguished and characterised by mistrust between states, a 'security community' is 'a different social structure, in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war' (1995: 73). Wendt's use of the term presaged the work of Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a, 1998b) on 'security communities' and their extension of that concept as originally formulated by the IR theorist Karl Deutsch. In the 1950s and 1960s Deutsch developed a theory known as 'transactionalism' to try and understand and explain the increasing level of interaction (or 'transactions') between states globally in the post-war era. This approach is also sometimes known as 'pluralism', or the 'communications approach' because of its emphasis on communication and interaction as the basis of integration. Deutsch argued that the ultimate outcome of transactionalism was a 'security community', a situation in which the prospect of war between a group of states has been eradicated due to deeply embedded structures of communication. Deutsch's ideas were revisited by Adler and Barnett in the late 1990s. They argue that the 'logic of anarchy' can in certain instances be superseded by the 'logic of community' – the idea that 'actors can share values, norms and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust' (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 3). Their approach suggests that international organisations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU, NATO and the Association of South East Asian Nations all (to varying degrees) display elements of the collective values, shared identity and relations of trust and reciprocity that Deutsch expected to be characteristic of security communities. Given the emphasis on collective identity and values, Adler and Barnett (1998b: 59) argue that a constructivist approach is best suited to the purposes of assessing how and when security communities form between states, and for evaluating whether they are 'loosely' or 'tightly' integrated as such.

From 'security communities' to 'cultures of insecurity': Critical constructivism and boundary debates

The variant of constructivist theory advocated by Wendt (see also in particular Wendt 1999) is one of the most notable, influential and widely cited post-cold war contributions to the theorisation of IR. As detailed above, much of that contribution has been based on direct engagement with and interrogation of the traditional terrain and terminology of security studies: the security dilemma, military alliances and nuclear deterrence. Some scholars have, however, raised questions over exactly how much of departure from mainstream IR theory and traditional security studies Wendtian constructivism is (see Hopf 1998; Zehfuss 2001). Wendt, for his part, hopes that his version of constructivism could be agreeable to schools of 'critical' thought in IR theory – 'postmodernists', 'neo-Marxists', 'feminists', and other constructivist theorists (1995: 71). At the same time, Wendt admits in the same article to his agreement with specific key traditional realist and neorealist IR theory assumptions: 'that international politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, [that states] cannot be 100 per cent certain about others' intentions [...] and a commitment to states as units of analysis, and to the importance of systemic or "third image" theorizing' (1995: 72). Thus, for example, Wendt does not reject the assumption that contemporary international politics is fundamentally composed of states interacting within an anarchic environment. Rather he suggests that realists and neorealist theoretical approaches (as well as other 'mainstream' liberal and neoliberal IR theoretical approaches) underestimate the importance of

(variations) in state identity within that context, and the range of possible modes of state interaction that arise as result (see Wendt 1992).

This has led some scholars to argue that Wendtian constructivism is representative of a 'conventional' theoretical approach, whereby conventional constructivism is distinguished by a desire to present 'an alternative to mainstream international relations theory' by offering 'constructivist solutions' to 'mainstream puzzles' (Hopf 1998: 172, 186). Likewise, the version of constructivist theory advocated by Katzenstein, for example, welcomes 'broader' security studies in terms of an expanded range of focus but 'only if the issues and actors that it studies have some demonstrable links to states and questions of military importance' (1996b: 525). In both cases, the emphasis on states and their military relations so characteristic of traditional approaches to the study of security remain intact even as conventional constructivists suggest new ways of studying and understandings international security.

Hopf (1998: 182) suggests that we can distinguish this 'conventional' variant of constructivist theory in the study of international relations from a more avowedly 'critical' variant. Both 'conventional constructivism' and 'critical constructivism' share, he argues, 'theoretical fundamentals'. Hopf, however, distinguishes critical constructivism from its conventional counterpart on the basis that critical constructivism is argued to be 'more closely tied to critical social theory' and, by consequence, to the goal of 'unmasking' (1998: 172, 185) the hierarchies of power that inherently exist within social relations. Hopf argues that conventional constructivism of the kind espoused by Wendt and Katzenstein promises a 'research agenda' (1998: 171) that aspires to be 'analytically neutral' and can fit with both mainstream IR theory and traditional security studies, but critical constructivism is more likely to be directly and explicitly critical of the disciplinary foundations of both.

Weldes *et al.* (1999) explicitly make the case for a specifically critical constructivist approach to the study of security and insecurity that adopts this more critical outlook towards the study of security. Critical constructivism, they argue, is loosely identifiable by adherence to the following analytical commitments: First, that 'What is understood as reality is socially constructed'; second, that 'Constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power. In turn, certain agents or groups of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities'; and third, that 'A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offers guidelines for the transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-worlds. It also problematizes the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also reflexive' (Weldes *et al.* 1999: 13; and on the last point compare also Fierke 1998: 94–110). Although the first of these principles can be said to be shared with conventional constructivism and consistent with Berger and Luckmann's earlier theses, the latter two principles are more radically at odds with conventional constructivists' aspiration to create an analytically neutral research agenda that takes certain key assumptions of mainstream IR theory and traditional security studies for granted. One way in which Weldes *et al.* (1999) seek to heighten this distinction is by emphasizing a focus not on 'security' *per se* but on 'insecurity' and the social 'production of danger' as key constitutive dimensions of social relations in general and international politics in particular. As they put it:

insecurities, rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural productions. One way to get at the constructed nature of insecurities is to examine the fundamental ways in which insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurity are mutually constituted; that is, in contrast to the received view, which treats the objects of insecurity and insecurities themselves as pre-given or natural, and as ontologically separate things, we treat

them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions: insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted.

(Weldes *et al.* 1999: 10)

At least two important points are notable from the view offered in this quotation. The first is that Weldes *et al.* make no direct initial reference to states in this discussion. In fact they instead suggest that we should not 'treat the objects of insecurity' as 'pre-given or natural'. In contrast to conventional constructivism, this suggests an approach that would seek to question the assumption of states as the pre-given objects of analysis in the study of international relations and security. A critical constructivist approach seeks to account for the apparent predominance of that assumption in the first place as well as the historical and contextual factors that give rise to that assumption. Weldes, for example, argues that Wendt's understanding of the state 'continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests [...] The state itself is treated as a black box whose internal workings are irrelevant to the construction of state identity and interests' (Weldes 1999: 9; see Zehfuss 2001 for an extended critique of Wendt's conception of state identity along related lines). This is not to say that states are unimportant, or that we should not seek to study them as both human communities and institutionalised forms of political association. But the point is precisely that states are *human* communities – or 'imagined communities' (see Anderson 1991) – formed out of lengthy, complex, messy and uneven processes of formation and institutionalisation. Critical constructivist accounts of state identity, then, cannot simply assume the metaphorical boundaries of a state's identity or its interests, but rather seeks to question how particular forms of identity and particular conceptions of the 'national interest' come to predominate at any given moment (see Weldes 1999; Steele 2008). Further to this, scholars such as Fierke emphasise the very 'centrality of language' (1997: 225) in the construction of understandings of security and insecurity, and the employment of metaphors of family, protection and domesticity in underpinning states' national security policies and 'architectures' (see also Chapter 3).

The second notable point from the quotation in Box 1.3 is that insecurities and dangers are social constructions that are seen to have constitutive identity effects. In other words, Weldes *et al.* make the proposition that elements of 'danger' in social relationships might actually have productive effects: productive not necessarily in terms of being desirable, but in producing distinctions between self and other, between friend and foe, and between states of security and insecurity. As they argue in relation to the social construction of nuclear insecurity (see Box 1.3), Weldes *et al.* do not claim that this position amounts to a rejection of the proposition that there is material reality ('Our constructivism would not deny that nuclear weapons exist', as stated in the quote in Box 1.3). However, as Fierke (1998: 11) puts it, 'material possibility is linguistically constituted' (see also Chapter 5, Box 5.3). Humans interpret and represent the world they encounter, primarily through language. On the basis that there can be multiple ways of interpreting reality constructivists seek to question how it is that certain ways of interpreting and representing reality come into being, predominate and enable particular courses of action.

At first glance, the discussion of the social construction of nuclear insecurity in Box 1.3 would seem to simply reiterate Wendt's observation (as discussed earlier in the chapter) that, historically, for the US state North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons has consistently been regarded as much more of a danger than Britain's possession of nuclear weapons. The general example, Wendt argues, indicates that states do identify and treat each other

Box 1.3 On the social construction of nuclear insecurity

To refer to something as socially constructed is not at all the same as saying that it does not exist [...] Our constructivism would not deny that nuclear weapons exist, that their use could maim and kill millions of people, and that a number of states possess a nuclear capability (including the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan, at least). On this a constructivist and the most empiricist of arms-control experts can agree. [...] In the face of the heterogeneous dangers represented by nuclear weapons, there is nonetheless an established common sense, made real in collective discourse, that foregrounds some dangers while repressing or ignoring others so that, for example, Americans are more likely to be afraid of Pakistani than of British nuclear weapons, although neither have ever been used. It is this discursive constitution of the *threat* represented by nuclear weapons that we refer to as 'construction,' and it means not that the weapons have been made up but that their meaning has been molded in discourse.

(Weldes *et al.* 1999: 12, emphasis in original)

differently in their assumptions and interactions. Weldes *et al.* similarly argue that 'Americans are more likely to be afraid of Pakistani than of British nuclear weapons'. But they go even further than this by arguing that 'In the face of the heterogeneous dangers represented by nuclear weapons, there is nonetheless an established common sense [...] that foregrounds some dangers while repressing or ignoring others' (Box 1.3). Why is it, we might ask, that for American citizens, North Korean or Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons might be assumed to be more of a 'danger' or 'threat' than America's own possession of nuclear weapons? The US is, as Weldes *et al.* implicitly allude to, the only state to have ever used nuclear weapons in conflict to date (in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945), but is often assumed to be a 'reasonable' nuclear weapons state (Gusterson 2004: 25). The very 'existence' of nuclear weapons actually means that all states that possess such weapons run the risks of accidental use (see, for example, Schlosser 2013 for an extended discussion of 'near misses' during the cold war) that would have the same destructive effects as the use of such weapons in war, and issues over the safe maintenance of weapons materials and facilities over time and their impact upon local habitats and communities (see Masco 1999). Why, we might ask, have these 'dangers' been less prominent, both in the academic study of security and in policy terms, in historical discussions of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence?

A critical constructivist approach to nuclear insecurities thus illustrates Weldes *et al.*'s broader contention that 'Constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power' (Weldes *et al.* 1999: 13). Gusterson's (2004) work on 'nuclear orientalism', for example, extends the argument to make the case that Western states have historically been able, by drawing on 'orientalist' representations of the non-Western 'other', to render 'Third World' possession of nuclear weapons as inherently more dangerous than their possession by 'established' nuclear powers. Fierke in particular notes the effect of particular kinds of 'language games' (drawing on the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein) in the rhetoric of the NATO alliance's promise to use nuclear weapons in defence of Europe that 'replac[ed] the destructive, fearful emotions associated with nuclear war with positive emotions of safety and belonging' (1997: 247). Similarly, Weldes' examination of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forensically details how practices and processes of identity construction by both US policy makers and in subsequent historical recounting not only constructed the

deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a global 'crisis', but also as a moment that reinforced the 'construction of the United States as the hemispheric and global leader with both a moral obligation and formal commitments to defend freedom' (Weldes 1999: 203). As such, Weldes argues that the construction of the Cuban missile crisis generally enabled the construction of US state identity as a defender of freedom, the Soviet Union as its evil 'Other' and Cuba as the backdrop or simply a 'physical space' under 'foreign domination' (1999: 39) in which the contest between the two superpowers would take place rather than a substantive state actor in its own right. That particular construction, Weldes argues, meant that the US could portray and pursue particular courses of action as 'commonsensical', as well as reinforcing and reifying a lasting identity construction of the US as the rightful leader of the 'free world' (see also Fierke 1997: 230–231).

While critical constructivism has clear applications to the study of inter-state relations and socially constructed worlds that policy makers interact in, there is also a much more explicit sense in critical constructivist scholarship that security is not – and should not – solely be considered as 'what states', or state elites, 'make of it'. Critical constructivism is concerned, to borrow a phrase again from Berger and Luckmann, with the intersubjective construction of 'common-sense' understandings of the world. Likewise individuals' common-sense understandings of the world are informed, implicitly and explicitly, by their experiences of everyday life and by processes of socialisation. This has two potentially radical implications for how critical constructivists suggest that we should approach the study of security. The first is that even in the realm of the 'high politics' of elite-led state interaction, the cultural sources of individuals' common-sense understandings of the world are replete with conceptualisations and beliefs that are potentially informed by a much wider range of cultural sources than just the formal policy realm. Weldes (1999: 241–242) for example argues that in order for policy makers to make their representations 'plausible and persuasive' and, ultimately, meaningful to broader audiences, they necessarily draw on a range of popular cultural, common-sense, discursive resources (see Box 1.4). She terms this process, drawing on the work of the post-Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1971) and its subsequent interpretation by the cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1985) as 'interpellation': that is, the ways in which individuals come to recognise and associate their own identity with wider identity formations that are articulated in, for example, formal policy discourses. Thus, for example, when national political leaders make a claim about what it means to be an 'American', 'French', 'South African', and so on, they will often invoke specific cultural and historical markers of that national identity, in the hope if not the expectation that a majority of an audience will recognise and agree with that articulation of national identity (a process that Althusser (1971) terms as 'hailing', likening this identity claim to the process of a shouted call to which individuals then respond to). And in the process of socially constructing and specifying notions of the national interest, and threats and dangers to the nation state and its identity, policy makers often draw on a wide range of cultural resources in attempting to specify both the nature of a threat and its referent object.

So, to continue the exemplification of this point as made in Weldes' study of the Cuban missile crisis, she argues that the representation of the 'crisis' as such was the product of a 'security imaginary', a 'structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created'. US policy makers' security imaginary of the Cuban missile crisis, she argues, drew upon pre-existing popular representations of the time of 'Red Fascism' and 'Russian oriental despotism' as ways of constructing the immediacy and seriousness of the Soviet threat in a familiar and recognisable way (Weldes 1999: 129–136; see also Doty 1993; Campbell 1992).

Box 1.4 Popular culture and the social production of dangers Weldes (1999: 241) makes the argument that:

The reproduction of common sense, and specifically of the grounds upon which particular representations are constructed and make sense [...] cannot be restricted to the representational practices of state actors. [...] Representing world politics is not an unusual or extraordinary activity; rather it is a relentlessly mundane and commonplace one. A key site at which that representation takes place, then, is in popular culture, in the everyday practices of meaning making that structure the quotidian.

A representative example of the extension of this approach can be found in Rowley and Weldes (2012) where the authors use the popular US television series *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* (and its spin-off *Angel*) to engage fundamental questions of the everyday constructions of danger insecurity and, as illustrated by the key characters' development and interactions, to make the case that such constructions rarely fit neatly into clearly divided states of security versus insecurity, safety versus danger. More generally, the examination of popular cultural constructions of security and insecurity is a growing area of research. Among multiple possible examples, Grayson *et al.* (2009) make the case for substantive incorporation of the study of popular culture into IR more generally; Grayson (2012) employs a reading of the biblical story of Judith in order to critically engage with representation of political assassination in Western cultural understandings of political violence; Dobrix (2008) assesses the role of visual culture and media in constituting the 'tabloid geopolitics' of the US war on terror; Lisle (2007: 334) investigates what the cultural phenomenon of 'dark tourism' – tourist visits to sites of assassinations, atrocities and wars – indicates in relation to the popular 'consumption of danger'; and Salter (2011) analyses the ways in which best-selling video games such as *Civilization* and *Grand Theft Auto IV* reproduce popular geopolitical imaginaries.

The second potentially radical implication of the approach suggested by Weldes in particular is that 'security imaginaries' pervade not only the worlds of policy makers but also the everyday lives of individuals more generally in a range of popular cultural discourses, practices and artefacts.

As discussed in Box 1.4, this opens up the spectrum of analysis of critical constructivist approaches to the study of security in a way that most proponents of traditional approaches to the study of security, and even conventional constructivist approaches, are likely to be uncomfortable with. In, for instance, using the 'Buffyverse' (Rowley and Weldes 2012) as way to interrogate and understand not only everyday constructions of insecurity and danger but also narrative constructions of the evolution of (critical) security studies, Rowley and Weldes (and others – see Box 1.4) arguably challenge the conventional boundaries of what is to be included in the study of security. While critics might argue that this risks loading the study of security with the weight of examining the wide and amorphous category of 'popular culture', this focus on popular culture and the everyday production of dangers usefully provokes reflection on the extent to which security studies, and even some variants of critical security studies, have tended to privilege analysis of 'exceptional' measures and the discourses and activities of political elites over and above the mundane, quotidian constructions of danger and insecurity or their interrelation.

Conclusion

As with all of the approaches covered in this book, a final point for consideration is the extent to which constructivist theories are distinct from or overlap with other positions considered in Part I of this text. On the question of whether constructivist theories constitute a distinct strand of approaches to the study of security, this chapter has made the case that there are at least two distinctive constructivist theoretical approaches. This is not to say, however, that either conventional constructivist approaches or critical constructivist approaches are hermetically sealed off from the other approaches covered here. At a general level, it might be said, as noted already in the Introduction to this book, that adherence to the idea that reality is socially constructed is a recurrent theme across all of the approaches covered in Part I. More nuanced differences begin to emerge in ways in which each of the approaches incorporate, address and extend that assumption, and this becomes clearer in comparison with the other individual chapters: feminist and gender approaches (Chapter 3) tend to home in on the social construction of gender identities; postcolonial approaches on constructions of an oriental 'Other' (Chapter 4); poststructuralism on binary and hierarchical constructions of 'Self' and 'Other' (Chapter 5); and securitisation theory on a specific mode of constructing existential threats that is argued to be peculiar to security discourses (Chapter 6).

In relation to Chapter 2, while the exact overlap with the critical theoretical approach advocated by the Welsh School is perhaps less obvious, the notion of security as a 'derivative concept' as advocated by the latter can still be related to a broader upholding of the notion of security as socially constructed. Moreover, even if critical constructivism clearly does not necessarily sign up to the precise notion of 'emancipation' covered in Chapter 2, Weldes *et al.*'s commitment to the use of critical constructivism to allow for 'facilitating the imagining of alternative life worlds' (1999:13) might at the very least be said to carry a more qualified commitment to identifying the potential for progressive social change. Fierke similarly argues that constructivist theory can be 'pushed[d] further' to include an explicitly critical and emancipatory purpose that draws on the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School (see Chapter 2 in this book) if, rather than simply describing processes of social construction, it:

makes us look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar. In this way, new spaces are opened for thinking about the meaning of the past and the present, and, therefore, how we construct the future.

(Fierke 1998: 11, 13)

Critical constructivism by virtue not only of its 'critical' appellation but its more general tenets and approach, thus clearly overlaps with the field of critical security studies if the latter is broadly conceived of. Indeed, critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches are often seen to bleed into one another to such an extent that it is common to find certain authors (Jutta Weldes and David Campbell being prominent examples) identified in the literature as key proponents of both. In closing though, it is worth reiterating not just the significance of social construction to the study of security, but also the distinct contributions of different variants of constructivist theoretical scholarship as discussed in this chapter.

Key points

- Constructivist theoretical approaches to the study of security might be said to share in common a concern with the intersubjective construction of security relations.
- Beyond this, a distinction can be made between conventional constructivist and critical constructivist theoretical approaches.
- Conventional constructivist approaches tend to accept key 'puzzles' as identified in traditional security studies, such as the security dilemma and explaining the maintenance and dissolution of military alliances between states, but offer constructivist accounts in response that emphasise the roles played by intersubjectivity and identity in states' interactions.
- Critical constructivist approaches are distinguished by their attention to how questions of power are inherent within social relations and common sense understandings of the world, are by a normative concern with identifying the ways in which dominant understandings of the world preclude the articulation and production of alternative life-worlds.
- Critical constructivist approaches also allow for a more heterodox and pluralist theoretical and methodological approach that is not limited to examination of state actors, but can also include analysis of everyday representations of insecurity and danger and focus on multiple cultural sources of both state and non-state security imaginaries.

Discussion points

- What is the potential significance of the claim that security is 'socially constructed'?
- What are the political and methodological implications of adopting a social constructivist approach to the study of security?
- In relation to the study of security, what is 'critical' about 'critical constructivism'?
- How should we define and study culture in relation to security?
- To what extent do other theoretical approaches within this text share or challenge the key tenets of constructivist theories?

Guide to further reading

Alexander Wendt (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Provides an extended version of Wendt's argument that 'anarchy', and by implication security, is 'what states make of it'.

Jarrod Hayes (2013) *Constructing National Security: US Relations with India and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A more recent attempt to apply and extend a modified constructivist approach to understanding processes of threat construction in relations between states.

Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds) (1999) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press). As well as a key introductory chapter by the editors, this edited collection offers critical constructivist perspectives in application to a wide range of issues and cases.

Karin M. Fierke (1999) *Changing Games, Changing Strategies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Fierke's theoretically detailed and empirically rich analysis of East-West relations in the last two decades of the cold war seeks to push constructivist approaches to the study of security further by combining a Wittgensteinian approach to 'language games' with the critical intent of the Frankfurt School tradition.

Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press). Makes the case for a constructivist approach to the

study of states' distinct national security cultures, with multiple contributions on specific case studies.

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Penguin Books). First published in 1966 and in multiple editions since then, Berger and Luckmann's text remains a key starting point for further reading on the topic of social construction.

2 Critical Theory

Abstract

Among the multiple critical approaches to security, one specific variant – Critical Security Studies (CSS), or the Welsh School approach – has sought to explicitly link the study of security to Critical Theory. This chapter locates the key intellectual origins and developments in this understanding of CSS, before moving on to discuss in more detail its central ideas. Particular attention is paid to the concept of ‘emancipation’ as viewed from a CSS perspective and to the issue of how security theory and security practices are related to one another. The chapter also goes on to discuss some of the most prominent criticisms of Welsh School CSS before evaluating the contributions, limitations and potentialities of this particular interpretation of the relationship between Critical Theory and security.

Introduction

Although critical security studies is increasingly recognised and used as a term, the significance of appending the word ‘critical’ to ‘security studies’ has been interpreted in several different ways. One particular school of thought – known variously as ‘Critical Security Studies’, ‘CSS’ (upper case), or sometimes as the ‘Welsh School’ of security studies (see Box 2.1) – argues that relating the study of security to ‘Critical Theory’ generates a specific range of theoretical, methodological and normative implications. One proponent has summed up these implications as entailing the ‘broadening’, ‘deepening’, ‘extending’ and ‘focusing’ of security studies (Wyn Jones 1999: 166). ‘Broadening’ refers to a conception of security studies that includes a range of issues beyond military force under the rubric of security. ‘Deepening’ implies a theoretical approach to security that connects our understandings of security to deeply rooted assumptions about the nature of political life more generally. ‘Extending’ denotes the expansion of the security studies agenda to recognise not only a multiplicity of issues, but also a multiplicity of actors beyond the state as referent objects of insecurity including, most fundamentally, individual human beings. Finally, CSS claims to provide an approach to security that is ultimately ‘focused’ in the sense that it is grounded in a particular normative goal: that of human ‘emancipation’.

This self-styled critical approach to security departs radically from more conventional (or ‘traditional’) approaches to security for reasons that are discussed in more detail later in the chapter. However, while some of the moves made by the Welsh School’s Critical Security Studies/CSS project are shared by the other approaches gathered under the critical umbrella, other commitments entailed in its relation of Critical Theory and security have been more controversial and divisive. The consequent result is that this definition of CSS is far from universally accepted.

Box 2.1 'Critical security studies' – what's in a name?!

Within recent writing on security it is possible to find references to both 'Critical Security Studies/CSS' (upper case) and 'critical security studies/css' (lower case). Why is this distinction made and what significance, if any, should we attach to it?

Generally speaking, security scholars use CSS/css in a manner parallel to a broader distinction made between forms of critical social theory. 'Critical Theory' (upper case) is conventionally used to denote a Marxian tradition of theorising that includes elements of ideas first put forward by Karl Marx (1818–1883) – most notably his invocation to not only 'interpret the world' but to 'change it' – but also several efforts to reinterpret and offset some of the more deterministic aspects of Marx's thought. In particular, the thinkers associated with the so-called Frankfurt School of Critical Theory sought to extend Marx's critique of capitalism from its focus on economics to a concern with issues ranging from popular culture, psychoanalysis and technology. Proponents of CSS, such as Ken Booth and Richard Wijn Jones, tend to reserve the use of the term 'Critical Security Studies' to denote a specific approach to security that claims to draw primarily upon this Marxian tradition of Critical Theory as well as interpretations of this tradition within the study of IR more broadly (although see Box 2.6 for critiques of CSS's employment and interpretation of Marxian thought). The use of the lower-case 'critical theory' is generally used in the social sciences to identify a more diverse range of ideas and approaches that includes Marxian-inspired thought but is far from limited to it and even challenges it in some respects. Whereas the former has a particular (emanipatory) purpose, the latter is more heterogeneous in its concerns and goals. A good way for readers to get at this contrast further is to compare the interpretations of the term Critical Security Studies taken by Booth (2007) and Wijn Jones (1999) with the multiple interpretations of the term used in Krause and Williams (1997).

More recently there has been an attempt to distinguish the CSS 'school' by its geographical origin. Since the key proponents of CSS – Booth and Wijn Jones – both put forward their rendering of Critical Theory and security whilst at Aberystwyth in West Wales, some have suggested referring to it as the Welsh School of security studies (see CASE 2006) as a counterpart to various other schools of thought.

From 'traditional' to 'critical' security studies

The CSS project has its broad origins in peace studies (or peace research), which aimed to develop 'new thinking' about the cold war stand-off that threatened nuclear annihilation, and its emergence is also linked to the development of a 'critical turn' in international studies more broadly. As peace studies evolved in the 1980s it increasingly began to focus not only on the achievement of 'negative peace' (the absence of war) but also the idea of 'positive peace' – the pursuit of social and economic justice as means of addressing underlying causes of conflict. The latter goal opened peace research out to consideration of issues such as health, economic welfare and environmental stability as well as its previous focus on military issues such as nuclear weapons, and this 'broad' perspective has been a key influence in the development of CSS. The expansive agenda of peace research helped encourage a 'comprehensive' view of security within the CSS project, and simultaneously developments in 'Critical International Theory' crucially informed its attitude towards the study of security. At the beginning of the 1980s, the IR theorist Robert Cox argued that the study of world politics could be divided into two categories: 'Problem-solving theory' and 'Critical Theory'.

Problem-solving theory, Cox argued, takes the nature of world politics as a 'given'. In other words, it assumes that there are a number of actors and issues that we should always focus upon. In security studies, this was traditionally manifested in the assumption that states are key actors in world politics, and that war between states is *the* central problem to be 'solved' in world politics.

Cox argued that *Critical Theory*, by contrast, should critically interrogate the traditional assumptions made by Problem-Solving Theory. Cox argued that by assuming that world politics is simply a range of problems – such as the problem of war between states – to be resolved, we risk missing out on key dimensions of world politics that don't fit squarely into a problem-solving mindset. More than this, we also embed and hence potentially legitimate the 'problems' we set out to study. What we should be doing in many instances is critically interrogating the way that the *problem* is set up.

Fundamentally, Cox argued, Problem-Solving and Critical Theory can also be distinguished by their approaches to knowledge (Cox 1981). Whereas Problem-Solving Theory assumes that scholars can attain and produce knowledge of the world in an objective and value-neutral fashion, Critical Theory assumes that because academic analysts are necessarily embedded within the social world they seek to analyse, knowledge has an inherently social character. Hence there is no easy distinction that can be made between 'facts' and 'values'. When building a theory or presenting an argument, we necessarily concentrate on some 'facts' and not others, highlight certain issues and cover others in less detail or not at all. All of these decisions will be affected by our own social position, education, beliefs and so on. The way that we as analysts choose to piece these elements together to either frame or address a specific 'problem' in world politics is, therefore, not a neutral act: it is an act that is, consciously or not, built upon a series of choices as to what counts as important and what does not. In turn, the ways that particular theories interpret and present the world will have consequent effects for how others view it, how decisions get made, where we devote our attention, how resources get distributed and so on. This led Cox, drawing on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci (see Box 2.4), to make his now famous pronouncement that 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' (1981: 128).

If we apply this perspective to the discipline of security studies, it has far-reaching implications. Security studies originally developed with the explicit mandate of solving the problem of war and instability in world politics. It had clear objects of analysis – states – and a clear goal – explaining why states go to war. One of the key exponents of this vision of security studies, Stephen Walt, has succinctly argued that 'security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use and control of military force*'. More specifically, Walt advised that security studies was best understood as the study of 'the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war' (1991: 212, emphasis in original).

This view of security studies, which originates from neorealist IR theory, is what has become known to its critics in CSS as 'traditional security studies'. As in Problem-solving theory, the central problem to be addressed (war) is already assumed in this view, as are the key actors (states). Although Walt makes reference to individuals and societies, he leaves us in no doubt that their security is predicated upon the policies adopted by states and that states should, by consequence, be the primary area of concern for security studies.

In keeping with the Coxian approach, critics of the 'traditional' approach argue that this narrowly focused problem-solving approach has several weaknesses. They claim that traditional security studies tends to accept the world 'as it is', assuming that analysts simply

produce knowledge about the world 'out there'. Traditional security studies assumes a number of 'enduring features' of world politics, most prominently it assumes war between states as the enduring recurrent feature of the international system. So in other words, traditional security studies accepts (1) the state, (2) the 'anarchic' nature of the international system (the idea that there is no higher authority or actor above the state level), and hence that (3) wars between states are an inherent feature of the international system. During the cold war in particular, these factors tended to be taken-for-granted starting points for the study of security.

Scholars operating within the CSS framework argue that accepting war as the fact of international life is *part of the problem*. Think about the logic here: if we begin from the assumption that war is a natural feature of international life, then we are perpetually limited to efforts to constrain it. Following the broader critical move within Critical IR theory espoused by Cox, what CSS argues is that we need to be sceptical about the actual benefits of an exclusive focus on war, which, though still of great importance, is but one among a multitude of contemporary security issues. Instead of the 'problem-solving approach', proponents of CSS have called for a study of security that 'goes beyond problem-solving within the status quo and instead seeks to help engage with the problem of the status quo' (Booth 2005a: 10 emphasis in original).

A primary objection to the traditional approach is that it is too narrowly focused on the military security of states (what is often referred to as 'state-centrism' or 'statism'). In doing so it paints a static picture of international life that claims to simply portray the world 'as it is', but also makes a powerful political statement in assuming that fundamental change in the nature of world politics is virtually impossible. After the end of the cold war, which radically undermined confidence in this traditional approach because of its preclusion of significant international change (see also Chapter 1), a number of criticisms emerged of this state-centric security focus and these have helped inform the emergence of CSS.

First the contention is that state-centrism is *empirically unhelpful*: in other words, that it is an incomplete description of the nature of contemporary world politics. Following the cold war, conflict between states – the central traditional focus – was arguably no longer the biggest issue in world politics. In the 1990s, the frequency of wars *within* (rather than between) states led some to coin the concept of 'new wars' (Kaldor 1999), to describe conflicts such as those that have occurred within the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and later in Sudan. In this context the traditional focus on wars between states seemed poorly equipped to grasp either the localised nature of new wars or the ways in which they are embedded within global complexes of militarism, aid and development (Duffield 2001).

Second is that state-centrism often acts as a *justification of the status quo*: in other words it justifies the preservation of the state system as it is. In the 'developed world' states might be argued to generally uphold the liberty of their citizens; but in many parts of the 'developing world' states can be the biggest threat to the liberty, human rights and lives of their citizens. Some peace theorists have argued that in many cases, states can be a source of *structural violence* – that states are often a major cause of poverty and repression for their citizens (Galtung 1996). Drawing on this line of thinking, scholars such as Richard Wyn Jones argue that we should approach the traditional assumption of the state as protector of its citizens with caution:

Even if a very narrow, military understanding of security is applied, it is apparent that the arms purchased and powers accrued by governments in the name of national security are far more potent threats to the liberty and physical safety of their citizens than

any putative external threat. This is true not only of states in the disadvantaged South but also of those in the North. When a broader definition of security that includes non-military threats is applied, it is clear that many states are deeply implicated in the creation of other forms of insecurity for their own populations, for example, in such issues as food and environmental security.

(Wyn Jones 1999: 99)

Likewise, Ken Booth has noted that 'to countless millions of people in the world it is their own state, and not "The Enemy" that is the primary security threat' (1991: 318).

Third, radical political economists – such as dependency theorists and world systems theorists (see Poku and Therkelsen 2013 for an overview) – have long argued that the state system as a whole is actually a *major source of poverty, instability and violence in the developing world* because international capitalism creates a system of winners and losers in the global economy:

the relative security of the inhabitants of the North is purchased at the price of chronic insecurity for the vast majority of the world population [...] So, far from being a necessary condition for the good life, statism appears to be one of the main sources of insecurity – part of the problem rather than the solution.

(Wyn Jones 1999: 99)

State-centrism, on this view, tacitly justifies the existing economic status quo, which is a major source of economic deprivation and dependency in many parts of the world.

CSS: Key concepts and core ideas

With these kinds of criticisms in mind, an emerging literature in the 1990s argued that the concept of security in the post-cold war era needed to be reconceptualised, and Welsh School CSS has been at the forefront of attempts to redefine both security and security studies. CSS is based on three core ideas that links it to a broader critical move in security studies, and one additional key principle dealt with in the following section – 'emancipation' – which tends to be seen as the distinguishing feature of the CSS project and is more divisive.

Understanding security as a 'derivative concept'

The first core idea underpinning CSS is the argument that security is a derivative concept. That is, the view of security we have derives from the way in which we see the world and the way we think politics works: what we think of as the most important features of world politics will influence what we think of as threats, what needs to be protected, and hence how we define security.

The question of how we should define security is all at once deceptively simple and of fundamental importance. One would think that academics and analysts working within the field known as 'security studies' would at least be able to agree on the meaning of the term. In one sense there must be a minimal shared understanding of the term security given that we speak of the field of 'security studies'. An example of such a minimal understanding might be Ken Booth's definition in his 1991 article *Security and Emancipation* where Booth argued that "'Security" means "the absence of threats".

Box 2.2 Key concepts in CSS

Statism/state-centrism: An ontological assumption – challenged by CSS – that holds the state to be both the primary actor in world politics and the provider of security, which leads in turn to a political orientation that holds national (state) security to be the pre-eminent value.

Security as a 'derivative concept': The idea that understandings of security reflect 'deeper' assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life' (Wyn Jones 1999: 166).

Emancipation: The 'freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do' (Booth 1991: 319).

Immanent critique: 'Immanent critique', as understood by Booth, 'involves identifying those features in concrete situations (such as positive dynamics, agents, key struggles) that have emancipatory possibilities, then working through the politics (tactics and strategies) to strengthen them' (2007: 250).

Theory-practice nexus: The idea that theories of security inform security practices and vice versa, leading to the contention that 'reconceptualized understandings of security and strategy might aid the transformation of real-world practices' (Wyn Jones 1999: 167).

When we examine such a definition in more detail, however, we come up with a range of related questions that are among the most contested (and most interesting) within the subject area: what kinds of 'threats' do we want to be free from? Who or what is it that 'threatens' us? How do we define the 'we' seeking freedom from threats? Is it the individual, group, nation, state or all of the above? Even if we can answer these questions, how do we go about achieving security?

Traditional security studies, by taking the security of the state as its central concern, assumes ready-made answers to each of these questions. So, for example, the view of security that dominated the cold war – neorealism – focused on the threat of nuclear war and the security of states, because this was derived from a focus on the political conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. But, for proponents of CSS, this definition of security is itself a derivative concept: it derives its meaning from a neorealist worldview and its emphasis on the 'anarchic' nature of the international system. Different worldviews give rise to different conceptions of security. This is not something which is usually acknowledged in a realist/neorealist perspective, which assumes 'national security' to be a universal value. From a Coxian-critical perspective this worldview is itself derived from the theories of white, Western and predominantly male academics working within a particular context. 'Security', from the point of view of a refugee in Sudan, for example, is likely to mean something very different. Expanding the point, theories that challenge neorealism's emphasis on the state as the referent object consequently give rise to different conceptions of security.

A broadened security agenda

CSS argues that military force, although important, is not the only potential threat to security, that other threats are equally worthy of consideration, and that the end of the cold war allowed space to give consideration to these alternative threats that were previously generally marginalised. Among the first academics to put forward this argument was Barry Buzan in his book

People, States and Fear. Buzan (1991) argues that security analysts needed to think about security in five different 'sectors': military, but also environmental, economic, political and societal. The basic point that those within the CSS project borrowed from Buzan was that in the contemporary world, people are threatened by a multitude of issues: yes war, but also poverty, famine, political oppression and environmental degradation to name but a few.

The individual as the 'referent object' of security

Although those within CSS concur with Buzan that security studies needs to widen its focus to include non-military dimensions, they argue that he does not go far enough because Buzan's work still exclusively focused on the state as its referent object. For Richard Wyn Jones, the title *People, States and Fear* is arresting but also misleading. "States and Fear" is a more accurate representation of Barry Buzan's ultimate focus in that work', Wyn Jones argues (1999: 112) because Buzan's broadening only accounted for the ways in which non-military issues such as environmental degradation and economic crisis might threaten the state. As we saw previously, CSS takes such state-centrism to be problematic. By contrast, what Booth and Wyn Jones want to argue is that military, environmental, economic, political and societal threats affect *people* in the first instance (see also Chapter 10). States are, at base, human communities; therefore the ultimate referents of security should be the human beings that make up the state, not the state itself in some abstract sense. In a similar vein, Bill McSweeney has asserted that 'security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level' (1999: 16). In short, proponents of CSS argue that security, fundamentally, should refer ultimately to the 'corporeal, material existence and experiences of human beings' (Wyn Jones 1999: 23).

Emancipation, community, identity

These three elements – security as a derivative concept, the idea of a broadened security agenda, and challenging the assumption of the state as the referent object of security – might be said to be common points of discussion in all the 'critical' approaches to security discussed in this book. They are addressed not only by the Welsh School formed around Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, but also (albeit to differing degrees) by critical constructivists, poststructuralists, proponents of securitisation theory, feminist and postcolonial approaches. However, the idea of security as a 'derivative concept' applies as much to the 'critical' approach to security as it does to its traditional counterpart. As well as originating in ideas drawn from peace studies and the 'critical turn' in IR theory, the argument for thinking of security as 'emancipation' links CSS to the broader tradition of Critical Theory and several concepts and ideas derived from Marxian thought.

As well as building on the three elements outlined in the previous section, Booth and Wyn Jones seek to add a fourth principle: the principle of 'emancipation'. They argue that Critical Security Studies should have a purpose, and that its purpose should be the transformation of society itself into a more secure and emancipated form.

Emancipation

Proponents of CSS argue that the corporeal, material existence of human beings should be the central focus of security studies: that is, security should ultimately be concerned with the 'real world' security of human beings. Consequently, for CSS, the study of security should

seek to illuminate the wide range of constraints on human well-being that exist in many parts of the world, and challenge the forms of security knowledge and practices that perpetuate these constraints.

Locating this goal within a broader tradition of Critical Theory (see Box 2.3), Ken Booth outlined the contours of an 'emancipation-oriented' approach to security in a seminal 1991 article entitled *Security and Emancipation*. Here Booth argues that:

'Security' means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.

(Booth 1991: 319)

What Booth argues here is that if we broaden the security agenda to include issues like poverty and education, then we are necessarily getting involved in the general well-being of societies (hence the 'broadening' and 'extending' of security are inherently related). People will feel secure not just through protection from military threats, but also through protection

from the threat of poverty, ill-health, environmental degradation and so on. Similarly, Richard Wyn Jones argues that the welfare of individual human beings – that is their freedom from both military and non-military threats – needs to be placed at the centre of the security studies agenda. We should study security, Booth and Wyn Jones argue, in order to learn more about how individuals can maximise their freedom from threats. The more secure people are from the threats of war, poverty and oppression, the more emancipated they will be and vice versa.

This necessarily leads to a more expansive conception of security that is more than simply 'survival'. In the traditional approach to security, state survival is assumed to equate to security for all its inhabitants. Yet for the various reasons outlined in the previous section CSS critiques opposed this assumption and the tendency to conflate the concepts of 'security' and 'survival'. Booth argues that 'Survival is being alive; security is living', or, as he puts it elsewhere, security is equivalent to *survival-plus*: security is 'an instrumental value in that it allows individuals and groups (to a relative degree) to establish the conditions of existence with some expectations of constructing a human life beyond the merely animal' (Booth 2007: 106–107). Survival merely implies the continuance of existence in conditions where life is threatened, whereas security denotes a genuine absence of threats and the consequent maximisation not only of an individual's life-chances but also of their life-choices. Booth and Wyn Jones therefore argue that when we think about security, we are also engaging in fundamental questions about nature of political life and, specifically, the attendant questions of roles of community and identity in the achievement of security.

Box 2.3 CSS and Critical Theory

Although associated with several strands of political thought as well as a variety of social movements (see Nederveen Pieterse 1992), the concept of *emancipation* is usually seen to hold special significance within Marxian thought. At the heart of Marx's philosophy was an attempt to rethink the relationship between 'freedom' and 'necessity'. Marx believed that under relations of capitalism, human beings subject themselves to a range of unnecessary constraints (servitude, wage labour, exploitation), which appear as 'necessities' but from which we can and should become emancipated. The concept was later taken up by a group of German social theorists in the interwar years known as the Frankfurt School – inclusive of thinkers such as Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) and Jürgen Habermas (1929–) (for an overview, see Held 2004) – who sought to develop a form of 'Critical Theory' aimed at illuminating the prospects for emancipation in society.

The Critical Theory tradition, in a very broad sense, looks to identify those aspects of modern life, culture, and technology that constrain and enable human freedom, and the work of Richard Wyn Jones (1999) in particular looks to this tradition to inform the 'Critical' in Critical Security Studies. The CSS conception of emancipation is not built around a static or monolithic vision of an ideal society: 'even if a more emancipated order is brought into existence, the process of emancipation remains incomplete. There is always room for improvement; there is always unfinished business in the task of emancipation' (Wyn Jones 1999: 78). Hence the concept of *immanent critique*, also associated with the Frankfurt School, has come to be central to the CSS project both as a normative and methodological orientation. Broadly speaking, the term refers to a strategy utilising critique in order to identify potentialities that are immanent but as yet unfilled in any given theory or historical context by highlighting inherent contradictions. Thus, for example, the CSS project might be regarded at a general level as an immanent critique of security studies that seeks to retrieve and expand the potential of 'security' from its more conservative statist definitions by highlighting the fact that 'national security' regularly impinges upon the security of individuals.

Community and identity

As is discussed in Chapter 6, the focus of the Welsh School on the human being as the ultimate referent of security has left it open to charges of methodological individualism. Wyn Jones (1999) argues that this need not necessarily follow from a focus on human emancipation. He recognises that individual identity is a central aspect of what it means to be human, and that by consequence the constitutive relationship between 'identity, security and community' requires CSS to engage with the nature of political groupings that exist within concrete historical circumstances:

Identity never occurs in the singular [...] The human condition is one of overlapping identities; that is, each person has a number of different identities, all (potentially) in flux, and all of which come into play at different times and in different situations. Thus a focus on individuals strongly discourages any tendency to reify human identity; it points instead to the complex, multifaceted, and even fluid nature of identity. (1999: 116)

Although the normative basis of CSS centres around the security of the individual human being, Booth and Wyn Jones recognise that individuals do not exist in vacuum; rather, 'individuals' are constituted in large part by their membership of overlapping forms of political community. The question of security is, in practice, underpinned by questions of who 'we' are and what 'we' want to be secured from. In this sense, Booth argues, 'Community is the site of security' (2007: 278).

However, the CSS approach to community is also a cautious one. Rather than celebrating 'difference' for its own sake, CSS argues that it is *emancipatory* communities – based around inclusionary and egalitarian notions of identity – that should be promoted over communities

that are predicated on internal relations of domination (such as patriarchy) and chauvinistic forms of identity (such as notions of national superiority). Fundamentally, human emancipation – both that of individual humans and humanity in general – provides the guide both for relations within communities and between them. Hence 'As a political orientation [CSS] is informed by the aim of enhancing world security through emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels, including the potential community of all communities – common humanity' (Booth 2007: 31).

Reconceptualising security, reconceptualising practice

Appeals to emancipation and common humanity are all very well, but even those operating within CSS have openly recognised that 'critical theorists must go beyond generalised exhortations concerning emancipation, empowerment, freedom, and happiness. If critical theory is to have practical relevance, it must reflect on what emancipation means in terms of actual institutions and relationships' (Wyn Jones 1999: 76). A theoretical commitment to emancipation can only be made good by a commitment to emancipatory practices, and the Marxian idea of *praxis* (see Box 2.4) indicates that theory is informed and reformed by engagement with practical issues and, conversely, that concrete situations are affected and improved by new theoretical insights (what Wyn Jones terms as a 'theory–practice nexus').

So what strategies are open to those seeking to advance emancipation? How does 'an emancipatory approach to thinking about security interact with and impinge upon emancipatory praxis?' (Wyn Jones 1999: 118). Here proponents of CSS offer general principles rather than a set framework for action. The reason for this is that CSS suggests an understanding of emancipation as 'a process rather than an end point, a direction rather than a destination' (Wyn Jones 1999: 77). The constraints and insecurities suffered by individuals vary across time and space; hence it is not possible to specify with finality abstract criteria for emancipatory action, rather these must be developed in conjunction with an analysis of specific contexts. At a more general level, Richard Wyn Jones has suggested that proponents of Critical Security Studies should seek to act as organic intellectuals (see Box 2.4) that promote progressive social change:

Box 2.4 CSS and Gramsci

As well as Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, CSS also draws in part upon the thinking of the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), in particular Gramsci's thinking on the role of intellectuals and the relationship between theory and practice (Gramsci 1971). Taking seriously Marx's admonition to not only think about the world but to change it, as Gramsci does, proponents of CSS emphasise *praxis* – the idea that theory and practice are inextricably intertwined – and the potential role of intellectuals in advancing emancipatory change. Critical scholars, Wyn Jones argues, should 'become the *organic intellectuals* of critical social movements when they exist, or encourage the creation of the political space necessary for their emergence if they do not'. As opposed to 'traditional' intellectuals, who regard the study of security as relatively autonomous from its subject matter, the concerns of organic intellectuals grow 'organically' out of the everyday struggles for security endured by 'the voiceless, the unrepresented and the powerless' (Wyn Jones 1999: 167).

through their educational activities, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements.

(Wyn Jones 1999: 161)

There has been a general reluctance to specify exactly what 'support' of social movements might consist of beyond this critical-educative function. However, the goal of emancipatory change itself does indicate that some alternative visions and social movements are more preferable than others. Let us consider the ending of apartheid in South Africa', Wyn Jones offers as an example (see also Box 2.5):

Although the citizens of that country cannot be adjudged to be free after the overthrow of the apartheid system, surely they are freer. Although the establishment of liberal democracy there offers no panacea, it is a better system than the totalitarian one it has replaced. (Wyn Jones 1999: 43)

Booth has argued that:

We can begin or continue pursuing emancipation in what we research, in how we teach, in what we put on conference agendas, in how much we support Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Oxfam and other groups identifying with a global community, and in how we deal with each other and with students. And in pursuing emancipation, the bases of real security are being established.

(1991: 326)

In this sense for Booth, emancipation is itself 'a *practice of resistance* [...] a framework for attempting to actualise both near-term and longer-term emancipatory goals through strategic and tactical political action based on immanent critique' (2007: 112, emphasis in original). This approach is captured in Booth's concept of 'emancipatory realism', where the Marxian origins of 'emancipation' are filtered through Kantian idealism and a focus on 'gradual reforms' as 'the only means of approaching the supreme political good' (2007: 87). In other words, scholars of security should seek to identify and foster elements of progressive social change through their work as part of a gradualist, non-violent strategy for emancipation that is ultimately more realistic than rigid blueprints for utopia that – as in the case of the French and Russian revolutions that heralded the 'Terror' and 'purges' respectively – often end up generating even more intense cycles of violence and insecurity.

CSS and its critics

As summed up by Richard Wyn Jones (1999: 5), CSS is an approach that:

- 'eschews statism'
- recognises that non-military issues have 'a place on the security agenda' as well as military issues
- and 'anchors the theory and practice of security in a broader concern with human emancipation'.

voiceless, the unrepresented, and the powerless" [in world politics], and its purpose is their emancipation' (Wyn Jones 1999: 159).

However, the Welsh School emphasis on 'emancipation' is both a distinguishing and divisive feature. As Ken Booth puts it, 'emancipation is at the contested heart of Critical Security Studies' (2005b: 181). The introduction of the concept of emancipation into security studies is at the heart of the CSS project for its proponents, but they also recognise that its introduction generates a series of further commitments and complexities. CSS attaches a particular meaning (emancipation) and referent object (the individual human being) to the concept of security. It thus challenges the state-centric definition of security, but also the idea sometimes put forward that security is 'an essentially contested' concept (see Baldwin 1997: 10). The particular threats to an individual may be multifaceted and change over time, and in this sense insecurities are contingent upon time and place, but security is assumed to have a basic meaning that relates to the establishment of freedom from those threats. 'Security' thus ultimately has a positive connotation within the CSS perspective when it can be related to the improvement of individual well-being. In this sense the CSS project has been seen by its proponents to entail a commitment to progressive politics and thus, ultimately, to the spirit of the eighteenth century Enlightenment (see Wyn Jones 2005 and especially Booth 2007).

The concept of emancipation is thus one of the most far-reaching but also one of the most controversial ideas associated with CSS or Welsh School security studies, and is generally seen to distinguish the Welsh School from the other 'critical approaches' to security. The most fundamental criticism of CSS is that its commitment to 'emancipation' is misguided, and this is a primary reason why several other critical (with a lower case 'c' – see Box 2.1) approaches to security are seen to be distinct from the Critical Security Studies project. Many poststructuralist approaches to security argue that we can still be critical of traditional approaches to security without invoking a broad goal like emancipation (see Chapter 5). Emancipation, on this view, is a potentially dangerous 'meta-narrative' – a term often used in poststructuralist thought to denote overarching explanations of the world, which it regards sceptically (Lyotard 1984) – that is particular to a Western philosophical tradition rooted in European Enlightenment and liberal thought. There is no universally agreed definition of what emancipation is (and many poststructuralists argue that the pretension to universalism is part of the problem), and definitions of emancipation may be used to legitimate illiberal practices. Even sympathetic critics of the CSS project, such as Hayward Alker, note with caution the tainted historical association of 'emancipation' both with projects for Marxist revolution, Western hegemony and liberal imperialism at the global level (Alker 2005: 189). Others, such as Mohammed Ayoob have suggested the potential inappropriateness of the concept of emancipation to non-Western security contexts, where 'interpreted as the right of every ethnic group to self-determination, emancipation can turn out to be a recipe for grave disorder and anarchy' (1997: 127).

In response to such criticisms, Richard Wyn Jones has argued that the distance between the CSS project and poststructuralist approaches to security has been overdrawn (Wyn Jones 2005: 215). All critical approaches to security, and indeed the very notion of critique, he argues, are implicitly underpinned by some notion of thinking or doing security better by the very fact that they all seek to problematise and criticise traditional approaches and practices. In this sense, Wyn Jones argues, poststructuralist approaches to security are necessarily committed to some notion of emancipation – albeit emancipation with a small 'e' rather than the visions of 'Emancipation' that originate more directly from Enlightenment thought. Similarly, rather than simply rejecting the idea of emancipation as inapplicable outside of a Western context, Alker recommends instead that:

Box 2.5 CSS and the case of Southern Africa

Among the attempts to offer practical application and illustration of the CSS project, Ken Booth and Peter Vale's (1997) work on Southern Africa remains one of the most instructive accounts. As well as the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa representing the result of a concrete emancipatory struggle, Booth and Vale argue that the historical experience of South Africa and the region more generally highlights several of the key contentions of CSS:

On the perils of statism:

The states of southern Africa [...] do not match the textbook images of Anglo-American political science. These states have not stood as reliable watch-keepers over the security of their inhabitants. In the southern African context the state is often the problem, not the solution. (333)

A broadened security agenda:

The threat of food scarcity is, for many, more fundamental than the threat of military violence [...] In [this] and other examples (drugs, violence, falling investment, and the threat to the fulfilment of peoples' expectations in South Africa) it is evident that the major security threats in the region are intimately interconnected. (337)

On the referent object debate:

The security of the apartheid regime [...] meant the insecurity of both the majority population of the South African state and the neighbours of their state. National security for South Africa meant security for the white minority, not the vast majority of citizens in the state. (334)

On the theory–practice nexus:

No small part of the strategic license that enabled South Africa's minority government to destabilize the region in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of generation upon generation of South Africa's white youth learning – being taught – to look upon their neighbours as inferior. (331)

On the role of (organic) intellectuals:

Critical security students have an important role to play, by raising the salience of different security conceptions, referents, principles, institutions, and timetables [...] In the long run, security in the form of peace, order and justice must come from within the people(s) of the region. At present they do not have much of a voice in their own affairs. Consequently [C]ritical [S]ecurity [S]tudies must engage with practical politics in Southern Africa and speak up for those without security. (354)

Most fundamentally, following Cox's contention that 'all theory is for someone and for some purpose', proponents of the CSS project argue that Critical Security Studies is 'for "the

we still need to achieve the fuller inclusion of multiple Western and non-Western perspectives on the meanings of freedom, without giving up the distinctive and attractive appeal to human improvement and emancipatory development that is so central to the ethical/global concerns of the critical security studies project.

(2005: 200, emphasis in original)

For some critics, though, the CSS project is problematic not for its use of the concept of emancipation but for the linkage it assumes *between* security and emancipation. By simultaneously advocating a broadened security agenda and a symbiotic relationship between security and emancipation, the implication of the CSS project is that more security is required across a range of issues to achieve human improvement. In short, it assumes that security (of the individual) is a 'good thing'. A number of thinkers, whilst acknowledging the need for a broadened security agenda, worry that this encourages the practice of simply 'hyphenating' security to other issues: that is, the tendency to attach the concept of security to other issues, such as environmental degradation in the notion of 'environmental security'. For some viewing the environment in terms of security is fundamentally unhelpful (this debate is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7).

More broadly, proponents of securitisation theory argue that because 'security' carries a specific military connotation historically, its application to non-military issues such as migration and economics can be highly misguided. Rather than emancipation and security being two sides of the same coin, they argue that the logic of security may be inappropriate to certain issues and that we should instead look to 'desecuritisise', as is discussed in Chapter 5. Others argue that struggles for security and struggles for emancipation – in terms of the achievement of equality at a social level – should be kept separate rather than conflated:

When equated with security, emancipation becomes problematic as it can no longer envisage social transformations outside of the logic of security [...] The struggle for security is re-styled as a struggle for emancipation, without any qualms about the relationship between emancipation and security.

(Aradau 2004: 397–398)

Once again, this is linked to the idea that security has, historically, been linked with a particular type of politics that has often inhibited rather than advanced struggles for political equality (think of the use of police and other state forces against civil rights protesters in the name of 'national security') (Peoples 2011).

As an alternative to the equivalence of security and emancipation, then, Claudia Aradau suggests that critical approaches to security might look to the understandings of emancipation found in the work of the French post-Marxists Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou and Étienne Balibar where emancipation is considered as distinct from security and 'is linked to democratic politics, extensively defined in terms of equality and fairness, voice and slow procedures open to public scrutiny' (Aradau 2004: 401). This alternative vision of emancipation is rooted within a broader critique of contemporary capitalism in post-Marxist thought and, in a related vein, some have criticised the CSS project for failing to say enough on the functioning of contemporary capitalism as a major source of individual insecurities. The implication here is, as has been argued elsewhere (Herring 2013), that CSS is insufficiently concerned with class and economic inequalities as originally so prominent within Marxian historical materialism (see Box 2.6).

Box 2.6 Historical materialist critiques of Critical Security Studies

Karl Marx espoused what he termed as 'the materialist conception of history' in the preface of his 1859 work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Subsequent interpreters of Marx often use the term 'historical materialism' to denote the view that the social, political and legal 'superstructure' (as Marx would have it) of societies is fundamentally shaped by the 'base' of its economic 'conditions [or 'means'] of production', with Marx further arguing that the distinguishing feature of modern capitalist societies was the class cleavage between those who own the means of production and profit from it (the 'bourgeoisie') and those who serve it and are exploited by it (the 'proletariat') (see Marx 1971 [1859]). Herring (2013) argues that it is surprising that 'historical materialism is much less prominent [...] than would be expected from the fact that [it] is central to the origins of the critical theory on which much of CSS draws'. Herring's criticism is not simply limited to the Welsh School variant of CSS covered in this chapter, but its potential applicability in this respect is clear in his further claim that 'Most of CSS is so post-Marxist as to be non-Marxist: what lingers are commitments to change and emancipation (freeing people from the constraints that prevent them from living full lives) but with little understanding of how capitalism shuts down or opens up space for emancipation' (2013: 47). Although some later interpretations of Marx's historical materialism have been accused of economic determinism – that is, the argument that economic structures determine all other aspects of social life – Herring and other proponents of historical materialism as an approach (including 'neo-Gramscian' scholars such as Cox (1981, 1983)) argue that the accusation is itself based on a reductionist reading of both Marx's ideas and historical materialism. Instead they argue that 'historical materialist approaches to security and insecurity do allow for the significance of "superstructural" aspects, but retain a crucial focus on how concrete material economic structures condition and create threats to individuals and communities. In the context of radical global economic inequalities that have been exacerbated by (but also precede) the impacts of the "global financial crisis" of 2008, a strong case can be made that, for a majority of the world's population, poverty is a fundamental source of human insecurity, and that the political economic dimensions of security and insecurity must be taken seriously as a result (for related discussions see Chapter 10).

Criticising Ken Booth's recent calls for a form of capitalism that is more appropriate to individual security globally, Rens van Munster has argued that 'The world would certainly benefit from a more humane capitalism, but emancipation cannot happen through dialogue and the extension of rights alone. It also involves concrete struggles in the realm of work, production and property relations' (2008: 439). Neocleous argues that Booth's equation of 'security' and 'emancipation' is in this respect 'far closer to classical liberalism than it is to critical theory'. As such, Neocleous claims, Booth's version of CSS reinforces a 'security fetish' (2008: 5) and ultimately fails to question the ways in which security politics has, historically, served to uphold a form of social and economic order that has benefited states' governing classes. He attempts to illustrate this point by detailing the connections between the rise of the 'national security' state and the 'social security' (welfare) state in the mid-twentieth century, and by examining the 'commodification of security' under contemporary conditions of privatisation (see also Chapter 12). Invoking the spirit of Marx (see Box 2.6), Neocleous argues for a 'critique of critical criticism'. That is, he argues that CSS should itself be critically interrogated as to its own assumptions, particularly the assumption that security in its 'true', emancipatory form can be a positive condition to aspire to and attain. Viewing 'security' as an instrument of 'bourgeois politics', Neocleous exhorts us to 'return the gift' of 'security' (2008: 8, 10).

Conclusion

Critics of the CSS project have highlighted several of its potential limitations but in the process may also point to some of its own inherent potentialities, particularly in regard to the general idea of relating Critical Theory and security studies. The work of Booth and Wyn Jones is suggestive of one possible variation of that relationship, but there may be other ways of relating Critical Theory to security, for example in application to environmental degradation, human security and military technology, to enhance our understanding of key issues (see Chapters 7, 10 and 12). Indeed the question of whether and how to relate Critical Theory to the study of security continues to animate debate. Hynes and Chandler (2013: 46) argue that CSS is 'no longer productive of emancipatory alternatives' in a concrete sense as a distinctive feature of the Critical Theory tradition. Conversely, Nunes (2012: 357) argues that a 're-engagement' with the CSS focus on emancipation is crucial to the 'politicisation' of security. While acknowledging the force of several of the criticisms of CSS, Nunes makes the case that a concern with emancipation can and should still be made central to critical analysis of security politics, and to analysis of how existing structures and relations of vulnerability and disadvantage might be overcome. Otherwise, he argues, the critical study of security risks losing all sense of purpose.

To its detractors the CSS project remains fatefully wedded to an Enlightenment progressivism whose time has come and gone, a connection that recent restatements of CSS have tended to stress and defend even more forcefully. Some readers, after moving on to later chapters, may become more convinced that this is an inherent limitation of the CSS approach. Others, however, will no doubt be attracted by the appeal of an approach that focuses upon the concrete insecurities of individual human beings globally, and attempts to deal head-on with the issue of how the study of security can be focused to help address those insecurities, an approach that 'points towards a notion of critique that is committed to deconstruction but also unashamedly reconstructive' (Nunes 2012: 357). For those readers, the CSS project may well constitute an attractive basis for attempting to change global security rather than simply thinking about it.

Key points

- The 'Welsh School' of Critical Security Studies (or CSS) is built in large part around a critique of state-centric approaches to security – that is, approaches to security that tend to focus exclusively on military threats to the state.
- Proponents of CSS argue that, ultimately, human beings are the most important referent object(s) of security; as a result, CSS adopts an explicitly 'emancipatory orientation' – focused on the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do – as the key to achieving security.
- Rather than offering fixed blueprints for emancipation, CSS suggests that the form of emancipatory practices must be contingent upon the identification of the particular insecurities experienced by groups and individuals within a given context.
- The CSS focus on 'emancipation' is seen to distinguish it from other critical approaches to security, and CSS has attracted a significant range of criticisms over its definition of emancipation, its focus on the individual and its equation of emancipation with security.

Discussion points

- Is the CSS critique of state-centric definitions of security well-founded or misguided?
- How and why has the so-called Welsh School of Critical Security Studies sought to utilise Critical Theory in thinking about security?
- Is CSS right to focus on the individual as the referent object of security?
- What function does the concept of 'immanent critique' play within CSS?
- 'The problem with emancipation is not that it is idealistic, it is that it is dangerous.' Discuss.
- How significant are historical materialist critiques of CSS?

Guide to further reading

- Bill McSweeney (1999) *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Although not usually counted within the CSS project, McSweeney's account offers several interesting overlaps and provides useful comparative reading.
- Ken Booth (1991) 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17: 313–326. The touchstone work in terms of setting out the idea of an emancipation-oriented approach to security.
- Ken Booth (2005) (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). An edited collection with various contributions that offer restatements of the CSS approach, sympathetic critiques and applications of the principles of CSS to empirical issues.
- Ken Booth (2007) *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Provides both a trenchant defence and restatement of the CSS project and attempts to use it as the basis of a more expansive 'theory of world security'.
- Michael Sheehan (2005) *International Security: An Analytical Survey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Makes the case for theorising security with a concern for human emancipation, justice and peace in the context of an overview of the field of security studies.
- Richard Wyn Jones (1999) *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Develops the idea of an emancipation-oriented approach further, but in the process roots CSS more explicitly within the tradition and ideas of Critical Theory.
- Shannon Brincat, Laura Lima and João Nunes (2011) (eds) *Critical Theory in International Relations and Security Studies: Interviews and Reflections* (Routledge: Abingdon). Brings together a series of essays on, interviews with and critical reflections by 'pioneers' of the turn to Critical Theory in IR and security studies, including Robert Cox, Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones and many others.

military-political security declined after the end of the Cold War? In pursuing this question, we found it necessary to take up the challenge that the wider security agenda is intellectually incoherent. As a consequence, the project became more ambitious, evolving into a general consideration of how to understand and analyze international security without losing sight of the original purpose.

Much of the conceptualization and writing of the book has been a genuinely joint enterprise, with all of the authors making substantial inputs into every chapter. But different parts do have distinctive individual stamps. Barry Buzan was the main drafter of Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 9; was largely responsible for the sectoral approach; and took overall responsibility for editing and coordinating the work. Ole Wæver was the main drafter of Chapters 2, 6, 7, and 8, as well as the third section of Chapter 9, and was the primary supplier of the securitization approach to defining the subject. Jaap de Wilde, the newest member of the Copenhagen research group, was the main drafter of Chapter 4 and the first two sections of Chapter 8, made substantial inputs into Chapters 5 and 9, and restrained the other two from taking a too unquestioning position toward realist assumptions.

We have received a great amount of help with this project. First and foremost, our thanks to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, whose generous grant made it possible for Buzan to devote his main attention to this book during the years 1995–1996, for us to assemble a team of experts who provided continual critical scrutiny, and for the support of the cost of a research assistant. Next, thanks to Håkan Wiberg and the staff at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, who provided a supportive, stimulating, and congenial atmosphere in which to work. Thanks also to our consultants—Mohammed Ayoob, Owen Greene, Pierre Hassner, Eric Helleiner, Andrew Hurrell, and Thomas Hylland-Eriksen—who lent us both their expertise and their wider judgment. All of the consultants made extensive written comments at various stages of the drafting of the book. This final version owes much to their input, although they bear no formal responsibility for what is written here. And thanks to Eva Maria Christiansen and Mads Våge, our research assistants, who handled most of the logistical tasks and sometimes worked unreasonable hours without complaint. Finally, our thanks to people who volunteered comments along the way and whose insights have helped to shape our arguments: Didier Bigo, Anne-Marie le Gloannec, Lene Hansen, Helge Hveem, Emile Kirschner, Wojciech Kostecki; Grazina Miniotaite, Bjørn Møller, Marie-Claude Smouts, Michael Williams, and an anonymous reviewer for Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies. Our approach is based on the work of those who for well over a decade have sought to question the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security. This questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. Some has come from the policy side, representing organizations (including the state) trying either to achieve recognition for their concerns or to adapt themselves to changed circumstances. Other questions have come from academia: from peace research, from feminists, from international political economy, and from security (and strategic) studies. Their move has generally taken the form of attempts to widen the security agenda by claiming security status for issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal sectors, as well as the military-political ones that define traditional security studies (known in some places as strategic studies).

As a consequence, two views of security studies are now on the table, the new one of the wideners and the old military and state-centered view of the traditionalists.¹ It is time to compare these two views and assess their costs and benefits. Doing so requires both unifying concepts and a method for pursuing the wider agenda in a coherent fashion. It also requires us to provide a classification of what is and what is not a security issue, to explain how issues become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics of the different types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global. Identifying security issues is easy for traditionalists, who, broadly speaking, equate security with military issues and the use of force. But it is more difficult when security is moved out of the military sector. There are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word *security* onto an ever wider range of issues.

In this chapter, the next section surveys the debate between the new and the traditional approaches to security studies. The following two sections define the concepts that structure the analysis in this book. The first sets out our understanding of levels of analysis (spatial locations from macro to micro, where one can find both sources of explanation and outcomes), and the second addresses sectors (views of the whole that select a

particular type of interaction). The rest of the chapter deals with regions, looking at how they relate to levels of analysis, outlining "classical" security complex theory as we have used it to this point, and unveiling some of the problems with trying to extend security complex thinking into the non-traditional sectors (economic, societal, environmental).

The "Wide" Versus "Narrow" Debate About Security Studies

The "wide" versus "narrow" debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. This dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s. The issue-driven widening eventually triggered its own reaction, creating a plea for confinement of security studies to issues centered around the threat or use of force. A key argument was that progressive widening endangered the intellectual coherence of security, putting so much into it that its essential meaning became void. This argument perhaps masked a generally unspoken political concern that allowing nonmilitary issues to achieve security status would have undesirable and counterproductive effects on the entire fabric of social and international relations (more on this in Chapter 9).

Those arguing explicitly for widening include Ulman (1983); Jahn, Lemaire, and Weaver (1987); Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988); Matthews (1988); Brown (1989); Nye (1989); Crawford (1991); Haftendorn (1991); Tickner (1992); and Weaver et al. (1993), most taking off from the urgency of new, often nonmilitary sources of threat. There has also been a strong thread in international political economy linking patterns in the economic and military sectors (Gilpin 1981; Crawford 1993, 1995; Gowa 1994; Mansfield 1994). Buzan (1991) is a widener, but he has been skeptical about the prospects for coherent conceptualizations of security in the economic (see also Luciani 1989) and environmental (see also Deudney 1990) sectors! Buzan has argued for retaining a distinctively military subfield of strategic studies within a wider security studies (1987, 1991, chapter 10). Ulman (1983) and Buzan (1991, chapter 3) have specifically widened the definition of threat away from a purely military to a more general formulation. The other two authors of this book are also wideners, de Wilde from a liberal-pluralist background and Weaver self-defined as a postmodern realist.

The defense of the traditionalist position got underway as the Cold War unraveled. Until rather late one could still find arguments for restricting the field to "anything that concerns the prevention of superpower nuclear war"

(Lebow 1988: 508). But as the main task of the strategic community—analysis of East-West military confrontation—evaporated, a period of disorientation occurred. The function, and therefore the status and funding, of the entire edifice of strategic studies built up during the Cold War seemed to be at risk; consequently, the military focus of strategic analysis seemed extremely vulnerable to pressure from the wideners. Indicative of this period was the 1989 issue of *Survival* (31:6) devoted entirely to "nonmilitary aspects of strategy."

Traditionalists fought back by reasserting conventional arguments about the enduring primacy of military security (Gray 1994b). In varying degrees, they accepted the need to look more widely at nonmilitary causes of conflict in the international system and made little explicit attempt to defend the centrality of the state in security analysis at a time when so many nonstate actors were playing vigorously in the military game. Most traditionalists insist on *military* conflict as the defining key to security and are prepared to loosen their state centrism. But some—Jahn, Lemaire, and Weaver (1987) and Ayoub (1995)—hold the *political* sector as primary and Ayoub the *state* as the focal point, and ease the link to military conflict. Some traditionalists (Chipman 1992; Gray 1992) have argued that there was simply a return to the natural terrain of the subject after the artificial nuclear narrowing of the Cold War, but the key strategy was to allow widening only inasmuch as it could be linked to concerns about the threat or actual use of force between political actors. As Chipman (1992: 129) put it:

The structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force. . . . Non-military aspects of security may occupy more of the strategist's time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst's inquiries.

Although he is clearly trying to keep the lid on the subject, Chipman's statement is interesting because it explicitly moves away from strict state centrism by acknowledging that peoples and nations, as well as states and alliances, can be strategic users of force in the international system.

Stephen Walt gives perhaps the strongest statement on the traditionalist position. He argues that security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force." Against those who want to widen the agenda outside this strictly military domain, he argues that doing so

runs the risk of expanding "Security Studies" excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to "security." Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to

devise solutions to any of these important problems. (Walt 1991: 212-213)

Walt (1991: 227; see also Dorff 1994; Gray 1994a) does allow "economics and security" into his picture but only as they relate to military issues rather than as economic security per se.

The traditionalists' criticism that widens risk intellectual incoherence can be a powerful point. The wider agenda does extend the range of knowledge and understanding necessary to pursue security studies. More worryingly, it also does two other things. First, given the political function of the word *security*, the wider agenda extends the call for state mobilization to a broad range of issues. As Deudney (1990) has pointed out, this may be undesirable and counterproductive in the environmental sector, and the argument could easily be extended into other sectors. Second, the wider agenda tends, often unthinkingly, to elevate "security" into a kind of universal good thing—the desired condition toward which all relations should move. But as Wæver (1995b) has argued, this is a dangerously narrow view. At best, security is a kind of stabilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state. Although security in international relations may generally be better than insecurity (threats against which no adequate countermeasures are available), a secure relationship still contains serious conflicts—albeit ones against which some effective countermeasures have been taken. Even this degree of relative desirability can be questioned: liberals, for example, argue that too much economic security is destructive to the workings of a market economy. Security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing. It is better, as Wæver argues, to aim for desecuritization: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.

The main purpose of this book is to present a framework based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position. Our solution comes down on the side of the wideners in terms of keeping the security agenda open to many different types of threats. We argue against the view that the core of security studies is war and force and that other issues are relevant only if they relate to war and force (although in Buzan's view [1991, chapter 10] such an approach would fit nicely with the idea of *strategic studies* remaining a militarily focused specialism within the new security studies). Instead, we want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to referent objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are nonmilitary as well as military. We take seriously the traditionalists' complaint about intellectual incoherence but disagree that the retreat into a military core is the only or the best way to deal with such incoherence. We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what

differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political. This solution offers the possibility of breaking free from the existing dispute between the two approaches.

The need is to construct a conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or problem. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and nonmilitary, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. These criteria are explained in detail in Chapter 2, and they show how the agenda of security studies can be extended without destroying the intellectual coherence of the field.

Levels of Analysis

For more than three decades, the debate about levels of analysis has been central to much of international relations theory (Buzan 1994c; Onuf 1995). Levels also run through all types of security analysis, whether in debates about preferred referent objects for security (individuals versus states) or about the causes of war (system structure versus the nature of states versus human nature). Since our project started with questions about the relationship between regional security theory and the multisectoral security agenda, it, too, depends on an understanding of levels of analysis. In the following chapters, we use levels of analysis extensively to locate the actors, referent objects, and dynamics of interaction that operate in the realm of security.

By levels, we mean objects for analysis that are defined by a range of spatial scales, from small to large. Levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located. Theories may suggest causal explanations from one level to another—for example, top down from system structure to unit behavior (e.g., market to firms, anarchy to states) or bottom up from human nature to the behavior of human collectivities, whether firms, states, or nations. But nothing is intrinsic to levels themselves that suggests any particular pattern or priority of relations among them. Levels are simply ontological referents for where things happen rather than sources of explanation in themselves.

In the study of international relations, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are as follow:

1. *International systems*, meaning the largest conglomerates of interacting or interdependent units that have no system level above them. Currently, this level encompasses the entire planet, but in

earlier times several more or less disconnected international systems existed simultaneously (Buzan and Little 1994).

2. *International subsystems*, meaning groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other. Subsystems may be territorially coherent, in which case they are regional (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], the Organization of African Unity [OAU]), or not (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), in which case they are not regions but simply subsystems.
3. *Units*, meaning actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals and sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g., states, nations, transnational firms).
4. *Subunits*, meaning organized groups of individuals within units that are able (or that try) to affect the behavior of the unit (e.g., bureaucracies, lobbies).
5. *Individuals*, the bottom line of most analysis in the social sciences.

Levels provide a framework within which one can theorize; they are not theories in themselves. They enable one to locate the sources of explanation and the outcomes of which theories are composed. Neorealism, for example, locates its source of explanation (structure) at the system level and its main outcome (self-help) at the unit level. Bureaucratic politics locates its source of explanation (process) at the subunit level and its outcome (irrational behavior) at the unit level. Up to a point, levels also enable one to locate many of the actors, forums, and other elements involved in international relations. Some organizations (the UN) and structures (the global market, international society) operate at the system level; others (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union [EU], the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], ASEAN) are clearly sub-systemic. But it is not always possible to locate actors clearly within a given level. A lobby group such as the national farmers' union may sit clearly at the subunit level, but transnational organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International cross levels. They may act in part on the subunit level and in part on the subsystem and system ones. The same can be said for multinational firms.

Because the levels-of-analysis debate in international relations has been closely associated with neorealism, it has tended to reflect that theory's state centrism, picturing subunits as within states and subsystems and systems as made up of states. On this basis, the levels-of-analysis scheme has been criticized for reinforcing the state centrism and inside-outside

assumptions typical of international relations (Walker 1993; Onuf 1995). In this view, the scheme is not just an innocent, abstract typology but presents a specific ontology that obscures and discriminates against those transnational units that do not fit clearly into the scheme. If one wants to see political time and space structured along different lines, the levels-of-analysis scheme in its neorealist form will be seen as problematic. There is no necessity for levels to privilege states—the unit level can encompass much more than states. Since in this project we are trying to open up a greater diversity of security units, and since one can argue that by necessity any unit has an inside and an outside (Wæver 1994, forthcoming-b), we do not accept the far-reaching version of the critique. But we do accept the reminder that in international relations one should be aware of the tendency for the levels-of-analysis scheme to reinforce state-centric thinking.

Sectors

What does it mean to adopt a more diversified agenda in which economic, societal, and environmental security issues play alongside military and political ones? Thinking about security in terms of sectors simply grew up with little reflection during the later decades of the Cold War as new issues were added to the military-political agenda. The practice of resorting to sectors is common but is seldom made explicit. Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz talk in terms of *political* theory, thereby assuming that sectors mean something analytically significant. It has become common when discussing international relations to qualify the identity of systems in terms of particular sectors of activity within them, as in "the international economic system" or "the international political system." Michael Mann (1986, chapter 1) thinks about power in terms of distinctions among ideology, economic, military, and political power. Indeed, the entire division of social and other sciences into disciplines is based largely on a preference for thinking in terms of sectors—a practice reflected in the general discourse, which often assumes that economy, society, and politics can somehow be separated without thinking too hard about how to do so. Embracing the wider security agenda means we need to consider what sectors mean.

One way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction. In this view, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion, the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.

Buzan (1991: 19–20) set out sectors in security analysis as follows:

Generally speaking, the military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.

In more recent work (Wæver et al. 1993: 24–27), we modified this statement to move away from its implicit (and sometimes explicit) placement of the state as the central referent object in all sectors. [If a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture.] The present book extends this line of argument much further. *

Sectors serve to disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its distinctive patterns of interaction. But items identified by sectors lack the quality of independent existence. Relations of coercion do not exist apart from relations of exchange, authority, identity, or environment. Sectors might identify distinctive patterns, but they remain inseparable parts of complex wholes. The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce complexity to facilitate analysis.

The use of sectors confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play. Thus, the economist looks at human systems in terms that highlight wealth and development and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by the desire to maximize utility. The political realist looks at the same systems in terms that highlight sovereignty and power and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by the desire to maximize power. The military strategist looks at the systems in terms that highlight offensive and defensive capability and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by opportunistic calculations of coercive advantage. The environmentalist looks at systems in terms of the ecological underpinnings of civilization and the need to achieve sustainable development. In the societal sector, the analyst looks at the systems in terms of patterns of identity and the desire to maintain cultural independence. Each is looking at the whole but is seeing only one dimension of its reality.

The analytical method of sectors thus starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity. To achieve understanding, it is necessary to reassemble the parts and see how they relate to each other, a task we undertake in Chapter 8.

Regions

Our interest in regions as a focus for security analysis stems not only from our previous work on regional security complex theory but also from an interest in the widespread assumption that in the post-Cold War world, international relations will take on a more regionalized character. The reasoning behind this assumption is that the collapse of bipolarity has removed the principal organizing force at the global level. The remaining great powers are no longer motivated by ideological rivalries, and they all show conspicuous signs of wanting to avoid wider political engagements unless their own interests are immediately and strongly affected. This situation creates weak leadership at the global level and, consequently, leads to the assumption that more than before, regions will be left to sort out their own affairs. Reinforcing this tendency is the fact that the weakening of the commitment to global engagement among the great powers is matched by ever rising power capabilities in most parts of the world. The long period of European and Western power advantage is being steadily eroded by the diffusion of industrial, military, and political capability among an ever wider circle of states and peoples.

In terms of level of analysis, regions are a special type of subsystem.² Geographical clustering does seem to be a sufficiently strong feature of international subsystems to be worth studying in its own right: Why should states tend to form regional clusters, and do other units behave in the same way? One has only to think of the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the South Pacific Forum, the Southern African Development Community, the OAU, and others to see the importance of territorially defined subsystems. Regions are objects of analysis in themselves, particular locations where one can find outcomes and sources of explanation. Why does this type of territorial subsystem (or any particular instance of it) come into being and sustain itself as a feature of the wider international system?

Perhaps the best general explanation of regional state systems can be derived from the thinking of Hans Mouritzen (1995, 1997). He starts with the simple but seldom considered fact that the units (states) are fixed rather than mobile. In contemporary international relations theory, it is taken for granted that the main political units are not mobile, but this was not always so. For thousands of years prior to the fifteenth century, barbarian tribes were a major feature of the international system. These tribes could and did move over long distances. In those times, it was not uncommon to find one morning that one had a great power as a neighbor where there had been no neighbor before. Mouritzen argues that if units are mobile, each unit's average environment will, after a reasonable time, constitute the system as such rather than any particular segment of that system. By contrast, if the units

are nonmobile, each unit will face a relatively stable regional environment consisting of the major units in its geographical proximity; each unit will be characterized by a specific *location* in the system's structure (Mouritzen 1980: 172, 180).

The failure to account for the effect of nonmobile units explains in part why the subsystem level has been relatively neglected in international relations theory. Hollis and Smith (1991: 7-9), for example, do not even mention it in their scheme. Identifying the mechanism that forms regions underpins the argument for paying attention to the regionalizing aspect of the subsystem level in the analysis of international security.

This discussion relates mostly to states, where the mobility/immobility question is relatively clear. Mouritzen's argument, with its focus on the military and political sectors, provides additional justification for classical, state-centric security complex theory and also gives us clues about how to begin thinking about security relations in other sectors. In the societal sector, for example, one might expect units such as nations to display immobility logic similar to that of states and thus to find regional formations among them. But in the economic sector, units such as firms and criminal gangs may be highly mobile. There, in an echo of the barbarians, one might expect to find system-level logic working more strongly and therefore expect little in the way of regional formations.

"Classical" Security Complex Theory

This section summarizes "classical" security complex theory as developed up to 1991 and can be skipped by those familiar with Buzan (1991, chapter 5). Security complex theory was first sketched by Buzan in the first edition of *People, States and Fear* in 1983 (pp. 105-115). The theory was applied to South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan 1983), then elaborated and applied in depth to the case of South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986), and later applied to Southeast Asia (Buzan 1988). Väyrynen (1988), Wiggins (1992), and Ayoob (1995) have applied versions of the theory to several regional cases, and Wæver (1989b, 1993), Buzan and colleagues (1990), Buzan and Wæver (1992), and Wæver and colleagues (1993) have used it to study the post-Cold War transformation in Europe. The most recent updates to the theory have been presented in Buzan (1991, chapter 5).

The logic of security regions stems from the fact that international security is a relational matter. International security is mostly about how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, although sometimes it addresses the ways such collectivities relate to threats from the natural environment. The emphasis on the relational nature of security is in line with some of the most important writings in security studies (Heiz 1950; Wolfers 1962; Jervis 1976), which have stressed rela-

tional dynamics such as security dilemmas, power balances, arms races, and security regimes. Little of interest can be said about the security of an isolated object (e.g., the security of France); thus, security must be studied in a wider context.

The widest context, the global level, is useful for studying the great powers, and also for thinking about systemic referent objects (the global environment, the world economy, international society). In the traditional (i.e., military-political) mode of security analysis, global security is integrated insufficiently to make much sense for most units: The securities of Togo and the Kurds might be deteriorating, whereas those of Argentina and Israel are improving and those of Sweden and Japan remain unchanged—without any of these situations being affected by the others. The rationale behind classical security complex theory was that for most of the actors at the unit level, military-political security falls into some in-between-sized clusters, and the theory claimed the most relevant scale was the regional one. Whether this rationale remains true within a multisectoral approach to security is one of the issues we address in this book.

Classical security complex theory posits the existence of regional subsystems as objects of security analysis and offers an analytical framework for dealing with those systems. Also, like most other traditionalist work in this area, the theory has focused primarily on the state as the key unit and on the political and military sectors. This framework was designed to highlight the relative autonomy of regional security relations and to set those relations within the context of the unit (state) and system levels. One of its purposes was to provide area specialists with the language and concepts to facilitate comparative studies across regions, which is a notable weakness in the existing literature. Another purpose was to offset the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international security affairs. This tendency was exacerbated by the rise of neorealism in the late 1970s (Waltz 1979), which focused almost exclusively on the power structure at the system level. It seems reasonable to expect this bias to decline with the demise of strong bipolarity at the system level and the advent of a more diffuse international power structure.

All of the states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbors more than distant powers; consequently, security interdependence across the international system as a whole is far from uniform. The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system is one of regionally based clusters, which we label *security complexes*. Security interdependence is markedly more intense among the states inside such complexes than among states outside them. Security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to dis-

tinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. A security complex is defined as a *set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another*. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex—by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. Individual security complexes are durable but not permanent features of the international system. The theory posits that in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system, security complexes are a normal and expected feature; if they are not present, one wants to know why.

Because they are formed by local groupings of states, classical security complexes not only play a central role in relations among their members; they also crucially condition how and whether stronger outside powers penetrate the region. The internal dynamics of a security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the defining security interdependence is driven by amity or enmity. At the negative end lies conflict formation (Senghaas 1988; Väyrynen 1984), in which interdependence arises from fear, rivalry, and mutual perceptions of threat. In the middle lie security regimes (Jervis 1982), in which states still treat each other as potential threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among them. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al. 1957: 1–4), in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Regional integration will eliminate a security complex with which it is coextensive by transforming it from an anarchic subsystem of states to a single, larger actor within the system. Regional integration among some members of a complex will transform the power structure of that complex.

The theory assumes that security complexes, like the balance of power, are an intrinsic product of anarchic international systems. Other things being equal, one should therefore expect to find them everywhere in the system. Two conditions explain why a security complex may not be present. First, in some areas local states have so few capabilities that their power projects little, if at all, beyond their own boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is insufficient security interaction among them to generate a local complex. The second condition occurs when the direct presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. This condition is called *overlay*, which normally involves extensive stationing of armed forces in the area overlain by the intervening great power(s) and is quite distinct from the normal process of intervention by great powers into the affairs of local security complexes. Intervention usually reinforces the local security dynamics; overlay subordinates them to the larger pattern of major power rivalries, and may even

obliterate them. The best examples of overlay are the period of European colonialism in what is now the Third World and the submergence of European security dynamics by superpower rivalry after World War II. Under overlay, one cannot see the local security dynamics with any clarity and therefore cannot identify a local complex; one only knows what the local dynamics were before overlay.

Security complexes are subsystems—miniature anarchies—in their own right, and by analogy with full systems they have structures of their own. Since security complexes are durable rather than permanent features of the overall anarchy, seeing them as subsystems with their own structures and patterns of interaction provides a useful benchmark against which to identify and assess changes in the patterns of regional security.

Essential structure is the standard by which one assesses significant change in a classical security complex. The three key components of essential structure in a security complex are (1) the arrangement of the units and the differentiation among them (this is normally the same as for the international system as a whole, and if so it is not a significant variable at the regional level), (2) the patterns of amity and enmity, and (3) the distribution of power among the principal units. Major shifts in any of these components would normally require a redefinition of the complex. This approach allows one to analyze regional security in both static and dynamic terms. If security complexes are seen as structures, one can look for outcomes resulting from either structural effects or processes of structural change.

The changes bearing on any given local security complex are usually numerous and continuous. Power relativities are in constant motion, and even patterns of amity and enmity shift occasionally. The key question is, do such changes work to sustain the essential structure or do they push it toward some kind of transformation? Four broad structural options are available for assessing the impact of change on a security complex: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation, and overlay.

Maintenance of the status quo means the essential structure of the local complex—its distribution of power and pattern of hostility—remains fundamentally intact. This outcome does not mean no change has taken place. Rather, it means the changes that have occurred have tended, in the aggregate, either to support or not seriously to undermine the structure.

Internal transformation of a local complex occurs when its essential structure changes *within* the context of its existing outer boundary. Such change can come about as a result of regional political integration, decisive shifts in the distribution of power, or major alternations in the pattern of amity and enmity.

External transformation occurs when the essential structure of a complex is altered by either the expansion or contraction of its existing outer boundary. Minor adjustments to the boundary may not significantly affect

the essential structure. The addition or deletion of major states, however, is certain to have a substantial impact on both the distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity.

Overlay means one or more external powers moves directly into the regional complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic. As argued earlier, this situation is distinct from the normal process of intervention by great powers into the affairs of regional security complexes.

Once the regional level has been established, the full range of layers that comprise a comprehensive analytical framework for security can be sketched out. At the bottom end lies the domestic security environment of individual states and societies. Next come the regional security complexes. One would expect security relations to be relatively intense within these complexes and relatively subdued among them, but in some instances significant interplay can occur across the boundaries of indifference that mark off one complex from another. Thus relations among security complexes also comprise a layer within the framework, one that becomes important if top end, one finds the higher, or great-power, complex that constitutes the system level. One would expect security relations among the great powers to be intense and to penetrate in varying degrees into the affairs of the local complexes. The method of analysis within this framework is first to understand the distinctive security dynamic at each layer and then to see how the patterns at each layer interact with each other.

In one sense, security complexes are theoretical constructs the analyst imposes on "reality." But within the theory they have ontological status: They reflect an observable patterning of global politics and so cannot be constructed merely at random. One can argue about the correct interpretation of the dividing lines, but one cannot simply use the term *security complex* to describe any group of states (Norden, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Proliferation Treaty members). A distinctive territorial pattern of security interdependence must exist that marks off the members of a security complex from other neighboring states. And this pattern has to be strong enough to make the criteria for inclusion and exclusion reasonably clear.³ Thus, there is a European security complex but not a Nordic one (because Norden is part of a larger pattern of security interdependence), a Middle Eastern complex but not a Mediterranean one (because the Mediterranean states are parts of several other regional complexes), a Middle Eastern example of a security complex centered on the rivalry between India and Pakistan, with Burma acting as the border with the complex in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan delineating the border with the complex in Southeast and China looming as an intervening great power.

One value of classical security complex theory is that it draws attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focuses it on

the region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs. Security complex theory also links studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the region, relations among regions, and relations between regions and globally acting great powers. More ambitiously, and as demonstrated in our 1990 book (Buzan et al.), security complex theory can be used to generate definitive scenarios and thus to structure the study of, as well as predictions about, possibilities for stability and change. The theory offers descriptive concepts for both static and dynamic analysis and provides benchmarks for locating significant change within the structure of international security relations. Once the structure of any given complex has been identified, it can be used to narrow possible options for change. The theory is prescriptive to the extent that it identifies appropriate (and inappropriate) realms for action and organization and suggests a range of states of being (conflict formation, security regime, security community) that can serve as frameworks for thinking about policy objectives.

Moving Beyond Classical Security Complex Theory

The classical approach to regional security analysis looks for patterns of security interdependence that are strong enough to mark off a group of units from its neighbors (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, chapter 5). Security complexes are formed from the inside out, by the interactions among their constituent units. Because classical security complex theory was formulated for thinking about the political and military sectors, states were its referent objects. Security regions therefore had the following characteristics:

1. They were composed of two or more states.
2. These states constituted a geographically coherent grouping (because threats in these sectors travel more easily over short distances than over long ones).
3. The relationship among these states was marked by security interdependence, which could be either positive or negative but which had to be significantly stronger among them than between them and outside states.
4. The pattern of security interdependence had to be deep and durable (i.e., much more than a one-time interaction), although not permanent.

In other words, security regions were a type of international political subsystem and were relatively autonomous microversions of the larger international political system within which they were embedded. Because the units of analysis were states, security regions tended to be a fairly large-

scale phenomenon. Most security complexes were subcontinental or continental in size: South Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Europe, South America, and the like.

One of the ways in which this book moves beyond classical security complex theory (CSCT) is by opening the analysis to a wider range of sectors. To what extent are regional patterns discernible when one no longer sticks to the state and privileges the political and military sectors? Will the security dynamics in the nontraditional sectors generate significant regional formations, or will their security logics place their main focus on higher (system) or lower (subunit) levels? Will the other sectors show dynamics that are mainly global, mainly local, a mess, or what? The answers to these questions will hinge on whether the relevant units are fixed or mobile and on whether threats and vulnerabilities are strongly shaped by distance. If units are not fixed or if threats are not shaped by distance, regionalizing logic may be weak. Even if we find "regions" in several or all sectors, will they line up—for example, are the regions in the environmental sector at all like those in the political sector? Will environmental sectors cluster, for example, around seas (the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Sea of Japan, and so on) and rivers (the Nile, Euphrates, and Jordan), whereas the political and societal sectors will be mainly land-based and continental? Discovering the answers to these questions is the work of Chapters 3 through 7, and putting the findings together is that of Chapter 8.

Logically, there are two possible ways of opening security complex theory to sectors other than the military-political and to actors other than states:

1. *Homogeneous complexes.* This approach retains the "classical" assumption that security complexes are concentrated within specific sectors and are therefore composed of specific forms of interaction among similar types of units (e.g., power rivalries among states). This logic leads to different types of complexes that occur in different sectors (e.g., military complexes made up predominantly of states, a societal complex of various identity-based units, and the like).
2. *Heterogeneous complexes.* This approach abandons the assumption that security complexes are locked into specific sectors. It assumes that the regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting across two or more sectors (e.g., states + nations + firms + confederations interacting across the political, economic, and societal sectors).

There is no reason to choose between these alternatives. In principle, both are possible, and the analyst needs to determine which alternative best fits the case under study.

Heterogeneous security complexes have the advantage of linking actors across sectors, thus enabling the analyst to keep the entire picture in

a single frame and also to keep track of the inevitable spillovers between sectors (military impacts on economic developments and the like). A, B, C, and D could be nations, a state, and a supranational institution such as the EU, and the security dynamics of Europe can perhaps best be understood as a constellation of security fears and interactions among nations, states, and the EU (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 4; Wæver 1996b, forthcoming-a). A similar logic might be applied to the Middle East, where the security complex contains both states and nations (e.g., Kurds, Palestinians).

Homogeneous, or sector-specific, security complexes (which would include the classical political-military, state-dominated model) require the construction of separate frames for each sector. They offer the possibility of isolating sector-specific security dynamics (politics-military, economic, societal, and so forth), but they also present the challenge of how to reassemble the separate frames into a holistic picture and the danger that linkages across sectors will be lost or obscured. Looking at security complexes sector by sector, one might find patterns that do not line up. In the chapters that follow, we take the sector-by-sector approach on the grounds that we need to explore the as yet poorly understood security dynamics of sectors and because it seems to be the best way to set out the framework. This should not be read as privileging the homogeneous approach over the heterogeneous one, as becomes apparent in Chapter 8.

Each of the sector chapters contains a subsection that asks, where are the security dynamics of this sector predominantly located, and what are the trends? Are they regional, global, or maybe local? Two types of considerations affect how we answer those questions. First is the cause-effect nature of the issues around which securitization takes place: the "facilitating conditions" for securitization. Second is the process of securitization itself. Facilitating conditions are sometimes clearly located on a level and sometimes not. Issues are clearly global when they have global causes and effects—for example, planetary temperature change, sea-level rises, and the like. They are local when they have local causes and effects—for example, pollution of water by industrial waste or sewage discharge. Water pollution may occur in many places worldwide, but that does not make it a global-level issue in the sense we use that term here but rather a case of parallel local issues. The difference is not whether pollution is felt locally—sea-level rises are too—but that one case could take place without the other. Rising sea level, in contrast, is an integrated phenomenon; it is impossible for it to rise in one region and not in another. But in principle its causes could be local, caused, for example, by energy consumption in one country.

It is possible to mix levels and have, for example, local causes and global effects (the earlier example) or global causes and local effects (such as holes in the ozone layer). This situation, however, is all about the level of the issue, not necessarily of its securitization. As in classical security complex theory, the more important criterion is which actors are actually

linked by their mutual security concerns. If the Middle Eastern powers become locked into a security rivalry and thus form a security complex, it is irrelevant whether some analyst can argue that the "real" threat to those powers is Russia or the United States. If the actors make their major securitizations so the Middle East becomes tied together, it constitutes a regional security complex.

More generally in this investigation, the criterion for answering the levels question is ultimately political: what constellation of actors forms on this issue. The nature of the issue—causes and effects—can often be an indicator of the likely level, but it is not what ultimately answers the question. In the process of securitization, the key issue is for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom. For example, a water shortage could become securitized at the global level, but the major battles will more likely be regional. Upstream and downstream powers and other potential beneficiaries from a particular river or lake will see each other as constellations in the region and thus become tied into a more general regional security complex. This result is not determined purely by the nature of the issue: If all downstream nations could join together and push for global regulations on water usage, they could securitize the issue at the global level. The outcome that materializes is a result of politics, and our answer to the levels question thus must pay attention to the actual securitizing feature is the size of the political security constellation that is formed around the issue.

Because we opt for the homogeneous, sector-specific approach in Chapters 3 through 7, there is a problem in pinning down the meaning of the section Levels of Analysis, we would have preferred to think of regions and units in terms appropriate to specific sectors. Thus, in the military and political sectors the units would be states and regions would be sets of adjacent states, but, say, in the societal sector, units might be nations and regions sets of adjacent nations. The problem with this approach is that unit and region can mean very different things in different sectors. The politico-military unit Nigeria, for example, might contain several societal "regions." We therefore adopt a state-centric frame for the purpose of getting a fixed scale against which to measure levels. Thereby, we achieve consistency in the meaning of *region* by using the political, state-defined sense of the term as a standard measure no matter which sector we are discussing. We do this not to determine or privilege the state as an actor but merely to achieve consistency in discussions. Other units exist, but only one is chosen as the instrument of measurement.

Thus, by *region* we mean a spatially coherent territory composed of

two or more states. *Subregion* means part of such a region, whether it involves more than one state (but fewer than all of the states in the region) or some transnational composition (some mix of states, parts of states, or both). *Microregion* refers to the subunit level within the boundaries of a state.

The second way in which we move beyond CSCT is by taking an explicitly social constructivist approach to understanding the process by which issues become securitized. CSCT addressed this issue simply in terms of patterns of animity and enmity (which entailed some constructivist deviation from objectivist, material realism—animity and enmity are generated by the actors and are not reflections of material conditions); adopting the wider agenda requires a more sophisticated approach. That approach is the subject of Chapter 2, which makes the case for understanding security not just as the use of force but as a particular type of intersubjective politics. Chapter 2 attempts to clarify two analytical issues: (1) how to identify what is and what is not a security issue, or, put another way, how to differentiate between the politicization and the securitization of an issue; and (2) how to identify and distinguish security actors and referent objects. These clarifications aim to meet the criticism of the broad security agenda which holds that opening up the agenda risks securitizing everything, therefore voiding the security concept of any meaning. We hope to show how the essential meaning of security can be carried across sectors (thus achieving the desired aim of broadening) without so diluting the concept that its distinctive meaning is destroyed.

Each of Chapters 3 through 7 covers one of the principal sectors that define the attempt to construct a broader agenda for international security studies. These chapters have a common structure: each asks what the security agenda is within the sector, what types of actors are distinctive to the sector, what logic of threats and vulnerabilities operates within the sector, and how the security dynamics within the sector divide among the local, regional, and global scales. Each of these chapters is a lens that isolates a specific sector for analytical purposes and tries to uncover its distinctive security dynamics. The assumptions are that these dynamics may be different and that the overall character of security relations will change as the dominant focus of security concerns shifts among sectors. Investigating whether we should expect a strong regional logic in the nontraditional sectors is one of the main purposes of the inquiry.

Chapter 8 attempts the reaggregation, first in terms of how the security dynamics in the five sectors align with each other but mainly in terms of the reintegration of sectors by actors in the policymaking process. Chapter 9 reflects on the approach used to pull security studies into a coherent framework, compares the new framework with the traditional one, and looks at implications for security complex theory.

Notes

1. A possible third contender is the newly launched "critical security studies," committed to seeking alternatives to realist, statist, and positivist orthodoxies. Some of what follows might be seen as fitting that description, but we have no prior commitment to antistate or antirealist positions, and we are driven more by methodological collectivism than by methodological individualism. More on critical security studies in Chapter 2.
2. We are aware that in some other literatures the term *region* has a different meaning from ours. The term was originally introduced at the subunit level. In nineteenth-century France, a political movement formulated regionalism as an ideal for political organization that was located in the middle of the continuum between centralized government and political autonomy. This politicized notion of the region lives on in separatist movements. Also, contemporary journals like *Regional Politics and Policy* (published since 1990), *International Regional Science Review* (since 1975), *Journal of Regional Science* (since 1958), and *Regional Studies* (since 1967) are devoted primarily to the situation of ethnic minorities in specific subunit regions and to issues of administration and planning at different political levels—that is, political centralization and decentralization. Additionally, there is a Europe of the regions: The contemporary map of the EU is subdivided not only into states but also into thousands of smaller units (a Swissification of Europe) and also increasingly into a variety of transnational "regions" (the Baltic Sea region, the Alpe-Adriatic, and the like), which in our terminology would appear as subregions and transregions, respectively. In this study, region refers to what that other literature sometimes calls macroregions (cf. Joenniemi 1993, 1997).
3. The security complex is not objective in the sense of "independent of actors." In much traditional security analysis, region is defined "objectively" purely in terms of geography or history (cf. current debates about whether Russia is a part of Europe). In this sense, a region is simply an arena for security and one that is not influenced by security policies—the analyst observes "objective" reality and tells the actors to which region they belong. In contrast, security complexes are specifically defined by security interactions among units. Since we argue that security is not an objective issue but a product of the behavior of actors, security complexes are not objective in the traditional sense. Nor is the security complex to be seen as a discursive construction by the actors. We are not (in this context) interested in whether the actors define themselves as a region or whether they claim that their true region is something larger or smaller. Security complexes do not require that their members think in terms of the concept *security complex* (cf. note 6, Chapter 2). Analysts apply the term *security complex* (and therefore designate a region) based upon the contingent, historically specific, and possibly changing constellation generated by the interdependent security practices of the actors. On this basis, lines can be drawn on a map, and the theory can be put into operation.

CHAPTER 2

Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus

What Is Security?

What quality makes something a security issue in international relations? It is important to add the qualification "in international relations," because the character of security in that context is not identical to the use of the term in everyday language. Although it shares some qualities with "social security," or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning. Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics. We are not following a rigid domestic-international distinction, because many of our cases are not state defined. But we are claiming that international security has a distinctive agenda.¹

The answer to what makes something an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (territorially, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying "security," a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (Wæver 1988, 1995b).

When we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms *existential threat* and *emergency measures* mean? How, in practice, can the analyst draw the line between processes of politicization and processes of securitization on this basis? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. We are not dealing here with a universal standard based in some sense on what threatens individual human life. The essential quality of existence will vary greatly

across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats.

In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state, although it may also be other kinds of political entities. It is also possible to imagine circumstances in which threats to the survival of the armed forces would elevate those forces to referent object status in their own right, perhaps serving to justify a coup against the existing government and its policy (whether of disarmament or of hopeless conflict). Traditional security studies tends to see all military affairs as instances of security, but this may not be the case. For many of the advanced democracies, defense of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main *de facto*, function of the armed forces. Their militaries may be increasingly trained and called upon to support routine world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, that cannot be viewed as concerning existential threats to their states or even as emergency action in the sense of suspending normal rules.

In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of the constituting principle—sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology—of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority. Among the ever more interdependent and institutionalized relations characteristic of the West (and increasingly of the international system as a whole), a variety of supranational referent objects are also becoming important. The European Union (EU) can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes.

In the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down. Firms are most commonly existentially threatened by bankruptcy and sometimes by changes to laws that make them illegal or unviable (as after communist revolutions). But in the market economy firms are, with few exceptions, expected to come and go, and only rarely do they try to securitize their own survival. National economies have a greater claim to the right of survival, but rarely will a threat to that survival (national bankruptcy or an inability to provide for the basic needs of the population) actually arise apart from wider security contexts, such as war. Unless the survival of the population is in question, the huge range of the national economy doing better or doing worse cannot be seen as existentially threatening. As in the political sector, supranational referent objects from specific regimes to the global market itself can be existentially threatened by factors that might undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute them.

In the societal sector, as we have defined it, the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as

nations and religions. Given the peculiar nature of this type of referent object, it is extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats. Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive or heretical and their sources pointed to as existential threats, or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of identity. Given the conservative nature of "identity," it is always possible to paint challenges and changes as threats to identity, because "we will no longer be us," no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be to be true to our "identity." Thus, whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained. The abilities to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioral customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in terms of survival.

In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of individual species (tigers, whales, humankind) or types of habitat (rain forests, lakes), to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere within the narrow band human beings have come to consider to be normal during their few thousand years of civilization. Underlying many of these referent objects are baseline concerns about the relationship between the human species and the rest of the biosphere and whether that relationship can be sustained without risking a collapse of the achieved levels of civilization, a wholesale disruption of the planet's biological legacy, or both. The interplay among all of these factors is immensely complicated. At either the macro or the micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat (the survival of species, the survival of human civilization) that can be securitized. In between, somewhat as in the economic sector, lies a huge mass of problems that are more difficult, although not impossible, to construct in existential terms.

Securitization

"Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is pre-

sented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open: Depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum.² In practice, placement varies substantially from state to state (and also across time). Some states will politicize religion (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma) and some will not (France, the United States). Some will securitize culture (the former USSR, Iran) and some will not (the UK, the Netherlands). In the case of issues (notably the environment) that have moved dramatically out of the nonpoliticized category, we face the double question of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized. This link between politicization and securitization does not imply that securitization always goes through the state; politicization as well as securitization can be enacted in other fora as well. As will be seen later, it is possible for other social entities to raise an issue to the level of general consideration or even to the status of sanctioned urgency among themselves.

In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be "best." The meaning lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others. In the case of security, textual analysis (Wæver 1988, 1995b, 1995c) suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat. If one can argue that something overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other, this must be the case because it can upset the entire process of weighing as such: "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)." Thereby, the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (e.g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task). "Security" is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.

Of course, places do exist where secrecy or violation of rights is the rule and where security arguments are not needed to legitimize such acts. The earlier illustrations were for a liberal-democratic society; in other societies there will also be "rules," as there are in any society, and when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics," we have a case of

securitization. Thus, the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.

Even if the general logic of securitization is clear, we have to be precise about its threshold. A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such. (Accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent. Since securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one's case.) We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized. The distinction between a securitizing move and successful securitization is important in the chapters that follow.

Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules. Still, we have a problem of size or significance. Many actions can take this form on a small scale—for example, a family securitizing its lifestyle as dependent on keeping a specific job (and therefore using dirty tricks in competition at the firm) or the Pentagon designating hackers as "a catastrophic threat" and "a serious threat to national security" (*San Francisco Chronicle*, May 23, 1996: A11), which could possibly lead to actions within the computer field but with no cascading effects on other security issues. Our concept of international security has a clear definition of what we are interested in, but it does not tell us how we sort the important cases from the less important ones. We do not want to sort by arbitrarily assigning degrees of importance to referent objects and sectors, for instance, defining state as more important than environment or military as more securitylike

than identity. Doing so would undermine the logic of both widening the security agenda and taking a securitization approach to that agenda. It would constrain arbitrarily and a priori what we can see and thus make it impossible to capture the extent to which the security agenda has actually changed or been widened.

A better measure of importance is the scale of chain reactions on other securitizations: How big an impact does the securitizing move have on wider patterns of relations? A securitizing move can easily upset orders of mutual accommodation among units. The security act is negotiated between securitizer and audience—that is, internally within the unit—but thereby the securitizing agent can obtain permission to override rules that would otherwise bind it. Typically, the agent will override such rules, because by depicting a threat the securitizing agent often says someone cannot be dealt with in the normal way. In the extreme case—war—we do not have to discuss with the other party; we try to eliminate them. This self-based violation of rules is the security act, and the fear that the other party will not let us survive as a subject is the foundational motivation for that act. In a securitized situation, a unit does not rely on the social resources of rules shared intersubjectively among units but relies instead on its own resources, demanding the right to govern its actions by its own priorities (Wæver 1996b). A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.

The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure"). This definition can function as a tool for finding security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political one, where it is often hard to define when to include new issues on the security agenda. Must new issues affect the military sector or be as "dangerous" as war (Deudney 1990)? To circumvent these restrictive ties to traditional security, one needs a clear idea of the essential quality of security in general.

That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that "really" endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship) (Wæver 1988; Austin 1975: 98ff.).

Sectors and Institutionalization of Security

What we can study is this practice: Who can "do" or "speak" security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects? It is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word *security*. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience. There will be instances in which the word *security* appears without this logic and other cases that operate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security reference. As spelled out later, in some cases securitization has become institutionalized. Constant drama does not have to be present, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of *this* (typically, but not necessarily, defense issues), we are by definition in the area of urgency. By saying "defense" (or, in Holland, "dikes"), one has also implicitly said security and priority. We use this logic as a definition of security because it has a consistency and precision the word as such lacks. There is a concept of international security with this specific meaning, which is implied in most usages of the word.

Our claim is that it is possible to dig into the practice connected to this concept of security in international relations (which is distinct from other concepts of security) and find a characteristic pattern with an inner logic. If we place the survival of collective units and principles—the politics of existential threat—as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept. This is the answer to those who hold that security studies cannot expand its agenda beyond the traditional military-political one without debasing the concept of security itself.

Sectors are "views of the international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units" (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 31). Given that the analytical purpose of sectors is to differentiate types of interaction (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental), it seems reasonable to expect (1) that one will find units and values that are characteristic of, and rooted in, particular sectors (although, like the state, they may also appear in other sectors); and (2) that the nature of survival and threat will differ across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors. One purpose of the following chapters is to unfold this sectoral logic of security more fully.

Securitization can be either *ad hoc* or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. This situation is most visible in the military sector, where states have long endured threats of armed coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies,

procedures, and military establishments to deal with those threats. Although such a procedure may seem to reduce security to a species of normal politics, it does not do so. The need for drama in establishing securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of urgency. As is the case for defense issues in most countries and for the dikes in the Netherlands, urgency has been established by the previous use of the security move. There is no further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence, that it is a security issue—by saying “defense” or “dikes,” one has also implicitly said “security” and “priority.” This can be shown by trying to inquire about the rationale for decisions in these areas. Behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a—probably irritated—repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted.

Some security practices are not legitimized in public by security discourse, because they are not out in the public at all (e.g., the “black programs” in the United States, which are not presented in the budget), but this is actually a very clear case of the security logic. In a democracy, at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can legitimately be handled differently. One could not take something out of the budget without giving a reason for the use of such an extraordinary procedure. When this procedure has been legitimized through security rhetoric, it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimization, and it is thus possible to have black security boxes in the political process. The speech act reduces public influence on this issue, but in democracies one must legitimize in public why from now on the details will not be presented publicly (because of the danger of giving useful information to the enemy and the like). In all cases, the establishment of secret services has some element of this logical sequence. Not every act is presented with the drama of urgency and priority, because it has been established in a general sense that this is an entire field that has been moved to a form of treatment legitimate only because this area has been defined as security.

In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states (Nigeria under Abacha, the USSR under Stalin) or in states mobilized for total war, much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm.³ The prominence of institutionalized military security underpins not only the claim of those who want to confine security studies to the military sector but also the *de facto* primacy of the state in security affairs. But nothing is necessary about this particular construction; it comes out of a certain history and has formidable institutional momentum but is not fixed for all time. Where the threat profiles warrant them, one can see other types of institutionalized security structures, such as those concerned with flood control in the Netherlands. One of the diffi-

culties facing those attempting to securitize environmental issues is that the threats are both new (or newly discovered) and controversial regarding their existential urgency. Consequently, they do not (yet) have institutions, and they find themselves operating in a political context dominated by security institutions designed for other types of threat.

Although in one sense securitization is a further intensification of politicization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the state), in another sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be different (laws of nature) or should not be put under political control (e.g., a free economy, the private sphere, and matters for expert decision). By contrast, securitization on the international level (although often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.

National security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit “threats” for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint. Our belief, therefore, is not “the more security the better.” Basically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific “threats” to a prepolitical immediacy. In some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor. Because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also has tactical attractions—for example, as a way to obtain sufficient attention for environmental problems. But desecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which we have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere (Wæver 1995b).

When considering securitizing moves such as “environmental security” or a “war on crime,” one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization. Thus, although in the abstract desecuritization is the ideal, in specific situations one can choose securitization—only one should not believe this is an innocent reflection of the issue *being* a security threat; it is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization.

Subjective, Objective, and Intersubjective Security

Extracting the essential quality of international security takes one some way toward pinning down a general but nonetheless still fairly confined

meaning of the concept that can operate both within and beyond the traditional military-political understanding of that concept. But this does not solve all of the problems. Commentators on security at least as far back as Arnold Wolfers (1962: 151) have noted that security can be approached both objectively (there is a real threat) and subjectively (there is a perceived threat) and that nothing ensures that these two approaches will line up. This distinction turns out to be crucial in formulating an international security concept for a multisectoral agenda.

Our argument is that securitization, like politicization, has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process. Even if one wanted to take a more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could be done except in cases in which the threat is unambiguous and immediate. (An example would be hostile tanks crossing the border; even here, "hostile" is an attribute not of the vehicle but of the socially constituted relationship. A foreign tank could be part of a peacekeeping force.) It is not easy to judge the securitization of an issue against some measure of whether that issue is "really" a threat; doing so would demand an objective measure of security that no security theory has yet provided. Even if one could solve the measurement problem, it is not clear that the objectivist approach would be particularly helpful. Different states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat: Finns are concerned about immigration at a level of 0.3 percent foreigners, whereas Switzerland functions with a level of 14.7 percent (Romero 1990).⁴

Regardless of whether an analyst finds that an actor's disposition toward high or low thresholds leads to correct assessments, this disposition has real effects. And other actors need to grasp the logic this unit follows. When states or nations securitize an issue—"correctly" or not—it is a political fact that has consequences, because this securitization will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise. This is the classical diplomatic (and classical realist) lesson, which holds that good statesmanship has to understand the threshold at which other actors will feel threatened and therefore more generally to understand how the world looks to those actors, even if one disagrees (Carr 1939; Kissinger 1957; Wæver 1995d).

In some cases, however, it *does* matter how others judge the reasonableness of a securitization, because this influences how other actors in the system will respond to a security claim. What may seem a legitimate securitization within a given political community may appear paranoid to those outside it (e.g., Western perceptions of Soviet concerns about pop music and jeans). Conversely, outsiders may perceive that a political community undersecritizes a "real" threat and thus endangers itself or free rides (e.g., U.S. perceptions of Danish defense policy during the Cold War). The way the securitization processes of one actor fit with the perceptions of others about what constitutes a "real" threat matters in shaping the interplay of

securities within the international system. Both within and between actors, the extent of shared intersubjective understandings of security is one key to understanding behavior.

In any case, it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define "real security" outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors to understand the term correctly. Such rationalist universalism will easily be "right" on its own terms, but it will be of very little help in political analysis. It is more relevant to grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization, because if one knows who can "do" security on what issue and under what conditions, it will sometimes be possible to maneuver the interaction among actors and thereby curb security dilemmas.

The distinction between subjective and objective is useful for highlighting the fact that we want to avoid a view of security that is given objectively and emphasize that security is determined by actors and in this respect is subjective. The label *subjective*, however, is not fully adequate. Whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals decide alone. Securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed. Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that *should* survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does not guarantee success (cf. Derrida 1977a; Wæver 1995b). Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but *among* the subjects (cf. Arendt 1958, 1959; Wæver 1990; Huysmans 1996).⁵

Social Power and Facilitating Conditions

This relationship among subjects is not equal or symmetrical, and the possibility for successful securitization will vary dramatically with the position held by the actor. Security is thus very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security (Bigo 1994, 1996, forthcoming). This power, however, is never absolute: No one is guaranteed the ability to make people accept a claim for necessary security action (as even the Communist elites of Eastern Europe learned; see Wæver 1995b), nor is anyone excluded from attempts to articulate alternative interpretations of security. The field is structured or biased, but no one conclusively "holds" the power of securitization.⁵ Therefore, it is our view

(contra Bigo) that one can not make the actors of securitization the fixed point of analysis—the practice of securitization is the center of analysis. In concrete analysis, however, it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept.

Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful).

The impossibility of applying objective standards of securityness relates to a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are about the future, about alternative futures—always hypothetical—and about counterfactuals. A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take “security action” (the threat), and what will happen if we do (How is the submitted security policy supposed to work?). A security theory that could tell politicians and citizens what actually constitute security problems and what do not would demand that such predictions should be possible to make on a scientific basis, which means society would have to be a closed, mechanical, and deterministic system. Even this condition, however, would not be enough, because a second complication is that securityness is not only a matter of degree—“how threatening”—but is also a qualitative question: Do we choose to attach the security label with its ensuing effects? Actors can choose to handle a major challenge in other ways and thus not securitize it. The use of a specific conceptualization is always a choice—it is politics, it is not possible to decide by investigating the threat scientifically.

An objective measure for security can never replace the study of securitization, because the security quality is supplied by politics, but this does not mean a study of the features of the threat itself is irrelevant. On the contrary, these features rank high among the “facilitating conditions” of the security speech act. Facilitating conditions are the conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused (Austin 1975 [1962]). Conditions for a successful speech act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical—to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures), and (2) the external, contextual and social—to hold a position from which the act can be made (“The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” [Austin 1975 (1962): 34]).

A successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech (Bourdieu 1991 [1982]; Butler 1996a, b). Among the

internal conditions of a speech act, the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out—the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and so on (cf. Wæver 1996b). The external aspect of a speech act has two main conditions. One is the social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who must be in a position of authority, although this should not be defined as official authority. The other external condition has to do with threat. It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening—be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves, these objects never make for necessary securitization, but they are definitely facilitating conditions.

After thus subdividing the social, external speech-act conditions into actor authority and threat related, we can sum up the facilitating conditions as follows: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor—that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.

Actor and Analyst in Securitization Studies

Approaching security from a speech-act perspective raises questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in defining and understanding the security agenda. As analysts, we define security as we have done here because it is the only way that makes coherent sense of what actors do. We have identified a particular sociopolitical logic that is characteristic of security, and that logic is what we study. Although analysts unavoidably play a role in the construction (or deconstruction) of security issues (viz., the long argument between peace research and strategic studies or the U.S. debate about the securityness of the Vietnam War), it is not their primary task to determine whether some threat represents a “real” security problem.

Objective security assessment is beyond our means of analysis; the main point is that actors and their audiences securitize certain issues as a specific form of political act. Actors who securitize do not necessarily say “security,” nor does their use of the term *security* necessarily always constitute a security act. We use our criteria to see if they take the form of “politics of existential threats,” with the argument that an issue takes priority over everything else and therefore allows for a breaking of the rules. As a first step, the designation of what constitutes a security issue comes from

political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political actors' actions and sort out when these actions fulfill the security criteria. It is, further, the analyst who judges whether the actor is effective in mobilizing support around this security reference (i.e., the attempted securitizers are "judged" first by other social actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then interpreted and measured by us). Finally, to assess the significance of an instance of securitization, analysts study its effects on other units. The actor commands at only one very crucial step: the performance of a political act in a security mode.

Thus, it is the actor, not the analyst, who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat. This does not make analysts hostage to the self-understanding of actors for the duration of the analysis. In all subsequent questions of cause-effect relationships—what are the effects of these security acts, who influenced decisions, and so on—we do not intend to give actors any defining role. Thus, a concept such as *security complex* is defined not by whether actors label themselves a complex (they do not) but by analysts' interpretation of who is actually interconnected in terms of security interaction.⁶ (Security complex is basically an analytical term; security is a political practice that we have distilled into a specific, more precise category on the basis of the way the concept is used.) The speech-act approach says only that it is the actor who by securitizing an issue—and the audience by accepting the claim—makes it a security issue. At that level, the analyst cannot and should not replace the actor.

This point does not suggest that we feel obliged to agree with this securitizing act. One of the purposes of this approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue. One rarely manages to counter a securitizing attempt by saying as an analyst, "You are not really threatened, you only think so." But it is possible to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to make this issue a security issue—to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics—or whether it is better handled within normal politics. As witnessed in the discussion about environmental security, even environmentalists have had strong second thoughts about the effects of putting the environmental agenda in security terms. The securitization approach serves to underline the responsibility of talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue. They cannot hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue.

The relationship of analyst to actor is one area in which our approach differs from that taken by many scholars with whom we share some theoretical premises. An emerging school of "critical security studies" (CSS) wants to challenge conventional security studies by applying postpositivist perspectives, such as critical theory and poststructuralism (Krause and Williams 1996, 1997). Much of its work, like ours, deals with the social construction of security (cf. also Klein 1994; Campbell 1993), but CSS mostly has the intent (known from poststructuralism as well as from con-

structivism in international relations) of showing that change is possible because things are socially constituted.

We, in contrast, believe even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues, using one's understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticize this fact but also to understand the dynamics of security and thereby maneuver them. This leads us to a stronger emphasis on collectivities and on understanding thresholds that trigger securitization in order to avoid them. With our securitization perspective, we abstain from attempts to talk about what "real security" would be for people, what are "actual" security problems larger than those propagated by elites, and the like. To be able to talk about these issues, one has to make basically different ontological choices than ours and must define some emancipatory ideal. Such an approach is therefore complementary to ours; it can do what we voluntarily abstain from, and we can do what it is unable to: understand the mechanisms of securitization while keeping a distance from security—that is, not assuming that security is a good to be spread to ever more sectors.

There are other differences between the two approaches (much of CSS takes the individual as the true reference for security—human security—and thus in its individualism differs from our methodological collectivism and focus on collectivities; cf. Chapter 9), but the political attitude and its corresponding view of constructivism and structuralism is probably the most consistent one. The analyst in critical security studies takes on a larger burden than the analyst in our approach; he or she can brush away existing security construction disclosed as arbitrary and point to some other issues that are more important security problems. Our approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their modus operandi, and assumes that future management of security will have to include handling these actors—as, for instance, in strategies aimed at mitigating security dilemmas and fostering mutual awareness in security complexes. Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it "really" is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions. This stands in contrast to the "critical" purposes of CSS, which point toward a more wholesale refutation of current power wielders.

The Units of Security Analysis: Actors and Referent Objects

The speech-act approach to security requires a distinction among three types of units involved in security analysis.

1. *Referent objects*: things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.
2. *Securitizing actors*: actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened.
3. *Functional actors*: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector—it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary).

The most important and difficult distinction is that between referent objects and securitizing actors, and this distinction requires some discussion. We deal with functional actors in the sector chapters.

The referent object for security has traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation. For a state, survival is about sovereignty, and for a nation it is about identity (Wæver et al. 1993, chapter 2). But if one follows the securitization approach outlined earlier, a much more open spectrum of possibilities has to be allowed. In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object. In practice, however, the constraints of facilitating conditions mean actors are much more likely to be successful with some types of referent objects than with others. Security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The referent object is that to which one can point and say, "It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to..."

Size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in determining what constitutes a successful referent object of security. At the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but few will listen. At the system end of the scale, problems also exist in establishing security legitimacy. For example, attempts have been made to construct all of humankind as a security referent—most notably in terms of shared fears of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War but also in the context of environmental fears. Another system-scale attempt was the failed move by socialists in 1914 to mobilize in the name of the international working class. Thus far, however, the system level has rarely been able to compete with the middle scale, although this does not mean it will not become more attractive in the future as international circumstances change.

In practice, the middle scale of limited collectivities has proved the most amenable to securitization as durable referent objects. One explanation for this success is that such limited collectivities (states, nations, and, as anticipated by Huntington, civilizations) engage in self-reinforcing rival-

ries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their "we" feeling. Because they involve a reference to a "we," they are social constructs operative in the interaction among people. A main criterion of this type of referent is that it forms an interpretative community—it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events. The referent is a social context with the dignity of a "site of judgment" (Foucault 1979). If rivalry is a facilitating condition for successful securitization, middle-level collectivities will always have an advantage over the system level in this respect. Somehow, the system-level candidates are still too subtle and indirect to trigger the levels of mass identity necessary for securitization. Lacking the dynamic underpinning of rivalry, their attempt at universalist political allegiance confronts the middle-level collectivities and loses.⁷

The apparent primacy of the middle-level, limited collectivities opens the way for an attack on our approach from traditional state-centric security analysts (and perhaps also from certain types of liberals). Their argument goes like this: Security, by definition, is and should be about the state, and the state is and should be about security, with the emphasis on military and political security. A hard-line liberal might say the state has no legitimate functions other than security. When security is expanded beyond the state, we have problematic securitizations such as environmental security; when the state expands beyond security, we have problems such as the conflation of economic security with protectionism. It is possible to take the state-security position and argue politically against all attempts to "do" security with reference to other referent objects on the ground that only through the state can the process of securitization be controlled democratically and kept in check.

We acknowledge that there is some analytical truth, as well as a legitimate political position, in this tight link between state and security. But the logic of our approach forces us to reject the use of such a narrow and self-closing definitional move. We have constructed a wider conceptual net within which the state-centric position is a possible but not a predetermined outcome. In using this scheme, one may still find that the state is the most important security referent; if so, this finding would carry much more force than if it were made true by definition and would also remain open to change. We do not say security is only about the state (although there is much truth to the argument that the state is the ideal security actor) nor that security is equally available to all—states and other social movements. Security is an area of competing actors, but it is a biased one in which the state is still generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose. This explanation acknowledges the difference between a state-centric approach and a state-dominated field.

But whereas the middle level in general, and the state in particular,

might enjoy primacy in the selection of referent objects, that is not the end of the story. Being a middle-level, limited collectivity is insufficient for achieving status as a referent object. This is probably best illustrated in the case of economic security, where one would think firms are the natural limited collectivity units. But by their very nature, firms rarely have a strong claim to a right of survival. If the survival of a firm is threatened, the firm will not be able to legitimize action beyond the normal, legal rules of the game. We rarely see middle-level security policy in this field except when economic arguments can be linked to what in economic terms is the secondary unit—the state—which can claim a natural right to survive, to defend its existence, and to take extraordinary measures (protectionism and the like) on a national issue (such as maintaining the capability for military mobilization) if deemed necessary.

Nor do system-level referent objects always lose out. Thus far they have done so in the military and political sectors, where the security of humankind has generally had less appeal than that of the state. But the story is different in other sectors. The environment is becoming an interesting case, because groups are using a securitizing logic that exactly follows the format prescribed in the previous section. The environment has to survive; therefore, this issue should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues will lose their meaning. If the normal system (politics according to the rules as they exist) is not able to handle this situation, we (Greenpeace and especially the more extremist ecoterrorists) will have to take extraordinary measures to save the environment. Sustainability might be the environmentalists' equivalent of the state's sovereignty and the nation's identity; it is the essential constitutive principle that has to be protected. If this idea catches on, the environment itself may be on the way to becoming a referent object—an object by reference to which security action can be taken in a socially significant way. We discuss this more fully in Chapter 4.

Once this door is opened, one can see other plausible candidates for security referent objects at the system level. Humankind as a whole achieved some status as a referent object in relation to nuclear weapons and could do so again—perhaps more successfully—in relation to environmental disasters, such as new ice ages or collisions between the earth and one or more of the many large rocks that occupy near-earth space. The level of human civilization could also become the referent object in relation to environmental threats. In the economic sector, system-level referents may be more effective vehicles for security discourse than limited collectivities, such as the firm and the state. Already, systems of rules or sets of principles, such as "the liberal world economy" and "free trade," have some status as referent objects in the economic sector. A similar practice could grow in the political sector around international society or democracy (the latter as an extension of the democracy = peace hypothesis). Our position is that

no principled, logical exclusion of referent objects should take place at the system level; therefore, we investigate the issue in each of the sector chapters.

Also, the individual is again a factor in security debate. As argued by Ken Booth (1991, 1994, 1995), much of security analysis blanks out the effects on actual human beings of the issues discussed; thus, his argument is an attempt to securitize concrete individuals in their competition with aggregate categories. Emma Rothschild (1995) has argued that historically, a major part of liberal thought had the individual as the referent of security; thus, there is a respectable philosophical tradition to build on. In the 1980s, with projects like the Brandt and Palme Commissions, security thought drifted back toward the individual, and Rothschild argues convincingly that regardless of whether it is intellectually coherent or ethically ideal, securitization of the individual is a real political practice of our times. (In this book, the individual will reappear primarily in the political-sector chapter, because it is usually a question of establishing the *principle* of, for example, human rights rather than of specific individuals appearing one by one as securitized referent objects.⁸)

To conclude, one can study security discourse to learn what referent objects are appealed to and can study outcomes to see which hold security legitimacy so an appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support. Traditionally, the middle level has been the most fruitful generator of referent objects, but lately more has been heard about system- and micro-level possibilities (Rothschild 1995). Referent objects must establish security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival. Bureaucracies, political regimes, and firms seldom hold this sense of guaranteed survival and thus are not usually classed as referent objects. Logically, they could try to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is not usually possible. In practice, security is not totally subjective. There are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized, although those limits can be changed. This means security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of securitization—the cases in which other people follow the securitizing lead, creating a social, intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale. Unsuccessful or partially successful attempts at securitization are interesting primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, and the possible future direction of security politics. In these larger patterns, desecuritization is at least as interesting as securitization, but the successful acts of securitization take a central place because they constitute the currently valid specific meaning of security.

Critics will undoubtedly protest our abdication of the critical use of objective security measures as a way to question dominant definitions (cf. McSweeney 1996). When a threat is not securitized, should one not be able

to show that this is a threat? Yes, the securitization perspective, which basically removes the objective ground from the dominant discourse, opens the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the absence of securitization, but it cannot do so by proving that something "is" a security problem—at least not without shifting from the role of analyst to securitizing actor. Thus, it is not advisable to add to our basic securitization perspective that there are also objective security problems (to hold against false securitizations and the lack thereof). Doing so would introduce an incompatible ontology that would ultimately undermine the basic idea of security as a specific social category that arises out of, and is constituted in, political practice.

What one can add are arguments about the likely effects.⁹ One can try to show the effects of either excessive securitization—security dilemmas—or of *not* securitizing—the inability to handle an issue effectively unless it is securitized. Only within society and by one's own participation in political practice can one contribute to securitization or desecuritization, which is a different matter from the threat "being" a security problem. Things can be facilitators of securitization—it is made easier if one can point to matters associated with threats, but the ultimate locus of securityness is social rather than technical, and it is between a securitizing actor and its audience in reference to something they value.

A *securitizing actor* is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. These actors are not usually the referent objects for security, because only rarely can they speak security through reference to the need to defend their own survival. Their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, principle, or system. Only occasionally will actors such as governments or firms be able to speak successfully of security on their own behalf.

The notion of an "actor" is in itself problematic. To say precisely who or what acts is always tricky, because one can disaggregate any collective into subunits and on down to individuals and say, "It is not really 'the state' that acts but some particular department—or in the last instance individuals." But to disaggregate everything into individuals is not very helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their "members" and are treated as social realities (methodological collectivism).

Identifying actors is thus more complicated than identifying referent objects. The former involves a level-of-analysis problem: The same event can be attributed to different levels (individual, bureaucracy, or state, for instance). Unlike the case with the referent object, a speech act is often not self-defining in terms of who or what speaks, and the designation "actor" is thus in some sense arbitrary. Ultimately, individuals can always be said to

be the actors, but if they are locked into strong roles it is usually more relevant to see as the "speaker" the collectivities for which individuals are designated authoritative representatives (e.g., parties, states, or pressure groups)—for example, France-materialized-as-de Gaulle rather than the person de Gaulle. If one wants to downgrade the role of the analyst in defining actors, one option is to let other actors settle the matter. Other states treated de Gaulle as acting on behalf of France and held France responsible for his acts; thus, in the world of "diplomats" France was constituted as the actor (Manning 1962; Wæver forthcoming-c). How to identify the securitizing actor is in the last instance less a question of who performs the speech than of what logic shapes the action. Is it an action according to individual logic or organizational logic, and is the individual or the organization generally held responsible by other actors? Focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor.

The difference between actor and referent object in any specific case will also usually mean there is a separate category of "audience," those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue. One danger of the phrases *securitization* and *speech act* is that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act (Huysmans 1996).

One use of the distinction between actors and referent objects is to avoid reifying some security units—for example, nations. When we say in the chapter on societal security (and in Wæver et al. 1993) that societal security is often about nations and their survival, we do not want to say that "a nation acts to defend itself," which would represent reifying and anthropomorphic terminology. Someone—some group, movement, party, or elite—acts with reference to the nation and claims to speak or act on behalf of the nation.

The distinction between securitizing actor and referent object is less of a problem in the context of the state and therefore has not previously been clearly noted. The state (usually) has explicit rules regarding who can speak on its behalf, so when a government says "we have to defend our national security," it has the right to act on behalf of the state. The government is the state in this respect. No such formal rules of representation exist for nations or the environment; consequently, the problem of legitimacy is larger in these areas than in the case of the state. When someone acts in the name of a nation, certain discursive rules are imposed on the actor, because he or she has to speak in terms of identity, in terms that follow the logic of "nation," and these terms shape the discourse and action in a way that differs from that appropriate to other referent objects. But only in the weakest sense does this mean the nation is "acting." The rules for what one can do in the name of a nation are less rigid than those for a state; therefore, it will

be easier to talk of the state acting than of the nation doing so. This is a matter of degree rather than necessarily a qualitative difference. Consequently, the analyst who writes about a fringe neo-Nazi group that tries to mobilize people to defend "our national survival" against the threat posed by immigrants will feel uncomfortable phrasing this as "the nation acting." It feels more correct to make the distinction between who actually does the acting and what those actors are referring to as that which should survive and then see how successful they are in asserting a claim to speak for that higher entity.

These arguments show why it is important to distinguish between securitizing actors and referent objects. But the distinctions are contextual rather than intrinsic to specific units. In many cases, the securitizing actors will be different from the referent object, but in others—most notably the state—the referent object will in a sense speak for itself through its authorized representatives. In all cases, however, the analyst is obliged to question the success or failure of the securitizing speech act. Even governments can fail at securitization, as happened to Britain over the Suez, the United States in Vietnam, and the European Communist regimes domestically in the late 1980s.

In applying the distinction among referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors to the five sector chapters that follow, it is important first to clarify the referent object(s) in each sector. In some cases, this will constitute most of the exercise. To map societal security around the world, it is probably more interesting—and at least logically primary—to know where people are mobilized in the name of nations, civilizations, religions, or tribes than to know where mobilization is effected by political parties, where by state elites, where by social movements, where by churches, and where by intellectuals. In the military sector, the referent object may almost always be the state, and the securitizing actor may in some sense also be "the state," but a number of functional actors may also influence decisions. If so, one would need to spend more space tracking down these functional actors. Thus, the sector chapters will vary in terms of the weight of analysis given to the three types of security unit. In an ideal situation—perhaps in more complete future case studies based on this approach—all three types will be covered fully, in particular the articulation of referent objects and securitizing actors.

Regions and Other Constellations of Securitization

In the part of this work aimed at tracing security complexes, the approach is to look at the pattern of security connectedness. The investigation proceeds in three steps: (1) Is the issue securitized successfully by any actors?

(2) If yes, track the links and interactions from this instance—how does the security action in this case impinge on the security of others, and where does this then echo significantly? (3) These chains can then be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns. When this case along with the patterns from all of the other cases (of the sector in the case of homogeneous sector-specific analysis or across sectors in the case of heterogeneous security complex analysis; cf. Chapters 1 and 8) are aggregated, we can see the level on which the processes of securitization and the patterns of interaction are concentrated.

Our general assumption, and one of the key motivations for this project, is that the post-Cold War world will exhibit substantially higher levels of regionalization and lower levels of globalization than was the case during the Cold War. One of our purposes is to adapt security complex theory to deal with this more complicated world. In the sector chapters that follow, however, we keep this question open. It may be that the security logic of some sectors inherently inclines toward regionalization, whereas in other sectors it does not. This is what we need to investigate in these chapters. And we do so in basically the same way as is done in classical security complex theory: by combining the concerns of major actors into a constellation, a knot of mutual security relations.

One final problem in thinking about security regions is how to tie such thinking into the discussion of actors and referent objects in the previous section. Is a security complex defined by actors or referent objects? As just argued, the security complex is actually a constellation of security concerns: the different instances of securitization as such form the nodes among which the lines can be drawn and the complex mapped. Because referent objects are the more basic, enduring, and salient features on the security landscape, the answer to our earlier question is the referent objects. Some might object that according to our scheme referent objects do not act and therefore cannot be the units in subsystems that are defined by interactions. This is an illusion. Security actors speak and act in the name of referent objects, and they generally see threats as emanating from other referent objects. There is thus a real sense in which India and Pakistan, Turkey and the Kurds, or Chile and ITT interact.

Since referent objects are the socially constituted units, they are often actors for each other, even if some analytical theories point to other links in the chains as the actors. For instance, states are to some extent real as states and they act as states even if the literal acting is done by statesmen, because states ascribe intentions and responsibility to each other as states (Manning 1962; Weaver forthcoming-c). This reflection is structured by the motivation of security complex analysis, which is to reach a dynamic analysis of security situations. We want to be able to grasp the connections between the security of A and that of B, the security dilemmas as well as mutually rein-

forcing security loops. Therefore, it is essential that we organize the regional analysis around nodes that are simultaneously that which is (claimed to be) threatened and that which is (depicted as) the source of threat.

In classical security complex theory (CSCT), the definition was phrased in terms of primary security concerns; in the current framework, it must be instances of securitization that connect and form the complex. In both cases, the core is obviously the articulation of threats by the major actors. Unfortunately, there is little conceptual literature on threats. In discussions of the concept of security, some participants claim an actor-based threat is a precondition for something to be a security problem (Deudney 1990). It is difficult to see what justifies this as a logical step, although it could be an empirical connection, a structural proclivity making threats attributed to actors more easy to securitize. We do not, however, want to define security problems such that actors *have* to be the problem. Probably, they usually are.

It follows from our general securitization perspective that what interests us is the *attribution* of security problems to specific sources rather than the actual origins of what appear as security problems. As argued by attribution theory, there is a general psychological tendency to overestimate the degree of choice for *alter* while emphasizing necessity as to *ego* (Hart 1978; Jervis 1976). One will therefore generally tend to "actorize" the other side—that is, fashion the other as a willful chooser rather than a chain in a series of events. In most cases, the fact that the other is a strategic actor with several choices is an amplifying factor in any threat perception and therefore assists in pushing an issue across the security threshold. Because the other is an actor, not just a wheel in a machine, it has the potential of outwitting us, of having intentions, or of bending or suppressing our will to replace it with its own (cf. Clausewitz 1983 [1832]; Wæver 1995b).

This focus on actors could seem to point to securitizing actors rather than to referent objects. This deduction, however, is probably false. What the attribution argument implies is not that we should focus on those units we see as actors but rather that whatever is presented as the cause of security problems is most likely also actorized. If securitizing actor "a" on behalf of community "A" claims A is threatened by B, he or she will present B as an actor, as responsible for the threat, as an agent who had a choice. Therefore, we do not have to define security complexes in terms of what we have labeled *actors* in our analytical framework: The actors might operate with other actors and thereby point to the bigger, more abstract categories—the referent objects. On the other hand, threats do not need to be attributed to the same categories as those the other side acted with reference to. Actual events are likely to be varied and complex, requiring a pragmatic approach that allows us to find the specific units of the case.

For instance, Churchill as a securitizing actor could have securitized Nazism as a threat. This does not necessarily mean a countersecuritization

is performed either by Nazism as actor or with Nazism as referent object. Instead, Hitler could securitize England (the referent object of Churchill, so far so good) as the threat in the name of Germany, all Germans, and the Aryan race. What constitutes the threat for one is not necessarily the referent object for the other. This procedure was much easier in CSCT where security was conducted for and by India, which was also the (perceived) threat to Pakistan and vice versa. The argument from attribution theory gives us reason to believe that most threats will be linked to actors and that what we analyze as referent objects will often be constructed by other actors as actors. If, however, one draws the map too finely, a number of actors will be securitizing slightly different referent objects (the German race, the German people, Germany, Aryans)—differences that are important when one is trying to look into the politics of securitizing moves—whereas we in security complex analysis need to find the main patterns of interaction and therefore need to bundle together the various versions of securitizing "Germany" as one node.

When generating the security complex, the best way to define the points between which the security arrows go might be to point to conglomerates of a referent object and the corresponding securitizing actor. In the extreme case, this means we have referent objects with stable spokespersons. A stable combination of referent object and "voice" points to the classical concept of the state as a clear instance. But even the state and sovereignty as referent object is appealed to by other than the one official voice. There are several actual securitizing actors, and the state as well as the other actors occasionally securitize other referents, such as the nation, the European Union (EU), or some principles of international society. In the case of France, Japan, and Sudan, the name makes a relatively clear reference to a dense network of correlated referent objects and securitizing actors. The different securitizing actors are connected by competing for the representation of the same referent object; the different referent objects are unified by their mutual substitutability for each other. There is more a chain of family resemblances than a clear-cut criterion or one primary unit. In each case, a conglomerate of actors and referent objects is unified by the density of overlapping security discourse and usually also nominally by a name: the security of "France" (which can mean several different referent objects and a large number of possible actors), of Europe and the EU, and of "the environment." (See the further discussion on pp. 171–175.)

The key question in security analysis is, who can "do" security in the name of what? For a time, experts could get away with analyzing only "states," and the system was then the sum of the states. Regional security meant the sum of national securities or rather a particular constellation of security interdependence among a group of states. The approach developed here offers more types of units to choose from, but the basic idea of security complexes can be carried over into a world of multiple units.

Notes

1. The history of the word *security* is complex (Kaufmann 1970; Der Derian 1993; Delumeau 1986; Corze 1984), but in the 1940s it was established in international affairs with a fairly distinct meaning (Rosenberg 1993). Much of this meaning was so easily installed because it rested on an old argument that had used the word *security* much less systematically—an argument about “necessity” previously contained primarily in the concept of *raison d'état* (Butterfield 1975). Especially from the mid-nineteenth century, when the state enters a juridical self-limitation and self-control, this “is balanced by the designation of a range of ‘governmental acts’ which are immune to legal challenge. This juridical reserve area of executive power is . . . the qualification which . . . calculations of security impose as a condition for the political feasibility of a liberal democracy” (Gordon 1991: 33; cf. Foucault 1991 [1978]). The classical argument, which holds that in extreme cases the government can use all means necessary, becomes concentrated as a specific, exceptional case (Wæver 1988, 1995b). This meaning of security evolved separately from the use of security in various domestic contexts (although connections definitely exist; see Kaufman 1970). This international type of security starts to spread to new referents and new actors; therefore, we want to retain a focus on international security because it has a distinct meaning, but we do not exclude the possibility that we will meet this kind of security increasingly in domestic contexts.

2. This argument does not imply that private issues could not in some sense be political, an argument made forcefully by feminists. To claim such is a politicizing move.

3. The concept of strong and weak states is elaborated and defined in Buzan (1991: 96–107) and rests on the degree of sociopolitical cohesion within the state, which is high for strong states and low for weak ones. The concept should not be confused with the distinction between strong and weak powers, which is about their capabilities vis-à-vis other powers.

4. Baldwin (1997) is the most sophisticated and consistent attempt to define security and to structure security studies according to the idea that the purpose and task is to assist decisionmakers in correctly assessing the relative attention to devote to different threats.

5. The importance of “cultural capital” to the ability to perform a speech act has been argued by Pierre Bourdieu (1991 [1982]). A speech act is not only linguistic; it is also social and is dependent on the social position of the enunciator and thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field. However, Bourdieu made this argument to counter a tendency of some poststructuralists and philosophers of everyday language to make the purely linguistic, internal features of a speech act completely determining (Bourdieu 1996). He has accepted the critique by Judith Butler (1996a, b) that since the speech act needs to include an idea of—with his own phrase—the “social magic” whereby some are accepted as holding authority and others are not, it has to be indeterminate, open for surprises. This is not purely a question of a formal position of authority (Austin’s example in which “I declare you man and wife” is an effective speech act only when performed by a properly authorized authority; 1975 [1962]: 8–15). There is a performative force to the speech act, to use Bourdieu’s own concepts, it has a magical efficiency, it makes what it says. A speech act is interesting exactly because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already within the context—it reworks or produces a context by the performative success of the act. Although it is important to study the social conditions of successful speech acts, it is necessary always to keep open the possibility that an act that had previously succeeded and for which the formal resources and position are in place may fail and, conversely, that new

actors can perform a speech act they had previously not been expected to perform (Butler 1996a, b; Derrida 1977a [1972], 1977b, 1988). Therefore, the issues of “who can do security” and “was this a case of securitization” can ultimately be judged only in hindsight (Wæver et al. 1993: 188). They cannot be closed off by finite criteria for success.

6. This stands in contrast to some other studies of regions where one is interested in the *construction* of regions by actors (Neumann 1994; Joenniemi and Wæver 1992; Joenniemi 1997). Both approaches to regions are relevant, but for different purposes.

7. For those interested in pinpointing our position within the field of international relations theory, this is probably the passage to pick. We do not take the state or sovereignty as representing fixed limits, but we are skeptical of individualism as the traditional alternative to state centrism. We therefore form a picture of a world of multiple units, which might be called postsovereign realism. The units can be overlapping (in contrast to the exclusivity of sovereign territorial states), but this does not necessarily lead to any benign transnationalism in which the focus is on the multiple identities of individuals relativizing all units and collectivities. Although each individual in a world of overlapping units is a “member” of several units, instead of focusing on any such softening effects produced by overlap, we study how the units can continue to conduct power politics; think, for example, of the work of Susan Strange (state-firm diplomacy; 1994) and Robert Kaplan (a very anarchic anarchy after sovereignty; 1994). Each unit has a possibility of becoming the reference for security action, but since the different units overlap and are placed at different levels, there is no fixed line between domestic and international—what is internal to one unit can be internal when one thinks of other units. More importantly a distinction exists between individual and collective security. This argument is important for the present project, because if domestic and international were fixed, there would be a risk of generating a cozy Western view of politics: Domestic politics is normal and without security, whereas the extreme is relegated to the international space. In other parts of the world, domestic is not cozy. This fact can be grasped by focusing on those units and collectivities that are mobilized in such contexts: These domestic security relations are intermittent because in these places the most powerful referent objects are smaller than the state.

8. One can contemplate cases in which concern seems to focus on a particular individual: one girl in Sarajevo or Salman Rushdie. To a large extent, these individuals are given such prominence and more resources are spent on them than on most others because they are taken to represent principles. Action for some specific individual always depends on a construction of that person as representing some category, as deserving protection because he or she belongs to a particular social category—for example, leader, representative, free intellectual, or revealing test case.

9. The analyst can also intervene to counteract actors in relation to the use of the word *security*. Sloppy talk of “economic security” or “environmental security” can be questioned by arguing that the security act has not really been performed and that the securitizing actor has not managed to establish a case for treating the threat as existential. Whether the threat really is or is not existential in relation to the referent object is impossible to decide from the outside, but we can study the discourse and see if the issue has been securitized in this sense. This is primarily an intervention into the debate among observers over the appropriateness of the use of the security label. When intervening in direct policy debates over a securitization, the mode of argumentation will typically be in terms of comparing the likely effects of having the issue securitized or desecuritized.

6 Securitisation theory

What is 'securitisation'?

The work of the Copenhagen School and their initial development of the concept of the concept of securitisation as the basis of 'a new framework for analysis' (Buzan *et al.* 1998) can, at a very simplistic level, be said to represent the fusion of two major theoretical and conceptual innovations in security studies: Barry Buzan's notion of different sectors of security (first put forward by Barry Buzan in the book *People, States and Fear* in 1983 and then later in an updated version in Buzan 1991) and Ole Wæver's concept of 'securitisation' (see Wæver 1995 for an early iteration). Buzan *et al.* endorse the widening of the security agenda as identified and advanced by Buzan's earlier work, but their development of a theory of securitisation emanates from a concern that there are 'intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word *security* onto an ever wider range of issues' (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 1, emphasis in original). For Buzan *et al.*, then, the main question is how to define *what is and what is not* a security issue in the context of attempts to 'broaden' the definition and usage of security as a concept. Given that context, they argue, we need some sort of analytical grounding or principle to judge what is and what is not a security issue; otherwise there is a danger that the concept of 'security' will become so broad that it covers everything and hence becomes effectively meaningless.

So how do we judge *what is and what is not* a security issue? Buzan *et al.* argue that security, as a concept, is fundamentally about survival: it is when an issue is represented as posing an *existential threat* to the survival of a referent object. Here the term 'referent object' can be defined simply as 'that to which one can point and say, "It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to..."' (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 36). This is the same basic principle that underpins the conventional focus of national security and defence: war threatens *the very existence* of a referent object, the state (hence the term 'existential threat'). Within the concept of national security it is assumed that the state 'has to survive', therefore it is assumed that it is necessary for the state to maintain standing armies, weapons production and procurement, intelligence agencies and so on.

One of the ways we can distinguish an existential threat, then, is the level of response it generates. When an issue is successfully presented as an existential threat, it legitimises the use of exceptional political measures. A classic (military) example in IR is a state's right to self-defence: if a state is under attack, it can legitimately use extraordinary measures that go beyond routine day-to-day politics. A state under attack can declare a state of emergency during which it suspends or changes its functions. It may declare martial law, for example, ration the provision of certain services, close roads and schools, and so on. Commonly, Wæver argues, existential threats set in chain a number of effects that characterise the specific quality of security problems: urgency – the issue takes priority; and extraordinary measures – authorities claim powers that they would not otherwise have, or curtail rights and liberties that might otherwise apply (1995: 51). So, ultimately, we have a seemingly simple formula: *Existential Threat to a Referent Object = A Security Issue*. Identifying the presence (or absence) of this formula allows us to get an analytical handle of what is and what is not a security issue.

How does securitisation occur?

This leads to the question of how the process of securitisation happens, and the conditions required for successful securitisation to take place. According to securitisation theory, when an issue comes to be treated as a *security* issue, it is justifiable to use exceptional political

Abstract

This chapter outlines the main features of 'securitisation theory', its theoretical underpinnings and its applications. It begins by introducing the concept of securitisation and establishing its intellectual origins. After outlining the meaning of the concept of securitisation in more detail, the chapter then goes on to address the issue of how securitisation occurs at a general level, before examining the dynamics of securitisation in specific 'sectors' (military, environmental, economic, societal and political). Following this it discusses the related concept of 'desecuritisation' and several other key debates in securitisation theory. Finally, the chapter assesses the place of securitisation theory within the broader category of critical security studies.

Introduction

The notion of 'securitisation' is one of the most significant conceptual innovations to emerge out of debates over the nature of security in recent decades. It is primarily associated in security studies with a group of scholars commonly referred to as the 'Copenhagen School', which is usually taken to consist of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and the collective authors of works such as Wæver *et al.* (1993) and Buzan *et al.* (1998). The term Copenhagen School, actually first employed in a critique of works by these authors (see McSweeney 1996), derives from the association of this school of thought with the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research (latterly known as the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute or COPRI) in the Danish capital. Like so many of the ideas discussed in this text, however, the concept of securitisation has been employed, and generates debates, far beyond the geographical or intellectual confines suggested by the idea of a 'school'. By consequence, the term 'securitisation theory' is generally preferred in this chapter as it is increasingly possible to argue that although work produced by those associated with the Copenhagen School remains the key point of reference in discussions of securitisation (particularly the Buzan *et al.* (1998) text *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*), the core idea of securitisation has also been adopted, adapted and developed by other scholars beyond the immediate original circle of the Copenhagen School, sometimes even in ways – as is discussed later – that challenge and test the limits of the framework originally outlined by Buzan *et al.* and Wæver *et al.* (see, for example, Balzacq 2011). Paralleling this line of development, this chapter begins by examining the core understanding of securitisation as originally put forward by the Copenhagen School and then moves to a consideration of challenges to this particular vision of securitisation, as well as critiques of the very notion of securitisation itself.

Box 6.1 Key concepts in securitisation theory

Securitisation: Shifting an issue out of the realm of 'normal' political debate into the realm of emergency politics by presenting it as an existential threat.

Securitisng speech act: The act of 'saying security' in relation to an issue.

Securitisng move: An attempt to securitise an issue by labelling it as a *security* issue.

De securitisation: Shifting an issue out of the realm of securitisation and emergency politics back into the realm of 'normal' political or technical debate.

As security: A condition in which issues tend to remain unsecuritised, and are dealt with primarily as political issues or considered as non-political.

measures to deal with it. In other words it is *securitised*: we treat it with the same degree of urgency as we would a military threat. Buzan *et al.* argue that we can think of this process of securitisation in terms of a spectrum that runs from nonpoliticised (meaning that an issue is not a political issue), through politicised (meaning it is part of a public policy debate) to securitised (meaning that the issue is thought of as an existential threat and therefore justifies responses that go beyond normal political practices).

Nonpoliticised -----> Politicised -----> Securitised

Figure 6.1 The securitisation 'spectrum'

Source: adapted from Buzan *et al.* 1998: 23

How does this occur? Simply put, securitisation begins by 'saying security': 'Traditionally, by saying "security", a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development' (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 21). Building on this template, Wæver argues that this process of securitisation has to be initiated through what is known as a 'speech act': a securitising 'move' occurs when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat comes to be *spoken of* as a security issue by important political actors (see Box 6.2).

On this basis, Buzan *et al.* argue, the meaning of security is in many ways secondary to 'the essential quality of security in general' (1998: 26) that resides in the *act* of saying 'security' rather than in any essential meaning of the word:

That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to address some objective threats that 'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.

(1998: 26, emphasis in original)

Box 6.2 Speech act theory and securitisation

As formulated by Wæver, the idea of securitisation draws heavily on the theory of language, in particular the branch known as 'speech act theory':

What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it [security] something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security', a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

(Wæver 1995: 35)

Here Wæver draws upon speech act theory as formulated in the work of the philosopher John L. Austin (1911–1960). In his 1962 book *How to do Things with Words*, Austin proposes that many utterances are equivalent to actions; when we *say* certain words or phrases we also *perform* a particular action. Classic examples of 'doing things with words' are cited by Wæver in the example above. For instance, when we give a promise ('I promise to...') we are not simply promising to do something in the future, the promise is itself a type of action.

Certain speech acts are known as 'performatives' whereby saying the word or phrase effectively serves to accomplish a social act (what Judith Butler (1996) terms as a kind of 'social magic'), as in the act of naming a ship. Of course, not just anyone can name a ship! For this type of performative speech act to work, certain conditions have to be met: the words have to be said by someone in authority, in the right context and according to certain pre-established rituals or conventions. These are what are known as 'felicity conditions' in speech act theory – conditions required for the successful accomplishment of a speech act.

In this sense there is an explicitly constructivist (see Chapter 1) component to securitisation theory: issues can become *security* issues by virtue of their presentation and acceptance as such, rather than because of any innate threatening qualities per se (although Buzan *et al.* do retain a sense that some threats are easier to present as existential threats than others, as is discussed below). Hence, 'the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitisation is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 25, *emphases in original*). Successful securitisation, Buzan *et al.* argue, requires some degree of acceptance between the perpetrator of the securitising speech act and the relevant audience that is appealed to otherwise, a securitising move remains incomplete.

Securitisation thus has a certain 'modality' (a general pattern or mode of operation) that is constant and identifiable, even if the context in which securitising speech acts occur may vary. Yet not every 'securitising move' is successful, even if they are presented in a way that adheres to the general pattern of operation required for securitisation. As Buzan *et al.* stipulate:

Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.

(1998: 5)

As this formulation indicates by noting the condition of endorsement, in any securitising speech act there is always a speaker and an audience (hence, securitisation is an 'intersubjective' process between human political subjects). In order for securitisation to work, an audience has to accept a threat as credible. Hence successful securitisation, Wæver argues, not only requires a securitising speech act, but also the presence of what he terms (drawing again on speech act theory) as 'felicity conditions' (2000: 252; see Box 6.2) – conditions that increase the likelihood of successful securitisation.

The first of these conditions, as already outlined, is that the internal logic of a securitising speech act follows the conventional 'plot' of securitisation: an existential threat is presented as legitimating the use of extraordinary measures to combat that threat.

The second condition entails the requirement that the securitising actor – the actor attempting to securitise a given issue – is in a position of authority and has enough social and political capital to convince an audience of the existence of an existential threat. Typically, for example, those designated as 'security experts' are assumed to have the capacity to speak authoritatively on what constitutes a security issue due to their background and qualifications, whereas non-experts are not usually assumed to have the same capacity to 'speak security'.

Third, it will be easier to present an issue as an existential threat if objects associated with the issue carry historical connotations of threat, danger and harm, or where a history of hostile sentiments exists. So, for example, tanks are generally held to be threatening owing to their status as weapons and historical experience of their use in war; so the massing of tanks along the border of a state is relatively conducive to securitisation by elites and security experts. Similarly, where there is a history of conflict between two states, a rapid increase in the production of, for example, nuclear weapons by one will be relatively easy for the other to present as a potential existential threat.

In short, certain actors and institutions are better at securitising than others, because they are perceived as being more credible by the relevant audience, and certain issues and objects are easier to securitise than others depending on the associated connotations. However, no one of these conditions on their own is sufficient to achieve securitisation, nor are they ever entirely assured. Perceptions of actors' credibility can fluctuate significantly over time for instance (credibility can be won or lost), and this can radically impact upon the chances for success in any securitising move (think of the extent to which the credibility of the US and British governments on security issues was affected by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction following the invasion of Iraq in 2003). Likewise, representations and perceptions of historical threats or enmities can change over time. Securitisation theory thus emphasises the importance of the speech act component, and the ultimately political and intersubjective nature of securitisation.

No condition (any number of tanks at the border) or underlying cause (motivation of leaders), not even a solid position of authority of the speaker of security, can make for a securitization – they can only *influence* a political interaction which ultimately takes place among actors in a realm of politics with the historical openness this entails.

(Wæver 2000: 252, emphasis in original)

The dynamics of securitisation

Securitisation theory seems to make sense when thought of in the familiar terms of military security. But can we apply this formula outside the military realm? Buzan *et al.* argue that

we can, but that we need to be aware that the types of interaction, referent objects, and threats to referent objects associated with non-military sectors (which they identify as environmental, economic, societal and political following Buzan's earlier (1991) categorisation) can be very different from those associated with the traditional military focus. Understanding securitisation as a 'mode of thinking' allows the security analyst to investigate how 'the same logic' might apply to non-military issues (Wæver 1995: 51). But what constitutes an 'existential threat' in one sector may not necessarily be identical to threats in other sectors, even if Buzan *et al.* caution that these sectors should be treated as distinct and separate only to make the analysis of securitisation more manageable. In reality, as they acknowledge, sectors frequently overlap; but they also argue that the disaggregation of security into different sectors allows us to discern distinctive patterns or dynamics of security that are found in each, as well as allowing us to identify the likely securitising actors and prospects for securitisation.

Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan *et al.* 1998) provides an initial attempt to identify how these dynamics operate in relation to the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors, and this is summarised initially in Table 6.1.

With regard to the *military* sector, unsurprisingly the traditional/military conception of security prevails. Security is 'about survival' (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 21), and in this sector the security agenda is geared towards the goal of *national* security. With the rise of the nation state, the priority became the preservation of the state such that the concepts of security and 'national security' became virtually interchangeable for much of the twentieth century. Defence of the nation was seen to legitimate extraordinary measures. Hence, for example, the US targeting of the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons that could wipe out millions of people (and vice versa) was legitimated in terms of maintaining national security.

Securitisation theory makes two important assumptions in relation to the *military* sector of security. First is that, as noted previously, military security is not the only sector worthy of consideration in security studies or analysis of securitisation. Even state militaries increasingly carry out a range of activities and functions, such as humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, associated with a 'broadened' security agenda. Indeed, owing to processes of institutionalisation, state militaries tend to be maintained even in the absence of an obvious existential threat. However a second and equally important point to note is that the traditional

Table 6.1 Dynamics of securitisation according to sector of security

Sector	Type of interaction (Buzan <i>et al.</i> 7)	Dynamic of securitisation
Military	Relationships of forceful coercion	Existential threat to state/populace/territory/military capacity
Environmental	Relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere	Existential threat to biosphere/species/natural environment
Economic	Relationships of trade, production, and finance	Existential threat to markets/finance/resources
Societal	Relationships of collective identity	Existential threat to collective identity/language/culture
Political	Relationships of authority, governing status and recognition	Existential threat to sovereignty/organisational stability/ideology of a social order

Source: adapted from Buzan *et al.* (1998)

conception of security operative in the military sector is in many ways paradigmatic for other non-military sectors. Non-military threats do not necessarily have to be as dangerous as war, but they do have to follow a logic (existential threats to a referent object) and have effects (the use of emergency powers) that parallel the traditional military-political understanding of security. As Wæver (1995: 47) argues, the concept of security – like any other concept – carries with it historical connotations. In the case of the concept of security, these connotations relate to practices of war, threat and defence. Hence invoking the term security potentially initiates what Wæver has termed elsewhere as the 'Clausewitz effect', that is, dynamics of threat and defence that parallel those conventionally associated with warfare (Bæge Laustsen and Wæver 2000: 724, Wæver 1995: 53).

Certain *environmental* issues, such as global warming, pollution and overuse of limited energy resources may be construed by securitising actors as threatening the very existence of animal species or even human life itself. For example, it could be argued that the very existence of Bangladesh is threatened by rising sea levels globally, and an environmental issue such as this can also have knock-on effects in other sectors: refugees from Bangladesh might be seen to threaten the societal, economic and political integrity of neighbouring states. Some within the scientific community have sought to securitise the issue of climate change on this basis, and these can be characterised as securitising actors within this sector. But as Buzan *et al.* note, 'Crucial for environmental security is whether states, major economic actors, and local communities embrace the scientific agenda' – in other words, successful securitisation of environmental issues requires acceptance by the relevant audience (1998: 91).

National or global markets might be threatened by financial collapse, and hence equate to an issue of *economic* security on a large scale with direct consequences for communities and individuals. It is worth remembering, however, that even though we speak quite commonly of our personal 'economic security', this needs to be an *existential* threat to meet the criteria of securitisation. In extreme cases, a financial crisis can compromise or remove access to basic necessities such as food, water, clothing and shelter and hence could be presented as an existential threat to individuals. At a broader level, threats to the existence of large firms and companies might also be presented as issues of security. Buzan *et al.* tend to focus on 'security spillovers' from the economic sector (1998: 117). Thus, for example, state actors may present financial crisis or collapse as a potential threat to the funding of national defence.

Within the *societal* sector, which is discussed in more detail below, securitisation occurs when issues are accepted as threatening the existence of a group's identity. For instance, an influx of migrants who hold rival and potentially competing values could be presented by securitising actors (such as state or community leaders) as threatening the very existence of a 'way of life', a language or a community.

In the *political* sector, the referent object is usually the constitutive principle of a political unit, the thing that makes a political unit 'hang together' – such as sovereignty in the case of states. Anything that threatens the existence of this principle can be presented as a security issue. One example Buzan *et al.* give is that the European Union could be existentially threatened by events that might reverse the process of European integration, which can be said to function as its constitutive principle. Or, at the state level, threats to state sovereignty that are non-military in nature could fall into this category.

As we can see, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, in their *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, do seek to make the case that non-military issues can be considered as security issues under certain circumstances. What they try to do is to distinguish what types of

referent object and what types of threats should fall under the heading of security. But they reject the idea that the study of security should focus purely on the welfare of individual human beings: even though this may seem like an attractive ideal, this would stretch the study of security too far. Wæver cautions that 'the individual has various needs and can be hurt by threats to those needs, and this makes everything a potential security problem'; hence, in his view, 'the concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is thereby emptied of content' (1995: 49). Focusing on the individual level simply perpetrates the over-expansion of the meaning of security, Wæver argues, which is what the analytical tool of securitisation seeks to avoid.

Wæver illustrates this with what he terms as the 'hourglass' model of security (Figure 6.2), arguing that whilst it can be accepted that 'security' is influenced in important ways by *dynamics* at the level of individuals and the global system' (1995: 49), terms such as individual security and global security remain fundamentally opaque and impractical for the purposes of analysis.




Figure 6.2 Wæver's 'hourglass' models of security

Source: adapted from Wæver 1995: 49

Buzan *et al.* hence maintain a commitment to methodological collectivism – a focus on the dynamics of collective units – and have conversely charged other critical approaches to security (such as those concerned with ‘emancipation’ – see Chapter 2) with an ill-judged resort to methodological individualism. For Buzan *et al.*, the state remains an important (and possibly the most important) ‘level of analysis’ in security studies. Further to this, they also concentrate attention on the role of securitisation of external threats plays in the formation of regional ‘security complexes’: subsystems of states within the international system whose major security concerns are inextricably linked and where the securitisation of an external threat lends internal coherence and unity to an otherwise diverse group of states (see Buzan *et al.* 1998: 15–19; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 2009).

However, Buzan *et al.* do acknowledge that referent objects other than the state can be subject to securitisation. In particular they have sought to explore the concept of ‘societal security’ as a ‘new referent object’ (Wæver *et al.* 1993: 17), arguing that societal identities have the degree of consistency and tangibility to function as a referent object in processes of securitisation (see the ‘modified hourglass model’ of security illustrated in Figure 6.2, which implies that society can be treated as a collective unit in a way that parallels the state, albeit with a different conceptual focus). Societal security denotes the security of ‘large-scale “we” identities’ (Wæver *et al.* 1993: 21) such as national (‘we Germans’; ‘we Irish’) and religious (‘we Christians’; ‘we Muslims’) identity groups. Since the boundaries of states and societies are rarely identical, and since state boundaries may contain multiple identity groups, focusing on the state alone fails to capture the dynamics of securitisation within the societal sector. As is explored in more detail in Chapter 11, securitisation theory has been applied to the study of migration in particular in order to assess how, when and by whom migration has been securitised as an existential threat to group identities (see Wæver *et al.* 1993 and more recently Huysmans 2006). Here it is usually some notion of ‘society’, as opposed to the state, that is claimed to be under threat: migrants may not be presented as direct threats to state institutions or political stability, but instead as threats to conceptions of national identity.

Securitisation and desecuritisation

In contrast to the traditional assumption that security is an intrinsic good and something that we would instinctively want more of, one of the most striking implications of securitisation theory is that security is not always a ‘good thing’. On this view more security is not necessarily better as securitisation of an issue brings with it a particular type of emergency politics where the space (and time) allowed for deliberation, participation and bargaining is necessarily constricted and brings into play a particular, militarised mode of thinking. Thus, for instance, many have argued that the securitisation of migration actually has a negative impact in limiting the political space required to think through this complex issue and instead introduces an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency (Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2006).

Consequently, Wæver in particular has argued that we should in most cases ‘aim for *desecuritisation*: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’ (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 4, emphasis added). The question of what desecuritisation means and what it might involve in practice is the focus of much current attention in debates on securitisation theory. It is generally acknowledged that the concept of desecuritisation figures more prominently in Wæver’s individual work (such as Wæver 1995, 2000) than in the collective efforts of the Copenhagen School, which spend less time on exploring desecuritisation. In his early work on securitisation and desecuritisation, Wæver gives a clearer sense that the rationale for developing securitisation theory as an

approach is not simply analytical but is also motivated by a concern that ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ approaches to security have fostered a tendency to simply append the term security to an ever-increasing variety of issues (environmental, economic, societal and political) without altering the substantive meaning of security from its traditional military origins. In so doing, Wæver argues, such approaches unwittingly risk facilitating and exacerbating the introduction of threat–defence dynamics and emergency politics into non-military realms of activity, and this is of questionable merit.



Figure 6.3 Desecuritisation?

As an illustration of this point, some have argued that the securitisation of environmental degradation (via the presentation of processes such as climate change as an existential threat to the planetary biosphere and species survival) could have a positive effect in motivating emergency measures to alter human and state activities that may well lead to such degradation. As Buzan noted in the context of increasing use of the term ‘environmental security’ by environmental campaigners in the early 1990s, ‘The security label is a useful way both of signalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to persist in environmental debates’ (cited in Wæver 1995: 63).

Wæver has, however, questioned the appropriateness of introducing the ‘grammar of security’ into environmental debates for several reasons. First is that intentionality is more difficult to ascribe in environmental issues than in traditional military issues. Whereas conflict takes place between warring parties, it is difficult to make the case that processes of environmental degradation, even if produced by human activities, are deliberately aimed at creating a threat to others. Second, because the label security is traditionally associated with the state, the term ‘environmental security’ implies that a state response is most appropriate. This implication, however, overlooks the fact that environmental problems frequently transcend and traverse state boundaries both in their likely causes and their impact. Third, securitisation of environmental issues brings with it an increased likelihood of militarised thinking, that is, of thinking in terms of threat and defence. Doing so might well encourage a reactive approach to environmental problems, whereas what might well actually be required is a more fundamental consideration of the extent to which environmental problems are the product of patterns of human activity that require substantial rethinking and deliberation (Wæver 1995: 65; see also Deudney 1990). The issue of the ‘securitisation’ of the environment is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. Others have similarly argued that the securitisation of issues such as health, aid and development is actually unhelpful in attempting to deal with these issues (Grayson 2003; Abrahamsen 2005).

Wæver thus expresses his preference for *not* securitising issues where possible, and for desecuritisation, that is, shifting issues from the realm of emergency politics back into the realm of ‘normal’ political deliberation and haggling. In some of his work, Wæver suggests the condition of ‘asecurity’, rather than security, is in fact optimal. Asecurity denotes a condition where actors ‘who do not feel insecure, do not self-consciously feel (or work on

being secure; they are more likely to be engaged in other matters' (Wæver 1998: 71). As security thus describes a condition where the occurrence of securitisation (and hence any consequent requirement for desecuritisation) is minimal or absent, and issues are not conceptualised in terms of security.

Yet this still leaves the question of how issues that have already been securitised might be downgraded or moved back to the status of 'normal' political issues. Several authors have noted this as a potentially under-theorised aspect of securitisation theory. As Claudia Aradau notes, the concept of desecuritisation has received 'comparatively scant attention' within securitisation theory as compared with the more prominent concept of securitisation (2004: 389). Examining the securitisation of migration in the EU, in which migrants are presented as a threat to existing forms of identity, Huysmans (1995: 66–67) suggests three possible strategies of desecuritisation: an 'objectivist strategy' (we might try to prove that migrants are not really a threat to 'our' identity); a 'constructivist strategy' (developing a broader understanding and awareness of how migrants are constructed as threats in processes of securitisation as a possible means of undercutting the potency of securitising moves); and a 'deconstructivist strategy' (where we might try and listen to the voices and experiences of migrants themselves as means of breaking down exclusionary notions of 'us' and 'them'). However, Roe (2004) has argued that in some cases (such as the securitisation of minority rights), securitisation is so entrenched (in, for example, constituting and perpetuating the identity of minorities) that it becomes virtually impossible to conceive of viable strategies for desecuritisation. In sum, while the concept of securitisation has been developed in a way that allows for clearly identifiable speech acts, securitising actors and conditions for success, the equivalent concept of desecuritisation, and what that might entail, remains much less well specified in securitisation theory and is a source of continuing intellectual ferment.

Debates, dilemmas and developments in securitisation theory

As well as debates over the nature of desecuritisation, there are several other debates, dilemmas and developments in securitisation theory that distinguish it as one of the most vibrant areas of research in contemporary security studies.

One of the initial points of contention over the development of securitisation theory concerns the concept of 'societal security'. In particular, the Copenhagen School has been accused of essentialising identity in its rendering of securitisation theory. Criticising the notion of societal security, McSweeney (1996) argues that identities (even national identities) are fluid and change over time. He consequently suggests that the concept of societal security 'will make claims for the protection of national identity all the easier to substantiate, without investigation of the interests underlying them or of the moral choices involved in any decision to authenticate them' (1996: 91). In short, McSweeney worries that the concept of societal security risks legitimating and hardening notions of 'us' and 'them' that in turn tend to fuel identity conflicts. Buzan and Weaver have countered this by arguing that they do not treat identities as objective or given, but that 'once mobilized, identities have to be reckoned with as something people perceive that they belong to, and act upon as objective, given' (1997: 246). Although we might find the practice objectionable or regrettable, securitising actors frequently speak *as if* group identities exist as hard facts for purposes of mobilisation, and hence it is argued this is something that the analysis of securitisation should take account of.

Others have, however, questioned whether even the distinction between securitising actor and the analyst of securitisation is so easily made (see Eriksson 1999). Securitisation entails

the analysis of when actors 'speak security' in relation to a particular issue. But logically, the analyst of securitisation ends up reproducing this 'security talk' in the process of analysis, as well as privileging the role of elite actors. As Wæver has acknowledged, this creates something of an ethical dilemma for the prospective analyst of securitisation. Even when talking security in order to achieve desecuritisation, it is possible that one contributes to securitisation by the very fact of producing more security talk' (2000: 252).

The issue of 'speaking security' and the emphasis on speech acts within Wæver's conception of securitisation is a further key point of debate within securitisation theory. For one thing, as Lene Hansen has argued, 'reliance on speech act theory presupposes the existence of a situation in which speech is indeed possible' (2000: 285). Examining the case of honour killings in Pakistan, Hansen argues that the version of securitisation theory put forward by Buzan *et al.* in their *New Framework for Analysis* is blind to the ways in which gender can have a major impact upon our social position and hence our ability to speak security. She also points to the ways in which the discursive aspect of securitisation is often accompanied by practices targeted against the body (stoning to death, flogging and bride burning in the case of honour killings) that 'exceed' speech acts given that they are physical and corporeal, rather than discursive, in nature.

From a different direction, Williams (2003b) argues that an exclusive focus on speech acts is ill advised when so much of contemporary political communication takes place through primarily visual media such as television and the internet. In this context, Williams suggests that an analysis of the securitising potential of images to accompany the analysis of speech acts is a necessary development in securitisation theory, and Hansen (2011) proposes the extension of securitisation theory to include analysis of visual depictions of threats and dangers. Watson (2012), in a related vein, makes the case that securitisation theory can and should be thought of as subfield of 'framing': that is, the study of the ways in which political actors frame and communicate their interests. Others have recommended that greater attention to the non-discursive aspects that facilitate securitising speech acts is also needed (see Chapter 5, Box 5.3). Bigo (2002) advocates a focus on the key role played by security 'experts' and institutions in securitisation (see Chapter 5), while Balzaq (2005: 173) suggests that the focus on speech acts needs to be supplemented by awareness that audience, political agency and context are 'crucial' to successful securitisation (see also McDonald 2008).

More recently, debate in securitisation theory has centred on the relationship between politicisation and securitisation, and the vision of politics that underpins the concept of securitisation. Buzan *et al.* declare that ' "Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics' (1998: 23). However, the question has been raised as to whether politicisation (the treatment of an issue within the 'normal' sphere of political haggling) and securitisation (where issues are given priority and responded to with emergency measures) can be treated as distinct and separate (Acharya 2006: 250), and this raises a further analytical question about the possibility of a distinctive 'political' sector of security.

Some have suggested that rather than plotting politicisation and securitisation on a spectrum, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, the distinction between politicisation and securitisation is better represented in terms of a 'sliding scale' where issues move only very gradually from 'normalcy' to 'emergency', and are usually conceived of as 'security risks' rather than existential threats in between these two stages (Abrahamsen 2005: 59; see also Nunes 2012). More fundamentally, the question arises as to how we conceive of 'normal' politics in distinction to the politics of emergency associated with security: what is 'normal' politics? For some this question can only be answered by assuming conditions in which 'exceptions'

actually define the normal day-to-day workings of politics (see Williams 2003b; Huysmans 2004), and that this in turn brings securitisation theory into the ambit of 'exceptionalism' as discussed within recent poststructural approaches to security (see Chapter 5). And as several authors have pointed out, discriminating between what constitutes 'normal' political life and the instances in which 'exceptional' measures can be invoked in the name of security is itself a highly fraught activity that involves major political and ethical claims (see, amongst others: Aradau 2004; Browning and McDonald 2013; Burke 2007; Nunes 2012). Some have made the case for a 'normative extension of securitisation theory' on the grounds that can be instances where it is 'morally legitimate' (Floyd 2011: 434) to engage in practices of securitisation. Floyd argues that this can apply in cases where only securitisation can provide the degree of political mobilisation required to, for example, address human practices of environmental degradation. On a consequentialist basis, she contends, some instances of securitisation can be regarded as 'positive' if it can be shown that they lead to progressive outcomes (and thus Floyd seeks to 'bridge' the Welsh School – see Chapter 2 – and securitisation theory approaches – see Floyd 2007). Other scholars, though, remain sceptical in this regard (Browning and McDonald 2013: 236) and question the extent to which securitisation theory itself provides or contains a sufficient ethical framework on which to make judgments on whether practices of securitisation should be welcomed or feared.

Conclusion

Securitisation theory has had such a significant impact on the way security is studied partly because it seems to offer a clearly identifiable research agenda: when, where and why do securitising speech acts occur? Why are some successful and others not? How do dynamics of securitisation differ across different sectors? For various reasons, though, this agenda in itself raises questions as to whether or not securitisation theory should be counted within the category of 'critical security studies' (and, once again, what the latter entails). Although securitisation theory shares in common with many critical approaches a concern with a 'broadened' security agenda in examining issue areas other than traditional military security, its development is also motivated out of desire to circumscribe the range of issues considered under the rubric of security lest the study of security becomes 'the study of everything, and hence the study of nothing'. Similarly, most proponents of securitisation theory (particularly those associated with the Copenhagen School) have largely resisted calls made by some critical approaches to 'deepen' the study of security to the individual level. Allowance has been made for the study of societal security as an alternative to focusing solely on the state, but many have argued that securitisation theory still encourages an analytical commitment to the state level and to those who already occupy positions of power (Erksson 1999; Wyn Jones 1999: 111–112).

Against potential charges of conservatism and elitism, or 'not being critical enough', Wæver counters that securitisation theory:

may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse [of security studies] than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political principles [...] the dynamics of securitisation and desecuritisation can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized.

(1995: 57)

In addition, more recent applications and developments of securitisation theory (see 'Guide to further reading') have sought to explore the ethical dimensions and implications of securitisation. If – as Buzan, Wæver and other proponents of securitisation theory have suggested – successful securitisation entails the suspension of processes of deliberation and democratic procedures then, as Aradau argues, 'the dynamics of securitisation/desecuritisation raise questions about the type of politics that we want' (2004: 388): the 'emergency politics' associated with securitisation, the identification of existential threats and the likely corollary of closed decision-making processes that are the purview of security experts; or a form of politics that emphasises the virtues of desecuritisation as means of creating transparency and enhancing democratic participation in political processes. In this sense securitisation theory offers not only an analytical framework but also a site of critical opportunity for thinking through larger questions about the nature of contemporary security politics.

Key points

- Proponents of securitisation theory (such as Buzan and Wæver), acknowledge the broadening of security beyond traditional military issues to include environmental, economic, societal and political 'sectors', but they have tried to develop an analytical framework for judging what is and what is not a security issue in each of these sectors.
- To do this they employ the concept of 'securitisation', which denotes the process by which an issue, military or non-military, comes to be presented as existential threat to a referent object.
- Securitisation takes place through a 'speech act'; this is known as a 'securitising move', which requires that certain 'felicity conditions' are present in order to succeed.
- Some variants of securitisation theory also consider the prospects for 'desecuritisation', the process of moving an issue out of the realm of security and back into the realm of normal political deliberation, although whether and how desecuritisation can occur is still a keenly contested issue.

Discussion points

- What is meant by 'securitisation'?
- What are the arguments for and against the securitisation of issues?
- Does the concept of 'societal security' add to our understanding of security?
- What are the potential limitations of securitisation theory?
- Does the analysis of securitisation necessarily entail an ethical dimension?

Guide to further reading

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner). The key starting point for those wishing to explore securitisation theory further. As well as detailing the theoretical underpinnings of an approach that focuses explicitly on securitisation, the book also examines the dynamics of securitisation within different sectors of security with relevant illustrations.

Claudia Aradau (2004) 'Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritisation and Emancipation', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7: 388–413, and Rita Taurek (2006) 'Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9: 53–61, offer contending perspectives on whether securitisation theory is inherently political, or simply a tool for practical analysis.

Holger Stritzel (2007) 'Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13: 357–383, offers a broadly sympathetic critique of securitisation theory as formulated by Buzan *et al.* and suggests possible revisions and extensions of their theoretical framework, as do Williams (2003b), Balzacq (2005) and McDonald (2008) (see bibliography for full details).

Jef Huysmans (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge). Advances a more sociologically grounded version of securitisation theory with reference to how migration and asylum are dealt with in the European Union.

Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (2006) (eds) *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation* (London: Ashgate). Discusses the merits and limitations of securitisation theory with reference to several empirical studies drawn from South and East Asia.

Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Keistrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter). Provides an extensive exploration of the concept of 'societal security'.

Ole Wæver (1995) 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press). Offers an explicit discussion of desecuritisation, as well as reflections on the ethics of securitisation/desecuritisation.

Thierry Balzacq (2011) (ed.) *Securitisation Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve* (Abingdon: Routledge). Offers a collection of essays that seek to review, critically engage with and extend securitisation theory at both a theoretical level and in application to different empirical contexts.

Part II Issues

Introduction

On Dangers and Their Interpretation

On August 2, 1990, Iraq became a danger to the United States. For many, this was obvious—nothing could be more real and less disputable than an invasion of one country by another. Even though it was not the United States that had been invaded, this deed was regarded as a fact that could be observed and a danger that could be understood. Yet, without denying the brutality of such an action, the unproblematic status with which this episode is endowed deserves analysis. After all, an event of this kind (particularly one so distant from America)¹ does not in and of itself constitute a danger, risk, or threat. It was possible for the leadership of the United States to have concluded that no matter how much it disapproved of the turn of events, the situation did not demand a full-scale response, and the initial period of what later became understood as a crisis was taken up with political debates over how and to what extent the United States should commit itself to act. Indeed, there have been any number of examples in which similar “facts” were met with a very different American reaction: only a decade earlier, the Iraqi invasion of Iran (an oil-producing state like Kuwait) brought no apocalyptic denunciations or calls to action, let alone a military response, from the United States.

Danger is not an objective condition. It [*sic*] is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. To illustrate this, consider the manner in which the insurance industry assesses risk. In François Ewald’s formulation, insurance is a technology of risk the principal function of which is not compensation or reparation, but rather the operation of a schema of rationality distinguished by the calculus of probabilities. In insurance, according to this logic, danger (or, more accurately, risk) is “neither an event nor a general

kind of event occurring in reality... but a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals." In other words, for the technology of risk in insurance, "Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything *can* be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a category of the understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intuition."² In these terms, danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for insurance technology than anything else, except when interpreted as such.

This understanding of the necessarily interpretive basis of risk has important implications for international relations. It does not deny that there are "real" dangers in the world: infectious diseases, accidents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life and death. But not all risks are equal, and not all risks are interpreted as dangers. Modern society contains a veritable cornucopia of danger; indeed, there is such an abundance of risk that it is impossible to objectively know all that threatens us.³ Those events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. Moreover, that process of interpretation does not depend on the incidence of "objective" factors for its veracity. For example, HIV infection has been considered by many to be America's major public health issue, yet pneumonia and influenza, diabetes, suicide, and chronic liver disease have all been individually responsible for many more deaths.⁴ Equally, an interpretation of danger has licensed a "war on (illegal) drugs" in the United States, despite the fact that the consumption level of (and the number of deaths that result from) licit drugs exceeds by a considerable order of magnitude that associated with illicit drugs. And "terrorism" is often cited as a major threat to national security, even though its occurrence within the United States is minimal (notwithstanding the bombings in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center in New York) and its contribution to international carnage minor.⁵

Furthermore, the role of interpretation in the articulation of danger is not restricted to the process by which some risks come to be considered more serious than others. An important function of interpretation is the way that certain modes of representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers. Given the often tenuous relationship between an interpretation of danger and the "objective" inci-

dence of behaviors and factors thought to constitute it, the capacity for a particular risk to be represented in terms of characteristics revealed in the community said to be threatened can be an important impetus to an interpretation of danger. As later chapters will demonstrate, the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience.

In this context, it is also important to note that there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an interpretation of danger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be *the* true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.⁶ In consequence, only in these terms is it possible to understand how some acts of international power politics raise not a whiff of concern, while something as seemingly unthreatening as the novels of a South American writer can be considered such a danger to national security that his exclusion from the country is warranted.⁷ For both insurance and international relations, therefore, danger results from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.

These qualities of danger were evident in the Persian Gulf crisis. In announcing that the United States was sending military forces to Saudi Arabia, President Bush declared: "In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe."⁸ By manifestly linking American identity to danger, the president highlighted the indispensability of interpretation to the determination of a threat, and tacitly invoked the theme of this study: that the boundaries of a state's identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy.

The invasion of Kuwait is not the subject of this book. But it does serve as a useful touchstone by which to outline some of the assumptions undergirding this study. Consider, for example, this question: How did the Iraqi invasion become the greatest danger to the United States? Two answers to this question seem obvious and were common. Those indebted to a power-politics understanding of world politics, with its emphasis on the behavior of states calculated in rational terms according to the pursuit of power, understood the invasion to be an easily observable instance of naked aggression against an independent, sovereign state. To those indebted to an economic understanding, in which the underlying forces of capital accumulation are determinative of state behavior, the U.S.-led response, like the Iraqi

invasion, was explicable in terms of the power of oil, markets, and the military-industrial complex.

Each of these characterizations is surely a caricature. The range of views in the debate over this crisis was infinitely more complex than is suggested by these two positions; there were many whose analyses differed from those with whom they might normally be associated, and indebtedness to a tradition does not determine one's argument in every instance. But the purpose of overdrawing these positions (which we might call, in equally crude terms, realist and Marxist) is to make the point that although each is usually thought to be the antinomy of the other, they both equally efface the indispensability of interpretation in the articulation of danger. As such, they share a disposition from which this analysis differs. Committed to an *epistemic realism*—whereby the world comprises objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them—both of these understandings maintain that there are material causes to which events and actions can be reduced. And occasioned by this epistemic realism, they sanction two other analytic forms: a *narrativizing historiography* in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves, and a *logic of explanation* in which the purpose of analysis is to identify those self-evident things and material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity they encounter.⁹ Riven with various demands, insistences, and assertions that things "must" be either this or that, this disposition is the most common metatheoretical discourse among practitioners of the discipline of international relations.¹⁰

But there are alternative ways to think, and this book exhibits a commitment to one of them. Contrary to the claims of epistemic realism, I argue that as understanding involves rendering the unfamiliar in the terms of the familiar, there is always an ineluctable debt to interpretation such that there is nothing outside of discourse. Contrary to a narrativizing historiography, I employ a mode of historical representation that self-consciously adopts a perspective. And contrary to the logic of explanation, I embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating, and specifying the "real causes," and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another.

As such, my argument is part of an emerging dissident literature in international relations that draws sustenance from a series of modern thinkers who have focused on historically specific modes of dis-

course rather than the supposedly independent realms of subjects and objects.¹¹ Starting from the position that social and political life comprises a set of practices in which things are constituted in the process of dealing with them, this dissent does not (and does not desire to) constitute a discrete methodological school claiming to magically illuminate the previously dark recesses of global politics. Nor is it the dissent of a self-confident and singular figure claiming to know the error of all previous ways and offering salvation from all theoretical sin. Rather, this form of dissent emerges from a disparate and sometimes divergent series of encounters between the traditions of international relations and theories increasingly prominent in other realms of social and political inquiry. It is a form of dissent that celebrates difference: the proliferation of perspectives, dimensions, and approaches to the very real dilemmas of global life. It is a form of dissent that celebrates the particularity and context-bound nature of judgments and assessments, not because it favors a (so-called) relativist retreat into the incommensurability of alternatives, but because it recognizes the universalist conceits of all attempts to force difference into the strait-jacket of identity.¹² It is a form of dissent skeptical—but not cynical—about the traditions of international relations and their claims of adequacy to reality. It is a form of dissent that is not concerned to seek a better fit between thought and the world, language and matter, proposition and fact. On the contrary, it is a form of dissent that questions the very way our problems have been posed in these terms and the constraints within which they have been considered, focusing instead on the way the world has been made historically possible.¹³

Consequently, in attempting to understand the ways in which United States foreign policy has interpreted danger and secured the boundaries of the identity in whose name it operates, this analysis adopts neither a purely theoretical nor a purely historical mode. It is perhaps best understood in terms of a history of the present, an interpretative attitude suggested by Michel Foucault.¹⁴ A history of the present does not try to capture *the* meaning of the past, nor does it try to get a complete picture of the past as a bounded epoch, with underlying laws and teleology. Neither is a history of the present an instance of presentism—where the present is read back into the past—or an instance of finalism, that mode of analysis whereby the analyst maintains that a kernel of the present located in the past has inexorably progressed such that it now defines our condition. Rather, a history of the present exhibits an unequivocally contemporary orientation. Beginning with an incitement from the present—an acute man-

ification of a ritual of power—this mode of analysis seeks to trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, gained importance, and effected politics.¹⁵ In short, this mode of analysis asks how certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse.

To suggest as much, however, is not to argue in terms of the discursive having priority over the nondiscursive. Of course, this is the criticism most often mounted by opponents to arguments such as this, understandings apparent in formulations like "if discourse is all there is," "if everything is language," or "if there is no reality."¹⁶ In so doing they unquestioningly accept that there are distinct realms of the discursive and the nondiscursive. Yet such a claim, especially after the decades of debates about language, interpretation, and understanding in the natural and social sciences, is no longer innocently sustainable. It can be reiterated as an article of faith to rally the true believers and banish the heretics, but it cannot be put forward as a self-evident truth. As Richard Rorty has acknowledged, projects like philosophy's traditional desire to see "how language relates to the world" result in "the impossible attempt to step outside our skins—the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something absolute."¹⁷ The world exists independently of language, but we can never *know* that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation.¹⁸ In Foucault's terms, "We must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour."¹⁹

Therefore, to talk in terms of an analysis that examines how concepts have historically functioned within discourse is to refuse the force of the distinction between discursive and nondiscursive. As Laclau and Mouffe have argued, "The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing* to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition... What is denied is not that... objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence."²⁰ This formulation seeks neither to banish arguments that authorize their positions through reference to "external reality," nor to suggest that any one representation is as powerful as another. On the contrary, if we think in terms of a discursive economy—whereby discourse (the represen-

tation and constitution of the "real") is a managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others—the idea of "external reality" has a particular currency that is *internal* to discourse. For in a discursive economy, investments have been made in certain interpretations; dividends can be drawn by those parties that have made the investments; representations are taxed when they confront new and ambiguous circumstances; and participation in the discursive economy is through social relations that embody an unequal distribution of power. Most important, the effect of this understanding is to expand the domain of social and political inquiry: "The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extradiscursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can account for social relations. Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted."²¹ The enlargement of the interpretive imagination along these lines is necessary in order to account for many of the recent developments in world politics, and (as chapter 1 will show) to understand the texts of postwar United States foreign policy.

In the form of a history of the present, then, this analysis begins from the incitement of "the end of the cold war," a period that is thought to portend a qualitative change in world politics. For many, the dangers of the past are a thing of the past. But one does not have to deny that world politics exhibits considerable novelty at this juncture to appreciate that United States foreign policy recognizes a range of new dangers that might occupy the place of the old. The European revolutions of 1989 and their consequences: "new global issues" such as the environment; the interpretation of drug use and trafficking as a national security issue; the representation of Japan and Germany as economic threats to security; an awareness of disease, migration, and other population issues as sources of external threat; a renewed focus on the "Third World" as the primary source of danger; the vigilance that is exercised toward new forms of violence such as "terrorism" or "Islamic fundamentalism"; and a general disquiet about the pervasive nature of ambiguity and uncertainty—all these orientations to the world stand as dangers that seem to challenge the long-standing and well-established modes of interpretation associated with the cold war.

For the most part, however, these developments have been represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant

during the cold war. To be sure, they are not represented as being reducible to Soviet behavior. But these challenges are represented as dangers, located in an external and anarchic environment, which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence. This provokes a question: What functions have difference, danger, and otherness played in constituting the identity of the United States as a major actor in international politics? To pose the question in these terms is a little misleading, for it is not intended to suggest either that it is a strict functional requirement of American identity that difference and danger be articulated as otherness, or that only certain groups or phenomena can be other. As Foucault argued with respect to the confinement of the insane and the repression of certain sexual practices in the nineteenth century, these were not functionally the result of or required by bourgeois domination. The bourgeoisie was interested not in the mad or the phenomenon of infantile masturbation but in the procedural system through which such exclusions and controls were effected.²² In other words, groups or practices other than those targeted could have been the objects of surveillance and discipline, while those that were targeted could have been tolerated if not accepted.

In this context, for the United States, the current period in world politics can be understood as being characterized by the representation of novel challenges in terms of traditional analytics, and the varied attempts to replace one enemy with (an)other. In consequence, the argument to be made here suggests that we need a more radical response to these challenges: a response directed at the modes of interpretation that make these challenges available for apprehension, the strategies and tactics by which they are calculated as dangers, and the means by which they come to be other.

Addressing the issue of the roles danger and difference play in constituting the identity of the United States involves a deconstruction of conventional political discourse and its self-presentation, especially that effected in the practice and analysis of both international relations and foreign policy. In reorienting analysis from the concern with the intentional acts of pregiven subjects to the problematic of subjectivity, this argument proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of American political identity. In order to delineate more precisely the relationship between foreign policy and political identity, this argument is predicated on a reconceptualization of understandings to which the conventional view of international relations

and foreign policy is deeply indebted — most specifically, a reconceptualization of identity and the state.

Identity and the State

Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity — whether personal or collective — is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Difference is constituted in relation to identity.²³ The problematic of identity/difference contains, therefore, no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation. Whether we are talking of "the body" or "the state," or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an "inside" from an "outside," a "self" from an "other," a "domestic" from a "foreign."

In the specific case of the body, Judith Butler has argued that its boundary, as well as the border between internal and external, is "tenuously maintained" by the transformation of elements that were originally part of identity into a "defiling otherness."²⁴ In this formulation, there is no originary or sovereign presence that inhabits a prediscur-sive domain and gives the body, its sex, or gender a naturalized and unproblematic quality. To be sure, many insist on understanding the body, sex, and gender as naturalized and unproblematic. But for their claim to be persuasive, we would have to overlook (among other issues) the multifarious normalizing codes that abound in our society for the constitution and disciplining of sexuality. In seeking to establish and police understandings of what constitutes the normal, the accepted, and the desirable, such codes effect an admission of their constructed nature and the contingent and problematic nature of the identity of the body.

Understanding the gendered identity of the body as performative means that we regard it as having "no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality." As such, the idea that gender is an interior essence definitive of the body's identity is a discursively constructed notion that is required for the purposes of disciplining sexuality. In this context, genders are neither "true" or "false," nor "normal" or "abnormal," but "are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity." Moreover, gender can be understood as "an identity tenuously constituted in time,

instituted in an exterior space through a *stylized repetition of acts*’, an identity achieved, “*not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition.*”²⁵

Choosing the question of gender and the body as an exemplification of the theme of identity is not to suggest that as an “individual” instance of identity the performative constitution of gender and the body is prior to and determinative of instances of collective identity. In other words, I am not claiming that the state is analogous to an individual with a settled identity. To the contrary, I want to suggest that the performative constitution of gender and the body is analogous to the performative constitution of the state. Specifically, I want to suggest that we can understand the state as having “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality”; that its status as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by “a discourse of primary and stable identity”, and that the identity of any particular state should be understood as “tenuously constituted in time . . . through a *stylized repetition of acts*,” and achieved, “*not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition.*”

Moreover, the simultaneity between the body and the state exceeds the status of being simply heuristically useful if we think of gender as the effect of a discourse about primary and stable identity, in terms of what Joan Cocks has called a “regime of Masculine/feminine.”²⁶ For Cocks the regime of Masculine/feminine is a disciplinary regime of truth that is prevalent in our culture and contains contingency through the production of “male” and “female” as stable identities. Most important, this regime effects a double move: “it imposes on each of the two kinds of bodies a particular norm and characteristic deviation, [and] it imposes on all bodies the rule that masculinity is the norm of active desire and femininity is active desire’s deviation.”²⁷ Informed by the understanding of power as productive and not confined to the boundaries or institutions of the juridical state, Cocks’s regime of Masculine/feminine is one of the ensemble of practices that give rise to the “society of normalization” about which Foucault wrote.²⁸ Characterized by discipline and domination through multiple forms of subjugation, rather than by the uniform authority of sovereignty located in a single point, a society of normalization secures the content and confines of its identity through the imposition of a norm rather than the enforcement of a rule. In so doing, it encourages and legitimizes certain dispositions and orientations while opposing and delegitimizing others, a process that is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally hegemonic in its consequences.

Cocks’s argument is directed primarily at how the regime of Masculine/feminine disciplines the sexed body. But given the culturally pervasive nature of the gender norms it is concerned with, it is not implausible to suggest that a similar regime—or at least the gender norms that it effects—operates in other domains and disciplines other identities, such as the state. Indeed, if we consider how our understanding of politics is heavily indebted to a discursive economy in which reason, rationality, and masculinity are licensed as superior to unreason, irrationality, and femininity, it is not difficult to appreciate that gender norms have also helped constitute the norms of statecraft. Therefore, in terms of the axiological dimension of spatializing practices, “the body” can be understood as being a historically well-established analog for the constitution of state identity. This becomes even more apparent when we think of how “the body politic” functions as a regulating and normalizing trope for “the political” (a discussion found in chapter 4). Moreover, central to that regulation and normalization, and to be understood as a privileged instance of the stylized repetition of acts, is foreign policy and the articulation of danger.²⁹ Accordingly, the identity of the state that is contained and reproduced through foreign policy is likely to be inscribed with prior codes of gender that will in turn operate as norms by which future conduct is judged and threats are calculated.³⁰

But if there are no primary and stable identities, and if the identities many had thought of as primary and stable, such as the body and the state, are performatively constituted, how can international relations speak of such foundational concepts as “the state,” “security,” “war,” “danger,” “sovereignty,” and so on? After all, isn’t security determined by the requirements of a preexisting sovereign state and war conducted in its name as a response to an objective danger? How then can we speak of these categories once we acknowledge the non-essentialistic character of danger?

Indeed, much of the conventional literature on the nation and the state implies that the essence of the former precedes the reality of the latter: that the identity of a “people” is the basis for the legitimacy of the state and its subsequent practices. However, much of the recent historical sociology on this topic has argued that the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy. Benedict Anderson, for example, has argued in compelling fashion that “the nation” should be understood as an “imagined political community” that exists only insofar as it is a cultural artifact that is represented textually.³¹ Equally, Charles Tilly

has argued that any coordinated, hierarchical, and territorial entity should be only understood as a "national state." He stresses that few of these national states have ever become or presently are "nation-states"—national states whose sovereign territorialization is perfectly aligned with a prior and primary form of identification, such as religion, language, or symbolic sense of self. Even modern-day Great Britain, France, and Germany (and, equally, the United States, Australia, and Canada) cannot be considered nation-states even though they are national states.³² The importance of these perspectives is that they allow us to understand national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess prediscursive, stable identities. As a consequence, all states are marked by an inherent tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for an "imagined political community" to come into being—such as territoriality and the many axes of identity—and the demand that such an alignment is a response to (rather than constitutive of) a prior and stable identity. In other words, states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.³³ Moreover, the drive to fix the state's identity and contain challenges to the state's representation cannot finally or absolutely succeed. Aside from recognizing that there is always an excess of being over appearance that cannot be contained by disciplinary practices implicated in state formation, were it possible to reduce all being to appearance, and were it possible to bring about the absence of movement which in that reduction of being to appearance would characterize pure security, it would be at that moment that the state would wither away.³⁴ At that point all identities would have congealed, all challenges would have evaporated, and all need for disciplinary authorities and their fields of force would have vanished. Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state's continued success as an impelling identity.

The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist. Such an argument, however, is occluded by the traditional representations of international politics through their debts to epistemic realism and its effacement of interpretation. Grounded in an interrogation of discursive practices within the study of international relations and the conduct of United States foreign policy, this study seeks to show how these themes and issues are immanent to these domains. Through a rethinking of the practice and theory of foreign policy in chapters 1, 2, and 3; a discussion in chapter 4 of the dominant modes of representing danger; and a consideration of the figuration of difference at various foundational moments in the American experience in chapter 5, this book posits the validity (though not incontestability) of an alternative interpretation of the cold war, which is elaborated in chapter 6. The hope is that this analysis can highlight some of the political issues at stake in the post-cold war era, as chapters 7 and 8 argue. The epilogue evaluates the efflorescence of concern with the politics of identity by those perspectives previously inattentive to these concerns, and considers the modes of interpretation that are more adequately attuned to the issues.

3 Security complexes: a theory of regional security

This chapter presents an operational version of regional security complex theory (RSCT). RSCT provides a conceptual frame that captures the emergent new structure of international security (1 + 4 + regions): hence our title *Regions and Powers*. As we have shown, RSCT has a historical dimension that enables current developments to be linked to both Cold War and pre-Cold War patterns in the international system. It contains a model of regional security that enables one to analyse, and up to a point anticipate and explain, developments within any region. RSCT provides a more nuanced view than strongly simplifying ideas such as unipolarity or centre-periphery. But it remains complementary with them, and provides considerable theoretical leverage of its own. In an anarchically structured international system of sufficient size and geographical complexity, RSCs will be an expected substructure, and one that has important mediating effects on how the global dynamics of great power polarity actually operate across the international system. This makes the theory interoperable with most mainstream realist, and much liberal-based, thinking about the international system. In another sense, the theory has constructivist roots, because the formation and operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power. Wendt (1999: 257, 301), for example, makes the connection explicit, pointing out that his social theory can be applied to regional security complexes.

By applying RSCT to the whole of the international system, this book offers both a vision for the emerging 'world order' and a method for studying specific regions. Our view of regions, and therefore our image of the contemporary structure of international security, is almost the

reverse of that set out in Huntington's widely read *Clash of Civilizations* (1993). Seemingly we are similar in emphasizing the importance of a distinct middle level between state and global system. Huntington emphasises how large civilisations like Islam, the West, and Asia clash, and how the really dangerous conflicts emerge at the fault lines of these culturally based macro-units. Conversely, we stress that security regions form subsystems in which most of the security interaction is internal; states fear their neighbours and ally with other regional actors, and most often the borders between regions are – often geographically determined – zones of weak interaction, or they are occupied by an *insulator* (Turkey, Burma, Afghanistan) that faces both ways, bearing the burden of this difficult position but not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one. The concept of *insulator* is specific to RSCT and defines a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back. This is not to be confused with the traditional idea of a *buffer state*, whose function is defined by standing at the centre of a strong pattern of securitisation, not at its edge.

Huntington's theory has the polemical advantage of ending up with a struggle that takes place at the system level, thereby putting the United States centre stage. That understandably appeals to an American audience, and was reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001. But seen from most countries of the world, the relevant strategic setting is not primarily at the system level – the first priority is regional. Huntington's delineation of the regions/civilisations differs from ours at several points because his are seen as reflections of underlying cultural affinities, whereas our RSCs – though possibly *influenced* by these and other factors – are *defined* (at the more 'superficial' or contingent level) by the actual patterns of security practices. In concrete cases this means that the same conflict (e.g., Bosnia) can be internal to our RSCs and intercivlisational to Huntington. Especially in the book version (Huntington 1996), there are conflicts both within and between civilisations, but the latter are seen as increasingly decisive. In our view, it was a bias of this type, favouring the global over the regional, that led to many of the disasters of Cold War policy from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, to Southern Africa and South Asia. Since regions matter more in the current era, the costs of underrating them could be even higher.

There are versions of RSCT going back to 1983, as well as a variety of applications of it to particular regions. So far, the most authoritative version is to be found as one chapter in a more general book (Buzan 1991b: 186–229) and at some points developed further in the context of different

applications (notably Buzan et al. 1990; cf. also Buzan, Rizvi et al. 1986; Buzan 1988b; Väyrynen 1988, 1998; Wæver 1989, 1993a, 1993b; Buzan and Wæver 1992; Wiggins 1992; Ayroob 1995; Lose 1995; Coppeters 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Lake and Morgan 1997c; Mozaffari 1997; Schlyter 1997; Zanders 1997, 1999; Aves 1998; Engelbrekt 1998; Ohlson 1998; Parmani 1998; Rondelet 1998, 1999; van Wyk 1998; Eide 1999; Haddadi 1999; Kinsella 1999; Muller 1999; Bø 2000; Cornell and Sultan 2000; Khokhar and Wiberg-Jørgensen 2000; Lobo-Guerrero Sanz 2000; Takahashi 2000; Zha 2000; Jonson and Allison 2001; Kaski 2001; Limaye 2001; Schulz et al. 2001; Tjurtun 2001; Adams 2002; Burnashev 2002; Christensen 2002; Corpora 2002; Heitne 2002; Alagappa forthcoming; Tickner and Mason forthcoming; Rees n.d.; van Schalkwyk n.d.). The purpose of the present book is to integrate the lessons from existing and new case studies, fill in remaining gaps in the theory, produce an operational formulation of the theory, and empirically apply it to all regions of the world. It is an extension of our previous book (Buzan et al. 1998), which was aimed at solving some problems arising from how to integrate the wider agenda of security with a focus on the regional level. Whereas the main focus of that book was on sectors, the main focus of this one is on levels of analysis, the two being linked by the process of securitisation. Although the original theory was largely conceived for third world cases, much of the elaboration of it was made with reference to Europe (our 1990 and 1993 books), and it is therefore important to survey global variations in regional security to expunge Eurocentric elements and produce a general theory of regional security. It is our hope that a book with such a general theory and applications will be of interest not only to security theorists, but perhaps even more for area specialists. Studies of 'regional security' usually take place without any coherent theoretical framework because, other than a few basic notions about balance of power and interdependence borrowed from the system level, none has been available.

The next section explains our approach to understanding security regions, and the second section looks at the main variables within RSC. The third section sets out RSC as a descriptive framework for area studies, explains the possible typologies for security complexes, and sets benchmarks for change. The fourth section sets out the predictive possibilities of RSC through the generation of scenarios. The fifth section reviews the constructivist method of securitisation theory as the way of defining RSCs, and the final section puts all this into the context of the literature on regional security.

Security at the regional level

One of the purposes of inventing the concept of regional security complexes was to advocate the regional level as the appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis. Normally, two too extreme levels dominate security analysis: national and global. National security – e.g., the security of France – is not in itself a meaningful level of analysis. Because security dynamics are inherently relational, no nation's security is self-contained. But studies of 'national security' often implicitly place their own state at the centre of an ad hoc 'context' without a grasp of the systemic or subsystemic context in its own right. Global security in any holistic sense refers at best to an aspiration, not a reality. The globe is not tightly integrated in security terms and, except for the special case of superpowers and great powers discussed in chapter 2, only a limited amount can be said at this level of generality that will reflect the real concerns in most countries. The region, in contrast, refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other. The regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs. The general picture is about the conjunction of two levels: the interplay of the global powers at the system level, and clusters of close security interdependence at the regional level. Each RSC is made up of the fears and aspirations of the separate units (which in turn partly derive from domestic features and fractures). Both the security of the separate units and the process of global power intervention can be grasped only through understanding the regional security dynamics.

One might, then, think that the way to proceed would be to find the cultural or economic or historical sources of regions, and then start to investigate security dynamics in these. This is seen, for instance, in the endless debates about whether Russia is part of Europe – with listings of Russian literary achievements versus European intellectual movements that flourished without touching Russia. In a security context such arguments easily become normative-political arguments: security cooperation *should* correspond to the 'natural' or 'true', cultural, geographic, or historical boundaries (see, e.g., the Central European arguments of Milan Kundera and others in the early 1980s; Kundera 1984). This approach might work for securitising actors, but not, in our view, as the starting point for analysts seeking to define regions specifically in the functional terms of security. Security complexes are regions as seen

through the lens of security. They may or may not be regions in other senses, but they do not depend on, or start from, other conceptualisations of regionness. We do not rule out the study of causal effects of, for example, cultural or economic patterns on security patterns. Quite the contrary, it is only by *defining* RSCs purely in security terms that this causal relationship is opened up for examination.

If one hypothetically listed all the security concerns of the world, drew a map connecting each referent object for security with whatever is said to threaten it and with the main actors positively and negatively involved in handling the threat, the resulting picture would show varying degrees of intensity. Some clusters of nodes would be intensely connected, while other zones would be crossed by only few lines. Of the clusters that formed, RSCT predicts that most would be territorially based. There will, of course, be some connections across otherwise thinly populated terrain between the RSCs and, in addition, there will be some non-territorially based clusters such as those around 'international terrorism'.

Some clarification of our previous statements of RSCT and security theory in general is called for. The original definition of a security complex (Buzan 1983: 106) was: 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another'. In our 1998 book (Buzan and Waever 1998: 201), the definition of RSCs was reformulated to shed the state-centric and military-political focus and to rephrase the same basic conception for the possibility of different actors and several sectors of security: 'a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another'. This more complicated formulation does not change the underlying idea or the main properties of the concept. The central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters. These clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes of (de)securitisation. Each level needs to be understood both in itself and in how it interplays with the other.

Our 1998 book was aimed at meta-theoretical questions, and its more constructivist – but also more complicated – formulation of the nature of security in terms of practices of securitisation remains our frame of reference. Ultimately, we have an open framework in which it is left for history to decide whether states are the most important referent objects

for security or, say, the environment. However, this wider framework does not predefine that states are *not* dominant. It is perfectly possible that the world is still largely state-centric, even if our framework is not. The finding is more interesting when the framework does not predefine the result. Thus, one might see the relationship between the original, state-centric, and partly objectivist formulation of RSCT and the more recent presentation of it within the multisectoral, multi-actor securitisation perspective in parallel to that between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics: the latter is in principle the correct way to phrase things, but for the majority of cases (except extreme border cases) the former reaches the same results and is a much less complicated way of expression. Therefore we will use the terminology of states in the following pages to give the general idea of the normal RSC, and then add the refinements and the implications of the securitisation framework.

Regional security complex theory: main variables

RSCT is useful for three reasons. First it tells us something about the appropriate level of analysis in security studies, second it can organise empirical studies, and, third, theory-based scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible forms of, and alternatives to, RSCs. These we will turn to in the following two sections, but first we have to clarify the status of RSCs and their main analytical components.

RSCs are defined by durable patterns of enmity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. The particular character of a local RSC will often be affected by historical factors such as long-standing enmities (Greeks and Turks, Arabs and Persians, Khmers and Vietnamese), or the common cultural embrace of a civilisational area (Arabs, Europeans, South Asians, Northeast Asians, South Americans). The formation of RSCs derives from the interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences, and on the other the pressures of local geographical proximity. Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas, a point also emphasised by Walt (1987: 276–7). Adjacency is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors. The general rule that adjacency increases security interaction is much less consistent in

the economic sector (Buzan et al. 1998: 95–117). All the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because insecurity is often associated with proximity, this interdependence is far from uniform. Anarchy plus the distance effect, plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it. South Asia provides a clear example, where the wars and rivalries of the subcontinent constitute a distinctive pattern that has been little affected by events in the Gulf or in Southeast Asia (Buzan, Rizvi et al. 1986).

The basic premise that security interdependence tends to be regionally focused is strongly mediated by the power of the units concerned. As shown in chapter 2, superpowers have such wide-ranging interests, and such massive capabilities, that they can conduct their rivalries over the whole planet. Superpowers by definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships. At the other end of the power spectrum are states whose limited capabilities largely confine their security interests and activities to their near neighbours, as in Southeast Asia or Southern Africa. Possession of great power thus tends to override the regional imperative, and small power to reinforce it. Smaller states will usually find themselves locked into an RSC with their neighbours, great powers will typically penetrate several adjacent regions, and superpowers will range over the whole planet. Local states can of course securitise threats seen to come from distant great powers, but this does not necessarily, or even usually, constitute security interdependence.

What links the overarching pattern of distribution of power among the global powers to the regional dynamics of RSCs is the mechanism of penetration. Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC. An indigenous regional rivalry, as between India and Pakistan, provides opportunities or demands for the great powers to penetrate the region. Balance-of-power logic works naturally to encourage the local rivals to call in outside help, and by this mechanism the local patterns of rivalry become linked to the global ones. South Asia during the Cold War gave a clear example, with Pakistan linked to the United States and China, and India linked to the Soviet Union. Such linkage between the local and global security patterns is a natural feature of life in an anarchic system. One of the purposes of RSCT is to combat the tendency to overstress the role of the great powers, and

to ensure that the local factors are given their proper weight in security analysis. The standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns among the main powers *within* the region: to this pattern can then be added the effects of penetrating external powers. Normally the pattern of conflict stems from factors indigenous to the region – such as, for instance, in South Asia or in the Middle East – and outside powers cannot (even if heavily involved) usually define, desecuritize, or reorganise the region. Unipolarity might in its extreme form be an exception to this rule: when both sides of a local conflict are dependent on the same power, it is possible for that power to pressure the conflicting parties into peace processes, for example, the Middle East (see B. Hansen 2000) and, in the case of European regional unipolarity, the Stability Pact for Central Europe (Wæver 1996b: 229–31, 1998a: 99–100).

The pattern of enmity and enmity is normally best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions. For most of the states in the international system, the regional level is the crucial one for security analysis. For the global powers, the regional level is crucial in shaping both the options for, and consequences of, projecting their influences and rivalries into the rest of the system. The regional level matters most for the states within it, but also substantially for the global powers. Security features at the level of regions are durable. They are substantially self-contained not in the sense of being totally free-standing, but rather in possessing a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it. This relative autonomy was revealed by the ending of the Cold War, when entities such as that between Israel and Syria, and Iraq and the Gulf Arab states, easily survived the demise of a superpower rivalry that had supported, but not generated, them.

'Regional security complex' is not just a *perspective* that can be applied to any group of countries. One can argue about the correct interpretation of the boundaries formed by patterns of relative security interdependence and indifference, but within the terms of the theory one cannot just use the term RSC for any group of states (Norden, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Proliferation Treaty members, the GCC states, Africa). In order to qualify as an RSC, a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them

as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions. Regions are not, as some argue, 'necessarily arbitrarily defined' (Khalilzad 1984: preface; B. Hansen 2000: 9). Within the terms of RSCT, RSCs define themselves as substructures of the international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units, and security indifference between that set and surrounding units.

Two important questions need to be settled here. First, the existence of an RSC is not in terms of the discursive 'construction of regions'. We are not (in this context) allowing, e.g., 'Europe' to be defined by how actors construct 'Europe' as a way to define its boundaries, or whether 'the Middle East' is an accepted regional definition in the region it applies to (which it is not). *Regional security complex* is an analytical concept defined (and applied by us, but these regions (RSCs) are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the *security practice* of the actors. Dependent on what and whom they securitise, the region might reproduce or change. We study the security discourses and security practices of actors, not *primarily* their regional(ist) discourses and practices. The latter is an interesting and important question (see Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Schulz et al. 2001), and is an *element* of our analysis, but not the basis of it. Our approach is constructed around 'security'. According to our theory 'security' is what actors make it, and it is for the analyst to map these practices. Consequently, these two ways of understanding the definition of regions have to be kept separate. The regionalist discourses of actors are part of their political struggle, and how they define the region has to be studied. 'Regional security complex' is our analytical term and therefore something is an RSC when it qualifies according to our criteria, not according to the criteria of practitioners. What we pass judgement on is securitisation practices of practitioners. Their practice in terms of labelling regions is only indirectly related to our criteria as such. RSCs are thus a very specific, functionally defined type of region, which may or may not coincide with more general understandings of region.

A second issue is whether RSCs are exclusive or overlapping. In contrast to the argument made by Lake and Morgan (1997c) that RSCs can have overlapping memberships (which we examine in more detail in the final section of this chapter, pp. 78–82), our position is that they are mutually exclusive. We take as the starting point of the analysis that the whole world has to be divided up on a map producing mutually exclusive RSCs, insulator states, and global actors. RSCs are distinguished

from each other by degrees of relative security connectedness and indifference. They are distinguished from global powers by occupying a different level of analysis as defined in chapter 2. If this set-up produces complications, anomalies, and difficulties, these are exactly what should be explained and what the theory has then served to alert us to. External involvement is analysed by the use of 'penetration' and 'overlay'. Difficult border cases between regions may be explained by noticing an insulator state, or a case of asymmetry where a neighbouring great power leans on a weaker neighbouring RSC. Strong instances of interregional dynamics may be indicators of an external transformation (merger) of RSCs.

As argued in our previous book (Buzan et al. 1998: 163–93), it is in the nature of security practice as a prioritising and thus implicitly comparative move that actors themselves integrate and hierarchise security issues. Since one threat is interpreted in the light of other threats, we get an integrated field of security, not separate issues or for that matter separate sectors of say 'economic security' and 'societal security'. Thus, the different issues get tied together, and a world of regions is therefore less unlikely than one might at first think when listing the diversity of security issues each drawing on a particular sector. So if we make the starting assumption that the world can be divided into a definite number of exclusive RSCs, what problems do we then have to solve on the way, which of these are instructive, and which are just artificially self-imposed? We return to these questions in part VI.

Within the structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and patterns of amity and enmity. The idea that power operates on a regional scale is well known from the concept of a regional balance of power, in which powers that are not directly linked to each other still take part in the same network of relations. Thus RSCs, like the international system of which they are substructures, can be analysed in terms of polarity, ranging from unipolar, through bi- and tripolar, to multipolar. This is why it is essential to distinguish regional powers from global level ones.

The second component, patterns of amity and enmity, has been much less featured in IR theory than has power, an early exception being Wolfers (1962: 25–35). Indeed, in the more extreme versions of power theory (maximalist realism), they are simply reflections of power relations: one fears whoever wields greater power. Less dogmatically, they might be seen as 'much stickier than the relatively fluid movement of

the distribution of power' (Buzan 1991b: 190; parallel to Krasner's (1983) classical discussion of regimes as intermediary variables and many other modified realisms, see Guzzini 1994). More realistically, these patterns are allocated a historically derived reality of their own as the socially constructed dimension of structure (Buzan and Little 2000: 68–89).

Those of a Wendtian predisposition can see that his social theory can easily be applied as a useful constructivist elaboration of the anarchy–enmity variable in RSCT, though his scheme is more differentiated than the simple dyad of enemy or friend. Wendt's idea of social structures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian) is based on 'what kind of roles – enemy, rival, friend – dominate the system' (Wendt 1999: 247); and how deeply internalised these roles are – by coercion (external force), by interest (calculations of gain and loss), and by belief in legitimacy (understandings of right and wrong, good and bad). All of these ideas work as comfortably at the regional level as they do at the global one. His observation that there is no necessary correlation between type of social structure and degree of internalisation (e.g., warrior cultures, whether tribal or fascist, can believe in the virtue of enemy relations and therefore generate a deeply internalised Hobbesian social structure) is a particularly useful insight into thinking about RSCs. We hope to use our regional cases to assess the viability of Wendt's assumption that one particular role (enemy, rival, friend) dominates sufficiently to assign an overall social structure to a system or subsystem. It is thus not enough to look at the distribution of power in order to predict the patterns of conflict – even if distribution of power might tell us quite a bit about what constellations are impossible and which might be likely. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define an RSC. These patterns of animity and enmity are influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, and geography, but to a large extent they are path-dependent and thus become their own best explanation.

RSCs are durable rather than permanent patterns. As substructures, they can have mediating effects on relations between the great powers and the local states as well as on the interactions of states in the regions. The RSC constitutes a social reality, which is more than the sum of its parts, and thus it is able to intervene between intentions and outcomes. Although the RSC does not exist independently of the states and their vulnerabilities, the outcome of their interactions would be different if

it were not for the existence of the RSC. It is not a root cause in itself but a structure that modifies and mediates the action and interaction of units.

Descriptive RSCT: a matrix for area studies

The most well-established function for RSCT is as a framework organising empirical studies of regional security. The theory specifies what to look for at four levels of analysis and how to interrelate these. The four levels are:

1. domestically in the states of the region, particularly their domestically generated vulnerabilities (is the state strong or weak due to stability of the domestic order and correspondence between state and nation (Buzan 1991b)? The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has (Wæver 1989) – and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions);
2. state-to-state relations (which generate the region as such);
3. the region's interaction with neighbouring regions (this is supposed to be *relatively* limited given that the complex is defined by interaction internally being more important. But if major changes in the patterns of security interdependence that define complexes are underway, this level can become significant, and in situations of gross asymmetries a complex without global powers that neighbours one with a global power can have strong interregional links in one direction); and finally
4. the role of global powers in the region (the interplay between the global and regional security structures).

Taken together, these four levels constitute the *security constellation* (Buzan et al. 1998: 201ff.). Since the earliest development of RSCT we have also allowed the idea of *subcomplexes* as a 'half-level' within the regional one, and we stick with that here. Subcomplexes have essentially the same definition as RSCs, the difference being that a subcomplex is firmly embedded within a larger RSC. Subcomplexes represent distinctive patterns of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole. The clearest example is in the Middle East, where distinct subcomplexes can be observed in the Levant (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) and in the Gulf (Iran, Iraq, GCC), but where there is so much overlap and interplay that the

two cannot be disentangled (all of the Gulf states are hostile to Israel, rivalry between Syria and Iraq, etc.). Subcomplexes are not a necessary feature of RSCs, but they are not uncommon either, especially where the number of states in an RSC is relatively large. The device of subcomplexes eliminates most of what might otherwise occur as disturbing cases of overlapping membership between RSCs: e.g., if the Gulf and the Levant were seen as separate RSCs, Iraq would be a member of both but, with these as subcomplexes, Iraq can be a member both of the Gulf subcomplex and of the wider Middle Eastern one.

RSCT asserts that the regional level will always be operative, and sometimes dominant. It does *not* say that the regional level *must* always be dominant. We argue that all four levels of a security constellation are simultaneously in play. The question of which level is dominant is not set by the theory, even though particular circumstances (on which more later) might swing the odds one way or another. Determining the balance among the levels rests on empirical observation of particular cases, and in that sense the case studies that compose this book will be a test of our (and others') assumption from chapter 1 that the conditions of the post-Cold War world will enhance the salience of the regional level for security. Just as in the social world individual psychology might be most influential in explaining behaviour in one case, family structures in another, and national society in yet another, so in the international world domestic factors might dominate some security constellations, regional ones others, and global ones yet others. The regional level may or may not dominate, but it will nearly always be in play in some significant sense, and cannot be dropped out of the analysis.

In its descriptive application RSCT is aimed at people working empirically on specific regions. It is mostly a descriptive language, a method for producing order out of complicated data, and for writing structural history. The theory offers the possibility of systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers. It also provides some structural logic, most notably the hypothesis that regional patterns of conflict shape the lines of intervention by global level powers. Other things being equal, the expectation is that outside powers will be drawn into a region along the lines of rivalry existing within it. In this way regional patterns of rivalry may line up with, and be reinforced by, global power ones, even though the global power patterns may have had little or nothing to do with the formation of the regional pattern.

One purpose of descriptive RSCT is to establish a benchmark against which to identify and assess changes at the regional level. Because RSCs are durable substructures with an important geographical component, they have both internal structures and external boundaries that can be used to monitor continuity and change and to distinguish significant change from less important events. The *essential structure* of an RSC embodies four variables:

1. boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours;
2. anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units;
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units; and
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units.

From its configuration at any given snapshot in time there are thus three possible evolutions open to an RSC:

1. *maintenance of the status quo*, which means that there are no significant changes in its essential structure;
2. *internal transformation*, which means that changes in essential structure occur *within* the context of its existing outer boundary. This could mean changes to the anarchic structure (because of regional integration); to polarity (because of disintegration, merger, conquest, differential growth rates, or suchlike); or to the dominant patterns of amity/enmity (because of ideological shifts, war-weariness, changes of leadership, etc.); and
3. *external transformation*, which means that the outer boundary expands or contracts, changing the membership of the RSC, and most probably transforming its essential structure in other ways. The most obvious way for this to happen is if two RSCs merge, as might happen if Israel became dramatically concerned about Pakistan's 'Islamic' nuclear weapons; or less often two RSCs splitting out from one.

Types of security complex

Within these parameters of structure and evolution, it is possible to identify different types of RSC. In our previous works we have talked about variations in polarity from unipolar to multipolar, and about variations in amity and enmity ranging from *conflict formation* through *security*

regime to security community (Wæver 1989, Buzan 1991b: 218). Wendtians should note that conflict formation, security regime, and security community run in parallel with Wendt's Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian social structures. The main differences are that conflict formation is rather wider than Wendt's Hobbesian model and security regime is probably a rather narrower idea than his Lockean model. The same parallel could be drawn with the English School's three traditions of Hobbes, Grotius, and Kant (Cutler 1991) on which Wendt (1999) draws. We have also sometimes talked about 'centred' regions (Wæver 1993a, 1997b), where centralisation of power in a region reaches a point at which its centre is primarily to be seen as a participant in the global security constellation among the greatest powers, and the regional dynamics can no longer be seen as a subsystem in which the primary fears and concerns of a group of states are defined by each other. One example of this is North America. The EU integration process might be thought of as moving towards another, albeit in a rather different way, and we have talked of this in terms of scenarios of 'fragmentation' and 'integration' (Buzan et al. 1990; Wæver et al. 1993). But we have not yet unfolded the whole range of possibilities in sufficient detail, nor have we had the benefit of a clearly worked-out differentiation between the regional and global level such as that set out in chapter 2. Our earlier classifications consequently blur or hide some significant issues.

The presence of several global powers in the international system (as in the present 1 + 4 system) raises questions about how great powers and superpowers interact with regions. The view of polarity cultivated during the Cold War assumed that the superpowers stood outside the regions as well as above them. On that basis, one could construct clear models of global and regional level security dynamics, and ask questions about how the two levels played into each other (Buzan 1991b: 186–229). The global level was distinguished by being unpenetrated by other powers, while the standard condition of RSCs was to be penetrated by outside powers. This scheme always ignored the regions within which the superpowers sat and, like Cold War polarity theory, fudged awkward questions about which level China occupied. But if there are several global level powers in the system, then it is unlikely that any complete differentiation between the global and regional levels will be possible. Some global level powers will be inside regions, while others, most obviously China at the present time, will have considerable entanglements in neighbouring regions, and will be operating at both levels

simultaneously. How do we deal with these problems, especially in the light of needing to fill in a map of the whole planet?

The first step is to draw a distinction between *standard* and *centred* RSCs. A standard RSC is broadly Westphalian in form with two or more powers and a predominantly military-political security agenda. All standard complexes are anarchic in structure. In standard RSCs, polarity is defined wholly by regional powers (e.g., Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, India and Pakistan in South Asia) and may vary from unit to multipolar. In standard RSCs, unipolarity means that the region contains only one regional power: Southern Africa (where South Africa is a giant compared to its neighbours) provides the clearest example. It is not centred, because the security dynamics of the region are not dominated from the unipolar power at its centre. Although they can be unipolar in this sense, standard RSCs *do not* contain a global level power, and therefore in such regions (currently Africa, the Middle East, South America, and South Asia) clear distinctions can be drawn between inside, regional level dynamics, and outside, intervening, global level ones. In terms of amity and enmity, standard RSCs may be conflict formations, security regimes, or security communities, in which the region is defined by a pattern of rivalries, balances, alliances, and/or concerts and friendships. Within a standard RSC the main element of security politics is the relationship among the regional powers inside the region. Their relations set the terms for the minor powers and for the penetration of the RSC by global powers.

Centred RSCs come in three (potentially four) main forms. The first two forms are the special cases in which an RSC is unipolar, but the power concerned is either a great power (e.g., Russia in the CIS) or a superpower (e.g., the United States in North America), rather than just a regional power. The expectation in these cases is that the global level power will dominate the region (unipolarity), and that what would otherwise count as regional powers (Ukraine, Canada, Mexico) will not have sufficient relative weight to define another regional pole. Part of the reason that India's claim for great power status has not been accepted is that Pakistan still defines a regional pole of power. It is possible that a unipolar standard RSC could also become centred without the unipole thereby elevating itself to global great power status. One can imagine such a scenario developing around regional level unipoles such as South Africa and Nigeria, but in fact we find no cases of this type (more on this in part VI).

One might think of the Cold War relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as an extreme case of a superpower-centred region, where Eastern Europe was not just overlaid, but virtually absorbed into a kind of Soviet empire, the whole acting more or less as a single entity at the global level. Less extreme, but comparable, is the situation in North America centred on the United States. The USA projects bases and military interventions into Central America and the Caribbean and, while it certainly cannot be said that this region functions as a unit at the global level, US influence clearly impinges on the indigenous security dynamics in quite major ways. In this rather odd hybrid, the core actor is driven much more by global than by regional security dynamics, and during the Cold War it was primarily global concerns that drove its security impositions on its smaller neighbours. Because the core actor is globally orientated, the security dynamics of the region are hugely distorted and suppressed. But since all other actors in the region have their concerns linked to each other, a general map of global security would still show a clear regional formation of densely knit connections compared to a lack of connections in and out of the region for most units. This therefore can still be treated as an RSC.

The third form of a centred RSC is very different, involving a region integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. The EU provides the example, hanging halfway between being a region in the form of a highly developed security community, and being a great power in its own right with actor quality at the global level. Another, though more problematic, example would be the USA during its 'Philadelphia' era (Deudney 1995). Like one of those drawings that can be either a rabbit or a duck depending how you look at it, the EU can be either a great power or an RSC in security community form. Institutional centredness created by the members of an RSC poses some problems for RSC. The definition of RSCs (and the general methodology of our security analysis) is based on the security actions and concerns of actors: an RSC must contain dynamics of securitisation. Usually this means that the actors in the region securitise each other. But the development of a security community is marked by processes of desecuritisation, or what Wendt would think of as a Kantian social structure: actors stop treating each other as security problems and start behaving as friends. They still compete and feel challenged now and then, but this is dealt with as normal political, economic, environmental, and societal problems – not as matters of *security*, i.e., threats to survival that mobilise extreme countermeasures. If a centred region moved into this kind of general

desecuritisation, it might eventually leave the world of security altogether and thereby also the map of RSCs (logically, this would also be true of non-centred security communities, though such a development is hard to imagine).

In the real world the extreme case of a region of total desecuritisation is not empirically significant, and the most mature cases of security communities today are not marked by a general forgetting of security concerns but rather by a conscious aggregation of them. As often stated explicitly in Europe, because of the risk of a return to power balancing, rivalry, and thereby eventually war, we Europeans have to do this (integrate) and abstain from that (beggary-thy-neighbour or rival intervention policies). The classical Deutschian definition of a security community (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5–9) states that the actors cannot *imagine* a war among each other. This would imply the complete desecuritisation form of security community and fits nicely with the neofunctionalist strategy of technocratic depoliticisation that marked European integration in the 1950s and 1960s. However, both today and at that time among the elites themselves, the process rested on the generalised security argument that one had to integrate to avoid the wars that thereby *were* imaginable. European integration and cooperation were not fully desecuritized – the historical trajectory itself was highly securitized (see Wæver 1998a; and Hurrell 1998 on Latin America). In a previous empirical study of securitisation in the EU, we found that the most intense and regular threat was Europe itself, the risk of Europe's past becoming also Europe's future (Buzan et al. 1998: 179–89; see also Wæver 1996b). The Southern Cone in South America is close to creating a security community based on securitising primarily an external economic threat, and from this deriving the necessity of regional pacification. The most relevant form of security community contains active and regional securitisation, only it is not actor-to-actor (one state fearing the other and therefore counterthreatening it), but a collective securitisation of the overall development of the region. Therefore, security community is a possible, if uncommon, form for an RSC. It is not a development that necessarily moves beyond the status of RSC.

But the EU case also points to a further difficulty. Not only has the EU moved strongly towards the amity end of the amity-enmity spectrum, it has also created joint institutions that are substantial enough to raise the question of whether it still qualifies as an international anarchy. In principle one could imagine a high level of security community without much in the way of accompanying institutions, but it is easier

to imagine that well-developed security communities will normally become increasingly institutionalised and integrated. In the case of the EU, centredness comes not from the domination of a single pole of power, but from the building by a group of states of collective institutions that are beginning to take on actor quality in their own right. It is not unreasonable to ask whether what goes on inside the EU is domestic or international politics, and this question is difficult to answer with any clarity. The situation is *sui generis*, and for our purposes it raises the question of when a process of integration replaces anarchic with hierarchic political structure sufficiently to say that what was an RSC in security community mode has instead become a single actor.

Integration processes may have a variety of impacts. They may, as would be the case with an EU actor, transform virtually a whole RSC into a great power, and thus transform the structure of polarity in the international system as a whole. But integration processes can also occur within RSCs, as happened with the unifications of the USA in North America, Germany and Italy in Europe, and as might happen in Korea, changing the local but not the global polarity. There may of course still be security dynamics in a centred region – cultural units will still be concerned about their societal security (the European nations in a future unified Europe, the ‘races’ of today’s United States), and environmental security obviously is still at stake, but as centredness becomes the making of a new unit, the political consequences of these securitizations are constrained by the disappearance of balancing options and the increasing salience of a centre–periphery constellation.

What links these three types of centred RSC together is the idea that the security dynamics of a region are dominated from a centre located within it. This is partly a question of how dominant the centre is (i.e., the degree of power asymmetry), but equally of the form of hegemony established. A centred RSC is more likely to be stable if the centre establishes a kind of open or penetrated hegemony, where dominated states are given access to the policy process of the ‘imperial centre’ (see Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Kupchan 1998; Ikenberry 2001). Even stronger is the case where the centre is a construct of the units such as the EU and the early USA, when still anarchically structured (Deudney 1995). Wholly imperial centred regions retain their form mainly as a result of power, and are less likely to survive changes in the distribution of power (viz. the break-up of the Soviet empire). These considerations run parallel to Kratochwil’s (1989) and Wendt’s (1999) ideas about how social structures get internalised: superficially if coercion is the mechanism,

deeply if they get accepted as legitimate. We will use Adam Watson’s (1992) term *legitimacy* in this context as the general designation of the degree of acceptance (also among the peripheral units) of centredness as natural and correct, not imposed against some timeless standard of maximum independence.

Having sorted out the distinction between standard and centred RSCs, the second step is to deal with the cases that do not fit into either category and in a sense fall between them. These cases arise from having a number of global level powers scattered throughout the system. The more such powers there are in a system, the less room there will be for standard RSCs; the fewer, the more room. Having great powers scattered through the international system creates two possibilities other than centred complexes: *great power regional security complexes*, and *supercomplexes*. In the present 1 + 4 system, both possibilities are most clearly visible in Asia.

In a great power RSC, the polarity of a region is defined by more than one global level power being contained within it. This was traditionally the case in Europe, and is now the case in East Asia, where China and Japan form the core of a bipolar great power RSC. Great power RSCs have to be treated differently from ordinary RSCs for two reasons. First, their dynamics directly affect balancing calculations at the global level in ways that one would not expect from a standard RSC. Second, because great powers are involved, one would expect wider spillover into adjacent regions, in other words, a higher intensity of interregional interaction than would normally be the case. Great power RSCs are hybrids of the global and regional levels. In some ways they can be analysed in the same way as standard RSCs in terms of polarity, unity–enmity, boundaries, and suchlike. But because their dynamics involve global level powers, they affect, are indeed part of, the global level security dynamics. In a 1 + 4 system, or anything like it, the existence of a great power RSC as a subset of the global polarity shapes the options available both to the powers involved and to the other powers in the system. Where two or more great powers share a regional RSC, then the internal dynamics of that RSC, whether of unity or enmity, will be a significant factor in global level security dynamics. If the great powers are all in centred RSCs, then the regional level does not directly affect how they interact with each other, except inasmuch as trouble *within* a centred RSC might weaken its great power in relation to its peers (Russia’s problem).

The second difference from standard RSCs arises from the spillover effects consequent upon the presence of great powers. Great powers will

normally be capable of projecting their power into adjacent regions and, other things being equal, can be expected to do so. The presence of global level powers in an area is thus likely to violate the rule that interregional security dynamics will usually be weak, by allowing an adjacent great power to play strongly into one or more neighbouring regions in a sustained way. The clearest example here is China, which during the Cold War played not only into the great power RSC in Northeast Asia, but also into the standard RSCs in Southeast Asia and South Asia. China plays into South Asia as an ally of Pakistan and an opponent of India, meaning that India has to divert substantial energies to balancing China. Similarly, in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, China fought a war with Vietnam. A weaker version of the same story can be found in US engagement with South America. The fact of adjacency makes this relationship qualitatively different from a normal global power intervention into an RSC because the option of disengagement is not really available in the same way. The USA or Russia can decide whether or not to be in Southeast Asia in a way China cannot (or cannot without endangering its status as a great power).

Put more formally, the rule violation attendant on the presence of great powers is that, in contrast to standard RSCs, we should expect them to generate a sustained and substantial level of interregional security dynamics. Rather than expecting the security dynamics of the interregional level to be weak in relation to those of the global and regional levels, we expect them to be strong. This spillover might result from the actions of a single great power, as in the case of China. Or it might result from the dynamics of a great power RSC, as might be imagined if China and Japan became serious rivals or friends in Asia. Either way, such intense spillover may well bind together what would otherwise be separate RSCs into *supercomplexes* with one or more great powers at their core. In such cases the security constellation becomes more elaborate than usual. Instead of there being just three main levels (domestic, regional, and global) to take into account, one may have to add a fourth, superregional, level to replace the normally weak interregional one. In a supercomplex, the interregional level is strong and sustained, as it has been between Northeast Asia and South Asia, but not so strong as to override the regional dynamics in the penetrated RSC (in this case, South Asia). If the interregional dynamics do override the regional ones, as happened during the 1990s between North-east and Southeast Asia, the spillover subordinates the previous patterns of regional security dynamics, and the component RSCs within the

supercomplex undergo external transformation, merging to form a new and larger RSC (in this case, East Asia). More on this in part II. As with the idea of subcomplexes, supercomplexes pick up cases of what would otherwise seem to be dual memberships.

Analysing cases of this sort requires paying close attention to the whole spectrum of levels making up the security constellation: domestic, regional, superregional, and global. In the Asian case, all the levels are in play at the same time, confronting all of the states concerned with an extremely difficult hand to play: China and Japan cannot disentangle their regional and superregional roles from their global ones. In supercomplexes, as in standard ones, weaker powers may well seek superpower and/or great power support against the regional power (Huntington 1999: 45–7). In a standard RSC, the consequences of such alignments will resonate mostly at the regional level, and only indirectly at the global one (if, for example, there are rival superpower engagements in a region, as in the Middle East during the Cold War). But in a great power RSC, or a supercomplex, such alignments will resonate directly at the global level, as well as at the regional one. As the United States discovered in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, misunderstanding the interplay of the different levels can come at a high price.

Explaining the absence of RSCs

So far we have talked only about the nature and definition of RSCs, and the theory has implied that, in principle, the map of any international system meeting the conditions of the theory could and should be completely filled in by a set of RSCs. But this is not the case. There is also the possibility that the regional level fails to function because the local actors do not generate their own patterns of security interdependence. RSCT presupposes that the units concerned are normal members of an international system: 'normal' in the sense that they possess autonomy to make their own policy and the power capabilities to engage the other units in the system. There are two general sets of conditions in which RSCs do not, or cannot, form: *overlay* and *unstructured*.

Overlay is when great power interests transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate. It usually results in the long-term stationing of great power armed forces in the region, and in the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of great power rivalry. The strongest examples of overlay are European colonisation of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, and the situation of Europe itself during the

Table 1 Summary of types of security complex

Type	Key features	Example(s)
Standard	Polarity determined by regional powers	Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia, Horn, Southern Africa
Centred		
Superpower	Unipolar centred on a superpower	North America
Great power	Unipolar centred on a great power	CIS, potentially South Asia
[Regional power]	Unipolar centred on a regional power	none
Institutional	Region acquires actor quality through institutions	EU
Great power	Bi- or multipolar with great powers as the regional poles	Pre-1945 Europe, East Asia
Supercomplexes	Strong interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into adjacent regions	East and South Asia

Cold War, when the classical European security dynamic was overlaid by the superpower rivalry. Northeast and Southeast Asia during the Cold War were heavily penetrated but not overlaid because their regional level dynamics remained significant. The term overlay will not be applied to dynamics *within* regions although the pattern in a centred RSC in some ways can be seen as analogous because a great (or super) power dominates a region. But since it is a power of the region, the region has not succumbed to extra-regional dynamics and therefore the situation is not designated overlay. Even situations where a distinct subcomplex is secondary to the core of an RSC (Central America in North America, the Balkans in EU-Europe) should not be designated overlay, because the subcomplex is part of what constitutes the RSC.

Unstructured security regions occur for either or both of two reasons: first, where local states have such low capability that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, second, where geographical insulation makes interaction difficult (for example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean). Either condition can result in insufficient generation of security interdependence to form the structures of an RSC. Low capability of course amplifies the

effect of geographical insulators, and high capability reduces it. But even for capable actors it makes a difference whether one's borders are defined by seas (Britain, New Zealand) or high mountains (Spain), or by open plains (Poland). Parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific after decolonisation illustrate this condition.

In the case of overlay, the security region is defined by outside powers. In the case of unstructured regions, it is defined in part by the absence of regional dynamics, and in part by the negative space left over on the map when all of the other security regions have been filled in.

Our previous presentations have not looked in much detail at these options, but moving to predictive RSCT requires that we do so. Attention must also be paid to the boundaries of these concepts, which like most things in social science are matters of definition and degree rather than sharp lines of discontinuity.

The main problem with overlay is to determine the boundary between it and mere heavy penetration of an RSC by great powers. The key to the distinction is that outside powers, rather than the interests and interactions of the local states, must shape the main security dynamics of the region. Normally this will mean that great powers have substantial military forces based in the region. Overlay is easiest to see when it has been imposed by force, by the invasion and occupation of a region by outside powers. Thus when Britain took over South Asia, it overlaid the local system, imposing on it both a strategic unity and a set of security dynamics driven by the 'great game' of colonial rivalry with Russia. More problematic is the semi-voluntary acceptance of overlay, when local states agree to subordinate themselves to a significant degree to an outside hegemon, and accept the stationing of its forces on their territory. This describes the situation of much of Western Europe during the Cold War (though less so of Germany where overlay extended from defeat in war and subsequent occupation). Even so, Europe during the Cold War counts as a case of overlay: clearly so in the east, but also in the west on the grounds of more or less complete suppression of local security dynamics plus extensive stationing of outside military forces. East Asia was heavily penetrated rather than overlaid.

While overlay is clear enough in snapshot, it is more problematic when looked at in historical perspective (Buzan 1989; Wæver 1990a). It might, for example, seem possible to conceptualise Cold War Europe as an RSC that is overlaid, in other words seeing overlay as a temporary phase in a longer history where an RSC exists on either side of the overlay period. However, this is rather dangerous, because when overlay is imposed on

what was an RSC, the region can easily be transformed, as happened in much of the third world during colonialism, and to Europe during the Cold War. What emerges after overlay might be a different RSC or no RSC. Therefore, overlay is in principle a non-RSC form that describes an area, although in practice it will often be a former and future RSC that is overlaid.

The simplest model of an unstructured security region is one in which the units are too weak as powers to generate security interdependence on a regional level. No regional RSC exists because the units do not become each other's main security concern. The image is of a security constellation dominated by the domestic level, and perhaps also the interregional and global levels. Reality, however, is rarely that simple, and a pristine unstructured region containing largely inward-looking units is hard to find. The South Pacific islands probably come closest to this model. The question is when security interaction becomes sufficient to start generating a regional security substructure. Unstructured regions thus must in one sense be seen as RSCs in the making, and where such conditions exist it is useful to employ some intermediate concepts. We will talk of *pre-complexes* when a set of bilateral security relations seems to have the potential to bind together into an RSC, but has not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage among the units to do so. The Horn of Africa is a good example. And we will talk of *proto-complexes* when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully fledged RSC. West Africa is the clearest example of this condition.

At this point, recall from chapter 1 the distinction (Buzan 1991b: 96–107) between weak/strong states and weak/strong powers. Obviously, security interdependence can very well be the product of the weakness of units, not only of their strength. In Africa weak states create more room for mercenaries, insurgencies, etc. When the states are weak and nonstate actors take on a relatively larger role, the question of the power of units (weak/strong powers) should logically be asked equally of all units, state and nonstate. If some of the 'other' units were strong and formed stable constellations of threat and vulnerability – e.g., transnational tribal groups – this could very well qualify as an RSC (and not only a pre- or proto-complex). Low interaction capacity in a region makes it difficult for RSCs to form.

Given that our aim in this book is to fill in the world map according to RSCT, we now have to hand the whole descriptive apparatus that we

need. First we fill in the global level powers. Next we fill in the various types of RSC (standard, centred, great power), and any insulators between them. The internal character of the RSCs will range along a spectrum from conflict formation through security regime to security community, though institutionally centred RSCs will necessarily be towards the security community end of the spectrum. We expect that all of the global level powers will fit within either centred complexes or great power ones, though it is just about possible to imagine a political geography that would allow a global level power to stand alone. Then we fill in any supercomplexes, which would be superimposed on the pattern of complexes. Finally we add in any areas that are either unstructured (noting any pre- or proto-complexes) or overlaid. The proportions of these options will vary from one era to another. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the bulk of the international system is filled with one or other type of RSC. But during the nineteenth century much of it was overlaid, and in earlier periods there large swaths were unstructured.

Predictive RSCT: scenarios

The descriptive framework set out in the previous section is useful not only for structuring empirical studies of particular areas. It also sets out the full range of possible conditions for a security region as a basis for generating scenarios. Using RSCT to generate predictive scenarios is a more demanding and more controversial role for the theory than providing an analytical framework for area studies. Ontologically, the scenarios are soft limits. One can make negative predictions on the basis of a scenario analysis (Wæver in preparation). It can be specified which options are relevant under which conditions. For instance we previously presented three scenarios for European security (Buzan et al. 1990) – we have since stated that history has now narrowed them down to two: fragmentation (a reassertion of balance-of-power logic within Europe and thus a return to some form of standard RSC) or integration (the replacement of the RSC by a single, global level actor) (Wæver 1991, 1993a, 1993b; Wæver et al. 1993). The scenarios are deduced logically from the range of possible conditions in which a security region can exist. We claim that they constitute actual *possibilities* – in contrast to those scenarios devised as ideal types, which are therefore so extreme that they are less likely to exist than the in-between situations. The question of what is possible is always a question of probabilities. Anything is

possible. It is just a matter of how many other elements of our world have to change in order to make it so. Thus, the scenario analysis says: given the structure of the international system as it is, there are these possible forms the area can take. Which one becomes realised depends ultimately on politics, and structurally on the compatibility with other conditions – for instance, the dominant discursive structures regarding foreign policy orientation in the main powers (Holm 1992; Weaver 1994).

The scenarios cover the whole range of possible forms and, until the situation has reached one of these forms, the scenarios as realistic possibilities influence the situation as structural pressures pushing towards resolution in one direction or another. An example of such structural pressures is the role that integration and fragmentation options play in the EU (ch. 11). In general terms, the options are as follows:

An unstructured region has the possibility of becoming an RSC or getting overlaid. It is hard to imagine an unstructured region leaping straight to integration without passing through one condition or the other.

A standard RSC can undergo internal or external transformation or get overlaid. It is more difficult to imagine it unravelling back to an unstructured region, though not impossible (as, for example, if plague or environmental disaster greatly weakened all of the units), or moving directly to integration. An RSC in security community form has the possibility of building itself into a centred RSC, and possibly a new actor, by creating institutions. A centred great or superpower RSC, or a unipolar standard one, might do the same, probably more coercively, by becoming an empire. Conversely, either form could unravel back to standard multipolar mode, as happened to the Soviet empire. If an RSC contains subcomplexes, then these serve as markers for a possible split if the overarching issues tying the subcomplexes together fade away.

An overlaid security region could transform into any of the other forms, depending on the depth and character of the changes induced in it by the experience of overlay.

An integrated actor can disintegrate, as happened to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Pakistan. If the actor is a large one, the most likely outcome is the creation of new RSCs and/or the internal or external transformation of existing ones. The disintegration of smaller actors is most likely either to define an internal transformation in the complex (Yugoslavia) or to have no effect on the essential structure of the complex (Pakistan, Czechoslovakia). The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan is an interesting case of a major (in the sense of regional polarity-defining) actor disintegrating *without* affecting

the essential structure of the RSC. West Pakistan remained powerful enough to hold its position as a regional pole. It is rather unlikely that such disintegrations would move towards unstructured regions, though not at all impossible that elements of overlay or annexation might result.

The potential for internal transformation can be monitored by checking material conditions for possible changes (or not) of polarity, and discursive ones for possible changes (or not) of amity/enmity relations. The potential for external transformation can be monitored by looking at the intensity of interregional security dynamics, which should act as precursors to change. Where these are sparse and of low intensity, no change in the boundaries of RSCs is likely. Where interregional security dynamics are fairly thick, intense, and increasing, external transformations become more likely. Applying these general observations to specific cases allows one to focus more precisely on what are the likely, and unlikely, options for transformation. Here one can deploy additional variables such as interaction capacity, power differentials, and system polarity to fine-tune the general assessment.

Interaction capacity (technological and social infrastructure for transportation and communication: Buzan and Little 2000) plays quite strongly into the basic forms of security region. Low interaction capacity within the region is probably a necessary condition for unstructured security regions. It is safe to predict that Europe will not move towards being an unstructured security region because its internal interaction capacity is much too high to permit such an option. As we argued before, the real options for Europe seem to be two: either it continues to integrate, at some point becoming a new unit on the international stage, or it falls back towards one of the versions of a standard RSC. Since the Europeans have hung their security community so firmly on joint institutions, and since the present phase of these institutions does not look like a stable resting point (the degree of institutionalisation having created a democratic deficit and its accompanying legitimacy crisis, and more democratisation requiring more integration), and more generally because of the structural pressure of regional security, only these two options look possible (Weaver in preparation). Standard RSCs require quite high levels of interaction capacity within the region, and it is hard to imagine integration without high interaction capacity. Overlay, of course, can occur when interaction capacity in the region is low, but higher in the wider system.

The relative levels of power between the region and global actors is important primarily because overlay emerges as a relevant option at high degrees of disparity (to the advantage of the global actors). The prospects for overlay depend also on discursive structures (within both sides) on questions of imperialism and national interest. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is safe to predict on both grounds that Europe is not in danger of overlay. Africa might be vulnerable to it in power terms, but is protected by the unfashionable standing of imperialism worldwide, which restrains the powers that might otherwise have the capability and the interest to impose it. For an RSC to operate it must not be overlaid by the global level. Because many regions now meet this criterion (unlike during the nineteenth century) we are confident in supporting the view that the regional level will be more important in the post-Cold War world. In the particular situation where none of the regional actors is a global power, but a joint regional centre would be of first global rank (as the EU potentially could be), a specific dynamic is instigated, because unification serves the dual purpose of intra-regional pacification and extra-regional power status. The classical Realpolitik argument against integration, that states do not give up their status as powers, is partly turned upside down because only by integration do they become or remain global powers. In this situation global and regional polarity are mutually defining – one is not given as a precondition for the other.

Global polarity has a difficult role because on the one hand it is a very strong factor but on the other hand it is not possible to formulate in strong terms because geography intervenes – a region which is located close to one of the parties to a bipolar rivalry (Central America) is likely to be overlaid by one of the parties, a region that is posed between can be overlaid in the form of division (Europe), and a strategically peripheral region might be left largely on its own (South America).

Those options that are evidently possible operate as structural pressures on the units. They translate structural dynamics into the regional context, and thereby operate as the fourth tier of structure in a Waltzian universe. Thus, when the region has fallen into one scenario as a clear trend, the structural forces of the international system tend to reinforce this trend – the way Waltzian structure generally contains reproductive rather than transformative logic (Waltz 1979; Ruggie 1983; Dessler 1989) – making it in this way self-reinforcing until some major shock hits it from either inside or outside. This can be seen in the way that the demand pull from outside for the EU to act as a great power often seems

stronger than the push towards a common foreign and security policy from inside, or by the attempts of the international community to stop the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The three forms of security region (RSC, unstructured, overlaid), plus the main options within them, plus the possibility of exit to another level by regional integration, are all relevant as predictions because they are the only long-term stable forms. Since some of their conditions can be specified, it is possible in any given situation to say which ones are relevant if the situation is to change. To characterise an area in terms of which of the forms it is in is furthermore relevant at any given time – without change – because the different structures generate distinctly different security dynamics.

Orthodox Waltzians often make the error of explaining developments in a given region directly from the global power distribution (e.g., Mearsheimer (1990) in his famous 'Back to the Future' analysis of post-Cold War Europe), but the relevant power structure for the main actors in a region is the regional one. The main reasons for this oversight in mainstream neorealism are probably two. One is a general American bias towards thinking globally and seeing regions from above, as parts of a larger strategic, superpower setting, not bottom-up as the relevant context for regional actors. The other is a product of the scientific (and scientific) preferences of American social sciences for general, abstract, and natural science-like theories (see Ross 1991; Wæver 1998b). Realist theory has therefore evolved away from geopolitical and historical specificity towards abstract 'systemic' theory which operates with 'units' that are defined as alike and non-located, i.e., the basic, simple premise of international politics that states are non-mobile is ignored (Mouritzen 1998). In classical geopolitics – and in RSCT – states (and other units) are located in concrete places and distance is mediated by terrain (Wæver 1997b). Global polarity is among the conditions that enable or constrain various possible polarities regionally, but within the regional level, whether the region is bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar generally tells one more about regional security than does the global polarity in which it is embedded (Wæver 1993a).

Our approach is akin to a security version of much political geography. However, this is much less common in the study of international security than one should expect. Within the discipline of IR, the mainstream lost geography in its search for abstract theory, and the critics usually reacted against the reactionary connotations of geopolitics. Academic geopolitics seem to have become polarised. Traditional geopolitics are too materialist and mechanical (Mackinder 1904; Cohen 1994), while

'critical geopolitics' on the other hand seem too absolutist in studying only the social construction of space (Ó Tuathail 1996). We believe that geography as such matters but that it has to be analysed in a political framework. In the policy literature, titles with 'The Geopolitics of...' are common (of Caspian oil, of the Yugoslav wars, etc.) but this usually means an atheoretical survey of some power politics. RSCT is a theory of security in which geographical variables are central.

Predictive SCT is *not* offered as a causal model in which each situation automatically produces one and only one scenario – a necessity if one is to be able to test the theory as a traditional causal model. The aim is to narrow down the range of relevant scenarios in any specific case. That there is often more than one possibility is the analytical point of establishing scenarios: i.e., that one points towards the space for political choice in shaping the outcome. For much of history, only one scenario appears as relevant, not necessarily because of these causal conditions, but because development has turned on to one of the tracks that then becomes self-reinforcing. At crucial moments of historical change, the situation is open and several scenarios become possible, though, as we have seen, rarely all. We will follow through these ideas about scenarios and structural conditions in each of the regional chapters.

Revised RSCT: constructivist method and the wider agenda of securitisation studies

Along with many others we have in recent years found it increasingly necessary to include in security studies more than military-political security. At first, one might expand the concept of security to new sectors while keeping the state as the focus, as the only 'referent object'. Especially when working on 'societal security', we realised that this was problematic. If security is always for the state, it implies that 'societal security' means the security of the state *against* society, i.e., society itself might be insecure and societal security high. This was too perverse, and in our 1993 book (Wæver et al. 1993) we eventually opened up the option of another referent object: in the societal sector, the referent object is any collectivity that defines its survival as threatened in terms of identity (typically, but not only, nations).

Once we had made this decisive move, it became clear that, although empirically most security action might be concentrated around states and nations, one could not analytically defend the exclusion of the

possibility that other units or levels might establish themselves as referent objects for security. Also, the case of societal security undermined the importance of distinguishing between referent objects (that which is to be secured) and securitising actors (those who make claims about this security). The distinction has typically been ignored in the classical security literature because the state has an official system for 'who speaks security', and even the 'alternative' literature, because written up against the traditional one, mixed up the two issues as a general (rhetorical) question about who security was for.

When distinguishing between referent objects and securitising actors, it becomes possible to formulate a general theory of the conditions under which an actor successfully 'securitises' some threat on behalf of a specific 'referent object'. For contingent, empirical reasons this is more easily done on behalf of limited collectivities (states, nations, religions, clans, etc.) than on behalf of individuals or humankind, but there is no absolute necessity to this, and 'universal' principles are now beginning to take on some importance as referent objects in the political and the economic sectors (free trade, human rights, non-proliferation). Thus, it is possible to formulate a theory that is not dogmatically state-centric in its premises, but that is often somewhat state-centric in its findings.

To set up such an open, analytical framework able to catch security in its increasing variation – across sectors, levels, and diverse units – and to be able to judge when an instance qualifies as security, it is necessary to focus on the characteristic quality of a security issue, i.e., to have criteria by which to avoid the slippery slope of 'everything is security'. A security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, for reasons of security (Wæver 1995c, 1997a; Buzan et al. 1998). With this definition of security, the approach has clearly turned constructivist in the sense that we do not ask whether a certain issue is in and of itself a 'threat', but focus on the questions of when and under what conditions who securitises what issue. The very act of labelling something a security issue – or a threat – transforms this issue and it is therefore in the political process of securitisation that distinct security dynamics originate. Although the

theory specifies 'facilitating conditions' that make securitisation more or less likely (Buzan et al. 1998: 32–3, 46–7), the theory is not causal in a traditional sense, because securitisation is conceptualised as a performative act never exhaustively explained by its conditions. It not only realises already given potentials, but also produces genuine novelty; in what Bourdieu (1991) calls an act of 'social magic', something happens at this exact point and therefore the act can never be reduced to a transmission belt in causal chains (Derrida 1977, 1992; Weber 1995; Butler 1997; Campbell 1998: 25–8; Wæver 2000b).

Traditionally, RSCs were usually generated by bottom-up (or inside-out) processes in which the fears and concerns generated within the region produced the RSC. However, the new definition intentionally opens the possibility of another kind of construction of RSCs that is increasingly relevant especially in the 'new' sectors: regions can be created as patterns within system level processes (Buzan et al. 1998: 198–200). A group of countries that find themselves sharing the local effects of a climate change is a case of collective responses to shared fates arising from outside systemic pressure. However, the RSC is still constituted by the regional actors because they are the ones defining the problem in such terms and interacting to produce a regional formation over the issue. RSCs are ultimately defined by the interaction among their units – the causes behind their action might be bottom-up (and thus internal to the region) or top-down (and thus external/global), but these causes never fully explain the outcome. It is in the nature of politics – and thus security too – that some autonomy is left for the acts of securitisation by actors in the region. The pattern formed by these acts defines the RSC. If it were purely a product of global processes, it would obviously not be a regional level phenomenon.

As implied in this discussion, the new formulation also entails that the network of interconnecting security worries is no longer necessarily symmetrical. What one actor sees as a threat is not necessarily in itself an actor and thus not necessarily the subject of a counter-securitisation. The chain reactions are more complicated because A might securitise B as a threat with the effect that C becomes worried and securitises A as a threat. For instance, if Japan securitises foreign rice as a threat to Japanese national identity, and thereby legitimises protectionist measures in violation of WTO regulations, the United States might securitise this as a threat to the liberal international economic order (and to US economic interests), and the United States thereupon takes measures that, e.g., the EU/France and Russia see as symptoms of unipolar arrogance,

and therefore they securitise... and so forth. The complication is that it is really the relationships (the moves) that tie together, not the particular referent objects (Buzan et al. 1998: 21–47, 163–93; see Rosenau 1984 on relationships of relationships).

To trace RSCs empirically, one needs to look at the pattern of security connectedness in three steps:

- (1) is the issue securitised successfully by any actors?;
- (2) if yes, track the links and interactions from this instance – how does the security action in this case impinge on the security of who/what else, and where does this then echo significantly?, etc.;
- (3) these chains can then be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns.

When this case together with the patterns from all the other cases are aggregated, we can see on what level the processes of securitisation and the patterns of interaction are concentrated.

The main task in this book is to survey the cases that are established as major security issues today – for whatever reason and through whatever measures. A detailed tracing of each process of securitisation is mandatory in a study of a single case, but in large-scale, aggregate analyses like the ones that follow in this book, we cannot report on the process behind each securitisation. Size matters here too. Because we want to produce a global overview, we have had to operate on a high level of generalisation. To do that we need to use broad indicators of securitisation rather than investigating each instance in detail. In most cases we will therefore use visible outcomes such as war, mass expulsions, arms races, large-scale refugee movements, and other emergency measures as indicators of securitisation. If people are killing each other in organised ways, or spending large and/or escalating sums on armaments, or being driven from their homes in large numbers, or resorting to unilateral actions contrary in major ways to international undertakings, then it is virtually certain that successful securitisations have taken place. In practice, the use of such events as indicators is not much different from the analysis generated by a traditional perspective since it operates from the security issues that are on the agenda. This means that the immediate indicators used to establish security issues cannot except in the most crucial or tricky cases be the ideal ones of discourse itself; they will most often be phenomena that register in the media and traditional literature and that are systematically associated with securitisation. Only in the

cases where the securitisation perspective makes an explicit difference to traditional perspectives will its terminology and apparatus be exploited to the full (i.e., cases that are only beginning to become security issues, or being desecuritized, or are contested as to whether they 'really' are security issues).

In practice this use of general indicators for securitisation means the chapters mainly unfold a relatively traditional story at the surface, so to say, of securitisations, without probing into their origins. It differs from traditional, objectivist security studies in taking securitisations rather than objective security problems as the basic dynamic of RSCs, i.e., the problems that are articulated as security problems, not those we project on to the region. However, a full-blown securitisation analysis would have to study more carefully how successfully different issues are securitised, by whom, and who contests this securitisation. Mostly we do not go into the single instances to clarify the nature of specific securitisations, because the nature of the present study as an integrative, synthesising, large-scale work prohibits this. With the maturing of securitisation studies, a synergy is emerging between micro-studies drawing on macro-studies and vice versa, but so far we have only a limited number of case studies to draw on, and these are mostly for Europe and North and South America, and to some extent the Middle East, Southern Africa, and South Asia. However, in each chapter we try to identify the defining or decisive issues on which developments hang – the questions that the large-scale analysis shows to be what the situation hangs on – and for each chapter one case is studied in more detail allowing for a little more of the refinements of securitisation analysis. Our case studies should thus be seen as preliminary sketches offering a template, or a target, for more detailed securitisation analyses.

These 'deep looks' in each chapter will not be identical in form. This is both because the needs are different from chapter to chapter and because we want to explore different forms of analysis. In some cases, the task is mainly to map what is securitized or check if some particular securitisation is powerful or not (in contrast to using indicators). In other instances, we want to explore the depth and solidity of some specific securitisation. When the focus is on a single country, this can be done by looking at the way securitisation draws on national identity and thereby which securitisations are easy or difficult to articulate. In several regions, the focus is naturally on the security debate of the central state: India in South Asia, Russia in the CIS, the USA in North America, and – with

a more specific question – China in East Asia and South Africa in Southern Africa. Especially in centred RSCs, it will very often be the domestic struggle over security in the central state that determines major developments. In the case of the EU, it would be interesting to explore securitisation in relation to national identities in each of the major states, but given the number of states this would be impossible within the limited space available for each 'deep look', and has to some extent been done elsewhere (Holm 1992; Larsen 1997; Malinborg and Stråth 2002; Wæver 1990b; Wæver et al. 1989, 1990). Instead, we explore the emerging security discourse at the European level and how it constructs time and identity. In South America, one of the major open questions is the future of Mercosur, both economically as an integration project and as a pillar of security. Some light can be thrown on both questions by looking at the security arguments in relation to Mercosur: do leading politicians in the two key countries, Brazil and Argentina, securitise (anything) in ways that serve to produce a security argument for Mercosur which in turn will make it more likely that the regional scheme will, in critical situations, eventually be given the priority necessary for it to survive? In the Middle East chapter, the case is terror groups like bin Laden's and the question of whether they are non-regional in taking aim directly at a global level actor, the USA, or whether their struggle is still rooted in the region.

The regions differ between those driven predominantly by military-political security (all of Asia, Middle East, to some extent CIS) and those dominated by other sectors (the Americas, EU-Europe). Africa, as ever the odd man out, hangs in a complicated way between these two positions. To some extent the regions can be organised along an axis from 'traditional' realist regions to 'postmodern' ones, but with some complications such as Africa being pre- and post-traditional as well as in other respects exhibiting hyper-traditional realist dynamics. Latin America is also difficult because in terms of underlying societal development it is not postmodern but its regional security order raises some questions atypical for a traditional region.

Another more serious problem is raised by having an open ontology allowing for post-sovereign, non-state focused situations, but largely telling state-centric stories. In principle, the 'unit' of securitisation and security dynamics can be of any kind, and thus it would seem natural to say that 'internal' is internal vis-à-vis the units of the regional security dynamics whatever they may be, with international correspondingly

translated into inter-unit. This would, however, make a constantly fluctuating analytical scheme out of the four-level model. Instead, we keep the state as the defining unit for locating things in this scheme – one might call it the ‘measure’ – but this should not be taken to prejudice the analysis in favour of states necessarily being the main units (cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 7; Wæver 1997a: 347–72).

Our general assumption is that the post-Cold War security order will exhibit substantially higher levels of regional security autonomy than was the case during the Cold War. With the new agenda of the wider concept of security, one might try to produce sector-specific (homogeneous) complexes and thus generate different maps for each sector. This will show both some variation in the degree of regionalisation (versus localisation and globalisation) but also sometimes only partly converging maps (same ‘Europes’ but different ‘Middle East’ in different sectors). However, a strong case can be made for ‘heterogeneous complexes’ where all security actions are linked across sectors (Buzan et al. 1998: 16–17, 166–70). The key is the synthesising done by actors. The actors, not only the analysts, have to make up their mind about how the different kinds of security concerns add up. Importantly, because of the prioritising nature of securitisation, the different cases cannot be disconnected: a securitisation of an economic threat will tend either to push down a competing military threat construction or to link to it and draw energy from the same threat appearing in several sectors. The integrated approach has two important advantages. First, it captures all those loops, security dilemmas, and spillovers that occur across sectors – Latvia being concerned about both demography and the Russian military and, on the basis of this securitisation, taking steps that Russian minorities construct as threats to economic, political, and societal security. Second, it often explains why an issue is treated not only as an environmental problem but as an environmental security problem. This often happens when the actor deemed responsible is one that is already seen as a security problem in another sector.

This clarifies one important issue. This book does not try to map the formation and development of regions in general. This could be the impression given by the inclusion of the new sectors: economy, environment, identity. It should be remembered: we are interested in economic security, not economy *per se*, environmental security, not everything that happens in the environmental sector. Otherwise, we would be suggesting an integrated theory of everything. Instead, this is a reading of the world political development through the perspective of security.

Place in the literature

Before we move to the case studies, it may be helpful to some readers to set the nature and explanatory structure of this book into the context of the existing literature on regions.

Towards the end of the 1960s, a literature emerged on regional subsystems (Russett 1967; Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 1973; Kaiser 1968–9; Haas 1970). Although it did not usually define the regions as ‘security regions’ (it was partly stimulated by the literature on regional integration), it often operated within the traditional quasi-realist image of the state system and thus produced theories of regional subsystems that were clearly security-relevant and in some ways precursors for the concept of RSCs. However, this attempt to theorise international regions has generally been seen as a failure and has often served to keep others from attempting any theory of regional subsystems (Thompson 1973). One reason for this was the complexity of the models, which began to make theory look more Byzantine than reality. Another was the comparative success of global level neorealist and neoliberal theories that arose during the 1970s, eclipsing the regional approach (Lake and Morgan 1997b: 6) and seeming to give a more accurate portrait of the Cold War. A third, subtler explanation arises from the behavioural scientific fashions of the day, which also affected small-state theory, comparative foreign policy, and to some extent foreign policy analysis at large. The attempt at theorising regional subsystems in a behaviouralist mode meant that a lot of effort was put into producing precise, operational definitions and finding generally valid correlations about the subject. Therefore, when, for example, small states could not be defined with sufficient clarity and when few generalisations were valid for all small states, the theory was said to have failed. In the case of foreign policy analysis and regional subsystems, the problem was rather that the approach developed into an ever-expanding net of relevant factors that increasingly put a question mark on the functionality and relevance of the theory. In all these cases, the problem was to a large extent the expectations. Much good work was done, important questions were raised and sometimes answered, and mechanisms were even uncovered but, due to the prevailing view of ‘science’, this was deemed unsuccessful and helped to keep others away from these areas. Post-Cold War, however, a new wave of books has emerged that study regionalism and regional security orders (Daase et al. 1993; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Holm and Sørensen 1995; Lake and Morgan 1997c; Adler and Barnett 1998; Schulz et al. 2001).

Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) and Schulz et al. (2001) really have regionalism as their dependent variable: are regions becoming more or less 'regionalised' (coherent and separate, maybe integrated)? In both volumes, but most explicitly Schulz et al., something close to RSCs enter the picture because the degree of regionalisation is explained by two kinds of factors: security and economics. Schulz et al. have tried to structure this by using RSC analysis as theory on the security side and globalisation for economics. Schulz et al. in particular have turned this into a teleological project in which regionalisation is an aim in itself, though the social consequences of globalisation and the maximisation of security are also part of the normative agenda of the book. Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) is more of a general overview of the problematique of regionalism with perceptive theory overviews and rather basic, solid, but not very theory-informed case studies. Daase et al. (1993) is a loose collection of theoretical and empirical articles on regional security with a number of case chapters on most of the regions of the world. It is not organised by a particular theory. By contrast Adler and Barnett (1998) and to some extent Holm and Sørensen (1995) are explicitly theory-based. Adler and Barnett is more coherently organised by a single theory than perhaps any other book, but the theory is that of security communities, which is highly relevant for some regions but hardly at all for others (see Kacowicz et al. 2000 on 'stable peace'). Holm and Sørensen is not particularly about security but uses the lens of globalisation and in particular uneven globalisation to survey regional variation.

More recently, a number of single-authored studies have come forward proposing distinct theories about regional security but applying the theory only to one or a few case studies (Mares 2001; Kacowicz 1998; Solingen 1998; Lemke 2002).

Lake and Morgan is in many ways the book that comes closest to ours: it takes RSCT (as developed by Buzan) as its starting point and tries to study specifically security-defined regions. The book argues nicely why regional security is likely to become more salient after the end of the Cold War (Lake and Morgan 1997b: 6ff.). It spells out that only a comparative approach does justice to regions. On the one hand there is a strong IR perspective according to which international relations are always and everywhere the same, which if true means that regions are not very important. On the other hand, many area studies specialists claim that their case is unique, and thus that a general theory of regions is impossible. Only with a comparative approach is it possible to say both that regions differ, and that it is possible to generalise about them (Lake

and Morgan 1997b: 8ff.). Finally, theorising regions is made necessary by the argument that regions are not just micro-versions of the global system in which case the same theory could be used (ignoring the fact that it would have a dynamic of regional-global added even if each level followed classical neoliberal systemic logic). Lake and Morgan (1997b: 9) argue that global and regional systems differ because the former are closed systems and the latter inherently open. These and many other points are shared between Lake and Morgan and the present volume.

But there are some differences. The first is that we (and also Schulz et al. 2001) attempt a full global picture of all the regions that exist. This holism is necessary both in order to see how well (or badly) our theory works, and to get the full benefit of the comparative approach. Selecting cases that fit too easily allows the ones that might embarrass the theory to be sidelined, especially if there are no explicit criteria for their selection.

The second difference between this book and Lake and Morgan's concerns what the whole effort is intended to explain. Their ultimate research question is the emergence and variation of regional security orders – i.e., who solves security problems how? This links nicely to traditional, policy-orientated security literature with its focus on different security orders or systems or models. Their analytical set-up is then (in principle) that the structure of RSCs is to explain the regional order comes in terms of conflict management and the shape of the regional security orders. But their concept of the structure of the RSC includes many different causal variables beyond security and thus recreates the problem that marred the old subsystem literature: too many causal connections and a lack of focus. They know how to solve this in principle by a model of three-level games, but they acknowledge that in practice such theory has not been sufficiently developed and thus this part is indeterminate (Lake and Morgan 1997b: 14). Our set-up, in contrast, stays more narrowly with security and security-defined activities, and uses RSCT as a general instrument for telling a structured version of world history, past, present, and future. The possible forms that regions can take are derived from the concept of the RSC, not from the existing debate, and the various domestic and global causal factors are those that are directly part of security, such as domestic vulnerabilities, not domestic politics and society in all its complexity. The concept of the RSC plays a stronger role in our construction, and is allowed to define the possible orders on the outcome side and to select the relevant parameters on the input side. This approach forfeits the possibility of loose, ad hoc inclusion of additional variables in order to push as far as possible with

one integrated theoretical scheme, thereby showing both its virtues and limitations.

The third difference involves the fundamental understanding of what an RSC is. Since both our book and Lake and Morgan's start from this concept, this difference matters a lot to how the respective analyses unfold. This is a basic methodological question that must affect any attempt to construct regional theory, and so it is worth examining in some detail. The essential difference is that we see the whole regionalist approach as hanging on the necessity of keeping and the ability to keep analytically separate the global and regional levels, whereas Lake and Morgan are happy to conflate the two levels into one. Their key move (Lake and Morgan 1997b: 12; Morgan 1997: 29–30; Lake 1997: 50–1; Lake and Morgan 1997a: 349) is to dissolve levels of analysis with the argument that 'geographical proximity is not a necessary condition for a state to be a member of a complex', and that great powers particularly should be counted as members of even remote regions into which they project force in a sustained way. In our view, this not only destroys the meaning of levels, but also voids the concept of region, which if it does not mean geographical proximity does not mean anything. They say that, if, for example, the USA is a consistent participant in European security, it is as much a member of the European security complex as Italy. Likewise, in East Asia, they see the main regional powers as China, Japan, Russia, and the USA. We, in contrast, insist that regions are defined exclusively, and that external powers are treated in terms of penetration or overlay, not as members of the RSC as such. In our scheme, China and Japan are members of the East Asian complex, but Russia and the USA are not. In the light of Lake and Morgan's move, we are puzzled by the accusation (Lake 1997: 48) that 'Buzan's conception... fails to distinguish adequately how regional interactions differ from global interactions', when by conflating the two levels in this way they make such a differentiation almost impossible. Our approach in this book, as should already be clear from these first three chapters, is to improve our ability to draw this distinction.

At first, readers may side with Lake and Morgan. Our position of forcing a distinction between countries of the region and outsiders even though they are equally consistent participants in the security dynamics of the region, as the United States is in NATO and the OSCE, may seem excessively territorial. In conducting any particular regional security analysis it seems useful to be able to include the relevant powers in each regional case irrespective of the question of whether these states

are located in the region, or appear in another RSC or at the global level. However, in practice, their seemingly more pragmatic approach has some serious analytical problems. Ultimately, this is not a question of what concept produces the easiest snapshot, but which concept produces the best theory. With the Lake and Morgan definition, one ultimately generates an RSC for each security problem. This is actually also what is said in their theory chapter which sets out a definition of RSCs defined in terms of 'security externalities': 'I define such a complex as the states affected by at least one transborder but local security externality' (Lake 1997: 46). 'If the local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states, it produces a regional security system or complex' (Lake 1997: 48–9). Many readers probably find this quite economic formulation a bit extreme, and will take the different elements of the Lake and Morgan approach as separate, e.g., accepting the revision of RSCT on delineation but not the definition in terms of externalities. However, the two are closely connected logically, because the security externality definition fills the hole left by the removal of the geographical criteria.

This approach must lead to an unmanageable multiplication of issues (and thereby security complexes), which can be contained only by taking a narrow (military) definition of security. It would be a tall order to structure a security complex and a full analysis around each single issue and, in practice, this is done by none of the empirical chapters of their book. Furthermore, by including external great powers as members of an RSC, the Lake and Morgan approach throws away all of the analytical leverage generated by levels of analysis. If remote great powers are 'in' the regions, how can one differentiate between global and regional level security dynamics in order to investigate their interplay? Although the United States may be 'in' Europe and East Asia and the Middle East in a seemingly durable way, it makes a big difference that it always has the option to withdraw from (or be thrown out of) these regions. China and Japan are in East Asia whether they want to be or not. The USA has a choice, and this choice underpins a whole range of policy options not possessed by actors that are really 'in' their regions. A major point of RSCT is to separate the global and regional security dynamics in order to see what each looks like separately, and then to see how they interact with each other. By collapsing this distinction, Lake and Morgan risk repeating the analytical and policy errors of the Cold War in which superpower dynamics were given far too much weight, and regional

ones far too little, in evaluating events in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

In terms of prediction and policy advice, the 'exclusive' approach has some advantages because it contains a picture of what the RSCs of the world, their borders, and their insulators are. Thereby, it can for instance judge which cooperative schemes are more or less likely to work depending on how they fit the structure.

As explained above, our operationalisation of RSCT is founded on a disciplined separation not only of the global level from the regional one, but also of each RSC from all the others. The reason for doing this is to cast maximum light on the distinctiveness of security dynamics at each level and within each RSC, so that the interplay between levels and among regions can itself be investigated as a distinct subject. If this approach generates anomalies or difficulties, then those are what should be explained and what the theory has served to alert us to.

Conclusions

Throughout these three chapters we have referred to regional security complex *theory* as a theory, and this claim needs to be explained. Indeed, for the study of regions, RSCT might be the only existing theory of regional security. Some typologies, matrixes, and checklists exist, but hardly anything that qualifies as theory. In the field of security/strategic studies, theories exist for specific problems: deterrence, alliances, not of (regional) security as such. Finally, theories have been developed for security orders – security community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998), zones of peace/stable peace (Kacowicz 1998; Kacowicz et al. 2000), collective security (Claude 1984; Morgenthau 1978: 417–29; Finlayson and Zacher 1983), security regimes (Jervis 1982; Inbar 1995), and concert (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991) – but these are, in the nature of things, valid only for some situations. The only candidates for theories of regional security are those that deny the issue any specificity and therefore unproblematically integrate it into general theories such as neorealism.

The nature of (this) theory

The answer to the question of whether or not something qualifies as theory often depends on where it is asked. Many Europeans use the term theory for anything that organises a field systematically, structures questions, and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories. Americans, however, often demand that a theory strictly *explains* and that it contains – or is able to generate – testable hypotheses of a causal nature. RSCT clearly qualifies on the first (European) account. In American terms, it probably does too:

1. It predicts when RSCs are expected to emerge and when not (basically whenever anarchy and diverse geography are combined *unless* low interaction capacity or overlay offsets this).
2. Specific hypotheses are attached to the different situations: e.g., conflict formations draw in outside powers along the lines of the initial conflict.
3. The theory enables construction of a restricted set of scenarios and thus narrows down the zone of predictions. Much of the explanatory power stems from neorealism and other existing IR theories but, since the regional component is missing from the existing general theories, the addition of this component generates a number of new insights and explanations. This should reasonably be seen as a distinct theory.

Some readers might still be puzzled that we do not put forward more ambitious general explanations about why security takes a particular form in this region or that, or what causes major changes like the end of the Cold War or the rise and demise of particular regional conflicts. However, this would be against the basic aspiration of allowing for a more regional understanding of the world. The agenda of allowing for regional diversity speaks for a more minimalist conception of theory. The overall plot of the book is that it is not possible to tell one, coherent, neat, and homogeneous story about the world – regional variation goes deeper than filling out different boxes in one overarching global scheme. Regions develop in different directions and this makes increasingly difficult the task of understanding each on its own terms while keeping up a language allowing for comparison. Typically, the IR theorist will generalise in ways not accepted by the area specialist, while area specialists claim that the uniqueness of 'their' region prevents the application of any general theory. Both have a point, and therefore we want to create a framework that is sufficiently open and abstract that it allows for far-reaching differentiation to develop among regions, while maintaining a general set of categories with which to describe this. A 'strong' theory would be improper because it would impose identical concepts and mechanisms on regions, and override the important fact that security means something different in East Asia, in Central Africa, and in Western Europe.

Almost all other conceptions of world order after the end of the Cold War are too top-down in either (or both) of two main ways: in most IR

theory the system level is allocated far too much power, thus continuing the Cold War error of seeing regional systems as mainly shaped by and relating to the global level. Most sociological theories (such as much globalisation theory) universalise key categories and apply them homogeneously across the world and thus assume an excessive sameness (even if fitted into, e.g., two contrasting types). Even two-world theory is top-down in the sense that its categories (core and periphery) are generated at the global level and the regions then fitted into them. Our approach, in contrast, is bottom-up in attempting – in a way that comes closer to the aspiration of area specialists – to capture the particularities of regions and then assemble the global picture from these components. To do this in a systematic way we need some categories and dimensions on which to sort regions, and this probably at times creates the impression of an excessively taxonomical enterprise: regions are fitted into typologies and described as to their location on various axes. This, however, is the natural procedure of such a minimalist theory that does not want to have large, central machinery operating that from the start keeps regions in their proper place and animates them to play their part in a global game.

Despite its minimalism, the effort is a theoretical one. The regions of the world cannot be compared without formulating theoretical concepts. These concepts generate observable connections and mechanisms that could not be specified without the theoretical frame being in place. The concept of RSC itself has a number of structuring effects:

It separates regional and global in a systematic way and thereby allows this relationship to be studied. More generally, the theory puts forward levels as a structuring device.

It separates one RSC from the next and this makes it possible both to understand the nature of each and to register the main cases where the division is difficult: i.e., crucial insulators, sub- and supercomplexes, and dense interregional dynamics that might signal possible transformation.

Through the notions of what constitute the internal structure of an RSC, the theory proposes benchmarks for the study of change. Thus, the theory is by no means static, even though the focus on typologies and structure can create this impression. However, a picture of general flux is actually less able to designate important changes than a more structural analysis that points out the underlying continuity of some seeming change while thereby focusing attention on the cases of real structural change.

The concept of RSC is the basis for the general typology of the forms a region can take and thus enables the predictive element of what change is more or less likely given various scope conditions.

In addition, the concept of securitisation is a main theoretical tool for mapping regional variation. An objectivist theory of security uses its own view of things and thus fits regional events more easily into its general theory of what drives the behaviour of actors. A securitisation-based theory will accept that the security agenda is about different things in different regions: the actors differ, as does the relative importance of different sectors. It avoids prejudices about how people 'should' react.

As explained above, the whole apparatus of securitisation studies plays two different roles in the present study – roles that would come together more seamlessly in a full multi-volume, encyclopaedic version of this enterprise. Here these roles stand at either end of the theory. At one end, securitisation has a meta-theoretical function in insisting that one can never infer mechanically from objective factors to ensuing security dynamics because 'security' is a political battlefield on which is fought out what counts as security issues and thereby what is acted on in a security mode. Thus, securitisation protects us from objective security including its blindness to regional variation. The second function of securitisation is to be mobilised on key issues. In most regions, one or a few questions are drawn out to be exposed to the direct light of securitisation analysis. Turning points are studied, and actors, politics, and decisions enter the stage where they have otherwise been less visible due to the grand scope of the analysis. In relation to the past, the present, and (not least) the future, we analyse a few such constellations of crucial political decisions and thus enable an understanding that goes against materialist generalisation.

Causal mechanisms can generally enter the theory in two ways. One is in terms of 'facilitating conditions' (Buzan et al. 1998: 31–3). Certain conditions make certain types of securitisation more likely. For example, the ability of a securitising actor to securitise the neighbouring country in military terms depends on the length and ferocity of historical enmity, the balance of material capabilities, and various signs of hostility (rhetorical as well as behavioural). Also, the vulnerability of the referent object shapes the likelihood of different forms of securitisation. The material world often matters. This is a crucial part of the theory because, if this were not the case, there would be no room for the basic assumption

that adjacency matters, and there would be no RSCs. Securitisation is not arbitrary – it is influenced by various facilitating conditions and it is mostly here that geography enters. However, if causes were introduced only as facilitating conditions, we would both create meta-theoretical problems and miss out on a lot of mechanisms. The result would be not a thoroughly constructivist theory but a materialist theory with added noise: securitisation would only be a marginal space allowing for some deviation from an underlying pattern that could be predicted solely and ideally from material factors alone. This would be deeply unsatisfactory as well as incomplete. The dynamics of securitisation as such explain a lot as well. Patterns emerge from the fact that different actors securitise differently; different political and cultural situations enable securitisation in different sectors and they have different dynamics (e.g., the peculiarities of societal security caused by the inherent paradoxes of securing identity). Thus, generalisations of causal patterns should equally be thought of as existing at the level of securitisation as such, not only in terms of facilitating conditions.

In both cases, we prefer not to put forward an elaborate scheme of causal mechanisms, but take the minimalist route of setting up our framework and theoretically generated conceptual apparatus, applying it to all the RSCs of the world, and then drawing together an aggregate picture. There are thus two key theoretical investments that structure the book, and up to a point our project stands or falls with them. If they fail, the value of the theory is diminished. The first is our choice of mutually exclusive regions, the logic and consequences of which were outlined in the discussion above contrasting our scheme with Lake and Morgan's. The second is the importance of the regional level as such and more generally of levels. This is far from uncontroversial, but we put it forward and construct the book around this format. The regional is not necessarily the most important level, but we suggest that it is consistently significant. We focus much attention on studying the counter-case: the role of the global level, of the transregional and of non-territorial subsystems, but we assume originally that this is not strong enough to invalidate a regional set-up. If the regional level fades or levels generally fuse, our chosen set-up will ultimately be less helpful. If we are wrong about the ongoing salience of territoriality for security, then RSCCT will become less relevant for the future. It would still be necessary for analysing history up to the late twentieth century, but thereafter would serve mainly to provide benchmarks against which to track the emergence of a deterritorialised structure of global security politics.

The structure of the book

Since the main purpose of this book is to explore the question of levels in the post-Cold War global security order, its design comes out of the regionalist perspective. The chapters that follow are structured to start at the regional level and work up to the interregional and global levels and down to the domestic one. But the theory underlying it does not predetermine which level is dominant, leaving that as an empirical question to be investigated. The next ten chapters are divided into four groups: Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The sequencing of these takes us from the modernist, largely military-political, security agendas still dominant in Asia, the Middle East, and (in a different, more premodern sense) Africa to the increasingly post-modern, and often non-military, security agendas in the Americas and Europe. This can also be seen as generally moving from the periphery to the core, though the fit is not perfect. The regionalist perspective, for example, puts Japan in Asia despite its individual standing as a post-modern core state. These ten chapters take a narrative approach. Each of them will look at the formative process, operation, transformation (if any), current condition, and prospects of the RSCs within the part of the world under discussion. The main emphasis in each case will be on the period since 1990. The RSCs will be investigated in terms of the following points:

1. the historical legacy of the units in the RSC and the way this conditions the principal security actors and the agenda that they generate;
2. the principal security actors, issues, and referent objects defining the RSC, and the nature of the processes that created and sustain it as a process formation;
3. the essential structure (anarchy or integration, power distribution, and patterns of amity-enmity, securitisation-desecuritisation);
4. the interregional dynamics between the RSC and its neighbours;
5. the global dynamics between the RSC and forces and actors from the global level;
6. the relative weights of the domestic, regional, interregional, and global levels, and of securitising versus desecuritising trends;
7. the most likely scenario(s) for the future given the current condition and dynamics of the RSC.

The final two chapters will sum up in two different ways. Chapter 14 will draw together the empirical story, and speculate about the future of international security given the structures, potentialities, and dynamics of the international system at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It focuses particularly on the interplay between regions and powers and on isolating the most important points of potential change in the current global order. Chapter 15 spells out the comparative results from the regional studies and reflects on the problems of conceptualising international security and re-examines our most important starting assumptions: the continued explanatory power of territoriality and regionality.

Re-imagining Cyprus: the rise of regionalism in Turkey's security lexicon

Alper Kaliber

Introduction

The rise of regional-level politics has been envisioned as one of the main constituents of the post-Cold War security order in international politics. The collapse of the Cold War security architecture rendered the region the main locus of 'cooperation and conflict for states' and as the most appropriate level of analysis for scholars 'seeking to explore contemporary security affairs' (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6). In this analysis, states, freed from the exigencies of global bipolar rivalry, have found new incentives and instruments to focus on regional conflicts and cooperation (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 3; Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6). The relative unwillingness of the great powers to intervene in local patterns of conflict and cooperation (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 5), the rise of such soft security threats as migration, human and drug trafficking and environmental degradation, the increasing intermingling of economic and security calculations (e.g. the rise of energy and pipeline politics) can all be identified as factors triggering the regionalisation of security dynamics. Therefore, regions have turned out to be the level at which patterns of amity and enmity among nations concentrate and national and global security dynamics interplay (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 9).¹

Buzan and Wæver (2003: 27) emphasise the importance of making clear distinctions between what constitutes the regional level and what constitutes the unit and global levels, which they believe is the analytical strength of their theory. To them, 'region' represents a distinct middle level between the other two, 'with an analytical and ontological standing' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 27), yet devoid of any actor quality. For the regionalist approaches,

the global- and national-level security dynamics have decreased in salience *vis-à-vis* the regional one, since regional security dynamics have become increasingly autonomous (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6–7; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: ch. 3). In such a regionalising world, national security conceptions of states are necessarily and 'inherently relational' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 43), so much so that it is theoretically and empirically meaningless to isolate one such conception from another. The emphasis on the regionality of security dynamics and regional aspects of national security is increasingly echoed in the discourse of policy-makers as well.

This chapter makes the case that Turkey's security language on Cyprus, which has been subject to gradual change in the last decade, does not constitute an exception to this. It argues that, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, Turkey's security language on the issue has gained a more regionalist tone than was the case in previous decades. Throughout its long history, the Cyprus question has had Janus-faced implications in Turkey's strategic calculations and threat perceptions. The geographical proximity of the island to Anatolia has facilitated the articulation of the issue either as a source of an imminent, persistent threat to the Turkish nation and state, or as an integral part of Turkey's national defence and security (Kaliber, 2005). In either case, the island of Cyprus has been imagined as an invaluable geostrategic asset, bound to be used by a hostile power to strike the Anatolian heartland, or one that can be used by Turkey against that aggressive state. It has simultaneously been the cornerstone in the encirclement of Turkey by Greece in particular and its only access to the eastern Mediterranean from the south. This security language has often confined the Cyprus dispute to the realm of bilateral Greek–Turkish relations and has implied that the real threat has been not the Greek Cypriots but Greece itself.

However, within the last decade, thanks to a constellation of internal and external factors, addressed below, this official state line has been subject to change in Turkey. Even if Greece does not completely disappear as a source of insecurity, a new rhetoric has gained prominence, placing Turkey's threat perceptions and strategic calculations on Cyprus in a more complex and regionalist context. The Turkish foreign and security policy (FSP) establishment, other political elites, academics and mushrooming think-tanks in recent years have all begun to talk of the eastern Mediterranean more frequently than ever before. The eastern Mediterranean has been re-invented as a regional – or in some cases sub-regional – context where Turkey's security calculations and interests on Cyprus should be situated. In the new rhetoric, the eastern Mediterranean has signified not only the diversification and multiplication of threats, but also emerging opportunities for economic development and the prospect of becoming an activist, regional power for Turkey.

This chapter mainly aims to trace the regionalist shift in Turkey's security outlook on Cyprus through the analysis of discourses within the Turkish FSP elite. It does not address whether the post-bipolar international order has induced the rise of new regional security complexes or whether the eastern Mediterranean is located at the centre of a new security complex. Rather, it reveals how and through which themes Turkey's security concerns and interests on Cyprus have been reformulated and articulated by the FSP elite within the last decade. The chapter is inspired by the notion that regions are not only geographical but also political, economic and even 'intellectual' constructions (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 575). Various scholars have aptly drawn our attention to the power politics (Katzenstein, 2005) as well as the economic, cultural and interpretative/cognitive processes (Väyrynen, 2003: 37) behind region formation. Yet the chapter restricts its analysis on the new regionalist turn in international relations (IR) with the regional security complex theory (RSCT) introduced and developed by Buzan and Wæver (2003; see also Buzan et al., 1998). A comprehensive treatment of regionalist approaches to international security is beyond the scope and aim of this study.

In line with its objectives, this chapter first discusses the explanatory power of Buzan and Wæver's RSCT in tandem with their securitisation approach in understanding Turkey's security discourse on Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean. In this sense, the chapter suggests that the securitisation theory introduced by the Copenhagen School provides an extensively useful research agenda to explore the themes of Turkey's security lexicon on Cyprus and its construction as an unfinished security project of the Turkish state (Kaliber, 2003: 179–216). The securitisation approach also reveals the implications of excessive securitisation and bureaucratisation of Cyprus policy in the internal power struggles between the reformist wing of the political elite and the statist bureaucratic apparatus in Turkey (Kaliber, 2005). However, Buzan and Wæver's later work on RSCT falls short of explaining the ascent of regionality in Turkey's approach to Cyprus accentuating the eastern Mediterranean as the source of new insecurities and geo-economic calculations. RSCT, based largely on the conception of geographically fixed regions, does not question how regions are defined, by whom and for which purposes. Therefore, it is analytically ill equipped to understand the power politics behind the regionalist/secuitising discourses of the domestic political elite. Furthermore, Buzan and Wæver's claim that Turkey is an 'insulator state' (2003: 392), also shared by Kazan (2002, 2005), provides too parsimonious an account of Turkey's regionalising security perceptions and interests.

The subsequent section delineates the basic tenets framing Turkey's strategic outlook on Cyprus from the middle of the 1950s up to the present time. The chapter then moves on to address the domestic and international context

emerging in the 1990s, which accelerated the regionalist tendencies in Turkey's FSP. In this section, the emphasis is on how the post-bipolar international order is understood by the FSP elite in Turkey. It analyses how Turkey's changing conception of the eastern Mediterranean and surrounding regions has had an impact upon its threat perceptions and geostrategic calculations.

The region as an object of security

Even though the literature on regional security is relatively new for the discipline of IR, the attempts to explain world politics from a regionalist perspective can be traced back to the late 1960s.² The first wave of regionalism in IR was triggered by the processes of decolonisation, accelerating integration with the European Community (EC) and the relatively liberal atmosphere of détente in bipolar global rivalry. Yet instead of developing innovative analytical tools, the first wave of regionalist literature contented itself with downscaling 'extant IR theory to regions' (Kelly, 2007: 202).³ This analysis also holds true for the second wave of regionalist IR scholarship and in particular for its positivist wing inspired by neo-liberal and neo-realist accounts of international politics.⁴ The second wave proved more successful in developing a regionalist approach to international security, as it was able to integrate the issues of identity (the sense of belonging to a region), power politics (regions as political creations), multidimensionality and functionality (economic interests and interactions) and transnational activism into the debates on regionalism and the regionalisation of security.⁵

In this section, my aim is not to cover the whole scholarship on regional security and regionalism in IR.⁶ The task is rather to critically discuss the analytical power of Buzan and Wæver's RSCT and the securitisation approach to explore Turkey's regionalising security discourse on Cyprus and its domestic implications. As a constructivist analytical tool, securitisation was incorporated into the definition of the regional security complex (RSC) by Buzan and Wæver in their 2003 book entitled *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. An updated definition of RSC was provided by Buzan and Wæver (2003: 44) as 'a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another'.

Regional security complex theory departs from the assumption that within a process beginning with decolonisation, and accelerating with the demise of the Cold War, security relations among units (states) are increasingly patterned into 'regionally-based clusters' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 4). The principle of territoriality, assuming a direct correlation between geographical proximity

and intensity of security interdependence, still operates in shaping security dynamics in the post-bipolar international order (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 4, 29–30, 45–6). It follows that the whole world is divided into 'mutually exclusive' regional security complexes, insulator states and global powers (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 48). The peculiar structure of each RSC is configured by: the interplay of anarchic international order and its regional balance of power; peculiarities of local geopolitics; durable patterns of enmity and enmity among the units constituting the RSC; and the distribution of material power among the members of the RSC (polarity) (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 45, 53; see also Morgan, 1997: 26). RSCs as the sub-structures of international order have internal structures of their own and external boundaries that allow analysts to distinguish them from other regions, insulator states and global powers.

Even though Buzan and Wæver accept that regions are 'socially constructed' and contingent upon the 'security practices of the actors', they take actors as pre-given and do not problematise their actorness. Not only are regions 'socially constructed' as they suggest, but also regionalism reproduces the actorness of the actors and contributes to the reproduction of their social capital in domestic society. Buzan and Wæver claim that they combine the constructivist and materialist elements of IR theory; however, their constructivism is restricted to analyses of the securitising practices of the given actors with already defined interests in a given region. In contrast, I argue that regions are not pre-established, fixed and objective geographical spaces structuring (constraining and enabling) the actions of the regional political actors. As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 575) suggest, 'regions are political creations and not fixed by geography'.

The process of region-building is a perpetual one and inherent in domestic power relations.

By understanding discursive practices on regions we can then understand how such practices construct specific subject identities and thereby construct a particular 'reality' in which policy becomes possible as well as through which future policies would be justified in advance. (Pace, 2006b: 37)

As in the case of Turkey's changing language on Cyprus (see below), discourses on region-building/regionalism (re-invention of the eastern Mediterranean) can be part of the elite's securitising discourses through which the geopolitics of the country is remoulded, with new security connotations. Thereby, the discursive practices of region-building by the ruling elite can be viewed 'as part of a wider process of political control – a sort of political engineering by means of which a politically, economically or socially desirable area is constituted' (Pace, 2006b: 37–8). Buzan and Wæver downplay the significance of the domestic elite's regionalist discourses in the social reproduction of regions, for these

discourses are regarded merely as part of the intra-elite political struggle. By saying that 'we study security discourses and security practices of actors, not primarily their regionalist discourses and practices' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 48), they imply that there may be a clear distinction between the two. However, the ways in which regions are defined, categorised and labelled by the ruling elite are constitutive of political imagination, where the security practices of the state are legitimate, meaningful and necessary. Thus, the limited constructivism and partial objectivism of RSCCT do not help us to understand the power politics behind the social reproduction of regions by the activities of actors. To understand the power politics behind the invention of regions by the security and state elite, we should ask such questions as the following: Who defines regions and for what purposes? In what ways is the definition of regions instrumentalised in the securitising practices of the states/political elites? What is the role of the emphasis on regionality in state discourses in the demarcation of state/political identities? Does the invention of new regions as a source of insecurities serve to establish new self/other constructions?

Another shortcoming of RSCCT is that it departs from the notion of regions as territorially fixed, exclusive, non-overlapping entities. Regions are assumed to be partly homogenous structures constituted by coherent patterns of security unique to them. In Buzan and Wæver's objectivist approach, RSCs are already established entities that can objectively be observed by analysts under a certain set of criteria. Although they accept that regions may change, depending on patterns of anarchy/enmity, in their theory the possibility of change is small. Unlike Lake and Morgan, they do not accept that there can be overlapping memberships and that a country outside an RSC can also be a member of it. Even if Buzan and Wæver concede that outside states, especially the global powers, can affect regions, in the end, regional security dynamics are constituted by the members of the RSC themselves. 'However, regional systems are inherently open. The global system, other regional systems, and even "outside" states can have a major impact on a region' (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 9–10). In the case of Cyprus, for instance, through different historical phases of the dispute, Britain, the United States and the European Union (EU) have been the outside powers deeply penetrating and in some cases reshaping regional security dynamics among the disputants. Furthermore, the right of the three guarantor powers of the Republic of Cyprus (Turkey, Greece and Britain) to take action jointly or unilaterally (under article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee) always makes it possible that there is a dominating 'overlay' of the security balances between these powers in the eastern Mediterranean.

Last but not least, RSCCT's claim that Turkey is an 'insulator state' should be approached cautiously. RSCCT suggests that in between the RSCs, where (in)security relations intensify, lie either 'zones of weak interaction' or an

insulator, such as Turkey, Burma or Afghanistan (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 41). Insulator states are exposed to security dynamics imposed by those RSCs they are surrounded by (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 41; see also Kazan, 2005: 589–90). They have (in)security relations with all neighbouring RSCs, yet not as intense as would be the case were they to be a member of any of them. Neither are insulators strong enough to merge these RSCs into one. Buzan and Wæver admit that Turkey has the potential to challenge the passive role – 'absorbing energies from the separate complexes' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 394) – assigned to the insulator in their theory. Yet even if Turkey pursues a more proactive policy 'than that traditionally adopted by insulators', to them it will not cease to be an insulator in the foreseeable future (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 395; see also Kazan, 2005: 589–90). They also imply that any change in Turkey's insulator position does not primarily depend on its activism or its foreign policy dynamics, but on the strategic acts of surrounding RSC members.

I suggest, however, that, as an analytical tool, the term 'insulator' is not well equipped to examine Turkey's intense security interactions with its regional neighbours.⁷ It is liable to simplistic and ahistoric generalisations, since it implies rigidity and stasis rather than dynamism and perpetual change. To illustrate, Greece, accepted as a member of the European RSC, and Turkey still enjoy much more complex security interactions than Buzan and Wæver's theory would imply for an insulator and an RSC member state. It can even be suggested that, in the post-1999 era, starting with the recognition of Turkey's EU candidacy, Turkish–Greek relations have been vested with a new and complex set of security connotations. In 1999, Greece drastically changed its policy of blocking Turkey's way to Europe and became a vigorous protagonist of its membership of the EU. This was a natural consequence of the new Greek policy of projecting its vital foreign policy concerns (Turkey and Cyprus) onto the 'European foreign policy-making agenda' (Economides, 2005: 488). The rationale was that the more Turkey approached the EU, the more receptive it would become to Greek security concerns, which are now formulated as European demands. Strengthening of Turkey's EU membership prospects would also produce a *rapprochement* in Turkish–Greek relations, which had been monopolised by a 'cycle of conflict–negotiation–conflict' (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2003: 99). However, the initial impetus in bilateral relations triggered by the earthquake diplomacy⁸ and Greece's support for Turkey's EU membership in 1999 gradually dissolved and did not bear any fruit, in particular in security- and sovereignty-related issues, such as the Aegean and Cyprus disputes. Rather, the impact of Europeanisation remained limited to the softening of security tones in their discourses *vis-à-vis* each other, careful management of tensions and sophistication of monolithic perceptions (Keidris, 2001: 14). As Ifantis and Aydın (2004: 1) suggest, what still exists 'is a very disturbing potential for

escalation which can lead to a more serious crisis with alarming destabilising effects at a regional level'. The linking of Turkish-Greek (in)security relations to Turkey's EU membership complicated the patterns of interactions between the FSPs of these two countries. Taking into account all these, the term 'insulator' state is by no means helpful to understand Turkey's dynamically changing and intensifying security interactions with its regional neighbours.

In their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) presented an innovative and comprehensive research agenda to reveal the nature of securitisation as an inter-subjective and political act.⁹ Among the central questions of this new research agenda are 'when, why and how elites label issues and developments as "security" problems; when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are made by other groups to put securitisation on the agenda?' (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). As these questions illustrate, securitisation theory takes for granted the fact that there cannot exist objective threats but 'only attempts to saddle issues with security implications' (Eriksson, 1999: 315). Through the articulation of danger and existential threat to sovereignty, the securitiser demands justification from the audience (for which read 'society') for its initiatives beyond the normal bounds of political procedure. Thereby, every attempt to securitise an issue is an explicit, political intervention with seminal consequences for which actors can be held responsible' (Buzan et al., 1998: 12).

However, the success of any securitising move is contingent upon the existence of an audience that accepts and tolerates the act by the securitising agent, which is all too often the government and/or bureaucratic establishment (Wæver, 2000: 251). Approval of the securitising act is not necessarily gained through negotiation and free discussion between the securitiser and the audience/society. To obtain the approval of society, the elite may apply imposition, political manipulation through the media and even legal sanctions and restrictions. As in the case of Cyprus, issues may successfully be securitised through various legal and political mechanisms, ensuring the silence of the obedient. To Wæver (1995: 57), 'security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites'. Further, the securitiser should have a 'social capital' and 'has to be in a position of authority' (Wæver, 2000: 252-3). What should be added to this analysis is the fact that security may be utilised as a reproducer of this social capital as well. To illustrate, the military wing of the Turkish state elite has customarily utilised its credibility in the eyes of domestic society in declaring what the internal and external threats to the nation and state are. Cyprus has always figured among the issues of top priority for the Turkish state elite, involving vital security interests of the country.

Bearing in mind the assumptions and the research agenda of securitisation theory, one may conclude that the Copenhagen School provides useful

analytical tools to explore the power politics of Cyprus, in other words, its implications in the production of power/domination relations in Turkey. As I have argued elsewhere (Kaliber, 2005), from the end of 2002 onwards, the Cyprus issue has turned out to be one of the central 'discursive battlefields' of the polarisation among the conservative/statist and reformist ruling elites. The main reason for the centrality of the Cyprus issue within domestic power relations in Turkey stems from its heavy securitisation by the FSP establishment. Here, the term 'securitisation' refers not primarily to militarisation but rather to de-politicisation, namely insulation from public debate, within a technocratic and authoritarian discursive economy (see Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995, 1998). The 'lack of a meaningful and critical public debate that goes beyond scientific sounding technicalities' (Yeldan and Cizre, 2002: 15) has hindered the outbreak of genuine alternative arguments and has ultimately eased the bureaucratisation of the Cyprus issue. Hence, the conventional state rhetoric on the Cyprus question substantially contributed to the institutionalisation of a regime fetishising such concepts as security, stability and 'national sensitivities' in Turkey.

Against this backdrop, some crucial implications of Turkey's security language on Cyprus may be outlined as follows. First, the casting of the Cyprus issue as one of national security has severely constrained the power and capacity of the political elite to intervene in the substance of existing policies. It has forced the government, as the political authority, to pursue policies already formulated by the bureaucratic elite, especially if they were labelled 'state policies' and/or 'national causes' (Kaliber, 2003: 217-75). Second, the consistent efforts of the bureaucratic elite to hold the Cyprus question within the sphere of 'the existential' and 'the imminent' thwarted the occurrence of widespread social debate within an autonomous public sphere, and thus led to the de-politicisation of the issue and its fixation as an area of bureaucratic specialty and competence. Labelling the Cyprus issue as a national cause gave the state elite the grounds to delegitimise opposition, since criticising these fixed policies amounted to criticising the regime and the state itself. Third, the effective insulation of 'foreign' policy issues in general, and the Cyprus case in particular, from public debate and the political domain has reinforced the power and hegemonic status of the bureaucratic apparatus, the members of which 'consider themselves as the ideological guardian of the "state"' (Yeldan and Cizre, 2002: 17).

Revisiting Turkey's security lexicon on Cyprus

The discourse and fear of encirclement have always been important components of Turkey's security approach to Cyprus. The notion of encirclement

has been instrumental in depicting the extent to which the Cyprus dispute constitutes an urgent threat to the survival of the Turkish nation and state. 'Struck in its southern underbelly, Cyprus is a major source of concern for Turkey', and 'it is the final, southern element in the containment of Turkey' (Olgun, 1999: 232). The island, which has a 'strategic position to control the important Turkish harbours of Iskenderun and Mersin', could be utilised by a hostile power as a 'springboard for the conquest of Anatolia from the South' (see Kazan, 2002: 58); 'an unfriendly power lodged in Cyprus could easily strike the nation's Anatolian heartland' (İsmail, 1989: 137). From the military and strategic perspective, any state dominant on the island would have a say in 'the fate of Turkey', since 'if this dominant power is also the same dominant power on the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be *de facto* encircled' (former Turkish Prime Minister F. Rüşü Zorlu, quoted in Kazan, 2002: 58). Encapsulated in all these excerpts is the idea that the real threat is Greece. This is the reason why the discourse and fear of encirclement locate the Cyprus issue directly within the field of 'vitality' and 'emergency' for Turkey. Reinforcing this line of reasoning, Turkey's Aegean coast has already been blockaded by the Dodecanese islands, which belong to Greece. 'Possession of Cyprus by Greece through *Enosis*, would have meant the encirclement of the southern shores of Turkey as well' (İsmail, 1989: 171).

The second component of this 'security speak' hinges upon the notion that Cyprus is an integral part of Turkey's national defence and security. The following statement by Tüban Güneş, Turkey's Foreign Minister in Ecevit's cabinet during Turkey's military intervention of July–August 1974 in Cyprus, reveals how the Turkish state elite understands and expresses the nature of the Cyprus question:

Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbours any. If we don't keep this strategic importance of Cyprus we cannot understand the peace operation of 20 July [1974] or rather it is impossible to understand the entire Cyprus crisis.... Many states, to a certain extent because it suits their interest, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community on the island. Whereas, the actual problem is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with the Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East. (Hürriyet, 20 July 1980)

The notion that Cyprus is geographically part and a natural extension of an Anatolian heartland, and thus an integral part of its defence, has been articulated by many prominent Turkish bureaucratic and political figures throughout the long history of the dispute. In the words of former Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, 'Cyprus is but the continuation of Anatolia

and constitutes one of the pivotal elements as regards its security' (quoted in Armaoğlu, 1963: 133).

In the 1990s, the notion of continuation was replaced by a new one equating the survival of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with that of Turkey. Turkish policy-makers began to put much more emphasis on the significance of Cyprus for Turkey's own national defence and security. To illustrate, a joint declaration between Turkey and the TRNC stated that 'both sides have emphasised the increasing importance of the TRNC for the security of Turkey, while Turkey continues to provide effective guarantee for the TRNC' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). The widely used metaphor of 'motherland–babyland' in Turkey's official and popular discourse also implies the inseparability and intertwinedness of the security of the two. This metaphor serves to emphasise both indissoluble and sacred linkages between 'motherland' Turkey and 'babyland' Cyprus and the unity of their fate and destiny.

As is evident in the quotations above, in Turkey's security language, the Cyprus issue signifies two seemingly paradoxical connotations. On the one hand, it implies the existence of a vital and imminent threat to Turkey's national security. On the other, it is an integral part of its defence, the absence of which would create a substantial hole in the protection of Turkey's territorial integrity. Even though these modes of representation seem paradoxical at first glance, they are complementary in the sense that the island of Cyprus is simultaneously the cornerstone in the encirclement of Turkey and its only access to the eastern Mediterranean from the south. The following section explores the regionalisation of Turkey's strategic outlook on Cyprus within the last decade through the re-invention of the eastern Mediterranean as a region of insecurities and opportunities.

Regionalisation of security perceptions and the re-invention of the eastern Mediterranean

The regionalisation of Turkey's discourse on Cyprus can be fully captured only when it is contextualised within the series of internal and external political developments shaping the Turkish state elite's sense of (in)security. A common assumption among the Turkish elite has been that the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the regional security environment in which Turkey is embedded (Adamson, 2002: 173; Sayar, 2000: 169). For the Turkish FSP elite, the demise of global bipolar rivalry, in which Turkey's position was solidly defined within the Western bloc, precipitated two seemingly contrasting outcomes for the country. On the one hand, it impelled Turkey to become a more assertive regional power, standing at the 'nexus of conflict-prone regions'

(Davutoğlu, 2004) characterised by instability and unresolved intra- and inter-state disputes. According to a widespread analysis among Turkish policymakers and analysts, Turkey 'stood encircled by 13 of the 16 threat generating regions, identified by NATO at the end of the Cold War' (Aydın, 2004: 85; see also Sezer, 2007). The new security architecture and geopolitical landscape emerging in the post-Cold War era situated Turkey 'in the virtual epicenter of a "Bermuda Triangle" comprising "the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East" (Türk, 1999), each of which is characterised by ethno-nationalist and religious conflict. The dismantling of the former Yugoslav Federation and the Soviet Union, the two Balkan wars of the 1990s, the strengthening of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq after the *de facto* partition of the country, and the deteriorating Palestinian-Israeli conflict have all strengthened the conviction of the Turkish FSP elite that Turkey has become much more exposed to insecurities in its vicinity. Hence, its 'tough neighbourhood' (Olgun, 1999) urges Turkey to pursue a more active, multi-track, multi-layered foreign policy in relation to its surrounding regions (Davutoğlu, 2004).

On the other hand, the radical transformation of the geopolitical and strategic landscape in the Balkans and the Caucasus following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union opened up new regions to Turkish influence. Turkey, as an 'anchor of stability' with a unique geopolitical position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, could play a larger and constructive role in the areas 'that were previously closed to Turkish policy' (Larrabee and Lesser, 2002: x). An assumption widely accepted by the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is that if Turkey is able to reconcile its eastern and western identities, it can assume 'a conciliatory role' in the polarisations 'between Asia-Europe, Islam-West and North-South' and can promote global and regional peace and constitute 'a centre of gravity' (Davutoğlu, 2004). Thereby, in the new era, Turkey, rather than being depicted as a mere bridge between the east and the west, 'should be defined as a pivotal state' (Davutoğlu, 2004).¹⁰ This line of reasoning is widely echoed by the secular security establishment as well. For instance, to former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2007), Turkey's unique geographical position and its distinctive 'historical and cultural values' facilitate and necessitate Turkey pursuing 'an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy'.

The regionalisation of Turkey's security outlook has paralleled the consolidation of the status of the Turkish military 'as the key interlocutor' (Lesser, 2000: 28) in the formulation of the FSP, 'often in a manner that undermined the authority of the civilian institutions' (Özcan, 2002: 13). In the second half of the 1990s, the military emerged 'more publicly than at any time ... as the most important institution, at least in charting the strategic dimension of "foreign" policy' (Robins, 2003: 92). It started to play an active role not only in

Turkey's strained relations with Greece, Syria and Iran, which it blamed for supporting terrorist activities (Uzgel, 2003), but also in initiating the policy of *rapprochement* with Israel, despite the opposition of the then coalition government.¹¹ Particularly on the military side of the security establishment, a prevalent approach was to associate Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism with Turkey's immediate neighbours in the Middle East and in the eastern Mediterranean more widely (Özcan, 2004; Uzgel, 2003). Turkey's new regional activism in its immediate surroundings (the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus) and insecurities originating from these regions have also been instrumental in justifying the military's costly and extensive defence modernisation programme.

Furthermore, that a new generation of threats and non-conventional security issues surfaced throughout the 1990s encouraged the Turkish FSP elite to develop a more regionalist outlook to internal and external security. Energy and water security issues, 'uncontrolled migration, ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism' (Kıslal, 2003; see also Larrabee and Lesser, 2002: 4) as well as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles (Kazan, 2005) have been incorporated into Turkey's security agenda as new challenges requiring a broader regionalist approach to foreign policy. These issues are of course beyond the remit of this chapter, which next examines the basic tenets of Turkey's regionalising security conception with respect to Cyprus.

The rise of regionalism in the Turkish strategic outlook on Cyprus

The two classical themes of Turkey's 'security speak' portraying Cyprus as the source of insecurity and as the indispensable element of national defence have proved their durability and dominance. However, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, this dual mode of representation has increasingly been laden with a regionalist outlook. In fact, Turkey's rhetoric on Cyprus was not totally devoid of regionalist concerns and calculations during the Cold War years. This rather vague regionalism was based on the notion that prevention of *enosis* (union with Greece) and maintenance of Turkey's involvement with the island were vitally important for the sustenance of NATO's stronghold in the eastern Mediterranean (both Greece and Turkey had long been NATO members). That is, the unification of the island with Greece would unavoidably create deficits and cause destabilisation in NATO's southern flank, because of the presence of communist and pro-communist forces among the Greek Cypriots. Greece and the Greek Cypriots would be unreliable in protecting Western interests in the region against the Soviets, who were presumed to be 'aiming at having access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East' (Armaoğlu, 1974: 178). Turkey was the only power, the argument went, able to defend the

interests of the 'free world' and to prevent Cyprus from being the 'Cuba of the Mediterranean' (Teveroğlu, 1966).¹²

However, in the 1990s, regionalism, rather than being a sub-argument in Turkey's Cyprus discourse, steadily gained prominence in mapping out Turkey's new security landscape. As stated before, Turkish policy-makers began to make more frequent references to the term 'eastern Mediterranean', which gained a constellation of new strategic and security connotations. As in the case of Greece (Stivachtis, 2002), the eastern Mediterranean, rather than being a mere geographical expression, accounted for a distinctive region embracing simultaneously new insecurities and opportunities. In what follows, I present the main discursive elements of Turkey's security lexicon on Cyprus characterised by regionalism.

The discourse of encirclement in the 1990s

The fear of encirclement has been continually articulated by the political elite in Turkey throughout different phases of the Cyprus dispute. In the 1990s, however, the emphasis was shifted from Greece only, to Greece plus hostile states in the eastern Mediterranean region which were signing military co-operation agreements against Turkey. For instance, Cyprus was depicted all too often as 'the cornerstone of Greece's policy of enveloping Turkey with a strategic belt of hostile states' (Olgun, 1999: 231–2). The Joint Cypriot Greek Defence Doctrine concluded in 1993 was perceived as 'a direct military threat' (Elekdağ, 1996) and 'an attempt at the encirclement of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by the hostile forces' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the TRNC, 2002). In the same vein, the signing of military and technical cooperation agreements between Armenia and the Republic of Cyprus has been interpreted as a new stride towards this aspiration.

Cyprus, as a 'naval fortress' or 'a natural aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean' (Balancar, 2003), is deemed indispensable if Turkey is to surmount this encirclement. The island's geostrategic location allows Turkey to control air and maritime routes (Kazan, 2002: 58) and to access sea lanes in the Mediterranean (Larabee and Lesser, 2002: 153) for defence and trade purposes. In this perspective, dominant among the FSP elite, Cyprus enjoys a unique location, in the sense that 'it is Turkey's only gateway to the Mediterranean and international seas, has the capacity to control Turkey's Mediterranean coastline from the sea and the air, and serves as a base for electronic intelligence to monitor the Eastern Mediterranean and North African regions' (Kandemir, 2004). That the island is closely located to the Anatolian heartland and Turkey's 'soft underbelly' is a thick signifier of the degree of

insecurity with which Turkey is faced in the eastern Mediterranean. 'In case a hostile power is lodged on the island and especially if it makes use of its air force, it will have access to Turkey's otherwise inaccessible eastern region from the air... In geographical terms, any force deployed in Cyprus will pose a grave threat to Turkey' (Kısal, 2003).

The Russian factor and the rise of energy security

In early 1997, the security and military dimension of the Cyprus dispute utterly overshadowed all other aspects of the issue with the announcement of the government of the Republic of Cyprus that it was to purchase S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia. This deeply concerned the military and the government in Turkey. It was defended by the Republic of Cyprus as a requirement for its defence *vis-à-vis* the strategic supremacy of the Turkish side (Veremis, 2001: 49). For the Turkish state elite, this event symbolised the return of Russia into the Cyprus equation and eastern Mediterranean power politics. The decision of Russia to allow these missiles to be deployed on Cyprus was interpreted as part of its broader 'strategy of influence and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean with the basic motivation of pressuring Turkey' (Lesser, 2000: 34). According to this analysis, what mostly motivated Russia was to weaken Turkey's hand in the rivalry over the transportation of the Caspian oil to western markets. The presence of S-300s on the island would destabilise and disturb the strategic balances in the Mediterranean region at the expense of Turkey (Davutoğlu, 2001: 177–8).

The growth of new energy routes around the Mediterranean basin has irreversibly incorporated the issue of energy security into Turkey's new regionalist agenda on Cyprus. The proximity of the island to the oil-rich Middle East and its critical location along the new routes of oil transportation stretching from the Caucasus to Europe added considerably to Cyprus's geo-political value in the eyes of the Turkish FSP elite. After the emergence of the Caspian basin as a rich resource for energy, the issue of how the Caspian oil and natural gas are to be transported and through which routes has become a determining factor configuring the strategic calculations of the regional powers. For Turkey and Russia, which favour different routes for oil transportation, pipeline politics has become heavily loaded with geostrategic implications, in that they could use pipeline politics to play a larger strategic role in the eastern Mediterranean, Central Asia and the Caucasus (Larabee and Lesser, 2002: 110). According to a widespread analysis among the Turkish elite, Cyprus will become even more important when the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline has been built, bringing Caspian oil across Turkey to the Mediterranean (Kandemir, 2004; Olgun, 1999: 243). This argument, shared by some analysts, assumes

that the construction of the Baku–Ceyhan and other pipelines transporting oil and gas 'will deepen Turkey's role as an energy entrepôt and will reinforce the position of the Eastern Mediterranean in world oil trade' (Lesser, 2004: 214). Thus, if Turkey wishes to have a strong say in both the sharing of this huge and seductive oil 'cake' and the political future of the region *vis-à-vis* its 'immediate neighbours' (namely Russia and Greece), it has to cling to its involvement with the island.

Energy politics came to re-occupy a central place in Turkey's security agenda when the Republic of Cyprus signed agreements on the delimitation of exclusive economic zones with Egypt and Lebanon in early 2007 (*Turkish Daily News*, 31 January 2007). On 15 February, the Cypriot government also initiated a bidding process to issue licences for oil and gas exploration in accordance with these delimitation agreements (Skordas, 2007). In a statement on 30 January, Turkey argued that the Greek Cypriots did not represent the island as a whole and reasserted its determination to protect its legitimate rights and interests in the eastern Mediterranean and to avert 'any attempt to undermine them' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). In the aftermath of its meeting on 20 June 2007, the National Security Council of Turkey declared that 'the Greek Cypriot Authority due to its initiatives in the eastern Mediterranean continues to be an element of instability in the region' and reiterated that Turkey would 'maintain efforts to protect its rights and interests' in the region (National Security Council, 2007). The then Turkish President, Sezer, also voiced on numerous occasions his conviction that the Greek-Cypriot leadership, 'in an irresponsible and provocative manner, has striven since 2003 to delimit naval sovereign rights in the eastern Mediterranean with the regional countries' (Sezer, 2007). These delimitation agreements pose a direct threat to both 'Turkey's and the TRNC's legal rights and interests' in the eastern Mediterranean (Sezer, 2007).

Redefining the geopolitics of Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean

Cyprus is neither solely an ordinary ethnic conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots nor a protracted dispute between Turkey and Greece.... Cyprus turns into a dispute involving Eurasian, the Middle Eastern and the Balkan, that is West Asian and East European regions. Turkey's Cyprus policy should be remodelled to meet the requirements of this new strategic framework. (Davutoğlu, 2001: 175–6)¹³

As is evident in the quotation above, the Turkish political elite is convinced that the emerging geopolitical configurations in the post-Cold War era impel Turkey to develop a broader strategic outlook on Cyprus. This new outlook rests on the relocation of the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus within the

global and regional security dynamics and geostrategic build-up. As argued above, throughout the Cold War years, the FSP elite in Turkey lacked a conception of the eastern Mediterranean as a distinctive regional setting with its own security dynamics and interactions. The Cyprus dispute was more of a Turkish–Greek ethnic conflict and the island's geostrategic salience was always discussed within the confines of military balances with Greece. Within the last decade, however, parallel to the post-Cold War and post-'9/11' security agenda of the West, the geopolitics and geo-economics of the eastern Mediterranean has been redefined by FSP establishment in Turkey. In this reconceptualisation, the eastern Mediterranean, which 'lies at the intersection of Europe, Asia and Africa' (Kandemir, 2004), is a central concern for Turkey, in both strategic and economic terms (Tashan, 2003). 'The eastern Mediterranean looms over the maritime trade running across Gibraltar, Suez and the Black Sea and the energy hubs in the Middle East and the Caspian Basin' (Kandemir, 2004). Turkish policy-makers also converge on the idea that, in post-bipolar international politics, the fates of the Balkan and Middle Eastern regions are ever bound to each other. 'Therefore, there may not exist, for Turkey, a policy of the Balkans and of the Middle East segregated from each other. It needs a new policy for the regions, at the centre of which the inner balances of the Eastern Mediterranean have been struck' (Davutoğlu, 2001: 177).

It has been a prevalent assumption among the practitioners and analysts of Turkish foreign policy that Cyprus constitutes the cornerstone of the eastern Mediterranean security architecture in the making since the 1990s. It has a dominant position to have a say in the fate of the region 'in political, economic and security terms' (Kandemir, 2004). Any regional or global power nurturing strategic calculations and interests in 'the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and in the Gulf' cannot fail to pay heed to the island of Cyprus, as it enjoys the capacity to directly influence all those regions (Davutoğlu, 2001: 180). Turkey should therefore consider it the key element of a general naval strategy (*ibid.*).

Conclusions

The post-Cold War regionalisation of security dynamics has been manifest in Turkey's strategic outlook on Cyprus. Since the 1950s, the Cyprus dispute has been categorised by the Turkish ruling elite primarily as an issue of national security within a discourse imbued with excessive geopoliticism. The geopolitically 'vital' position of the island of Cyprus and its proximity to the Turkish mainland have facilitated the articulation of the issue either as a source of imminent threat to the Turkish nation and state or as an integral part of

Turkey's national defence and security. The fear of encirclement – a prevalent element in Turkish rhetoric – triggered by geopolitical and power political matrices between Turkey and Greece has also implied that the real threat has been Greece itself. However, as revealed in this chapter, within the last decade the security lexicon confining the Cyprus issue to the realm of bilateral Turkish–Greek relations has been subject to change. Thanks to a constellation of domestic and external factors, a new strategic approach has gained prominence, placing Turkey's threat perceptions and strategic calculations on Cyprus in a more complex and regionalist context. This regionalisation has mostly found its expression in the increased use of the term 'eastern Mediterranean' by policy-makers and analysts to resituate Turkey's new security concerns and expectations, both geographically and economically. In the new rhetoric, the eastern Mediterranean has signified not only the diversification and multiplication of threats but also emerging opportunities for economic development and the prospect of Turkey becoming an activist regional power.

The comprehensive research agenda of the securitisation approach poses relevant questions for an exploration of the power politics behind an excessively securitised and bureaucratised Cyprus policy in Turkey. However, the Copenhagen Schools' later work on RSCs falls short of explaining the ascent of regionalism in Turkey's approach to Cyprus and the new domestic and regional security dynamics behind it. RSCs are largely based on the conception of geographically fixed regions, whose internal security dynamics are configured by given regional actors with already defined interests. It does not question how regions are defined, by whom and for what purposes. Thus, the limited constructivism and partial objectivism of RSCs does not help us to understand the power politics behind the social reproduction of regions as objects of security. The chapter has also proposed that RSCs' claim that Turkey is an insulator on the boundaries between different RSCs is not persuasive. The term 'insulator', implying stasis, is liable to simplistic and ahistoric explanations of Turkish FSP dynamics; it is by no means helpful in exploring Turkey's dynamically changing and intensifying security interactions with its regional neighbours. The deepening of Turkish–Greek security interactions in the post-Cold War era, which are complicated by the effect of EUisation/Europeanisation, is a pertinent example of this.

Notes

- 1 This chapter is based on research conducted in the framework of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme funded by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and Volkswagen Stiftung.

- 2 For a literature review on regional security, see Buzan and Wæver (2003: 77–82) and Kelly (2007). For a concise review of the first wave of regionalism in IR, see Kelly (2007: 202–4).
- 3 For a few key texts of first-wave regionalism, see, among others, Russett (1967), Nye (1968), Miller (1973a,b) and Canorri and Spiegel (1973).
- 4 Here I follow the distinction drawn by Kelly (2007: 206) between 'the more positivist formal and the critical normative' approaches to regional security within the second wave of IR regionalism. Though Buzan and Wæver's work is included in the positivist category by Kelly, as will become clear below, their theory has some constructivist elements in it.
- 5 For the second wave of regionalist theory, see, among others, Hettne et al. (1999, 2000), Farrell et al. (2005) and Hentz and Boås (2003).
- 6 For an overall review of regionalism in IR, see Pace (2006b: 22–57).
- 7 For a counter-argument, see Kazan (2005).
- 8 This term refers to the revival of government-level negotiations as well as the boost to civil society cooperation between Turkey and Greece following the devastating earthquakes in Izmit and Athens in August and September 1999.
- 9 They define securitisation as a self-referential practice where issues are 'presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan et al., 1998: 23–4).
- 10 The term 'pivotal state' was coined by Chace et al. (1996) to refer to such countries as Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, India and Indonesia. Pivotal states have the potential to influence regional and international stability owing to their population, location, and economic and military potential. See also Larrabee and Lesser (2002: 2).
- 11 In November 1997, with the military's initiative, there occurred a major change in the national security policy document, which describes the threats to national security and provides policy for state institutions, including the government. In the document, after political Islam and Kurdish separatism, possible cooperation between Greece and Syria and Turkey's need to strengthen its ties with Central Asian republics were stated among Turkey's security priorities (Uzgel, 2003: 194).
- 12 For the details of the anti-communist rhetoric through the Cyprus issue, see Kaliber (2003: 197–200 and 268ff.).
- 13 This section draws mostly on the analyses by Ahmet Davutoğlu of Turkish foreign policy and the Cyprus question. He was not only the chief political adviser to the current Turkish Prime Minister, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, from 2003 up to July 2007, but also a very influential figure in the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy during his term in office.

Colin McInnes and Lee Kelley (2012) *Global Health and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press). Offers a constructivist account of the relationship between health and IR and explores security as one of a number of framings of that relationship.

João Nunes (2013) *Security, Emancipation and the Politics of Health: A New Theoretical Perspective* (London and New York: Routledge). Highlights the politics of health and advances an agenda for rethinking security via a reformulated approach to emancipation.

World Health Organization (2007) *A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century*, Geneva: WHO. Sets out the WHO's understanding of major health challenges and vision for the future of global public health security.

Weblinks

World Health Organization: <http://www.who.int/en/>
 Centre for Health and International Relations (CHAIR), Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University: <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/research-centres-and-institutes/chair/>
 Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/globalhealthpolicy/>

9 Homeland security and the 'war against terrorism'

Abstract

This chapter introduces the concept of homeland security, and practices carried out in its name, against the backdrop of the global war against terrorism. It begins with a brief overview of the concept of terrorism in comparative and historical context. The discussion then turns to consider two cases of the response to the perceived threat of terrorism by Western governments: the rise of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the US; and parallel counterterrorism initiatives in the UK. Connecting the study of homeland security and the war against terrorism with some of the theoretical perspectives outlined in Part I, the chapter then introduces two prominent 'applications' of critical thinking in security studies: 'critical terrorism studies' and the CHALLENGE project. Finally, especially in the light of the changing imperatives of the Obama presidency, the chapter ends by questioning the future direction of the war against terrorism.

Introduction

On 11 September 2001 ('9/11') two passenger jets were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC. In total the two attacks led to the deaths of approximately 3500 people. Within hours of the first attack on the WTC, US President George W. Bush declared a global 'war against terrorism'. Al-Qaeda, a radical Islamist network led by Osama bin Laden, was held responsible for the atrocities, but the US responded militarily by targeting specific states thought to harbour terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On 7 October 2001 operation 'Enduring Freedom' was launched against the Taliban government in Afghanistan; and on 20 March 2003 operation 'Iraqi Freedom' began with the aim of toppling Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime.

Since 9/11, 'terrorism' has taken centre stage in debates about new security challenges facing the West. On the one hand, we might want to question whether this focus is warranted. After all, every day three times as many people die of HIV/AIDS in the global South as those who were killed on 9/11 (see Chapter 8). By concentrating too much on the perceived terrorist threat, it might be argued that other, more pressing security issues (such as those discussed in other chapters in Part II of this book) are wrongly marginalised. On the other hand, however, irrespective of whether we agree with the prominence given to terrorism in global security relations, the human costs of the war against terrorism should be underlined. Data on the number of Afghan civilian fatalities resulting from operation Enduring Freedom were not collected rigorously before 2007 and precise numbers remain unknown. As of March

2011 the total is estimated to be 8832, according to the Independent Human Rights Commission and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. In addition, more than 4000 Taliban soldiers have died and as of January 2014, coalition military fatalities stood at 3416 (www.icasualties.org). Operation Iraqi Freedom claimed between 97461 and 106348 civilian deaths up to July 2010 and more than 15,000 Iraqi military lives (BBC), as of January 2014 a total of 4804 coalition service personnel had been killed in Iraq (www.icasualties.org). The financial costs of the war against terrorism are also worthy of note, though equally difficult to calculate: the Congressional Research Service estimates that the US spent nearly \$802 billion on the Iraq war by the end of the fiscal year 2011.

In addition to human and financial costs, the threat of terrorism has also led to a series of responses by governments that affect citizens' everyday lives: enhanced airport security measures; heightened levels of surveillance; new forms of identity capture and management; the cultivation of a climate of fear and suspicion; more vigorous policing and use of 'stop and search' measures; harsher legislative conditions; the rise of the 'resilient society'; and moves to prioritise national security imperatives ahead of personal liberty. These practices, which enable particular forms of governance of populations as a means of dealing with the perceived terrorist threat, have increasingly come to be defined in terms of homeland security and resilience. As Ole Wæver (2008) has argued, the idea of homeland security is not simply yet another name for territorial defence within the confines of the state, but rather a new set of logics increasingly focused on individuals and networks across the globe.

Terrorism in context

When thinking about the prominence given to terrorism in debates about security since 9/11 it is important to bear in mind that the concept of 'terrorism' is not something new. 'La Terreur' was used to describe the period of violence after the French Revolution, between 5 September 1793 and 27 July 1794, which saw the killing of enemies of the new Republic. More recent examples of terrorism in the twentieth century include the campaigns of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Basque separatist group Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland. Al-Qaeda's operations also pre-date 2001, as the group claimed responsibility for the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998, which killed over 200 and injured over 5000 people. More generally, variants of Islamic terrorism were perceived to be a threat prior to 9/11 in Russia, Israel, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.

What is an act of 'terrorism'? Some scholars argue that it is possible to distinguish terrorism as a particular form of political violence. Paul Wilkinson (2000), for example, has identified what he considers to be the defining characteristics of a terrorist attack: a premeditated intent to create fear; a target audience beyond those who are victims; a deliberately random choice of (particularly civilian) victims; a motive to affect political behaviour especially that of governments; and a perception by the society within which it has taken place that something 'extra-normal' has occurred. While these characteristics seem intuitive, however, the more we probe the concept of terrorism the more complex it becomes. Who decides what and/or who is a terrorist? Are there different forms of terrorism? Must terrorists always be non-state actors?

As well as a lengthy history, the use of the concept of terrorism is also deeply political. It is not the case that a particular individual, group or organisation is ever self-evidently 'terroristic'. Rather, the label 'terrorist' is something that is *applied* and as such it can be highly controversial. Much depends on particular circumstances and sometimes the designation of

someone as a 'terrorist' can change dramatically over time. At the height of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland, for example, Martin McGuinness was considered by the British government to be an outlaw due to his involvement with the activity of the PIRA. Yet, 30 years or so later, McGuinness became deputy leader of the Northern Ireland Assembly at the heart of new power-sharing arrangements under devolution. Similarly, as the leader of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela was found guilty of sabotage during the apartheid

Box 9.1 'Official' definitions of terrorism

- 1 UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (passed in October 2004) defines terrorism as:
Criminal acts, including [those] against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.
- 2 The official American definition of terrorism can be found in US Code Title 22, Section 2656f(d) (1983):
The term 'terrorism' means premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving the citizens or the territory of more than one country.
The term 'terrorist group' means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.
- 3 The UK Terrorism Act (2000) defines terrorism as follows:
 - (1) In this Act 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where—
 - (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
 - (b) the use of threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
 - (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.
 - (2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
 - (a) involves serious violence against a person,
 - (b) involves serious damage to property,
 - (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
 - (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.
 - (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

regime in South Africa and was imprisoned for 27 years. Four years after his release from prison in 1990, however, Mandela became the country's first president to be elected democratically. Indeed, Mandela is one of four former 'terrorists' who have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize (the others being Menachem Begin, Sean McBride and Yasser Arafat). Shifts in political contexts, therefore, can radically alter who and what gets labelled as a 'terrorist'.

Another complicating factor in thinking about the phenomenon of terrorism is that it tends to act as an umbrella term for many diverse political causes. One form of terrorism, as in the cases of the Tamil Tigers, ETA and the PIRA, is *ethno-national* terrorism. What is common to these groups is a series of claims on (usually a portion of) the territory of an existing sovereign state based upon familiar narratives of 'blood and soil'. Another type is *ideological* terrorism, which, for example, is illustrated by the activities of the so-called 'Red Brigades' during the 1970s and 1980s in Italy, who attempted to establish a neo-communist state. There are also examples of *issue-based* terrorism such as the wave of (often violent) animal rights protests across the UK during the 1980s. Al-Qaeda, with its expressed intentions of evicting 'foreign' forces from the Middle East, replacing 'corrupt' pro-Western governments such as those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, and establishing a pan-Islamic caliphate, are usually thought of (in the West, at least) as a kind of *religio-political* terrorist organisation.

The *referent object* of terrorism also demands consideration. Traditionally, it has been assumed that terrorists are either individuals or groups labelled as such. More recently, however, some analysts of terrorism have sought to emphasise that states can be terrorists too (see, for example, Blakeley 2007). Indeed, given the apparatuses available to it, the state has historically cultivated fear and relied upon repressive measures. In this context, for example, we might point to the colonial period in Africa, the era of the purges in Stalin's Russia, state terror in Latin America, or, perhaps most obviously, the Third Reich in Germany. In the context of the war against terrorism, President Bush famously denounced Iraq, Iran and North Korea as terrorist states forming an 'axis of evil'. More subtly, though, state terrorism can also take the form of strategic bombing, certain forms of governance and even counterterrorism. On this expanded view, given the range of often illiberal and anti-democratic measures used to combat the threat of terror, Western democratic states have been accused of acquiring the 'terroristic' characteristics of the enemies they seek to overcome. Thus, according to Noam Chomsky (2000), the US has become the greatest of all rogue states. Again, these examples highlight the enormous political capital of the concept of terrorism.

While the phenomenon of terrorism is clearly not something new or straightforward, some writers argue that the specific threat faced from Al-Qaeda is nevertheless qualitatively different from its historical forebears. Wilkinson (2007b), for instance, points to key differences between Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations in terms of scope (it is not territorially delimited to one state but a global network), method (it opts for mass killing as demonstrated by attacks in New York, Washington, Kenya, Bali, Casablanca, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) and aims (it seeks nothing less than a change in the nature of the international system). Crucially, whether or not we see Al-Qaeda as a unique threat, a distinctive range of counterterrorist measures has emerged in response under the banner of homeland security.

US homeland security

The use of the term homeland security in the US context pre-dates the events of 9/11. Discussions about the provision for a new national homeland security agency took place

following the publication of the Hart-Rudman Commission Report in February 2001. The attacks later that year expedited the process of establishing the agency. In his 'Fear and freedom are at war' speech to Congress on 20 September, President Bush announced the creation of a new Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Tom Ridge, the then governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as its first director. The stated aim of the OHS was to oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks. In June 2002, however, President Bush proposed the upgrading of the OHS to a Cabinet-level DHS. With the passing of the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the DHS became fully operational on 24 January 2003, with an annual budget of \$100 billion.

Prior to the establishment of the DHS, homeland security activities were spread across 40 different federal agencies. Indeed, the '9/11 Commission Report' cited the lack of a coordinated approach as a factor in the failure to prevent the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 384–385). As such, the DHS constituted a major reorganisation of US federal government. In terms of its remit, the Department was tasked with four main 'mission' areas from the outset:

- 1 *Border and Transportation Security* – to control the borders and prevent terrorists and explosives from entering the country.
- 2 *Emergency Preparedness and Response* – to work with state and local authorities to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.
- 3 *Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures* – to bring together the country's best scientists to develop technologies that detect biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to best protect citizens.
- 4 *Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection* – to review intelligence and law enforcement information from all agencies of government, and produce a single daily picture of threats against the homeland.

Taken together these missions indicate the extent to which, above and beyond the institutional shifts inaugurated by the DHS, the concept of homeland security represents a fundamental shift in the organisation of American society. Many of the legal foundations for this shift were provided for in the US Patriot Act, which President Bush signed into law on 26 October 2001. This act allowed for a range of new measures such as an increase in powers of state surveillance, national search warrants, the detention of foreigners without trial for up to seven days without charge and the deportation of suspected terrorists. The extent and depth of homeland security, as further outlined in the 'National Strategy' published in July 2002 (see Box 9.2), places the US nation on a quasi-war footing. Indeed, the controversial colour-coded Homeland Security Advisory System, introduced in 2002 by the DHS and abandoned in 2011, indicated the perceived level of risk from terrorist attack and served as a daily reminder to US citizens of their nation's involvement in the war against terrorism.

Since its inception, the Advisory System was not lowered beyond the yellow or 'elevated' level. Effectively, the 'normal' state of affairs in the US became one where the 'significant risk of terrorist attacks' was permanent. The extent to which the Advisory System offered a sense of security among the US population is a vexed question, however. A permanently 'elevated' state implied heightened vigilance to combat potential risk, which may have offered some citizens peace of mind. However, the traffic light system itself may have also created fear, panic and a sense of insecurity among people. Of course, we cannot be completely sure what affect the Advisory System had (it was interpreted by different people

Box 9.2 The National Strategy for Homeland Security

The White House released the first National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002. Below is an extract from President Bush's preface to the document.

My fellow Americans:

[...] We must rally our entire society to overcome a new and complex challenge. Homeland security is a shared responsibility. In addition to a national strategy, we need compatible, mutually supporting state, local, and private-sector strategies. Individual volunteers must channel their energy and commitment in support of the national and local strategies. [...]

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* is a beginning. It calls for bold and necessary steps. It creates a comprehensive plan for using America's talents and resources to enhance our protection and reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. [...]

Our enemy is smart and resolute. We are smarter and more resolute. We will prevail against all who believe they can stand in the way of America's commitment to freedom, liberty, and our way of life.

George W. Bush

The National Strategy defined what is meant by the term 'homeland security' through the identification of three objectives:

- 1 Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States
- 2 Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism
- 3 Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

in multiple ways), but it was striking as a particular political method of governing the population via a politics of fear (Massumi 2005).

As well as mobilising domestic society in the US, efforts to secure the homeland have implications for the globe as a whole. The National Strategy for Homeland Security makes it clear that defending the US against the threat of terrorism is necessary 'both at home and abroad':

In a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect to traditional boundaries, our strategy for homeland security cannot stop at our borders. America must pursue a sustained, steadfast, and systematic international agenda to counter the global terrorist threat and improve our homeland security.

(2002: xii)

Thus, in a speech celebrating the fifth anniversary of the DHS, President Bush declared it was better to face enemies 'over there than here in the US'. In this way, operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom can be read precisely as acts of homeland security, albeit overseas. This raises an interesting geopolitical question about what and where the limits of the

US homeland actually are. These limits are not necessarily coterminous with the physical territorial borders of the US. Rather, in the light of the so-called 'Bush Doctrine' of pre-emption, military strikes in defence of the US homeland can occur virtually anywhere in the world. According to this doctrine, the US claims the right to take military action against any state it believes to be harbouring or supporting terrorists. For this reason, some writers have argued that it is now impossible to maintain any rigorous distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' dimensions of US security policy (Bigo *et al.* 2007). Instead, an image of the US homeland is arguably being projected on to the globe in its entirety, as satirised by the film *Team America: World Police* (2004).

UK counterterrorism

While homeland security has become the headline term for an array of policies and practices in the US context, it has not been embraced to the same extent in the UK context. The UK does not have a direct equivalent to the US DHS nor a single-response framework for dealing with emergencies such as the bombings in London on 7 July 2005. Rather, the UK's response to the threat of terrorism consists of civil contingencies legislation, specific counterterrorism measures and a civil protection capabilities enhancement programme. According to some writers, this difference is symptomatic of other divergences between the US and the UK concerning views of radical Islam, levels of commitment to military action and 'strategic culture' in response to the threat of terrorism more generally (Rees and Aldrich 2005). Of course, one of the potentially significant differences between the US and UK is the broader historical perspective in which this threat is perceived. Whereas terrorism is a relatively recent phenomenon in the US, the UK has a longer history of terrorism and counterterrorism on its own territory.

Between 1967 and 1998 over 3500 people, both civilians and military personnel, were killed during 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland. The activities of the PIRA, which sought a united Irish Republic on the island of Ireland, included car bombings, mortar attacks, assassinations, letter bombings and kidnappings. On 21 November 1974, for example, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on a pub in central Birmingham that killed 20 civilians and injured over 180. In a spiral of violence, loyalist groups, those in favour of the Union of Northern Ireland and Great Britain such as the UDA (Ulster Defence Army), UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), were equally engaged in campaigns of terror throughout the same period. Among the atrocities carried out by the UDA was the so-called 'Greysteel massacre' on Halloween in 1993, which killed 8 people and injured a further 19. Beyond paramilitary violence, some writers also draw attention to what they consider to be British state terror during the 'long war'. Wilkinson (2007a), for instance, highlights the way in which, primarily in response to the Republican threat, a range of repressive measures were introduced. In this context, the zenith of state terrorism in the Northern Irish context was the shooting of 14 unarmed Catholic civilians by British soldiers in Londonderry on 30 January 1972, known as 'Bloody Sunday'.

The basis of post-9/11 counterterrorism legislation in the UK has its roots in the 'the Troubles' (Bigo and Guittet 2011). In 1973 the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act provided for special police powers and criminal justice procedures including scheduled offences (trial by judge without jury) and internment (detention without trial). One year later, in the aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombing, the Prevention of Terrorism Act extended these measures by allowing for: the exclusion of suspected terrorists either through refusal of entry to Britain or deportation; the enhancement of 'stop and search' powers granted to

port police; the extension of detention without charge to seven days; and the permission to arrest without a warrant anyone 'reasonably suspected' of being a terrorist or associated with terrorism. In 1998 the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement brought devolved government to Northern Ireland. Despite the Agreement, however, it is still not clear that 'the Troubles' are fully over, as evidenced by on-going intra-community violence and the murder of two army personnel and an officer of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in separate incidents during March 2009. Nevertheless, more recent legislation takes as its starting point the assumption that the more pressing threat comes from international terrorism, specifically: (1) Al-Qaeda and its associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; (2) groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Yemen; (3) self-starting cells or individuals with no relation to Al-Qaeda; and (4) groups similar to Al-Qaeda but with their own identity and/or regional agenda (Home Office 2009, 2011).

The shifting focus on international terrorism in the UK was evident before 9/11 with the 2000 Terrorism Act, which exported anti-terror measures designed initially for Northern Ireland across the UK as a whole. This was followed by the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, providing for additional powers to freeze and seize terrorists' financial assets and detention pending the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorist activity. In 2003 the Civil Contingencies Act was accompanied by greater capital investment in emergency response, operational facilities and business contingency arrangements. Since 2003, UK counterterrorism policy has been coordinated through the so-called 'CONTEST' strategy. CONTEST incorporates four primary 'workstreams' – PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and PREPARE – and its stated aim is 'to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence' (Home Office 2009: 8). The 'PURSUE and PREVENT' workstreams relate to the reduction of the threat of terrorism while 'PROTECT and PREPARE' aim to enhance the UK's resilience (see Box 9.3) against attack.

Following the London bombings on 7 July 2005, in which 52 people were killed along with four suicide bombers, there has been a broadening of the scope and an intensification of the activities of CONTEST. A particular focus under the PREVENT strand has been on countering the so-called 'process of radicalisation' whereby formerly moderate British Muslim citizens come to support violent extremism and/or join terrorist groups (Heath-Kelly 2013). This controversial approach to the perceived threat of 'homegrown terrorists' has led scholars to argue that there has in effect been a 'securitisation of Islam' in Britain (Croft 2012). The 2006 Terrorism Act made the preparation of terrorist attacks, the giving and receiving of training for terrorist purposes, and the attendance at a place used for terrorist training new offences under UK law. More recently, the 2008 Counter-Terrorism Act gave the police stronger asset-freezing powers, enhanced powers of entry into private property, the right to remove documents and take DNA and fingerprints from those on control orders, permission to question terrorist suspects after they had been charged, tougher sentences for convicted terrorists, and new controls on those who have been released after serving their sentence.

Despite the differences that some writers perceive between the US and UK, however, there are similarities across the Atlantic in the emerging field of homeland security. Emulating the DHS threat advisory system, the UK Home Office has made its assessments publicly available since August 2006. As in the US, there are five levels of threat in the UK: critical (an attack is expected imminently); severe (an attack is highly likely); substantial (an attack is a strong possibility); moderate (an attack is possible but not likely); and low (an attack is unlikely). Innovation in the field of border security, whereby borders are

Box 9.3 Security, citizenship and resilience

The increasing propensity for Western governments to frame security in terms of risk and preemption (see Box 5.5) has also given rise to the closely related notion of resilience (Brassett *et al.* 2013). Derived from the Latin *resilio* – meaning to 'jump back' – resilience is increasingly viewed by policy-makers as the horizon for living with a range of risks including terrorism, cyber crime, financial crisis, flooding and critical infrastructure collapse. In the UK, for example, the first stated objective of the 2010 National Security Strategy is to 'ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory, and ways of life from all major risks that can affect us directly'.

Whereas emergency planning in the context of the cold war era involved the prediction of events and the protection of society against known threats, the idea of resilience pays greater emphasis to societal adaptation in the face of potentially unknowable risks (Walker and Cooper 2011). For this reason, resilience is associated with broader socioeconomic changes linked with neoliberalism: citizens, communities and businesses are enjoined by governments to be entrepreneurial in taking steps to manage their own risks. A resilient society is therefore not only able to 'jump back' from disorder wrought by high-impact, low-probability events, but one that is able to exploit the opportunities of risk in order to emerge stronger.

In security studies the concept of resilience has been studied as an integral part of the risk management cycle in multiple contexts, including: civil contingency planning (Adey and Anderson 2011, 2012); critical national infrastructure protection (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Zebrowski 2009); cities and public spaces (Coaffee 2010; Coaffee *et al.* 2008); international state-building, aid and development (Chandler 2013; Duffield 2012; Reid 2012). Against this backdrop, there is also an increasing interest in the role of the citizen in counterterrorism measures and the extent to which government attempts at cultivating societal resilience have gained traction at the level of the everyday (Jarvis and Lister 2013b; Malcolm 2013).

increasingly based upon off-shore identity capture and management, is another example of convergence between the two countries (for more see Chapter 11). The launch of the UK's first ever 'National Security Strategy' in 2008 also reflects shared thinking with the US about how it might be possible to involve society at large in the common task of fighting the war against terrorism.

Critical perspectives on the war against terrorism

The rise of homeland security and the global war against terrorism more generally has stimulated new thinking and research agendas in critical security studies. Here we consider two prominent developments in the field: 'critical terrorism studies'; and international political sociology inspired scholarship on the relationship between liberty and security.

Critical terrorism studies

Richard Jackson refers to 'critical terrorism studies' (CTS) not as a 'precise theoretical label', but rather in terms of 'a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism [...] which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs' (Jackson 2007: 246).

According to Jackson, the CTS project is partly animated by four areas of critique of traditional approaches to the study of terrorism. First, it is claimed that much of the conventional

terrorism literature suffers from an 'embarrassing list of methodological and analytical weaknesses' such as: a paucity of reflection on research methods; an over-reliance upon secondary rather than primary sources of information; an absence of any rigorous analytical definition of terrorism; a privileging of description over analysis; a lack of inter-disciplinarity; the dominance of orthodox approaches to IR; the tendency to see terrorism as something 'new' since 9/11; a lack of attention given to forms of state terror; and an overly policy-prescriptive agenda. Second, the reliance of traditional terrorism studies on orthodox security studies and counterinsurgency literature is highlighted as a problem: as well as a privileging of the state as the referent object of study this work also reproduces a very narrow set of narratives and assumptions about the causes of and responses to terrorism. Third, the 'embedded' and self-referential nature of terrorism expertise is identified as a limited horizon within which 'terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres' (Jackson 2007: 245). Finally, CTS is critical of what is considered to be the 'problem-solving' logic of traditional terrorism studies, which takes the world as it finds it rather than questioning the status quo and relations of power/knowledge that (re)produce it.

Beyond critique, the CTS project seeks to contribute to terrorism studies via three epistemological, ontological and ethical-normative commitments. Epistemologically, CTS acknowledges that knowledge is a social process that is produced inter-subjectively in different contexts. As such, knowledge claims are always implicated in what Michel Foucault referred to as 'regimes of truth': what counts as 'true' will depend on hegemonic understandings of 'facts' that by definition exclude alternative thinking and practice (for more on Foucault see Chapter 5). On this basis, Jackson argues that 'CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism knowledge for and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?' (2007: 246). The view that knowledge is fundamentally bound up with power means that CTS deems the pursuit of objective research in terrorism studies to be impossible. Instead, what is called for is an approach that focuses on *how* knowledge claims work in different contexts in order to establish particular regimes of truth. This locates CTS within a post-positivist framework, which is methodologically pluralist drawing on perspectives such as deconstruction, genealogy, ethnography, historical narratives, Gramscianism and constructivism. In a similar manner, although less explicitly positioned within CTS, Stuart Croft (2006) has examined the ways in which the meaning of the war against terror was constructed in the aftermath of 9/11 via various cultural artefacts – television, billboards, bumper stickers and even jokes. Croft does this by using methods drawn from cultural studies and discourse analysis that are well beyond the methodological toolbox of conventional terrorism studies, examining how, for example, the television show *24* became a cultural resource and referent point for justifications for the use of torture in the war against terrorism.

Ontologically, CTS is committed to adopting a sceptical stance in relation to the concept of terrorism. That is to say, 'terrorism' is not anything in and of itself, but a 'tool employed at specific times, for specific periods of time, by specific actors and for specific political goals' (Jackson 2007: 248). While the effects of terrorism constitute 'brutal facts' often involving the loss of life, what counts as terrorist behaviour is a 'social fact' established through inter-subjective practice. Therefore, CTS does not work with a particular definition of terrorism against which it can 'test' certain scenarios. Rather, CTS takes its lead from the political economy within which the label 'terrorism' circulates and is applied: 'CTS is committed to questioning the nature and politics of representation – why, when, how, and for what purposes do groups and individuals come to be named as "terrorist" and what consequences does this have' (Jackson 2007: 248).

Finally, the recognition that the definition of an individual, group, institution or event as 'terroristic' is also a judgement about who may be legitimately killed or tortured, leads CTS scholars to reflect on the ethical-normative dimensions of terrorism studies. Again, rather than pursuing 'objectivity', their aim is to foreground their expressed commitments to 'the values and priorities of universal human and societal security, rather than traditional, narrowly defined conceptions of national security in which the state takes precedence over any other actor' (Jackson 2007: 249). Jackson argues that the CTS project aims to 'go beyond critique and deconstruction' in order to offer a perspective that positively constructs an agenda for social change (2007: 249). It is here that the 'critical' dimension of CTS most obviously overlaps with the tradition of Critical Theory in social and political thought and the so-called Welsh School of security studies (see Chapter 1). In this vein, Matt McDonald identifies the key ethical-normative question posed by CTS as: 'What are the imminent possibilities for emancipatory change in the context of contemporary practices of terrorism and counter-terrorism?' (McDonald 2007: 256).

What is clear is that the theoretical foundations of CTS are deliberately broad, drawing on an array of different understandings of what it means to be 'critical' (see also Jackson *et al.* 2011). On the one hand, this is perhaps to be celebrated, as it mobilises the insights of many of the perspectives introduced in Part I of this book. On the other hand, such is the breadth of influence that some authors have expressed a concern that the movement runs the risk of lacking coherence (Gunning 2007).

Liberty and security in Europe

Reflecting an IPS approach to security studies (as outlined in Chapter 5), the CHALLENGE project offers an examination of the relation between liberty and security against the backdrop of the war against terrorism in Europe. In the 'Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project', Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and R.B.J. Walker articulate the overall aim of the research programme as follows: 'CHALLENGE seeks to provide a critical assessment of the liberties of citizens and others living within the EU and how they are affected by the proliferation of discourses about insecurities and the exchange of new techniques of surveillance and control' (Bigo *et al.* 2007: 2).

The project takes as its starting point the observation that in the post-9/11 context liberal democratic governments have resorted to illiberal practices in response to the perceived threat of international terrorism.

By 'illiberal practices' the authors refer to: the rise of a more severe legislative climate; heightened levels of unease; declarations of emergency conditions; the disestablishment of the importance of human rights; the justification of the development of more sophisticated technologies for mass surveillance and exchange of individual data; and the merging of the vision and role of the police, military and intelligence agencies.

Bigo *et al.* argue that there are various defining characteristics of the model of governance underpinning these practices, which can be summarised as: a privileging of the logic of security over liberty; the emergence of a new paradigm of generalised suspicion; and the justification of illiberal practices through references to 'exceptional' national security imperatives. It is worth paying closer attention to these three dimensions in turn as they have come to influence recent scholarship on the war against terrorism associated with the so-called Paris School approach to security (see Chapter 5).

First, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in European law in 1999, provided for the establishment of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (AFSJ) within the

territorial borders of the member states of the EU. In order to implement the provisions of the Treaty the accompanying Tampere Programme adopted the rule of law as the core of the development of the AFSJ. Five years later, however, following the attacks of 9/11 and the bombings in Bali and Madrid, The Hague Programme adopted a new policy agenda that revised this basic principle. Instead of putting the rule of law first it was claimed that an alternative approach was required in the light of the heightened threat posed by international terrorism: one that seeks to *balance* liberty on the one hand, with *security* on the other. According to Bigo *et al.* (2007), this approach constitutes a 'major weakness' in the EU's ongoing efforts to promote itself as an AFSJ. The 'balancing' metaphor implies, contrary to the Tampere formulation, that 'liberty' and 'security' are antithetical values to begin with. In turn, such a framing permits discussion about what sort of 'equilibrium' *should* be reached between the two, depending upon the circumstances of the day. Consequently, it *relativises* what was formerly an *absolute* commitment to the rule of law and this move opens the way for a privileging of security *over* liberty. Indeed, according to the authors of the CHALLENGE Report, this is precisely what has happened in the EU since 2004: 'The overall priority which guides the [Hague] programme remains clear: strengthening security understood as coercion' (Bigo *et al.* 2007: 16).

Second, the CHALLENGE Report identifies what it refers to as a paradigm of generalised suspicion in the West, which accompanies governments' counterterrorist initiatives. Central to the emergence of this paradigm is the decoupling of practices of policing from judicial control. Such a move has enabled the intensification of surveillance techniques, which involve not only the watchful gaze of the state *over* the citizen but also vigilance *among* citizens. The central question facing the security sector in the EU and US has thus become how to deploy suspicion broadly enough to catch unknown people while not suspecting everybody. On the one hand, Bigo *et al.* argue that the US has lurched towards a generalised form of suspicion whereby every US citizen may be a potential terrorist. On the other hand, it is claimed that the response in the EU has been more measured by comparison, even after the attacks in Madrid and in London. Despite this qualitative difference in response, however, a common reliance upon the cultivation of fear and unease has nevertheless become a routinised practice of the intelligence services and police forces in both regions. By fostering a climate of suspicion groups of people can be risk profiled, assessed as 'friends' or 'enemies', and then dealt with accordingly (see also Bigo and Guittet 2011). As the CHALLENGE Report highlights, such an approach potentially marks a significant departure from traditional evidence-based modes of policing. Rather, it is argued, what has emerged in the West under the banner of the paradigm of suspicion is a more *anticipatory* logic based upon worst-case scenarios. In this way, *security* has become increasingly synonymous with *surveillance* and control rather than maintaining human rights and the rule of law.

Third, the CHALLENGE Report highlights the way in which illiberal practices of liberal regimes come to be justified with reference to discourses of *exceptionalism*. The concept of the exception has a rich political, philosophical (and theological) heritage within the tradition of Western thought. Different thinkers have used the concept of the exception/exceptionalism in various ways (see Chapter 5 and Box 5.4). Today it is not uncommon to find the phrase 'exceptional times call for exceptional measures' used by politicians who seek to justify an array of illiberal practices such as those identified above. Indeed, throughout the war against terrorism, this phrase has been especially popular: former US President George W. Bush, for example, used it to justify the indefinite detention of 'unlawful enemy combatants' at the US naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Clearly, however, the usage of this phrase is not something new or unique to the context of Western

politics post-9/11 (Neocleous 2008). Rather, there is a long history of declarations of emergency conditions said to necessitate exceptional measures in the West. During the 1920s, for example, successive governments of the Weimar Republic in Germany repeatedly invoked emergency powers under Article 48 of the constitution. The use of discourses of exceptionalism in order to train populations to be suspicious of each other is also something far from new: Walter Benjamin, writing in 1938, argued that 'in times of terror, when everyone is something of a conspirator, everybody will be in the position of having to play detective' (Benjamin 2003: 21).

While formal declarations of states of emergency are few and far between in the West, the authors of the CHALLENGE Report argue that an intensified *logic of exceptionalism* nevertheless pervades contemporary counterterrorist policies. Such a logic enables techniques of governance, often of a *biopolitical* nature (such as torture, rendition or indefinite detention) that would otherwise be stymied by normal liberal democratic checks and balances on coercive and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, by invoking discourses of exceptionalism, such as the notion that in any given context it is precisely the security of the nation that is at stake, it is arguably more likely that populations in liberal democracies will not only sanction but in fact *demand* further illiberal practices.

An IPS-inspired approach to security thus shifts our analysis of the global war on terrorism on to a more *everyday* or 'vernacular' setting (see also Bubandt 2005; Jarvis and Lister 2013a). While the war on terror has involved large-scale military operations such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the CHALLENGE project enjoins us to also think about the ordinary or even banal ways in which it impacts on society. Through the training of populations to be suspicious, for example, the logics of the war against terrorism are (re)produced: 'good' citizens are trained to be on the lookout for 'risky' terrorist subjects. Such practices are not neutral but politically and ethically laden since, as Judith Butler has pointed out, the cultivation of an objectless suspicion all too easily translates into 'a virtual mandate to heighten racialised ways of looking and judging' (Butler 2004: 77). Furthermore, racialised forms of suspicion often lead to acts of violence in public places such as railway stations, as illustrated by the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in Stockwell Station, London, on 22 July 2005 (Pugliese 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2007).

Conclusion

For some scholars, the war against terrorism is more than simply a phase in post-cold war international politics. According to Richard Jackson, writing in the first half of the 2000s, 'the war has taken on a life of its own and any administration would find it extremely difficult to unmake or alter to any significant degree, even if they wanted to' (2005: 3). Nevertheless, with the end of the Bush administration and the election of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the US, it is possible to identify shifts away from the rhetoric of the war against terrorism. Indeed, during his period in office Obama has rarely used the sort of language favoured by Bush, preferring a more subtle framing. Similarly, in the UK context, there was a move to abandon the 'war against terrorism' phrase during the premiership of Gordon Brown. A Home Office 'phrase book' produced in 2008, for example, called upon civil servants instead to speak in terms of 'assisting vulnerable communities in building resilience against violent extremism and criminal murder' (quoted in Amoore 2008: 130; see Box 9.3). To this extent, we might question whether 'war against terrorism' is an increasingly outdated horizon within which to analyse global security relations.

However, despite what appears to be a rhetorical shift, the extent to which security

practices have changed remains somewhat less clear. There are no signs of an intention to downgrade the elaborate homeland security infrastructure constructed largely in the aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, the DHS continues to be a funding priority of the Obama administration and, as we have seen, ever-more sophisticated methods of securing the homeland are being rolled out. Louise Amoore has written about the responsibility of critical scholars in being too quick to go along with the 'official' rejection of the language of the 'war on terrorism' in both the US and UK contexts. Amoore cites Foucault, who argued that 'the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe the relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals' (quoted in Amoore 2008: 131). On this basis, she argues that the worry about simply rejecting or forgetting about the war against terrorism is that it serves to mask the less spectacular and yet often no less violent ways in which it continues to be played out. Given the extent to which such violence affects the everyday lives of vast numbers of the globe's population, it is precisely the 'normalisation' of the war against terrorism that critical security analysis should arguably be wary of.

Key points

- Terrorism is a political label: definitions of who and/or what are 'terroristic' can change dramatically according to context.
- The limits of the US 'homeland' stretch beyond the geographical territory of America and increasingly over the globe.
- The term 'homeland security' has not been embraced in the UK as much as in the US, but there are parallels between these states' responses to terrorism as reflected in their respective national security strategies.
- CTS is a movement that questions the methodology, state-centrism and conservatism of traditional approaches to terrorism.
- The CHALLENGE project explores the relation between liberty and security via a sociological interrogation of practices at the level of the everyday.

Discussion points

- To what extent is the current threat of international terrorism qualitatively different from historical precedents?
- What is the greatest threat facing Western populations: international terrorism or governments' responses to it?
- Where are the geographical limits of the US 'homeland'?
- How applicable are notions of 'emancipation' to the analysis of terrorism?
- What does a shift in focus to an analysis of the 'everyday' mean for the study of security?
- Is the war against terrorism a short-term reaction to 9/11 or a more substantive phase in global security relations?

Guide to further reading

Angharad Closs Stephens and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2008) (eds) *Terrorism and the Politics of Response* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge). A set of essays on the London bombings from poststructuralist perspectives.

Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and R.B.J. Walker (2007) 'The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project', Research Paper No. 4, online, available at: www.libertysecurity.org/article1357.html (accessed 10 April 2009). An articulation of the aims of the CHALLENGE project.

European Political Science, 6 (2007). A symposium on CTS featuring key articles by Ruth Blakeley, Marie Breen Smyth, Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson.

Richard Jackson (2005) *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). A good starting point for an introduction to a CTS perspective on the war against terrorism.

Stuart Croft (2012) *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Develops a post-Copenhagen School approach to trace how acts of securitisation shape the identity of securitiser and securitised against the backdrop of the war on terror in Britain.

Weblinks

The EU-funded CHALLENGE project: www.libertysecurity.org

US Department for Homeland Security: www.dhs.gov

UK Home Office: www.homeoffice.gov.uk

10 Human security and development

Human security: Assessing the concept

Whereas many elements of critical debates about security have tended to remain solely at a level of academic debate the notion of human security has become, in some contexts at least, part of a broader political discourse. Proponents of human security argue that human security is a 'people-centred' approach to security, and in this regard the concept seems to resonate with academic attempts to reassess – and redefine – the 'referent object' of security (see the Introduction to this text for an overview of this debate). However, advocates of human security, although engaging to some extent with broader academic arguments about security, have generally been less focused on theoretical debates about the nature of security and have instead concentrated more on trying to influence policy to take greater account of the security of individuals in a more practical sense (see Newman 2010). In fact, the concept of human security is frequently seen to have its basis not in academic debate but in the realm of policy, specifically the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report, which is often pinpointed as a key original statement of the concept. Reference to the concept emanated initially not in the academic study of international security but in development studies and amongst bodies such as the UN.

As is noted elsewhere (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4), one of the main criticisms of traditional, state-centric approaches to security that emerged in the 1990s was that traditional security studies was empirically unhelpful, in so far as its concentration on *inter-state* conflict has become less appropriate to the post-cold war world. For UNDP practitioners in the developing world during the 1990s and up to today, this limitation of traditional security studies was particularly evident. Since the mid-1990s, the vast majority of conflicts have taken place *within* rather than between states. Moreover, the majority of these *intra-state* conflicts have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa, with more people killed in conflicts in this region than any other part of the world in the post-cold war era (even though the total number of deaths from conflict globally have dropped off since the end of the cold war). In this context, programmes such as the UNDP have sought to shift the emphasis away from *inter-state* conflict exclusively towards issues of development, and the consequences that underdevelopment can have for the liberty and security of individuals. Echoing the general tenor of several critiques of 'traditional' definitions of security, the 1994 UNDP report asserted that:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related to nation-states more than people [...] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.

(UNDP 1994: 22)

The UNDP proposed the concept of 'human security' as an alternative to the traditional focus on state security. This interpretation of human security was famously formulated in the 1994 UNDP report as 'freedom from fear and freedom from want': freedom from fear denoting the aspiration that people should be secure from the threat of violence; and freedom from want denoting the aspiration that people should be free from poverty and destitution and entitled to basic means of survival. This is clearly distinct from the traditional focus of

Abstract

The concept of 'human security' has achieved near-ubiquitous status within contemporary security discourse. For this reason alone it deserves critical scrutiny, but beyond its sheer prevalence the concept is especially deserving of attention as it seems, on the surface at least, to touch upon several key ideas and debates within critical security studies. These include: debates over the 'broadening' of security to encompass non-military issues; the relationship of security to freedom; and, most fundamentally, the idea of prioritising individual humans over the state in understandings of security. This chapter begins by detailing the rise to prominence of the idea of human security and the inroads it has made into both security policy and development practices globally. From there it assesses how the concept of human security fits within the broader notion of a 'security-development nexus' wherein human development and the management of security threats are seen to be inextricably linked. The latter sections of the chapter then engage critical debates on the meaning of human security, the scope of its application in development practices, and the question of whether human security ultimately challenges or reinforces traditional understandings of security.

Introduction

Of all the ideas covered within the pages of this book, few have generated as much attention – and contention – as the notion of 'human security'. In connecting security to the issue of human development, human security has aroused a range of responses. For some the concept holds the promise of 'security with a human face': that is, an understanding of security that is focused explicitly on the well-being and welfare of individuals rather than on the protection of states exclusively. For others, human security is at best an unhelpful chimera, and at worst an understanding so broad it both voids the concept of security of any substantive meaning and simultaneously subjects a whole new range of human activities to 'security' practices unnecessarily. Similarly, for those scholars grouped under the broad umbrella of critical security studies, the idea of human security provokes mixed feelings. Aspects of human security discourse seem to resonate with the 'emancipatory' impulse of some approaches, yet the practices associated with human security and development have still aroused much critical debate over whether the concept is simply a way of managing perceived risks to global security – most prominently the 'global South' – through new modes of intervention and administration. Is the idea of 'human security' a source of promise or peril? What are its potential pitfalls? This chapter engages these questions first by outlining the emergence of the concept of human security and its incorporation into development practices, and then by turning to a discussion of key critical perspectives on human security.

Box 10.1 Human security: Policy impact and inroads

Several states have sought to make the case that enhancing the basic level of human security through development can encourage stability and act as a form of conflict prevention. Of particular note here is what is known as the 'Human Security Network', a coalition of states and non-governmental organisations that endorse the concept of human security. The human security network has been championed by Canada and Norway in particular, two states that have historically been particularly active in advocating the concept of human security (among the other 13 states involved in the network are Japan, the Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Chile, Jordan and Mali). The Human Security Network has set itself the goal of 'strengthening human security with a view to creating a more humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear, and with equal opportunities to develop their human potential to the full'. Issues that have been addressed (with varying degrees of success) by the network include: 'protection for civilians'; a ban on landmines; a permanent International Criminal Court; children's issues (including the optional protocol on the Rights of the Child on minimum ages of recruitment and deployment of soldiers); control of small arms and light weapons; and curtailment of drug trafficking, people trafficking and organised crime networks.

Canada in particular has been a driving force in developing the human security agenda at the international level, and the concept of human security has been a prominent one in Canadian foreign policy rhetoric. In 2000, Canada became one of the first states to devote dedicated funding to the issue of human security, and the landmines treaty – a Canadian-backed initiative signed as part of the Ottawa Convention of 1997 – is still regarded as one of the primary accomplishments of the human security agenda.

Norway has similarly identified an agenda of preventive action, control of small arms, and peace operations as the core components of its approach to human security. Japan has adopted an expansive conception of human security as a key aspect of its foreign policy to ensure 'human freedom and potential'.

The UNDP has been at the forefront of the promotion of the human security agenda, and other international organisations such as NEPAD (the New Partnership for African Development), the AU (African Union), and the EU have also begun to incorporate and use the concept.

security. As the UNDP report puts it, 'Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity' (1994: 22).

Beyond this the 1994 UNDP report identified four key characteristics of human security:

- 1 that human security is a *universal concern*, i.e. that applies equally to all people;
- 2 that the components of human security are interdependent, i.e. military and non-military sources of insecurity overlap;
- 3 that there is an emphasis on prevention rather than intervention;
- 4 that human security is 'people-centred'.

This in turn seems to parallel the 'broadening' of the security agenda within the academic study of security. In the developing world violent conflict still constitutes a major source of insecurity for people living in, for example, sub-Saharan Africa. But organisations such as the UN have also recognised that many of the threats facing people in the developing world are non-military in nature: political instability leading to state oppression and breakdown in basic provisions such as education and healthcare is also a major threat to individuals;

environmental degradation (such as processes of desertification) also threatens residents of sub-Saharan Africa in particular, and in the same region epidemics and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS have a devastating effect (on the latter, see Chapter 8).

For the original proponents of the human security concept, all of these factors – internal conflict, state breakdown, environmental degradation and disease – threaten the welfare and lives of individuals as much if not more than the threat of inter-state conflict. By consequence the UNDP 1994 report identified seven specific elements that comprise human security: (1) economic security (freedom from poverty); (2) food security (access to food); (3) health security (access to healthcare) (4) environmental security (protection from factors such as degradation and pollution); (5) personal security (physical safety from systematic use of violence); (6) community security (protection of traditional cultures and physical security of ethnic groups); and (7) political security (protection of civil liberties and freedom of political expression). At the fundamental core of this expansive conception of human security is a notion that all individuals, as human beings, have a right to exist free of such threats. As Thomas and Tow put it, the 'most fundamental application' of the concept of human security 'is to concentrate upon enhancing the physical security and economic welfare of *all* the world's inhabitants, notwithstanding their sovereign status or individual identity' (2002: 181, emphasis in original).

Development and security

As noted above, the concept of human security in principle applies equally to the security of *all* human beings irrespective of geographical location. In practice, though, the primary focus of human security as an academic and policy concern has been on the 'developing world'. In this sense the concept of human security emerges as much from the field of development studies as it does from security studies; as one prominent commentator notes, 'war and its effects are now an important part of development discourse' while, conversely, 'development concerns have become increasingly important in relation to how security is understood' (Duffield 2001: 1). Consequently, the issues of security and development have come to be merged in a number of important respects (see Box 10.2 and Box 10.4).

The concept of human security and its emergence is intimately related to the emergence of the idea of 'human development'. The early 1990s saw a shift away from conceptualising improvement in global standards of living in terms of economic growth towards a focus on the more holistic concept of 'human development', an idea first put forward in the UN's *Human Development Report* of 1990 (UNDP 1990). The concept of human development refers to the broad approach to expanding people's choices or capabilities not only in terms of income, but also in areas such as health, education, the environment and employment. This understanding of human development was influenced by the thinking of Amartya Sen, Harvard professor and a former honorary president of the charity Oxfam, who has created the so-called theory of capabilities or 'capability approach' based around the extent to which human beings have access to the basic facilities to maximise their potential. The UNDP also later developed the Human Development Index as a composite measure of income per capita, life expectancy at birth and educational attainment (see King and Murray 2001). Although we might debate the accuracy and basis of such measures (how would we define an acceptable level of educational attainment for example?), it is again notable that virtually all the countries described as having low human development indicators are located in sub-Saharan Africa.

Box 10.2 Enlightened self-interest? Development as security

Development and security are intimately related – one cannot be achieved without the other. DFID's [the UK Department for International Development] approach must be guided by this [...] While the link between conflict and development is a relatively new field, the Government must prioritise it in order to improve development outcomes among the poorest. Preventing and ending conflicts will do more to create a climate for poverty reduction than any amount of costly aid programmes.

(UK House of Commons International Development Committee, *Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* 2006: 3–4)

Poverty in all its forms is the greatest single threat to peace, security, democracy, human rights and the environment.

(Michael Moore, head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), speech to WTO delegates in 2002)

Development co-operation [has] an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions that terrorist leaders feed on and exploit. Many conditions that allow terrorists to be politically successful, build and expand constituencies, find recruits, establish and finance terrorist organisations, and secure safe havens fall within the realm and primary concerns of development co-operation.

(OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention* 2003: 11)

Addressing causes of conflicts (poverty, disease, lack of governance and rule of law) is an essential first step for the EU to help promote peace and development.

(website of the European Commission on development policies, 2009)

This links back into the issue of human security – which argues that military and non-military threats to security are interdependent – as conflict is seen to be one of the most frequent inhibitors of human development. It not only poses a direct threat to the lives of those living in conflict zones, but also indirectly inhibits their access to food, health and educational facilities. This is what is sometimes termed as the 'development–security nexus' or 'development–conflict nexus': the idea that underdevelopment leads to conflict and vice versa.

Again sub-Saharan Africa is seen to be particularly prone to the worst effects of this development–security nexus. The Human Security Centre's *Human Security Report* of 2005 argues that violent conflicts in Africa (such as those that have occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan) risk giving rise to a 'conflict trap' in which conflict tends to exacerbate the condition of poverty, thus leading to greater political instability and, consequently, a higher risk of violence. In sub-Saharan Africa this prospect is exacerbated by pervasive poverty, commitment to servicing external loans and the legacies of colonial rule. The last of these is often seen to have perpetuated weak administrations, poor-infrastructure, external interventions, readily available and cheap small arms as a legacy of cold war supply by the superpowers, and the frequent lack of fit between the old-colonial boundaries and the multi-ethnic make up of many African states. The occurrence of conflict thus only serves to compound existing problems and potential state instability far beyond the direct impact of war. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is estimated that of the 2.5 million

war deaths between 1998 and 2001, only 6 per cent of these (145,000) were as a direct result of the conflict itself. The majority of deaths actually resulted from the broader societal impact of the war in terms of war-related disease and malnutrition. Similarly, the effects of conflicts frequently outlast the immediate period of violence. The 1994 Rwandan conflict, for example, generated 1.4 million 'internally displaced persons' and sent 1.5 million refugees into neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Tanzania and Burundi, with consequences that have long outlasted the cessation of violence.

Critical debates in human security

On the face of it, the rise of human security as a concept that traverses both policy practice and academia is remarkable. Few of the theories or concepts discussed in this textbook can boast such a degree of crossover between academic and policy realms. There are, however, several heated debates that have emerged over the issue of human security, how it should be defined and understood, and how it shapes security practices.

As a qualifier to the seeming rise in prominence of the concept it should be noted that although the term human security is increasingly a feature of policy discourses, this has not equated to universal acceptance. Cynics note that the concept of human security has largely been adopted by 'middle powers' such as Canada and Japan (as opposed to 'great powers' such as the US and China) as a means of increasing their influence on debates in international security. Even states and organisations that employ the concept diverge over its exact meaning leading to a fundamental question: what does human security actually mean? Although states operating within the human security network (see Box 10.1) all agree that they are in favour of something called 'human security', consensus on exactly what human security is has been difficult to find. In general, states are seen to favour either a 'broad' or 'narrow' interpretation of human security (see Box 10.3).

These broad and narrow conceptions can in turn be understood in terms of the original UNDP definition of human security as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. The first commitment – freedom from fear – is generally seen as the more narrow definition of human security as this is usually interpreted to mean protection from violence and political oppression. Canada, for example, is seen to endorse this narrower conception of human security, as are the majority of other states in the human security network. The general implications of this are that Canadian security policy places an emphasis on strengthening legal norms and building the capacity to enforce them, as exemplified in the 1997 Ottawa Convention (the landmine ban) and the 1998 Rome Treaty (which established the International Criminal Court). This also leads to an emphasis on protection of civilians, peace support operations, and conflict prevention as goals, and much the same is true of Norway's security policy which has also tended to emphasise the freedom from fear aspect of human security. By contrast Japan, like the UNDP, views human security as made up of freedom from fear and freedom from want. This latter commitment – freedom from want – has much more expansive implications. The vision of human security employed in Japanese foreign policy, by its own previous definition, 'covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity', thus potentially including factors such as environmental degradation and the spread of infectious diseases. These two interpretations of human security thus have radically different ramifications for policy practice.

Similarly, the academic community is divided over the exact definition of human security. Andrew Mack advocates a narrow interpretation that emphasises the effects of conflict, directly and indirectly, on human beings. Others, such as Ramesh Thakur, Amartya Sen,

Box 10.3 'Narrow' versus 'broad' definitions of human security

<i>'Narrow' definition</i>	<i>'Broad' definition</i>
Emphasis on 'freedom from fear' (conflict prevention and resolution).	Emphasis on 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' (conflict prevention and resolution + broader social issues such as health and education).
<i>In policy discourse:</i> Canada, Norway.	<i>In policy discourse:</i> The UNDP, Japan.
'Human security is a people-centred approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives' (from the Canadian government's Human Security website, www.humansecurity.gc.ca, 2009).	'Human security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity [...] and strengthens efforts to confront these threats' (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999, restated on its website, www.mofa.go.jp, 2007).
<i>Intellectual proponents:</i> Mack (2002); Thomas and Tow (2002).	<i>Intellectual proponents:</i> Nussbaum (2000), Sen (2000), Caroline Thomas (2002).
'[Human security] could be especially useful for explaining and justifying humanitarian interventions by underscoring the causes that generate the conflicts that invite such action' (Thomas and Tow 2002: 189).	'Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met' (Thomas 2002: 3).

Caroline Thomas and Martha Nussbaum advocate more expansive definitions. Nussbaum, for example, argues that human security in its fullest sense should include bodily health, senses and emotion (2000). Critics contend that even the narrow understanding of human security is much too elastic to be a workable concept. They argue that the concept of human security is:

too broad and vague a concept of to be meaningful for policymakers, as it has come to entail such a wide range of different threats on the one hand, whilst prescribing a diverse and sometimes incompatible set of policy solutions on the other.
(Owens and Arnell, cited in Paris 2001: 92)

Roland Paris has been particularly vocal in his criticism of the concept, arguing that 'every-one is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means' (2001: 88). Moreover, Paris argues that the broad definition of human security is effectively meaningless, since the broad understanding of human security could encompass virtually anything that causes us discomfort. For those operating within the framework of securitisation theory (see Chapter 6), this aspect of human security is especially problematic as it opens up issues such as poverty, ill-health, and poor education to dynamics of securitisation where 'in the vast majority of cases, securitization will not lead to any significant improvement [in the lives of individuals]' (Khong 2001: 233).

A further key debate in human security concerns the relationship between human security and state (or national) security. Although the concept of human security is ostensibly 'people-centred' rather than 'state-centric', the role played by states in the provision of human security varies according to different definitions of the concept. Some proponents of human security generally tend to acknowledge a role for state forces and a need for state capacity to maintain – and on certain occasions restore – peace by upholding or re-establishing state authority where it has broken down. For those of a more radical persuasion, this allowance for coexistence between state and human security undermines the ability of human security to question the global status quo, the North–South divide and the insecurities that follow from it. This disjuncture is neatly captured in a 2002 debate (see further reading) between Thomas and Tow (2002) and Bellamy and McDonald (2002). Although both sets of authors endorse the idea of human security, the former argue that a more narrowly defined concept of human security 'would accrue greater analytical and policy value' (2002: 178), whereas Bellamy and McDonald argue that a 'narrow' definition of human security is itself 'largely inconsistent with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda' (2002: 373). In common with the variant of critical security studies covered in Chapter 2, Bellamy and McDonald argue that 'viewed from a human security perspective, states are more often part of the problem than the source of the solution' (2002: 373).

Finally, one of the continuing debates over human security is the extent to which the human security discourse may be moving away from a focus on prevention to *intervention*. This debate has arisen particularly in the aftermath of the publication of the *Responsibility to Protect* report in 2001 (a.k.a. R2P) by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The R2P report is seen by many as representative of a 'new humanitarianism' identifiable in some elements of the human security discourse. The report addressed 'the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive [military] action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state'. It therefore deals with the issues of when and where states fail to fulfil their obligation to their citizens, and even actively contravene their human rights. This takes it into the natural territory of the human security agenda, which the R2P report refers to explicitly: 'Whether universally popular or not, there is growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions' (ICISS 2001: 1.28). On this basis the report argues that commitment to the idea of human security will (or should), on occasion, necessitate military intervention in support of that ideal.

The R2P was welcomed and endorsed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his successor Ban Ki-moon. However, the R2P principle continues to be highly controversial. For much of the post-Second World War era non-intervention has been the perceived norm in international affairs (although we should note that both the US and the USSR intervened militarily on a frequent basis, often by covert means, in the global South during the cold war) and some worry that the R2P will simply encourage greater intervention by Western powers in the developing world. With regard to the human security agenda there is also a fear that the R2P over-emphasises military means and intervention, rather than issues of poverty and ill health as also covered by broader understandings of the term, and prioritises a 'top-down' interventionist approach to security that returns the state to the fore (Chandler 2012).

Critical perspectives on the 'security-development nexus'

On one level it might appear that 'human security' and 'development' are desirable almost to the point of being unobjectionable: who wouldn't want human security, one might be tempted to ask? Why not intervene where human security is at risk? Yet for many scholars operating within the ambit of critical security studies, the emerging practices associated with human security and development are a source of both critical opportunity and concern (see Christie 2010). For some operating from a self-consciously critical perspective, such as Bellamy and McDonald (2002), the problem is that in many cases the policies and practices enacted in the name of human security frequently fail to fulfil the normative, progressive potential inherent in the idea. Peterson (2013) likewise makes the case that it is the ways that human security has been operationalised in policy practices that fundamentally inhibits its 'emancipatory potential'. Others, however, argue that what is problematic is the fact that ideas of human security and human development give rise to a range of practices that are less explicitly concerned with achieving 'human security' per se than they are with enacting and perpetuating particular modes of governance, particularly in those regions of the world designated as the 'developing world' or 'global South'. Here the argument is made that rather than being motivated purely by benevolence or altruism, contemporary development practices – and associated ideas such as human security – are also designed to prevent threats to global stability from 'dangerous' parts of the underdeveloped world: 'The threat of an excluded South fomenting international instability through conflict, criminal activity and terrorism is now part of a new security framework. Within this framework, underdevelopment has become dangerous' (Duffield 2001: 2).

In keeping with many of the assumptions of recent postcolonial approaches covered in Chapter 4 of this book, the argument has been made that the end of formal colonialism has not severed fundamental continuities with the colonial past. Ironically, Duffield argues, the 'radicalisation of development' – the argument that underdevelopment is a security concern and hence has to be addressed by radical measures (see Box 10.4) – means that Northern organisations (state and non-state) now operate in the global South to an extent that surpasses even the colonial period. 'The idea of underdevelopment as dangerous and destabilising provides a justification for continued surveillance and engagement' (Duffield 2001: 7): extensive new modes of governing the global 'peripheries' have come into being beyond the formal trappings of colonialism, and here the notion of a 'development-security nexus' has been crucial. The idea that underdevelopment potentially leads to threats, which gained increasing currency from the early 1990s onwards and became further embedded after the events of 9/11, has been key in the formation of what has been termed as 'liberal development complexes' (Duffield 2001). These 'strategic complexes' encompass UN agencies, international NGOs, governments, military establishments, private military companies and business interests. They are 'liberal' in the sense that, though the elements of these strategic complexes appear disparate on the surface, they are ultimately united in a few basic assumptions: that the spread of liberal governance encourages peace; the spread of economic liberalism (in the form of free markets) encourages development; and that these two elements combined ultimately create the conditions for security. Hence the basic logic is that where individuals have access to avenues of political participation and monetary income, they are much less likely to resort to activities such as terrorism and violent crime that may ultimately spread beyond the global South. Through development, so the logic goes, the underdeveloped world becomes less 'dangerous' in security terms.

Box 10.4 Mark Duffield on the merging of development and security

The commitment to conflict resolution and the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to avoid future wars represents a marked radicalisation of the politics of development. [It is now assumed that] Societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise, as happened with development in the past; moreover this process of transformation cannot be left to chance but requires direct and concerted action [...] The radicalisation of development in this way is closely associated with the reproblematisation of security. Conventional views on the causes of the new wars usually hinge upon their arising from a developmental malaise of poverty, resource competition and weak or predatory institutions. The links between these wars and international crime and terrorism are also increasingly drawn. Not only have the politics of development been radicalised to address this situation but, importantly, it reflects a new security framework within which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous. This framework is different from that of the Cold War when the threat of massive interstate conflict prevailed. The question of security has almost gone full circle: from being concerned with the biggest economies and war machines in the world to an interest in some of its smallest.

(Duffield 2001: 15–16)

Importantly, where some have claimed that development practices simply represent a new mode of imperialism (e.g. Chomsky 1999) Duffield maintains that these 'liberal complexes' are not uni-directional: they are shaped and modified by their engagement with the developing world. Again, as emphasised by many recent postcolonial approaches to security as discussed in Chapter 4, such critical approaches to the development-security nexus avoid depicting development practices as something that is simply imposed on the global South, instead looking to the ways in which liberal complexes of governance also encompass and integrate local actors, subjects and existing patterns of authority in order to secure 'fragile' states (see Duffield 2005).

Ultimately, some are left to wonder as to whether the acceptance of the idea of a development-security nexus in the discourse of states, NGOs and development agencies is self-defeating with respect to the ostensible goals of development practices. Abrahamson, (2003) drawing on securitisation theory as discussed in Chapter 6, argues that the securitisation of underdevelopment in relation to Africa is both undesirable (it risks simply embedding and embellishing the divide between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' worlds) and inadequate (it risks the militarisation of social and economic problems where the efficacy of such militarisation is highly questionable). Duffield surmises that the emphasis on 'sustainable development' and 'self-reliance' in development discourse is seriously undermined by a range of development practices that are predicated on the expectation of recurrent crises – or 'complex emergencies', as in the current lexicon – as justification for intervention and constant surveillance. Echoing Achille Mbembe's (2003) pronouncements on 'necropolitics' (discussed in Chapter 4), he argues:

a small part of the world's population consumes and lives beyond its means within the fragile equilibrium of mass society while the larger part is allowed to die chasing the mirage of self-reliance. Rather than addressing these divergent life chances, the securitization of development is further entrenching them.

(Duffield 2005: 142)

On this reading development is 'better understood as a liberal technology of security for containing and managing the effects of underdevelopment', rather than as an effort to transform the underdeveloped world into the equivalent of its developed counterpart (Duffield 2005: 142).

(En)gendering human security?

As noted in the section above, although the idea of human security ostensibly points to a concern with individual security and development, others suggest that the concept is inherently bound up with a broader liberal mode of global governance that aims at the management of whole *populations* (Duffield 2007; De Larriaga and Doucet 2008). In this vein, a key aim of many critical approaches to the concept is to shift the terrain of debate away from the question of what 'human security' is to a question of what it *does*. That is, rather than focusing on the definitional merits of 'narrow' versus 'wide' interpretations of the concept, the alternative suggestion is to focus attention on the range of practices enacted and legitimated in the name of human security. More often than not, it is argued, the practices associated with the promotion of human security are targeted at a societal level – the level of populations – rather than individual human beings in spite of pretensions to the contrary in much human security discourse. For many this places human security firmly within the ambit of what Michel Foucault calls 'biopolitics', where humans are thought of as a species in biological terms rather than as individuals (see Chapter 5 for an extended discussion). In this light, human security is viewed primarily as a technology in the sense that security is reduced to a series of technical considerations: indices of health and containment of disease; measurement of standards of education; tracking population and refugee movements.

Although conscious of the biopolitical logic that is potentially inherent within practices of human security and development, some perspectives emanating from gender theory nevertheless maintain the hope that human security also contains more positive immanent potentialities. Gender theory, applied to security studies, emphasises the need for a 'bottom-up' perspective of security rather than a 'top-down' approach: in other words, it stresses the need to take into account the 'everyday' insecurities that are experienced by people, but which have conventionally been marginalised by the statist focus of traditional security studies (see Chapter 3). In this light the idea of beginning security analysis at the level of the individual human might be worth retaining, notwithstanding the way this general idea has been rendered and applied in human security and development practice.

Bringing gender to bear on human security means much more than simply including gender issues within the remit of human security. Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvøy (2006) note that both academic and policy discourses on human security do occasionally make reference to 'gender issues', usually flagging up instances where gender differences become a source of individual insecurity (such as in cases of the contravention of women's rights and instances of gender inequality – see McKay 2004 for an overview). Domestic and sexual violence and violence against marginalised groups have also been traditionally beyond the gaze of security studies, and such concerns are usually given greater salience within discourses of human security. In this sense, the concept of human security has already been gendered, but the manner in which this has tended to occur is often used simply to differentiate human security concerns from the 'real' stuff of security studies: human security is often seen to encompass 'soft' security issues such as health and welfare, with connotations of 'feminine' qualities, which are to be distinguished from the traditionally male-dominated realms of military security. On a practical level, we might simply note that

even for states at the forefront of the human security agenda, such as Canada, 'the traditional notion of security has not disappeared – it has simply found a new home elsewhere' (Neufeld 2004: 115): in other words, even states propounding the idea of 'human security' continue to maintain and differentiate it from a more traditional notion of national, military security policy and practices. Hence:

This 'feminization' of human security or a widened security concept is not meant to be complementary. It means that human security does not measure up, and traditional security sets the standard. As such, security must be rooted within the eradication of largescale violent conflict, and anything else – 'everyday security' or the securities and insecurities of individuals themselves, such as health, food, economic or environmental issues – is *not* security, at least not by the standards of those who matter [including] most policymakers who work with the concept.

(Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006: 210)

What Hoogensen and Stuvøy argue, by contrast, is that gender theory potentially provides a more fundamental rethinking of human security. Focusing on the individual/human means more than simply substituting the individual for the state within existing frameworks of analysis; it also brings those very frameworks into question. *Human security*, from a gender theory perspective, cannot simply be limited to the inclusion of new 'issues' such as poverty and educational attainment. A more substantive understanding of the concept, drawing on gender theory and feminist perspectives, potentially constitutes a new 'epistemological perspective for security studies' (2006: 209): that is, it makes allowance for forms of knowledge derived from individual and personal human experience of security and insecurity at an everyday level, and seeks to simultaneously unpack the reasons why such forms of knowledge have been treated as illegitimate by mainstream security analysis (see Chapter 3; and also Grayson 2004). It also alerts us to the extent to which practices associated with the provision of human security – such as the 'peace support operations' enacted by the UN – uphold and enact particular notions of both masculinity and femininity in their very enactment (see Higate and Henry 2004).

By focusing on the personal, everyday dimensions of human security, gender approaches therefore seek to counteract the extent to which existing human security practices are targeted at the collective level of population. At the same time gender approaches to human security thus also aim at a greater degree of individual empowerment than is often allowed for within discussions of human security. Where a tendency exists within mainstream discourses of human security to treat – and objectify – individuals as 'victims' to be saved, a gendered concept of human security seeks to reinstate the agency of individuals by linking personal accounts of insecurity to broader social contexts and structural factors. It also refocuses our attention on the corporeal nature of human security: the extent to which the physical body is very often the site of security/insecurity behind the statistics that detail the extent of conflict and poverty, and the ways in which bodies often function as nodal or connection points in networks of security that are global in their scale. Although not explicitly focused on human security, Carolyn Nordstrom's work on 'shadow industries' serves as a good exemplar here. It carefully weaves together the personal accounts of three girls variously affected by wartime violence in Mozambique in the 1990s with a wider account of the transnational linkages surrounding illegal labour and sex-trafficking (Nordstrom 1999). Networks of migrant labour and sex-trafficking ferry victims of conflict into 'peacezones' where their bodies are further exploited and abused; but these 'shadow industries' can only

be sustained via a complex network of transport housing, and maintenance that ultimately allow such profiteering and exploitation to take place. The individual human insecurities of war victims and refugees, rather than being somehow limited to the 'developing world', are thus often embedded within and sustained by global networks to a degree that is not accessible simply by reviewing statistics on human rights abuses within zones of conflict. Taking this viewpoint reiterates the connection between 'every day' practices – including, for example, the work of illegal migrants that sustains the day-to-day running of many developed economies – and human insecurities (see also Steans 1998). Similarly, Lemanski makes the case that policy discourse of human security tend to begin from a top-down global level that treats individuals as an aggregate category, where, by contrast, starting from the local level of 'everyday human (in)security' produces a more fine-grained picture. Employing empirical examples of cities in the global South and drawing on individuals' own experiences, she shows how citizens are affected in their daily lives by specific issues of crime, physical security and financial insecurity that are not well captured by the catch-all categorisation of poverty as a human security issue (Lemanski 2012).

Conclusion

In many ways, as we have seen, the concept of human security is one of the most challenging contemporary ideas that critical approaches to security are trying to come to terms with. This is the case precisely because the idea itself seems to incorporate at least some of the aspects of critical debates in security and feeds them into policy discourse, yet the range of practices enacted in the name of human security and development only seems to raise numerous further concerns for many critically minded scholars. So where does this leave critical perspectives on human security and development? The ubiquity of human security in contemporary global security discourse is likely to mean that it will be a focus of much critical scholarship for years to come and, it might be speculated, the key debate will continue to be over whether the concept of human security has by now effectively been co-opted as a new model of statist security practices, or might be reinvigorated as a site of critical potential. In this sense at least the concept of human security provides a continuing source of debate. The guide to further reading below gives readers some indication of where they might follow up on this question, and, as indicated above, each of the approaches covered in the first section of the text also offer different resources for reflecting on the merits and limitations of human security in the twenty-first century.

Key points

- The concept of 'human security' has gained increasing prominence and recognition within global security discourse since the idea first emerged in the early 1990s.
- Although the idea has potentially universal application, in practice it has been used primarily in relation to issues of development and in reference to the global South.
- Critics of the notion of human security argue that it deprives the concept of security of any substantive meaning, and even proponents of the term are split over the merits of 'narrow' versus 'broad' understandings of security.
- Critically minded scholars have paid particular attention to how the concept of human security informs and is shaped by contemporary development practices.
- Some argue that the term has largely been co-opted by states as a new 'technology' of security aimed at managing populations in the global South; others hold out hope that

the basic idea of human security nevertheless opens the way to an understanding of security concerned with the 'everyday' insecurities experienced by individuals in many parts of the world.

Discussion points

- What does human security mean in theory and practice?
- Does the human security literature reproduce the assumptions of traditional security studies?
- What is at stake in claiming that poverty is a security issue?
- What is assumed in the idea of a 'development–security' nexus? Does it simply perpetuate Western intervention in the developing world?
- Does the 'human security agenda' simply perpetuate Western intervention in the developing world?

Guide to further reading

Caroline Thomas (2000) *Global Governance, Development and Human Security* (London: Pluto Press). Addresses the issue of whether and how development might be 'done' differently to achieve human security.

David Chandler and Nik Hynck (2012) (eds) *Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge). Brings together a wide range of critical assessments of human security.

Mark Duffield (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed). Provides an expansive assessment of the development and deployment of 'liberal complexes' of global governance in the name of development. See also his (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (London: Polity), which focuses more explicitly on the role and impact of 'human security' on development practices.

Martha C. Nussbaum (2000) *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An empirically rich and theoretically sophisticated account of the human insecurities created by relations of patriarchy.

Ryerson Christie (2010) 'Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To Critique?', *Security Dialogue*, 41:169–190 offers a comprehensive overview of the literature on human security and responses to its rise within the critical security studies literature. Christie's ultimate assessment is that human security in itself should not be regarded as a 'critical concept' or critical approach in its own right, even if it is a discussion point on which both policy-makers and academics can 'converge'. Newman (2010) and Peterson (2013) – see Bibliography for full details – suggest greater critical potential in the concept and study of human security and offer interesting comparative reading in this respect.

Security Dialogue (2004) 35(3). Special issue of the journal that offers a series of academic perspectives on human security.

Weblinks

United Nations Development Programme: www.undp.org/
Human Security Centre/Human Security Report: www.humansecurityreport.info/
Commission on Human Security: <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/>

11 Migration and border security

Abstract

This chapter introduces the crossover between the securitisation of migration and innovations in border control as a significant nodal point in the field of global security relations. It begins with an overview of some of the dominant trends in global migration and a commentary on how states go about classifying different types of migrants. From here the discussion moves on to consider how migration has been rendered a security problem in relation to the politics of insecurity in Europe, human trafficking and the gendered dimension of migration, and the relationship between critical security studies and 'critical migration studies'. Moves towards new forms of border security practices in response to the threat of migration are then traced and illustrated against the backdrop of US and EU contexts. The changing nature and location of borders in global politics poses a number of conceptual challenges for theorists of security and the chapter ends by discussing what these are and how current research in 'critical border studies' seeks to address them.

Introduction

More and more people are moving around the globe. According to United Nations data, in 1960 there were 75 million international migrants (UN 2013). By 2005 this figure had more than doubled to 191 million. As of 2013, 232 million people – 3.2 per cent of the globe's total population – are international migrants living abroad. There are many different reasons why people move between states. Some do so because they are in search of better economic prospects. Others seek to join families who have moved abroad. A significant number, 13.5 million or 7 per cent of all migrants, are in search of refuge from war, oppression and persecution.

While the phenomenon of international migration is not something new, rising numbers of migrants have led to changes in the way they are treated by states and viewed by non-migrant populations. Following the Second World War, for example, migrant workers from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean were welcomed as part of the economic reconstruction of Europe. Yet, in subsequent years the same migrants came to be associated with threats to European public order, cultural identity, and domestic labour markets. Especially since 9/11, migration has been linked by Western governments to global terrorism and transnational crime. In this way the movement of people, once encouraged as a 'good' thing, has been 'securitised' (see Chapter 6).

Throughout the global North in particular the main response to the 'problem' of migration as constructed above has been tougher border controls, which nevertheless affect people all over the globe. Traditional forms of securing the borders of sovereign states, such as the

issuing of visas, the checking of passports and other forms of monitoring movement in and out of states, have been enhanced and this is transforming the relationship between mobility and (in)security. Border control is no longer solely to be found at ports, airports, and other conventional crossings, but also offshored to the point of departure. New biometric technologies, such as iris scanning, fingerprinting and automated entry/exit systems have been rolled out to capture and manage people's identities digitally (see Chapters 9 and 12). Via this kind of 'dataveillance' individuals and populations are now risk assessed and managed according to various categories of 'dangerousness', which are often calculated in advance of their travel. Thus, the identification of migration as a security issue has stimulated new border security practices that challenge conventional ideas of what and where 'the border' is.

Migration in global politics

Why are there so many international migrants? While the globe's migrant population is at an historic high, there are particular trends in the movement of people that deserve closer attention. Part of the reason for the huge growth in international migration towards the end of the twentieth century was the effect of the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1992 and Czechoslovakia in 1993. The breaking up of these states transformed formerly internal migrants (people who move around within a particular state) into international migrants (people who move across different states). Indeed, this reclassification accounts for more than one-fifth of the increase in numbers of international migrants between 1960 and 2005 (UN 2006). Other factors contributing to the increase since 1960 include population growth, technological development, easier and cheaper transportation and better communication networks under globalising conditions.

Who are international migrants, where are they from, and where to they go to? According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs the globe's migrant populations are generally concentrated in more developed states – the North is home to 136 million international migrants compared with 96 million in the South (UN 2013). However, South–South migration is just as common as North–South migration. Of 232 million international migrants, 74 per cent are of working age (between 20 and 64 years) and 48 per cent are women. As of 2013, Europe hosted the largest number of international migrants (72 million), followed by Asia (71 million) and North America (44 million). Overall, the US is the state that receives the largest number of migrants (38 million) followed by the Russian Federation (11 million), Germany (9.8 million), Saudi Arabia (9.1 million), United Arab Emirates (7.8 million), UK (7.8 million), France (7.4 million), Canada (7.3 million), Australia (6.5 million) and Spain (6.5 million). Although there is a greater density of international migrants in the global North, there is evidence to suggest that the pattern of settlement is changing. By 2005 37 per cent of all migrants lived in less developed states and the migrant population in Africa was 17 million. Having said this, different types of migrants are typically found in different parts of the globe. In Africa, for example, there is a far higher proportion of refugees (18 per cent of total migrants) than elsewhere (average 7 per cent). Moreover, as Squire (2011) has cautioned, knowledge of certain kinds of migration is always incomplete and often highly politicised and so this should always be borne in mind when confronting statistics on population movements.

How are migrants classified? We have already started above with a distinction between 'international' and 'non-international' (domestic) migrants. A number of further categories are used by states in order to manage global flows of people. This categorisation is not an innocent activity but a very significant political move because individuals – and sometimes

entire populations – are treated differently according to which group they are labelled as and put into. 'Regular migrants' are those who are considered to have entered the state legally at official border crossings and are recognised as 'legitimate' individuals within that territory. 'Irregular migrants' are those who are deemed not to have met the criteria for admission into a given state: these individuals can be further classified in terms of 'clandestine immigrants' (because they are found to have crossed the border illegally) or 'irregular immigrants' (if they have overstayed a formerly legal visa).

Another important distinction to which we have already implicitly referred is that between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' migrants. The category of voluntary migrants refers to people who are said to have chosen to move from one state to another, such as economic migrants. Within this category, further sub-divisions are often made between 'legal permanent settler' migrants (for example the Afro-Caribbean migrants who came to work in the UK during the 1950s/1960s), 'legal temporary settler' migrants (including business travellers, tourists, students, workers) and 'illegal permanent' or 'temporary settler' migrants (such as the thousands of Mexican migrants who attempt to cross the US border each year).

The label 'involuntary migrant' is applied to those whose movement from one state to another is recognised as being forced in some way. Under the terms of Article 14 of the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights, all people have the right to seek asylum from persecution in other states. This provision is reaffirmed by the 1951 Refugee Convention, which asserts the right of all to freedom from natural disaster, civil war, ethnic, religious and political oppression. Importantly, however, these international human rights conventions do not guarantee everyone the right of refugee status, only the right to be able to seek it.

The term 'asylum seeker' is used to refer to those who claim to be fleeing from persecution under those conventions. In practice, the principle of state sovereignty means that states decide whom they will admit and recognise as a legitimate asylum seeker. Those who are recognised as such are granted the status of a 'refugee', which entitles them to the same rights of hospitality and protection as citizens of the host state. However, if an individual is deemed to be a 'bogus asylum seeker' then he or she is likely to be deported back to the country from which s/he travelled in the first place.

The securitisation of migration

Is migration a 'good' thing? The answer to this question very much depends on who you are, where you are and what your interests might be. There can be obvious advantages to the migrant if s/he is successful in fleeing from persecution and/or achieving a better standard of living.¹ The host state might also benefit economically in terms of attracting cheaper labour, enhancing productivity and adding skills to the workforce. Original states often stand to gain as well if money is sent home and/or pressure is eased on social benefits such as housing and employment.

Taking the opposite view, however, it is sometimes argued that migration can lead to the spread of conflict and forms of civil unrest between original and host states. Competition between migrants and citizens of a host state for jobs, housing and other welfare resources can lead to enmity and inter-communal rivalry and violence. Social instability, often stoked by right-wing media and political groups, can arise from the perception that migrants pose a 'threat' not only to economic well-being, but cultural identity, national heritage and the social cohesion of the host state. Whether accurate or not, migration is often associated by various state and civil actors with disorder, crime and increasingly, as we shall see below, with terrorist activity. As such, migration is a deeply contested issue.

Today, migration can be located within a security continuum that connects it with issues such as terrorism, international crime and border control. Host populations are often fearful of immigrant communities and racial tensions sometimes lead to violent confrontations (such as the 'race riots' in Oldham near Manchester in the UK in 2001 and violence against undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique and elsewhere in South Africa). Yet, this has not always been the case – in Europe's recent past, for example, migration was not only tolerated but actively encouraged. What has changed and how has migration been produced as a security threat?

Immigration and the politics of fear

Jef Huysmans (2006) has examined the securitisation of migration against the backdrop of European Union integration. According to Huysmans, during the 1950s and early 1960s immigrants were treated as a valuable workforce in most European states. The post-war economic climate required a cheap and flexible workforce that could not be found among domestic populations. Permissive and even promotional migration was common in France, Germany and the Netherlands, for example. Furthermore, the arrival of migrants was met with ambivalence by host populations for whom their settlement was not a salient political issue.

Towards the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, Huysmans argues that migration was increasingly a public concern in Europe. The inward movement of people became associated with the destabilisation of civic order and challenges to the welfare state model. Prominence was given to immigrant communities as they started to enlarge with the arrival of workers' families. A formerly permissive stance gave way to a new tougher attitude that sought to control who came to settle. During this period, to use the language of securitisation theory (see Chapter 6), the issue of migration became 'politicised' as a pressing concern. Indeed, this is well illustrated by British MP Enoch Powell's infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech delivered amid heightened public tensions over immigration to the UK in April 1968 (see Box 11.1).

For Huysmans, the further transition from the politicisation to the securitisation of migration in Europe occurred from the late 1980s/early 1990s onwards. At this time we see the gradual incorporation of migration and asylum policy into the constitutional structure of the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Community (EC). In 1990 the Convention designed to implement the lifting of internal borders in Europe connected immigration and asylum issues with terrorism, transnational crime and border control for the first time. While this was not a 'speech act' as conventionally understood, Huysmans argues that it constituted a significant securitising move because it placed migration within the institutional framework of the internal security of European member states. In this way, Huysmans draws our attention to the way in which an issue does not have to be literally 'spoken about' or 'written of' in the language of security for it to be securitised. Rather, the placing of an issue like migration into the technocratic institutional realm of security also has the effect, albeit one that is perhaps more subtle, of securitisation. What is at stake here, according to Huysmans, is the production of a 'domain of insecurity' in which something formerly considered resolvable in the sphere of politics has shifted to that of security (Huysmans 2006: 4).

Moves towards the securitisation of migration were thus already well underway prior to the events of 9/11. Since then, however, Huysmans points to the way in which these dynamics have been intensified and further entrenched (see also Bigo *et al.* 2007, Bigo and Guitter

Box 11.1 Extract from Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech, delivered to a Conservative Association meeting in Birmingham, 20 April 1968

A week or two ago I fell into conversation with a constituent, a middle-aged, quite ordinary working man employed in one of our nationalised industries.

After a sentence or two about the weather, he suddenly said: 'If I had the money to go, I wouldn't stay in this country.' I made some deprecatory reply to the effect that even this government wouldn't last for ever, but he took no notice, and continued: 'I have three children, all of them have been through grammar school and two of them married now, with family. I shan't be satisfied till I have seen them all settled overseas. In this country in 15 or 20 years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.'

I can already hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible thing?

How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation?

The answer is that I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that his country will not be worth living in for his children.

I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else. What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking – not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history.

In 15 or 20 years, on present trends, there will be in this country three and a half million Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants. That is not my figure. That is the official figure given to parliament by the spokesman of the Registrar General's Office.

There is no comparable official figure for the year 2000, but it must be in the region of five to seven million, approximately one-tenth of the whole population, and approaching that of Greater London. Of course, it will not be evenly distributed from Margate to Aberystwyth and from Penzance to Aberdeen. Whole areas, towns and parts of towns across England will be occupied by sections of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population.

As time goes on, the proportion of this total who are immigrant descendants, those born in England, who arrived here by exactly the same route as the rest of us, will rapidly increase. Already by 1985 the native-born would constitute the majority. It is this fact which creates the extreme urgency of action now, of just that kind of action which is hardest for politicians to take, action where the difficulties lie in the present but the evils to be prevented or minimised lie several parliaments ahead.

The natural and rational first question with a nation confronted by such a prospect is to ask: 'How can its dimensions be reduced?' Granted it be not wholly preventable, can it be limited, bearing in mind that numbers are of the essence: the significance and consequences of an alien element introduced into a country or population are profoundly different according to whether that element is 1 per cent or 10 per cent.

The answers to the simple and rational question are equally simple and rational: by stopping, or virtually stopping, further inflow, and by promoting the maximum outflow. Both answers are part of the official policy of the Conservative Party.

2011). Moreover, we might add, security practices in response to fears of the effects of migration have taken on increasingly racialised characteristics. The linking of immigration and asylum with security threats in the 1980s and 1990s had already singled out Third World nationals as many asylum seekers in Europe have historically come from the global South. A more recent trend, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 and the bombings in Madrid and

London, has been the particular focus on Muslim communities (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2013). In this context, the granting of asylum to Muslim clerics has been cited as one of the conditions of possibility for the so-called 'radicalisation' of Muslim youths in Western Europe.

Huysmans' work not only considers the production, but also the political implications of the securitisation of migration. By invoking the very notion of a community that is endangered by migration a securitising actor reinstates that community as a sovereign political entity. In other words, fear of migration and asylum can be mobilised politically in order to reaffirm the existence of a particular community: 'The securitization of migration reproduces a myth that a homogenous national community or Western civilisation existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens' (Huysmans 2006: x). On this basis, Huysmans powerfully highlights what is at stake politically in the rendering of migrants as an existential security threat.

Gender, categorisation and human trafficking

In his treatment of the securitisation of migration, Huysmans adopts a Foucauldian approach that reads knowledge as constitutive of global politics (for more on the thought of Michel Foucault see Chapter 5). That is to say, security is 'not simply an analytical lens' through which we study global politics in a passive sense (Huysmans 2006: xii). Rather, on this view, security is understood more dynamically as a 'political technique of framing' that structures social relations (2006: xii). The framing of migrants in different ways, through the use of various categorisations considered earlier, has significant implications. If an individual is framed in humanitarian terms then s/he may be dealt with compassionately as a holder of particular rights. However, if a migrant is seen in terms of security (threats) then they may be subject to exclusionary practices.

Like Huysmans, Claudia Aradau pays attention to the ethical and political implications of the categorisation of different types of migrants. Aradau takes human trafficking as a case study for further analysing the way in which the naming of people constitutes their relationship with apparatuses of security. According to Aradau, there are 2.5 million people recorded as being caught up in practices of human trafficking globally (Aradau 2008). Of course, given the underground nature of these practices, there are many more undocumented cases. Irrespective of the 'true' figures, however, the majority of those trafficked from one state to another are women in the sex industry, which highlights an important gender dimension to migration.

Aradau examines how, depending on the categorisation of trafficked women, different possibilities for action are opened up and closed down. The labelling of women as illegal migrants, prostitutes, victims or the abused bearers of human rights each leads to different outcomes. Women classified as 'victims' are either admitted to rehabilitation centres or deported voluntarily, whereas 'illegal' female immigrants are typically held in detention centres and then forcibly returned to their country of origin. Yet, as Aradau shows, the line between the two is often unclear and in practice suspicion of illegality hovers over all trafficked women who are 'caught' and duly 'processed' (2008: 4).

Significantly, Aradau does *not* argue that the labelling of women is systematically 'inaccurate' in recording their 'true' status. Indeed, she emphasises that such a status does not exist straightforwardly: many women are *both* victimised *and* caught up in illegal cartels; they are not *all* dangerous, but some are; trafficking is neither entirely forced nor voluntary. Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective, Aradau is more interested in how it is through the

very act of classification that the logic of security works. In other words, it is precisely the activity of making divisions, drawing lines and distinguishing between people, in this case trafficked women, that enables security to function as a method of governing populations.

From here, Aradau raises the normative question of how it might be possible to think about the trafficking of women in such a way that avoids the security trap. She rejects notions of desecuritisation (see Chapter 6), emancipation (see Chapter 2) and other forms of ethics, because she argues that these all lead to a 'humanitarian impasse'. By this Aradau refers to the way in which any approach built around the construction of victimhood leads back into the sort of line drawing that security relies upon. Instead, Aradau draws on the work of Alain Badiou to argue that a common struggle needs to be identified in order to establish the grounds for 'equality' between all those caught up in trafficking. On this view, it is through the identification of such a commonality that the situation of trafficked women might be politicised and the grounds for further differentiated classification refused. One such commonality according to Aradau is that, irrespective of how they get categorised, all trafficked women are essentially workers. Thus, by making the claim that prostitution is a form of work, Aradau argues that such women are remade as political subjects who are then better positioned to challenge 'the security practices governing the situation of trafficking' (2008: 143).

Critical migration studies

As we have seen, both Huysmans and Aradau share a commitment to the analysis of the production of different types of migrants by the state as a security practice. For Elspeth Guild this commitment underpins what she refers to as 'critical migration studies' (CMS). CMS is Guild's term for a growing body of literature that seeks to challenge the assumption that 'we know what migration is and which actors are entitled to determine the political in respect of migration' (Guild 2009: 2). Influenced in part by an IPS perspective (see Chapter 5), CMS seeks to move away from a realist-inspired state-centric approach to migration. Rather than treating migration as the mass flow of differentiated groups of people from one state to another, and therefore as an object of dispassionate statistical analysis, CMS focuses on how individual movement becomes framed in particular ways: 'How does the individual fit into a set of state structural frameworks and become categorised as a threat to security and to state control of migration?' (Guild 2009: 3; see also Squire 2011).

As the quotation above indicates, one of the key moves Guild makes is to argue for the increased prominence of the *individual* in the study of migration. All too often, she claims, analysts buy into the statist language of 'flows', 'stocks' and 'tidal waves' of particular types of migrants. An alternative focus on people and their experiences allows for a more nuanced and politically engaged mode of analysis: 'By refusing to accept the disappearance of the individual into an undifferentiated flow of people which is then directed [...] by state actors or processes, I seek to reveal the construction and deconstruction of assumptions about migration, identity, and security' (2009: 5).

According to Guild, the problem with a conventional state-centred study of migration is that it treats migrants as confronting the state as if it were a pre-existing monolithic political community. This obscures the way in which, as Huysmans' work demonstrates, it is at least partly through the securitisation of migration that the state is reaffirmed and reproduced as a distinct political community in the first place. Moreover, such an outlook distracts attention from the 'political agency' of migrants, who not only play a role in constituting regimes of border control but may also resist and/or disrupt the system in which they find themselves (see also Squire 2011; Stierl 2012).

Taking the individual as the starting point for analysing migration does not 'do away' with the state. Rather, it enables a different form of enquiry that considers how the individual and state interact. Neither is taken as *a priori* given, but understood to be co-constitutive of each other. This view problematises the state, which is no longer assumed to be a fully formed 'complete' sovereign entity. Rather, a more dynamic approach is implied that draws attention to how, paradoxically, the state relies on migration in order to continually perform its sovereign authority.

Although not necessarily framed explicitly in terms of Guild's use of the term, CMS might also be linked to a number of interdisciplinary currents. A particular hallmark of this research is its focus on the experiences of individual migrants: Shahram Khosravi (Khosravi 2010) analyses 'illegal immigration' from the perspective of asylum seekers travelling from Iraq and Afghanistan; Alison Mounitz (2010) has explored the encounter between the state and migrants in the Australian and US contexts; Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz (2010) investigate the global deportation regime from a 'bottom-up' perspective; and Jennifer Hyndman's (2012) collection considers the role of border-crossers in shaping the relationship between mobility and (in)security.

Border security practices

There is an important connection between migration and states' borders. Indeed, it is the very act of crossing the border that produces the international migrant in the first place, as someone who is in transit from one sovereign territory to another. At the border key decisions are made about who is 'legitimate' and who is 'illegitimate'; who is 'trusted' and who is 'risky'; who can be allowed to cross freely and who is excluded. Traditionally, the image of 'the border' is of a thin line located at the geographical outer edge of the state. Today, however, the line is increasingly 'thick': it is the site of many rituals such as the checking of the passport, body searches and questioning. Through these border security practices the state performs and thus (re)asserts its authority.

Realist approaches within security studies, and IR more generally, have long been interested in the defence and transgression of states' borders. While important, however, this work has tended to take borders for granted merely as part of the 'fixtures and fittings' of the international system (Williams 2003a: 27). By contrast, more recent work, typically of a critical vein, has sought to investigate borders as sites of intellectual enquiry in their own right. In this section we consider recent research on the evolution of border security practices in the US and EU contexts, as well as more theoretical insights produced by the growing interdisciplinary field of critical border studies.

The US–Mexico border

Migration to the US has grown considerably in recent decades. In 1986 permanent legal residency was granted to 601,708 migrants (Doyle 2009). By 2006 this figure had risen to 1,266,264. Of course, these numbers only illustrate the extent of successful, legitimate, recorded migration. There is also a much darker set of statistics, which show that between 1996 and 2006 approximately 4000 people died trying to get into the US illegally. Most of these deaths were of Mexican migrants heading north and their shrines are a striking feature of the border landscape.

The US–Mexico border, which spans over 2000 miles, is the longest and busiest contiguous border between the 'first' and 'third' worlds. Soon after 9/11 an explicit connection was

emphasised by the US administration between immigration in the south and the threat of international terrorism. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission Report identified the border as a weak link in US security and called for tougher controls. In response, the DHS has pursued an aggressive approach to Mexican immigration as part of its overall counterterrorism strategy (see Chapter 9). Yet, as the research of Peter Andreas (2000) demonstrates, the securitisation of migration in the US–Mexico borderlands has a much longer history (see also Nevins 2010).

Andreas (2000) points out that for centuries there has been a clandestine border economy between Mexico and the US. Smugglers have long crossed the border with an array of goods from money, precious metals and stones, and antiquities to drugs, pornography and waste. The first US Border Patrol was established in 1924, with 450 officers and a budget of \$1 million (Andreas 2000: 31). The number of apprehensions at the border increased from 182,000 in 1947 to 1,600,000 by 1986, which stimulated heightened control from the late 1980s/early 1990s. In 1995 Operation Hard Line was launched to curb drug trafficking and at the same time new initiatives were developed to limit illegal immigration. Tougher border security was thus already well underway during the 1990s with the enforcement budget rising from \$354 million in 1993 to \$877 million by 1998 (2000: 89).

At this time, the border was 'thickened' using new fencing equipment and surveillance devices, such as infrared night-vision scopes, low-light TV cameras, ground sensors, helicopters and all-terrain vehicles (2000: 90).

Writing at the turn of the millennium, Andreas' work ran counter to globalisation theorists' claims about the existence of a 'borderless world'. Rather, drawing on the US–Mexico border as a case study, he pointed to the continued significance of stubborn territorial divisions between states. Moreover, Andreas argued that, while partly aiming to deter drug traffickers and illegal immigrants, the escalation of border security in the US during the 1990s was also a political move. By constructing an impression that the border was 'under siege', local and national politicians could then present themselves as guardians of the nation. Thus, for example, Pete Wilson's campaign for re-election as governor of California in 1994 arguably focused on the border for political gain. More generally Andreas emphasises that the creation of a lawless borderland in need of control presents the state with an opportunity to reproduce its authority. Historically the US–Mexico border has never been 'sealed' and never will be. This is not the point, however. Rather, the border must be seen as a political stage: 'Border policing [...] is not only the coercive hand of the state but a ceremonial practice, not only a means to an end but an end in itself' (2000: 11). On this view, even though complete control of the border is impossible, the 'border games' states play are themselves politically significant security practices.

While Andreas focuses on the role of the state as a securitising actor, Roxanne Lynn Doty (2007) has shown how some US citizens are also involved in border work. In October 2004 retired businessmen Jim Gilchrist and Chris Simcox founded an anti-immigration group called the Minute Men Project (MMP). This unofficial and unauthorised, though not illegal, group was set up in order to promote citizen-led border security initiatives. It is named after the so-called 'minutemen' of the American Revolution, who were highly mobile rapid response teams mobilised to help fellow soldiers under threat. The MMP claims that, despite the gradual intensification of border control, the US state is still not doing enough to control the US–Mexico border. On this basis, it organises vigilante border protection and MMP squads go in search of illegal Mexican immigrants in order to deter and/or report them to official border guards. Doty uses this example not only to highlight the phenomenon of border vigilantism, but also to problematise what she refers to as the Schmittian decisionism of securitisation theory (see Chapters 5 and 6). She argues that the MMP, though a good

example of what the Copenhagen School refers to as 'societal security', illustrates how sovereign decisions on what and/or whom is allowed to cross the border are made by diverse actors at multiple sites:

Everyone is potentially 'the police', faceless creators and upholders of the social order. Border vigilantes 'found' a society and identity that never existed, but which they claim to want to preserve. Their practices supplement a sovereign that remains indeterminate, reminding us that any promise of an ordinary sovereign foundation can only ever be a promise. (Doty 2007: 132)

In other words, Doty uses the case of MMP border vigilantism to show how the ability to securitise an issue is not the sole preserve of the state and that in practice sovereign decisions are made by those who simply claim the authority to do so.

As we have seen, in their study of the border both Andreas and Doty focus on the geographical line that separates the US from Mexico. Louise Amoore's work adds to this analysis by considering how US border security practices do not only occur at the geographical outer edge of the state (Amoore 2006, 2007). Amoore has shown how the raft of new bordering practices rolled out by the DHS challenges straightforward distinctions between domestic/foreign, national/international, inside/outside. The Smart Border Alliance initiative, unveiled in 2004 by the DHS in response to the threat of international terrorism, prompted a shift in the conceptualisation of border security in terms of risk management. Amoore traces how the US has developed new forms of pre-emptive borders that assess risky travellers *before* they leave their country of origin to travel in the first place. In this way Amoore argues that: 'The management of the border cannot be understood simply as a matter of the geopolitical policing and disciplining of the movement of bodies across mapped space' (2006: 337). Rather, Amoore draws on the thought of Michel Foucault (see Chapter 5) to suggest that the US border is 'more appropriately understood as a matter of biopolitics, as a mobile regulatory site through which people's everyday lives can be made amenable to intervention and management' (2006: 337). It is 'biopolitical' precisely because of the focus on the body of populations through the encoding of travellers to allow for their classification according to perceived levels of risk. Moreover, rather than fixed at a specific territorial site, Amoore refers to the mobility of the US border, 'carried by mobile bodies at the very same time it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, or subways, or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood' (2006: 338). In this way, Amoore uses the US case to illustrate how borders are not what or where we might expect them to be in contemporary political life.

The EU and its borders

On the one hand, as we have already noted, the EU hosts the largest number of international migrants globally. On the other hand, the ever more sophisticated and intensive policing of member states' borders has been a significant theme in research on migration and security in the EU context. Yet, while earlier work referred to the sharp edges of 'fortress Europe' (Geddes 2000), more recent scholarship has pointed to the increasing complexity and diffusion of Europe's borders.

In 1985 the Schengen Agreement was signed between France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Agreement pledged to apply the principle of the free movement of people, services and goods, as originally provided for under the 1957 Treaty

of Rome, by abolishing border controls between those states. In 1990 a Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed and within six years the original states were joined by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The body of law accompanying the implementation of the Agreement, known as the Schengen *acquis*, was formally incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. This incorporation was central to the expressed aim of the EU to establish a borderless 'area of freedom, security, and justice' (Article 2, Treaty of the European Union).

Although Schengen sought to enhance the freedom of movement for European citizens into and between the territories of the EU's member states this was accompanied by harsher controls on non-European nationals. A series of 'compensatory measures' were put in place including a tougher asylum and immigration regime to prevent illegal entry from the outside. As William Walters (2002) has pointed out, however, these measures formed a continuum with checks inside the EU to monitor movement within Europe via identity cards, hotel registers, employment registers, customs and excise legislation, health certificates, social security data, and the establishment of EU-wide information databases such as the Schengen Information System (SIS). On this basis, Walters argues that the EU's borders must be read not merely as a sharp line at the outer edge of member states' territories but as 'a more diffuse, networked, control apparatus' (Walters 2002: 573).

Similarly, Didier Bigo (2000) has emphasised the increasing intertwining of internal and external security in the context of the EU. Surveillance of the sort to which Walters refers means that the domestic and foreign policies of member states are now inseparable. Accompanying these shifts is a blurring of high-intensity policing and low-intensity military activity so that the formerly distinct realms of police inside and army outside no longer hold purchase. Rather, new forms of transnational government have led to a blurring of the categories of the inside and the outside and a destabilisation of the concepts of sovereignty, territory and security. Whereas, Bigo claims, traditional notions of security were conceptualised in terms of a 'given territory delimited by state borders', what we see in the EU is a more complex field of (in)securitisation (for more on this concept see Chapter 5):

Security checks are no longer necessarily done at the border on a systematic and egalitarian basis, but can be carried out further downstream, within the territory, within the border zone or even upstream with police collaboration in the home country of immigrants, through visa-gathering systems and through readmission agreements. (Bigo 2000: 185)

Bigo thus abandons a simple understanding of the border as a line between sovereign territories. Instead, he develops the idea of a 'field of (in)security' to refer to the fundamentally interconnected network of security relations in the EU (cf. Burgess 2011). Such a field involves the security of some at the expense of the insecurity of others: it is a method of 'unease management' that combines practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling, containment and detention of foreigners, together with enhanced mobility for trusted liberal subjects (see Chapter 9).

Other recent work, in many ways further illustrating the insights of Walters and Bigo, has investigated the 'off-shoring' and 'out-sourcing' of Europe's borders (Bialasiewicz 2011, 2012). In an additional stage in the Europeanisation of member states' borders, the Frontex agency was established in 2004 to promote a pan-European model of integrated border security. Added impetus was given to the coordination of Europe's borders in the wake of the attacks on 11 September and subsequent bombings in Madrid and London. Indeed, the

Revised EU Terrorism Action Plan of 9 March 2007 refers to the role of Frontex as central to counterterrorism initiatives by conducting effective risk analyses of threats to Europe's borders, maximising the capacity of existing border systems to detect suspected terrorist activity and to impede terrorists' movement into and within the EU. Sergio Carrera (2007) has examined how, in addition to traditional forms of borderwork at conventional sites such as ports, airports and peripheral territories, Frontex operations have also taken place hundreds of miles away from member states' territories.

In 2006, for example, the Spanish government approached Frontex to help with what it characterised as unprecedented levels of illegal immigration from Western Africa to the Canary Islands. Operation HERA II brought together technical border surveillance equipment from numerous member states with the objective of preventing migrants from leaving their shores on the long sea journey in the first place. To achieve this, Frontex mobilised patrol boats supplied by Italy and Portugal off the West African coast near Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal. Surveillance planes borrowed from Finland and Italy were also flown along the coastline and deeper into African territory in an attempt to deter would-be immigrants from travelling. Moreover, evidence from NGOs alleges that the naval interception of migrants at sea and their subsequent return to third countries – often with requests for humanitarian assistance denied – has become another strategy pursued by Frontex. On 21 June 2009, for example, it is claimed that Operation Nautilus IV picked up 74 migrants and handed them over to a Libyan patrol vessel marking the 'first forced return operation coordinated by Frontex on the high seas (PICUM 2010: 58).

Population movements arising from the Arab Spring have set the scene for an intensification of EU border security practices. According to the BBC, between January and March 2011 an estimated 25,000 'illegal immigrants' arrived on the Italian island of Lampedusa from North Africa. In response Frontex launched Operation Hermes, which pushed migration routes further eastwards and an unknown number have sought entry into the EU via Greece's border with Turkey. Despite the launch in 2011 of the EU's humanitarian-focused Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), NGOs working in the region claim that the increasingly pre-emptive, off-shored, out-sourced and militarised nature of EU border security has not only exposed many more migrants to death at sea, but also to inhuman, degrading and often life-threatening conditions in detention centres throughout member states, north Africa, west Africa and the Greece–Turkey borderlands (PICUM 2010).

In these ways, the activities of Frontex constitute a European border performance that complicates the traditional geopolitical imaginary of the EU. The territorial limits of the EU on the one hand are increasingly decoupled from the stretch of the EU's attempts to control movement on the other hand.

Critical border studies

The idea that 'the border' is not what or where it is supposed to be according to traditional conceptions of global politics is a theme that Étienne Balibar (1998), among others, has written about. According to Balibar, the concept of the border is itself undergoing considerable transformation:

We are living in a conjuncture of the vacillation of borders [...] borders are no longer at the border, an institutionalised site that could be materialised on the ground and inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins. (1998: 217–218)

Crucially, reflecting on the insights of recent empirical work on the US–Mexico and European borders, Balibar is not arguing that the vacillation of borders means their disappearance. On the contrary, in his view borders are not melting away under conditions of globalisation, but are increasingly ‘multiplied and reduced in their localisation [...] no longer the shores of politics but [...] the space of the political itself’ (1998: 220).

The observation that borders are complex assemblages that are ever more dislocated, offshored and as mobile as the people, services and goods they seek to control, has prompted new directions in the inter-disciplinary field of border studies. Limology, the formal study of borders, first emerged as a branch of geography in the late nineteenth century and the focus was almost exclusively on empirical case studies of particular land borders (Kolossoff 2005). Traditional geopolitical scholarship in this vein took as a given the existence of borders between states as territorial markers of jurisdiction and sovereignty. From the 1990s onwards, however, the influence of the postpositivist turn in social sciences led to a more nuanced treatment of borders in global politics. The field of critical geopolitics sought to problematise the modern geopolitical imagination of which the traditional image of the border has been central in carving divisions between inside/outside (Agnew 1994; Ó Tuathail 1996; Walker 1993). Instead of taking borders between states as a static given, this work has analysed the symbolic value of borders, the work that they do in various social, political and economic discourses, and how borders get (re)produced through ‘signs, identifications, representations, performances, and stories’ (van Houtum 2005: 672).

A more recent development in the study of borders, especially against the backdrop of the war on terror, has been a shift from a geopolitical to a biopolitical horizon of analysis. Thus, as we have already seen, Amoore draws on Foucault to diagnose what she calls the ‘biometric border’: a ‘mobile regulatory site through which people’s everyday lives can be made amenable to intervention and management’ (Amoore 2006: 337; see also Muller 2010). Developing the thought of Giorgio Agamben (see Chapter 5), Nick Vaughan-Williams has identified a logic that he refers to as the ‘generalised biopolitical border’ (Vaughan-Williams 2009). Instead of viewing borders as fixed and at the outer edge of the state, Agamben offers critical resources for reconceptualising ‘the border’ as a mobile, pre-emptive and biopolitical decision about the worthiness of different lives. Such a ‘decision’, which is not necessarily taken by a singular sovereign source (or even a human, necessarily), attempts to performatively produce and secure the borders of political community. It does so by defining the politically qualified life of the citizen in contradistinction with those whose lives are deemed to be ‘bare’. On this view, it is precisely this sovereign dividing practice – one that is not always ‘successful’, but rather always only an *attempt* – that constitutes the primary activity of border security across a global biopolitical terrain. Bigo (2007) also draws on the insights of Agamben to develop the concept of the ‘ban-option’, which can be understood as another alternative biopolitical border imaginary. This concept, a play on Bentham’s figure of the panopticon as featured in the work of Foucault (see Chapter 5), refers to logics of surveillance that help to create a transnational field of unease and (in) security management that transcends divisions between inside and outside. The use of ‘ban’ is a reference to Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of the ‘abandoned being’ (Nancy 1993), which Agamben uses to characterise bare life. Lives that are produced as ‘bare’ by sovereign power are effectively banned from juridical-political structures: they are subject to them but do not benefit from any of the rights of the citizen. In this context we might think of various ‘exceptional’ figures caught up in the biopolitical border politics of the war on terror such as the detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Jean Charles de Menezes who was shot dead by UK counterterrorist officers in Stockwell Station on 22 July 2005, and in some

contexts entire communities deemed to pose a security risk purely because of their ethnic background (see also Chapter 9).

But while there has been a spirited uptake of Agamben in some quarters of critical migration and border studies (Diken 2004; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Khosravi 2010; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004), other scholars have expressed caution when focusing on sovereign power, the politics of exceptionalism and the ‘bare life’ thesis more generally. Vicki Squire argues that ‘while Agambenian analyses of border practices generally focus on the exceptional moments of a politics of control, an analytics of irregularity examines a range of processes of (ir)regularization that are manifest across various sites through various rhythms and in various forms – the standard and the everyday, as well as the extraordinary and the spectacular’ (Squire 2011: 14). Agamben may offer tools for theorising border security as a technique of government, but his work is arguably less instructive – even ignorant of – the daily experiences of migrants and how they in turn shape regimes of border control. For Squire ‘borderzones may be marked by struggles around abjection, but do not necessarily produce abject subjects’ and for this reason she argues that it is important to recover sites of contestation and migrant agency (Squire 2011: 14; see also Johnson 2013; McNevin 2013; Shewly 2013).

A growing literature associated with the broad label of CBS has sought to problematise the conception of ‘the border’ as a ‘thin’ line demarcating the sovereign territory of member states (Johnson *et al.* 2011; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009, 2013; Squire 2011). According to Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009: 2), one of the tasks of critical border studies is to ‘extrapolate new border concepts, logics, and imaginaries that capture the changing perspective on what borders are supposed to be and where they may be supposed to lie’. For example, by adopting a biopolitical perspective that reads borders as mobile controls on and through the bodies of individuals, new ways of thinking ‘the border’ are opened up. Surveillance technologies and other methods of monitoring movement can be incorporated in a broader conception of what bordering practices consist of (see Dijstelbloem and Ameijer 2011). In turn, this also allows for analysis of how the agents of many contemporary border security practices are not exclusively those employed by the state, but citizens who adopt the role of temporary sovereigns in performing borderwork (Rumford 2008, 2012). Moreover, the research foci on the changing nature of borders as they relate to broader spatial, governmental and legal shifts, the ethical and political implications of border controls, and the multiple violences and injustices implied by increasingly pre-emptive border security practices, means that there are significant areas of overlap between critical security, border and migration studies.

Conclusion

The movement of people across the globe has increased with growing populations, easier and cheaper forms of transportation, and new technologies that enhance communication. Yet, while migration to some of the most popular destinations such as Europe and North America was once welcomed by host governments, the issue has arguably become securitised. The securitisation of migration in the West began in the 1980s, although this process was given added impetus by the attacks of 11 September 2001. Migration has become ever more closely associated with the threat of international terrorism, transnational crime and the dissolution of traditional forms of political community. Critical approaches to the study of migration have sought to trace the production of mobility as a security threat, emphasise the ethical and political implications of the categorisation of different forms of migrants, and

argue for a shift in the referent object of analysis away from statist perspectives on 'tides' and 'swarms' of migrants to the individual and his/her experiences and political agency.

As part of the securitisation of migration we have witnessed the rise of new forms of border security practices. These practices are not, however, designed merely to *stop* the circulation of people, services, and goods. Rather, borders are increasingly designed to maximise flows of legitimate traffic while at the same time filtering out illegitimate movement. The traditional geopolitical imagination views the border as a territorial marker of the limits of sovereign power at the outer geographical edge of the state. Innovations in border security practices, such as the Smart Border Alliance in the US or the activities of Frontex in the EU, in many ways challenge this imagination and call for alternative ways of conceptualising what and where borders are.

Key points

- Migrants are classified by states in different ways to manage flows of people and each classification has important implications for individuals.
- A range of writers in critical security studies has shown how migration has become produced as a security threat, or 'securitised', in the West.
- Critical approaches to border and migration studies have argued that borders are ever-more complex phenomena, not only to be found at the territorial outer edge of the state but increasingly dispersed across a global terrain.

Discussion points

- What and/or whom does migration threaten?
- Should migration be securitised? How could it be desecuritised?
- What is the relation between the securitisation of migration and the politics of fear?
- In what ways are borders central to the securitisation of migration?
- What and/or where are borders in contemporary political life?
- Does the distinction between inside and outside still apply in the study of global security relations?

Guide to further reading

- Claudia Aradau (2008) *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics Out of Security* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Offers a detailed empirical engagement with the gendered dimension of human trafficking and a theoretical critique of 'desecuritisation' and 'emancipation'.
- Elisbeth Guild (2009) *Security and Migration in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity). An excellent introduction to the historical, conceptual and empirical phenomenon of migration and its relation to critical security studies.
- Jet Huysmans (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge). An important account of the securitisation of migration in the European context.
- Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009) *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press). A poststructuralist critique of the concept of the border in the modern geopolitical imagination.
- Vicki Squire (2011) (ed.) *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity* (London: Routledge). An agenda-setting collection of essays analysing contemporary border struggles via the lens of 'irregularity'.

Weblinks

- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/index.html>
- Minute Men Project: www.veteransforsecureborders.us
- No Borders Network: <http://noborders.org.uk/>
- United for Intercultural Action: [www.unitedagainsracism.org/](http://unitedagainsracism.org/)
- Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen: <http://nibr.ruhosting.nl/>
- International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University: www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/

7 Environmental security

Abstract

This chapter offers an introduction to the main contours of recent debates about environmental security. It begins with an overview of some of the most pressing ecological issues facing humanity in contemporary political life. From here the analysis then turns to examine the way in which environmental degradation and resource scarcity have been produced as security threats in recent years. The next section interrogates the nature of the link between the environment and violent conflict drawing on research that seeks to question whether a connection can ever be made between the two straightforwardly. After a summary of arguments in favour of the desecuritisation of the environment, the discussion moves on to consider what critical alternative resources exist in green theory for thinking outside the ambit of national security imperatives.

Introduction

Since the 1980s environmental degradation and resource scarcity have become increasingly incorporated under the rubric of security by national governments, the media and academics. This has prompted many heated debates about the merits and disadvantages of linking two domains formerly perceived to be separate from each other in global politics. In particular, the framing of environmental issues and resource scarcity in terms of security offers an apposite case for an assessment of the Copenhagen School or 'securitisation' framework (for more see Chapter 6). On the one hand, some environmentalists argue that a move to 'securitise' the environment is rhetorically powerful because it draws states' attention to problems that would otherwise be left unaddressed. On the other hand, scholars such as Daniel Deudney have questioned the appropriateness of thinking about the environment through the lens of security, effectively calling for a 'desecuritisation' of the issue.

Environmental degradation, resource scarcity and population growth

Environmental degradation encompasses a vast range of issues from carbon emissions to deforestation. While a minority of scientists still disagree about the long-term implications of environmental damage, the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that it was 90 per cent likely that the increase in the global average temperature was due to human activity, and has continued to reiterate that basis for that finding (see IPCC weblink). Statistics illustrating the scale of environmental problems abound, as is well documented by international organisations such as the UN and noted in particular by scholars that

focus on the issues of environmental degradation and resource depletion within security studies (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1999, Klare 2002). These illustrations provide an important backdrop against which debates in the field of environmental security have taken place, with, for example, Tuchman Matthews (1989) amongst the first to argue the case that the profound scale and scope of global environmental change required a corresponding effort to 'redefine security'. In order to establish the gravity of the situation, attention is typically drawn to three areas of concern: rates at which the earth is said to be in decay; levels of consumption of natural energy resources; and the extent to which an increase in the global population is likely to further exacerbate these trends.

If current rates of emissions from fossil fuels are maintained then IPCC scientists predict that, by 2100, the temperature on the earth's surface will increase between 1 and 6.4 degrees Celsius (°C). While this rise may seem negligible it is useful to consider that the earth has only warmed by 5 °C since the coldest period of the last ice age 18,000 years ago. According to the IPCC, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide increased from a preindustrial average of 280 parts per million cubed (ppm³) to 379 ppm³ in 2005. Emissions are not distributed equally over the globe, however, with the highest cumulative output coming from the industrialised states of the global North (US estimated 27 per cent, EU estimated 18 per cent). Conversely, much lower rates of carbon output are to be found in states of the global South such as in Africa, South America and South East Asia.

Related to the increase in carbon emissions are the historically unprecedented levels of resource consumption. Between 1970 and 1995 alone, for example, one-third of all the earth's natural resources were depleted as a result of human activity (Klare 2002). Again, however, it is important to note that rates of consumption are up to 40 times higher in the world's most industrialised states (including the US, Western Europe, Russia and a rapidly industrialising China). While populations of the wealthiest states rely heavily on oil and gas, 3 billion of the world's poor live in rural areas dependent on local resources such as wood, charcoal, straw and cow dung as their main source of fuel.

At the current rate of consumption, oil reserves are estimated to run out in 2040 and an increase of just 2 per cent could bring this date forward to 2025-2030 (Klare 2002). Similarly, fresh water supplies are under strain. In 1997 there were 430 million people living in areas with chronic water shortage; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN and UN-Water predict that by 2025, on current trends, 1.8 billion people will be living in parts of the world with absolute water scarcity. Already, there are 250 million cases of waterborne diseases reported each year leading to 10 million deaths annually. Another area of concern is the decline in total fish stocks – between 1950 and 1990 total fish production increased fivefold from 20.7 million to 101.27 million metric tons (Homer-Dixon 1999: 69). The UN FAO currently categorises only 3 per cent of the world's marine fish stocks as 'underexploited'; of the remainder 52 per cent are 'fully exploited', 7 per cent 'depleted' and 1 per cent 'recovering from depletion'.

Deforestation contributes to a rise in so-called greenhouse gases and affects biodiversity and vital food chains. During the 1990s tropical deforestation took place at the rate of 17 million hectares annually across the globe. Areas of forest roughly equivalent to the size of England and Wales are lost each year (Klare 2002). This is twinned with a decline in the total surface area of high-quality croplands and virgin forests reducing farmers' ability to grow food. Between 1985 and 2000, for example, there was a global loss of 100 million hectares of arable land equivalent to the combined areas of Texas and California (Homer-Dixon 1999: 56).

As we shall go on to see, some analysts argue that these trends are only set to worsen as the total global population continues to rise. According to the UN, the current global

population stands at 6 billion; this figure is predicted to grow to 8 billion by 2050 and to 9.4 billion by 2050. In broad historic terms there has actually been a recent dip in the annual percentage population increase. However, the UN calculates that the total population of the world is still expanding at a rate of over 80 million people per year. Moreover, 90 per cent of this growth is taking place in developing countries of the global South.

The securitisation of the environment

Today, issues relating to environmental degradation and resource scarcity are commonly incorporated into states' national security strategies (see Box 7.1). In this way, along with other issues considered in this book such as migration, it is possible to identify the way in which the environment has become increasingly seen through the lens of security. Earlier in the twentieth century many of the problems now associated with environmental degradation were not considered to be even of popular concern. From the 1970s onwards, however, there has been an increasing politicisation of environmental issues, as illustrated by the high-profile campaigns of Greenpeace and other green pressure groups. To borrow the language of the Copenhagen School (see Chapter 6), the environment was then 'securitised' in public policy, popular media and academic contexts from the late 1980s/early 1990s. At this time, we see the gradual incorporation of environmental issues within a range of security thinking.

During the cold war there were relatively few explicit articulations of the environment-security nexus. One of the first academics to call for the theorisation of environmental problems within the ambit of security was Norman Myers (1986). He argued that food shortages, fisheries depletion, water scarcity, climate change and deforestation were likely to induce violent conflict. Such a view was also articulated in the influential report of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development, published as *Our Common Future* in 1987 (United Nations 1987) (also known as the 'Brundtland Report' after Gro Harlem Brundtland who chaired the Commission).

After 1989, variations on this argument became common as the study of security broadened. In this context, Robert Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy', published in the *Atlantic Monthly* in February 1994, remains a paradigmatic portrayal of the environment as a security threat. Kaplan's 1994 piece, said to have been read in the White House, is a doomsday prophecy about the turmoil resulting from environmental degradation and resource scarcity in the global South (see Box 7.2). Kaplan argued that global population growth would exacerbate the effects of disease, conflict and civil instability arising from environmental disruption. These effects, he claimed, are already visible in parts of West Africa, which have led to unprecedented levels of refugee migration, the erosion of nation states and the empowerment of private armies, security firms and international drug cartels. According to Kaplan, such developments are not likely to be contained in the South and 'will soon confront our civilization'. On this basis, he asserted that the global North was highly vulnerable to these dynamics and proclaimed the environment to be 'the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century' (Kaplan 1994).

A similarly pessimistic account of the future of global politics can be found in Michael T. Klare's book *Resource Wars* (2002). Like Myers and Kaplan, Klare begins with the premise that rising population levels and increased resource scarcity will lead to ethnic, religious and tribal violence. Indeed, writing in the aftermath of the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, he argues that struggles over resources along inter-ethnic lines have already begun on a global scale. Klare points to the way in which states' security ultimately depends on their energy supplies: oilfield protection, the defence of

Box 7.1 The incorporation of environmental issues into national security strategies
Extracts from *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security for the Next Generation*, June 2009: 8–9:

Climate change:

Climate change will increasingly be a wide-ranging driver of global insecurity. It acts as a threat-multiplier, exacerbating weakness and tensions around the world. It can be expected to worsen poverty, have a significant impact on global migration patterns, and risk tipping fragile states into instability, conflict and state failure. From a security perspective, it is important to act now to reduce the scale of climate change by mitigation, such as emissions reduction, and by being able to adapt to climate change that is now already unavoidable. The Government is determined to play a leading role and, over the past year, the Climate Change Act has come into force, setting a legally binding target to reduce the UK's emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050, from 1990 levels, and introducing the world's first carbon budgets.

Competition for energy:

Global energy demand, on the basis of governments' existing policies, is forecast to increase by around 45 per cent between 2006 and 2030. Internationally, competition for energy and other resources can act as a driver of insecurity in a number of ways: through fostering increased state-led competition for resources; through increasing the economic and political leverage of producer states; and through tension arising from the exploitation of resources as a source of internal instability. The Government recognises the importance of tackling these issues.

Extract from the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006: 47:

Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. Examples include:

- Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic megadisasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response.

These challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national security.

maritime trade routes and the ability to export energy products are all vital to the economic competitiveness and ultimate survival of a given state (cf. Ciută 2010).

Adopting a realist logic, Klare argues that the fight for states' survival in an anarchic system will increasingly come to depend upon their ability to secure resources under conditions of heightened global scarcity. In this context, he predicts a higher incidence of resource wars defined as 'interstate conflicts that revolve, to a significant degree, over the pursuit or possession of critical materials' (Klare 2002: 25). Klare recognises that inter-state conflict over resources is not a new phenomenon, but argues that such violence is likely to resurface

Box 7.2 Extract from Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994

For a while the media will continue to ascribe riots and other violent upheavals abroad mainly to ethnic and religious conflict. But as these conflicts multiply, it will become apparent that something else is afoot, making more and more places like Nigeria, India, and Brazil ungovernable.

Mention the environment or 'diminishing natural resources' in foreign-policy circles and you meet a brick wall of skepticism or boredom. To conservatives especially, the very terms seem flaky. Public-policy foundations have contributed to the lack of interest, by funding narrowly focused environmental studies replete with technical jargon which foreign-affairs experts just let pile up on their desks.

It is time to understand the environment for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War. In the twenty-first century water will be in dangerously short supply in such diverse locales as Saudi Arabia, Central Asia, and the southwestern United States. A war could erupt between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile River water. Even in Europe tensions have arisen between Hungary and Slovakia over the damming of the Danube, a classic case of how environmental disputes fuse with ethnic and historical ones. The political scientist and erstwhile Clinton adviser Michael Mandelbaum has said, 'We have a foreign policy today in the shape of a doughnut – lots of peripheral interests but nothing at the center.' The environment, I will argue, is part of a terrifying array of problems that will define a new threat to our security, filling the hole in Mandelbaum's doughnut and allowing a post-Cold War foreign policy to emerge inexorably by need rather than by design.

with heightened intensity in the years ahead. Indeed, he envisages that instability resulting from resource scarcity will become the most distinctive characteristic of the international system and that a new landscape of global conflict will emerge.

Problematising the environment-conflict thesis

While some writers such as Kaplan and Klare take the link between environmental degradation and conflict for granted, a number of other authors have adopted a more sceptical stance. Indeed, the debate between the two sides has become a defining faultline in the literature on environmental security over the past three decades. In this section we turn to consider a range of arguments that we call the 'environment-conflict' thesis – and in some cases the securitisation of environmental issues more generally – into question.

Critiquing the 'environment-conflict' thesis

Thomas Homer-Dixon has sought to investigate whether environmental scarcity (as an independent variable) can be said to affect the incidence of violent conflict (as a dependent variable) in global politics. On the one hand, Homer-Dixon agrees with Kaplan and Klare

that environmental disruptions are likely to be increasingly linked with violence: 'In coming decades the world will probably see a steady increase in the incidence of violent conflict that is caused, at least in part, by environmental scarcity' (Homer-Dixon 1999: 4). On the other hand, though, Homer-Dixon seeks a more nuanced and methodologically sophisticated approach to interrogating the complexity of the environment-conflict thesis: 'Sensationalist claims about "water wars", "food wars", and "environmental refugees" in the popular literature are – almost without exception – simplistic and flawed' (1999: 73).

First, Homer-Dixon argues that the causal link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is not as straightforward as writers such as Kaplan and Klare assume it to be. Environmental problems *may* be associated with violent conflict but, on his view, they are 'neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause' for it to occur (1999: 7). Rather, Homer-Dixon has identified five negative social effects of environmental scarcity and degradation that can be linked with outbreaks of violent conflict in specific developing countries: (1) constrained agricultural productivity; (2) constrained economic productivity; (3) migration of those people affected by (1) and (2); (4) greater segmentation of societies; and (5) disruption of civil society and state infrastructure. However, Homer-Dixon stresses that it is always the interaction of these with other non-environmental factors that may lead to violence.

Second, while inter-state resource wars may appear to be intuitive in the context of the realist paradigm, Homer-Dixon argues contra Klare that 'there is, in fact, virtually no evidence that environmental scarcity is a principle cause of major war among states' (1999: 138). Moreover, taking an opposing view to that of Kaplan, Homer-Dixon claims that North-South violence induced by environmental degradation is also unlikely (cf. Acharya 1997: 312). Rather, he suggests that environmental factors are most likely to be indirect causes of ethnic clashes and civil strife within states, as illustrated by recent conflict in South Africa, Mexico, Pakistan, India and China. For example, in South Africa chronic shortages of land, water and wood have led to the internal migration of poorer members of the black community into squatter settlements around major cities such as Johannesburg. This, in turn, has created conditions for inter-ethnic rivalry and violent feuds over competition for basic resources. Similarly, the migration of the rural poor to Karachi and Hyderabad has led to civil unrest and social instability in Pakistan.

Homer-Dixon notes that the relationship between natural resource scarcity, population growth and prosperity is not a new concern. Rather, in many ways the arguments of Klare and Kaplan were prefigured in the work of the eighteenth-century British clergyman and political economist Reverend Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) (see Box 7.3). Malthus argued that without constraint, human population growth was exponential whereas food production only grows linearly (Winch 1992). On this view, famine is seen as a natural check on population growth. Today, neo-Malthusians make a similar point that finite natural resources put limits on the growth of human population and that if such limits are broken then poverty and social degradation are likely. According to Homer-Dixon, this is a position that prevails in mass-media representations of global scarcity. However, he argues that empirical studies do not support these outmoded and sensationalist arguments. The link between population growth and poverty is not clear and the effects of population growth are arguably mitigated by technological change, which enables increased labour productivity. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that larger populations can lower levels of environmental degradation depending on farming techniques and consumption patterns.

An alternative position adopted in the literature is that of the so-called 'economic optimists', who argue that the opportunities for profit act as stimuli for technological innovation. In other words, the central idea here is that ultimately there is no cause for concern as the

Box 7.3 Extract from Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*

I think I may fairly make two postulates.

First, that food is necessary to the existence of man.

Secondly, that the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state.

These two laws, ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been fixed laws of our nature, and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to be what they now are, without an immediate act of power in that Being who first arranged the system of the universe, and for the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all its various operations.

[...] Assuming then my postulate as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.

By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.

This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall somewhere and must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind.

This natural inequality of the two powers of population and of production in the earth, and that great law of our nature which must constantly keep their effects equal, form the great difficulty that to me appears insurmountable in the way to the perfectibility of society. All other arguments are of slight and subordinate consideration in comparison of this. I see no way by which man can escape from the weight of this law which pervades all animated nature. No fancied equality, no agrarian regulations in their utmost extent, could remove the pressure of it even for a single century. And it appears, therefore, to be decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the means of subsistence for themselves and families.

market will always respond in new ways to ensure the supply of enough resources. This position is one adopted by the World Bank, which illustrates how such economic paradigms are not abstract phenomena but frameworks for practical action in the 'real world'. Yet, as Homer-Dixon explains, this perspective is also not without its problems. For example, it assumes that natural resources are homogeneous and that the human species is an exceptional form of life. Furthermore, like the neo-Malthusian approach, it arguably sidelines the politics of distribution.

Distributionists, often those approaching international political economy from a Marxist or neo-Marxist perspective (see Chapter 2), claim that the problem is not with 'scarcity' so much as the unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the first place. From this viewpoint, poverty is a cause – rather than a consequence – of high population growth and practices that lead to environmental scarcity. What this perspective emphasises, contrary to both neo-Malthusianism and liberal economic optimism, is that famines are the outcome of political decisions about who gets what, when, where and why (see Homer-Dixon 1999: 35–36). In many instances 'scarcity' of food, for example, exists in the countries and regions

where the use of arable land is prioritised for the growth of 'cash-crops' intended for export, such as coffee and cacao, rather than domestic food production. Hence, on this view, more attention should be given to structural inequalities built into the international system that privilege those whose interests are best served by maintaining the status quo.

Homer-Dixon claims to add to the debate between the three positions outlined above by offering a synthesis of their claims. He argues that scarcity is an important factor but focuses on the way in which it affects human ingenuity, and thus the technologically innovative responses presupposed as possible by the optimists: 'Rather than speaking in terms of limits, it is better to say that some societies are locked into a race between a rising requirement for ingenuity and their capacity to supply it' (1999: 44). In other words, for Homer-Dixon the main bifurcation is not between the 'haves' and the 'have nots', but rather a division separating societies able to respond well to scarcity versus those who cannot. While the focus on ingenuity certainly marks out Homer-Dixon's distinctive contribution to the debate, however, other writers have criticised what they consider to be the politically anodyne implications of his analysis (Barnett 2001).

The case against the securitisation of the environment

By contrast, the work of Daniel Deudney has consciously sought to provocatively question the efficacy of thinking about environmental degradation and resource scarcity through the lens of national security, even in the more 'sophisticated' forms suggested by scholars such as Homer-Dixon. In an influential essay entitled 'Environmental Security: A Critique', Deudney (1999) sets out three key reasons for a more sceptical approach to the securitisation of the environment in academic and policy-making arenas.

At base, Deudney argues that to treat environmental issues as a security threat is conceptually confused and misleading (see also Deudney 1990). This is because 'the traditional focus of national security – interstate violence – has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions' (1999: 189). Significantly, environmental issues and traditional military threats differ in four key respects:

- 1 Environmental issues may affect human well-being but this is an *insufficient basis for the definition of a threat to national security* as such;
- 2 There is *nothing particularly national* about the ecological problems because most 'affect the global commons beyond state jurisdiction';
- 3 Interstate violence reflects intentional behaviour whereas *environmental degradation is largely the result of unintentional activity* since 'people rarely act with the [...] goal of harming the environment';
- 4 While military threats necessitate the response of 'secretive, extremely hierarchical, and centralized' organisations, *environmental concerns need to be met with altogether different approaches and institutions* based upon global citizenly 'husbandmanship'. (Deudney 1999: 193–194)

Deudney notes that, irrespective of conceptual or empirical accuracy, some environmentalists do seek to portray ecological degradation in terms of a national security threat as 'part of a rhetorical and psychological strategy to redirect social energies now devoted to war and interstate violence toward environmental amelioration' (1999: 195; cf. Booth 2007: 327–336). In other words, he recognises the fact that some environmentalists will seek to securitise environmental issues in the hope of mobilising the levels of attention and

resources that are usually reserved by states solely for military security issues (cf. Floyd 2007). Yet, he argues, the move to present environmental destruction in security terms may backfire as it runs counter to the sort of globalism required to develop workable solutions for a sustainable future: 'in short, if environmental concerns are wrapped in national flags, the "whole earth" sensibility at the core of environmental awareness will be smothered' (Deudney 1999: 200). Rather, Deudney calls for the abandonment of the security framing (or a 'desecuritisation' in Copenhagen School terms – see Chapter 6) in favour of fostering a globalist green sensibility as 'the master metaphor for an emerging post-industrial civilisation' (1999: 201).

Significantly, unlike Kaplan and Klare, Deudney dismisses the core assumption that ecological decay is likely to cause inter-state wars. This assumption, he argues, unfairly characterises international political life as a context of unending conflict and violence. Methodologically most accounts of the environment-conflict thesis are highly problematic because they fail to cross-reference all cases of resource scarcity with incidence of conflict. Moreover, the extent to which environmental degradation can stimulate international cooperation between states has often been glossed over in the literature. Three further issues cast doubts on Klare's hypothesis about new landscapes of violence: the global market means that states no longer experience resource dependency as they once did; territorial conquest is too costly to pursue in search of new resources; and industrial technology is developing at a rate that mitigates the effects of the depletion of non-renewable energy sources (Deudney 1999: 206). On this basis, Deudney concludes:

Environmental degradation is not a threat to national security. Rather, environmentalism is a threat to the conceptual hegemony of state-centred national security discourses and institutions. For environmentalists to dress their programs in the blood-soaked garments of the war system betrays their core values and creates confusion about the real tasks at hand. (1999: 214)

Despite Deudney's systematic critique of the appropriateness of thinking about the environment in the register of security, however, this line of argument does little to engage with the politics of securitizing moves. Furthermore, while Deudney points to the desirability of fostering a 'green sensibility', it ultimately remains unclear in his analysis what this might entail for practical politics or indeed how a desecuritisation of environmental degradation might occur.

Environmental security and the modern geopolitical imagination

The problem of environmental degradation and resource scarcity does not only raise thorny political and ethical questions about the appropriateness of solutions within a security framework. Rather, it is also an issue that confronts and problematises some of the dominant assumptions about space, identity and territory underpinning the modern geopolitical imagination. While this issue has primarily concerned political geographers, critical inter-disciplinary writers such as John Agnew, Simon Dalby and Jon Barnett have pointed to the way in which this imagination conditions the way we think about the world within security studies.

John Agnew has famously argued that the modern geopolitical imagination constitutes a 'territorial trap' (1994). It is predicated upon three highly contentious starting points: first,

that states have exclusive power within their territories as represented by the concept of sovereignty; second, that domestic and international spheres are distinct; and third, that the borders of the state define the borders of society so that the latter is constrained by the former. Agnew claims that, despite structuring prominent conceptualisations of global politics, there is a tendency for these premises to go largely unexamined in IR, security studies and related disciplines. Moreover, these starting points are 'contentious' precisely because they are not facts but rather represent certain ideals about the way things *should* be. Yet, in some regions of the world (such as Africa, for example), this specifically Western conception about the organisation of political community bears little resemblance to historical or contemporary experience (see Chapter 4). On a more abstract level, while these principles enable a host of epistemological and ontological claims about the way the world is, Agnew suggests that they tell us more about our own imagination of geopolitics than anything else. For this reason, he argues that it is important to interrogate this imagination as a historically and culturally determined phenomenon in its own right.

Applying Agnew's insights, Dalby (2002) and Barnett (2001) have examined how certain geopolitical assumptions shape debates about the environment–security nexus. Dalby, for example, reminds us that Malthus' arguments cannot be divorced from the geopolitical context of the industrial revolution, the American and French revolutions, and contemporary fears about the dissolution of political order. In the face of such fears the reactionary move was naturally to attempt to restore civil stability at all costs. By focusing on a lack of resources Dalby suggests that Malthus was able to distract attention from the more structural causes of inequality: 'A general assumption of scarcity [...] works as an ideological move to preclude the necessity of probing distributional questions' (2002: 24). Barnett also emphasises that the Malthusian position assumes it is simply numbers of people that are cause for ecological concern rather than the way they choose to live. He highlights that, rhetorically, the presentation of population growth as an issue that requires management creates a role for some people to control others. It also, he argues, reduces people to impersonal demographic statistics so they might be monitored and analysed more easily (2001: 60).

According to Dalby, many of the geopolitical assumptions of Malthus are carried over into the work of Kaplan, whose essay assumes a similarly bifurcated world between aspiration and fear. Like Malthus, Kaplan ignores structural inequalities and the colonial histories that produced them in the first place, which, in Dalby's view, constitutes a very narrow geopolitical horizon – 'one that focuses solely on local phenomena in a determinist fashion that ignores the larger trans-boundary flows and the related social and economic causes of resource depletion' (2002: 34). From Barnett's perspective, neo-Malthusian arguments such as Kaplan's and Klare's fail to grasp the obvious point that rather than causing violent conflict population growth leads to famine, which, in turn, reduces the ability of a society to go to war. Like Homer-Dixon, Barnett takes issue with the environment–conflict thesis: 'There is little if any evidence to suggest that environmental problems do cause violent conflict, instead what is presented are theories that have intuitive appeal but empirically fail to convince' (2001: 50). In a further step, however, Barnett also questions the very concept of scarcity and the work it does in geopolitical discourses on environmental security, pointing out that it is ultimately relative to expectations of abundance. Furthermore, critiquing the concept of 'resource wars', Barnett complains that much of the literature on environmental security mistakenly conflates 'scarcity' with 'degradation', a move that 'offers strategic rationality a beachhead on the environmental agenda because resources and conflict are central to the strategic stock-in-trade' (2001: 51; see also Litfin 1999). This, together with the ethnocentric and primordialist assumption that people in the global South will

automatically take to arms in periods of dearth, illustrates the extent to which the neo-Malthusian position is not neutral nor natural but ethically and politically loaded in favour of the maintenance of particular interests.

More broadly, Dalby has also sought to investigate how environmental problems have come to challenge some of the basic predicates of the modern geopolitical imagination as outlined by Agnew. Dalby is critical of the way in which the geopolitical vocabulary of traditional security studies is in his view stuck in the 'territorial trap'. He argues that this continued reliance upon territorially defined modes of thinking renders traditional approaches to the study of security particularly unable to grasp the complexities of environmental degradation. Analysis and rectification of phenomena such as population displacement, transnational pollution, and ecological decay do not fit within the statist vision of the modern geopolitical imagination:

If there are no insides and outsiders in a planetary predicament driven by the flows of resources, exploitation of remote ecosystems, and global traffic of wastes, then [...] ecological security cannot be understood in the conventional geopolitical parameters of territorial states.

(Dalby 2002: 141)

Instead, Dalby calls for a change of geopolitical horizons within which environmental security is thought about (see also Dalby 2007). To do so he draws on the work of Barry Commoner (1971) who has sketched out four basic 'laws of ecology': first, everything is interconnected with everything else and therefore isolation of phenomenon is an impossibility; second, everything must go somewhere and, on this basis, there is no such thing as 'waste'; third, nature knows best, in other words, human attempts at improving conditions artificially are more likely to result in further deleterious results; finally, there is no such thing as a free lunch, that is to say there is a price to be paid ecologically for every aspect of human behaviour. Thus, Dalby argues that, as well as taking into account the historical domination of humanity over nature and the particular European imperialist iteration out of this phenomenon, thinking in terms of ecological systems is necessary unless security studies is to run the risk of reproducing some of the very problems it presumably wishes to solve.

The greening of critical security studies?

The final section of this chapter considers what resources exist in green theory in order to pave the way for such an alternative to the various environment–conflict theses, as called for by Dalby and others. Most notably, Jon Barnett has sketched out his vision for a 'critical' perspective on environmental security informed by 'green theory'. This vision is animated by four mutually supporting principles. First, it is motivated by a 'suspicion that modern anthropocentric and utilitarian cosmology is responsible for environmental degradation' (2001: 2). In other words, many of the problems that have become labelled as 'environmental issues' stem from an attitude towards the world that puts the human and his/her needs first. Therefore, an alternative perspective is required, one that questions the privileging of the human in order to search for different ways of prioritising more sustainable ways of living.

Second, and related to the above, Barnett refers to the need for a fundamental shift in the philosophy of space and scale. Typically, in traditional approaches to IR and security studies, the state is taken as the primary actor in the international system. Each state is presumed to be sovereign and treated as a separate entity from other states. Similarly, under domestic

and international law, people are treated as distinct individuals each responsible for themselves. A further division is that between society on the one hand and the natural world on the other. On this basis, we can see how different entities are commonly boxed off so that the relations between them can then be analysed in the study of global politics. What a green theory perspective challenges us to do, by contrast, is to see everything as being always already inextricably interlinked to begin with. From this perspective, all entities are part of complex interdependent systems. So, for example, the distinction between humans and animals makes little sense when the earth is rethought of in terms of one ecosystem. Instead of separate beings humans/animals are recast as part of a continuum of life whose common future is invested in the sustainability of that ecosystem as a whole.

Third, Barnett emphasises that an approach to environmental security inspired by green theory is one that takes on board the problems of the uncertainty of knowledge. Echoing many of the insights of Michel Foucault (see Chapter 5), green theorists are acutely aware of the problematic status of all 'truth' claims. This is not to say that there is no such thing as truth, but rather that notions of what is 'true' are always bound up in relations of power that require close interrogation. Such an approach recognises that environmental problems are not a given but defined by scientific communities. Moreover, the way in which a given problem is identified affects the range of possible solutions available. Since those solutions are in effect only ever particular responses to particular understandings of the problem, attention needs to be given to the way that problem is diagnosed in the first place.

Finally, in the manner of critical theorising as outlined by Robert Cox (see Chapter 2), Barnett emphasises that green theory encourages not a pretence to objectivity but an outwardly normative dimension to the study of environmental security. In this vein, Barnett argues that his own work reflects 'a mode of theorising and critiquing which explicitly acknowledges and purposefully deploys the beliefs and values of the theorist' (2001: 3). More specifically, and reflecting many aspirations of writers associated with the Welsh School (see Chapter 2), Barnett urges a move from thinking in terms of national/state to the human/individual level, based on a conception that recognises that the human species exists in and not against, nature (see also McDonald 2003: 70). In his view, environmental security refers to 'the process of minimising environmental insecurity', and a focus on the individual enables welfare, justice and peace to be the ultimate goal (Barnett 2001: 129). Similarly, Ken Booth has suggested a 'holistic' approach to the environment as an aspect of Critical Security Studies that, grounded in 'deep ecology', would view human beings as part of nature rather than distinct from it, and the security of individuals and the ecosystem as intricately intertwined rather than separate (Booth 2007: 327–336; see also Dalby 2007). In this way, it might be possible to see how an explicitly normative commitment to emancipation offers one route for thinking environmental degradation out of the framework of securitisation.

Conclusion

The linking of environmental degradation and resource scarcity with discourses and apparatuses of security is a highly controversial terrain in both the theory and practice of global politics. Even if a consensus has emerged that the rate of ecological decay is one of the most pressing features of the current era there is little agreement about how this connects – or should connect – with security. The issue of the relationship between the environment and security provokes further questions investigated elsewhere in this book about what we mean by security, what is at stake when a given issue is 'securitised', and whether 'desecuritisation' is possible and/or desirable.

Those who adopt a more traditional view of security, epitomised by Stephen Walt's definition of it as 'the threat, use, and control of military force', may question whether it makes any sense to think of the environment as a security issue at all (Walt 1991). Moreover, some writers on environmental security such as Homer-Dixon continue to doubt the existence of a straightforward causal connection between ecological damage and violent conflict. Yet, as we have seen, since the 1980s environmental degradation has been framed in terms of the language of security by states, international institutions such as the UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). On the one hand, some environmentalists have argued that this strategy works to raise the profile of ecological destruction and inspire action. On the other hand, writers such as Deudney question whether this logic runs contrary to their aims.

One way out of this impasse is to move the debate forward by analysing the politics of framing environmental degradation in security terms. What actors 'securitise' the environment, why and with what effect? What 'work' does the concept of security do in environmental discourses (and vice versa)? Whose interests might a securitising/desecuritising move of the environment serve? It is precisely through investigating such questions that a more critical stance has made a significant contribution to the literature. Analysts such as Dalby and Barnett seek to interrogate the positivistic, neo-Malthusian, ethnocentric and often realist assumptions upon which accounts of the environment–security nexus typically rest. Moreover, adopting Agnew's critique of the modern geopolitical imagination, these authors demonstrate how such accounts serve to reproduce a particular vision of global politics that serves to maintain the status quo. By taking their lead from the array of issues associated with environmental degradation green theorists are also able to question the appropriateness of orthodox thinking in IR and security studies. From a green perspective, for example, the referent object debate is opened once more and extended to include not only the state, or the individual, but also the planet as an ecosystem. In this way the anthropocentrism of security studies is not only brought into full relief but might fundamentally be challenged as a sustainable horizon.

Key points

- The rate of consumption of the earth's natural resources has been at an historic high during the twentieth century and developed states consume up to 40 times more than developing states.
- From the 1980s onwards, environmental degradation and resource scarcity was increasingly presented by national governments, the popular media and some academics through the lens of security.
- Deudney (1999) makes the case against the securitisation of environmental degradation on the grounds that: (1) environmental issues are not a national security threat; (2) presenting those issues in terms of security may backfire on environmentalists; (3) arguments about resource wars fail to grasp international cooperation in environmental affairs.
- Scholars working in critical geopolitics demonstrate how a neo-Malthusian approach glosses over significant ethical and political issues such as the colonial histories that produced structural inequalities in the distribution of resources globally.
- A critical green theory approach is one that calls for four key moves: a questioning of the anthropocentrism of security studies; a shift in space and scale to encompass a more holistic perspective on the earth as an interconnected biosphere; an appreciation of the uncertainty of knowledge and the relationship between knowledge and power; and an overtly normative position that seeks to find more sustainable ways of living.

Discussion points

- To what extent do environmental problems lead to violent conflict?
- Should environmental campaigners seek to encourage or avoid the 'securitisation' of environmental degradation?
- How does the environment–security nexus challenge traditional assumptions about the study of security?
- What is the referent object of environmental security?
- What are the implications of green theory for the study of global security relations?

Guide to further reading

- Daniel Deudney (1999) 'Environmental Security: A Critique', in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthews (eds) *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). An influential critique of the securitisation of the environment.
- Kate O'Neill (2009) *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Offers a general introduction to some of the key theoretical positions on the environment in IR theory.
- Michael T. Klare (2002) *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt and Company). A realist-oriented analysis of the relation between resource scarcity and international conflict.
- Lorraine Elliott (2004) *The Global Politics of the Environment* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). A significant contribution to green theory in the context of IR.
- Richard A. Matthew, Jon Barnett, Bryan McDonald and Karen L. O'Brien (2010) (eds) *Global Environmental Change and Human Security* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press). Brings together a series of perspectives on the potential overlaps between environmental and human security.
- Simon Dalby (2002) *Environmental Security* (Minneapolis, MN, and London: University of Minnesota Press). An account of the relationship between environmental degradation and security from a critical geopolitical perspective.
- Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press). A seminal critique of the environment-conflict thesis.

Weblinks

Institute for Environmental Security, The Hague: www.envirosecurity.org/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: www.ipcc.ch/
 World Resources Institute for statistics on global environmental degradation: <http://earthtrends.wri.org/miscell/citing.php?theme=0>

12 Technology and warfare in the information age

Abstract

This chapter engages arguments and evidence that suggests that developments in both technology and warfare in the 'information age' have significant implications for practices of war and the way we think about them. Here it looks particularly at the idea of a 'Western way of war'; the related discourse and developments associated with the 'revolution in military affairs', and the increasing mediation of warfare as a key feature of contemporary conflict. Having established this context, the chapter then goes on to examine ways in which scholars working from various theoretical positions have addressed specific features of contemporary practices and discourses of warfare: virtual war, technostategic discourse and dataveillance. In closing, the chapter evaluates the current state of critical scholarship on technology and warfare, and questions where this scholarship might go from here.

Introduction

The issue of whether and how technological change impacts upon warfare – and vice versa – forms a perennial debate in security studies. 'War', Carl von Clausewitz declared in his oft-cited maxim from *On War* (Clausewitz 1976 [1832]), 'is the continuation of politics by other means'. This has been interpreted by some modern advocates of Clausewitz as indicating that war has a fundamental, eternal nature that remains essentially constant in the face of technological change. The view is summed up in the title of an article by one self-proclaimed 'Clausewitzian': 'Clausewitz rules, OK? The future is past – with GPS' (Gray 1999). Not all analysts of contemporary warfare, however, are as convinced as Colin S. Gray that the nature of conflict remains fundamentally as it was when Clausewitz wrote during the Napoleonic era, or that technologies such as GPS (global positioning systems) are mere 'add-ons' to traditional means and methods of organised violence. Within security and war studies there have recently been several attempts to characterise the nature of contemporary warfare as a distinctive form. Some have argued that the study of conflict needs to take into account the emergence of 'new wars' (Kaldor 1999) where 'old' forms of state-based conflict have given way to the prevalence of intra-state wars and where private use of force – in the form of militias, criminal organisations and private military companies (PMCs) – undercuts the state's supposed monopoly of violence. Others have seen similar dynamics as heralding the advent of 'postmodern war', additionally marked by reliance on technology and increasingly sophisticated means of destruction but, paradoxically, most prominent within the 'post-military' societies of the US and Western Europe that tend to be predominantly war averse (Gray 1997; Shaw 2005: 37). Box 12.1 offers a brief introduction to some of the key concepts associated with these debates. The rest of the chapter then proceeds to an overview

Box 12.1 Key concepts: Technology and warfare in the information age

Western way of war: The idea that Western states and militaries have developed a way of battle that emphasises technological superiority as a means to assure both military victory and minimisation of casualties.

Revolution in military affairs (RMA): Refers, broadly speaking, to the use and incorporation of information technologies to enhance US warfighting capacities.

Spectator-sport war: Used to denote the extent to which Western publics in particular primarily 'spectate' (through visual media) rather than participate in war.

Virtual war: Indicates a form of warfare where for the users of certain military technologies war is experienced primarily as a series of visual images and representations.

Technostategic discourse: Used to describe the way in which the language of military planners tends to mimic and legitimate military technology itself.

Dataveillance: The monitoring and 'mining' of multiple forms of data – including financial transactions, patterns of international travel and behavioural data – by security professionals with the aim of identifying potentially 'risky' groups and individuals.

of these debates and to outline key critical positions on technology and warfare in the information age.

The 'Western way of war' and the revolution in military affairs

In tandem with the notions of 'new' and 'postmodern' wars, the concept of a new *Western way of war* has also become increasingly common in current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. The idea of a Western way of warfare is used to capture the way in which Western militaries – the US in particular and many Western Europe states – have shifted their emphasis away from a reliance on armies based on mass conscription, to militaries based around smaller numbers of professionalised troops, but with an increased level of technological capability and greater employment of 'private' military forces (see Box 12.2). In part this trend might be seen to be driven by technological development; but it is also a reflection of the extent to which the populations of the US and Western Europe are increasingly 'risk averse'. Martin Shaw argues that since the Vietnam war, Western publics have become increasingly intolerant of military fatalities (owing in large part to the effects of the so-called 'body-bag' syndrome), and statistics show that the number of people signing up for military service in Western states has tended to decline in recent decades.

Hence, Western militaries have increasingly used technology to achieve 'risk transfer' – the minimisation of fatalities by transferring the risk of death to enemy combatants as far as possible. The employment of 'precision' weapons is one of the main ways that Western militaries have attempted to achieve this, although as Shaw notes the frequent corollary is that the risk is transferred to innocent civilians as well as enemy combatants (Shaw 2005).

This move towards an emphasis on hi-tech military methods is identified in particular with the US and its post-cold war emphasis on establishing a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA): that is, using civilian and military technological innovations – particularly information technologies – to provide the US military with an enhanced strike capability that allows it in turn to rely on smaller troop numbers. Undoubtedly the US is the world's most advanced

Box 12.2 The privatisation of warfare

Described by some as 'the new business face of war' (Singer 2001: 187), the rise of 'private military companies' (PMCs), or 'private military firms' (PMFs), is one of the more notable features of contemporary warfare. The employment of PMCs has been an issue for consideration in the study of security for some time, but became particularly prominent as a result of the high reliance of the US on private contractors to provide 'military support' functions in its post-2003 occupation of Iraq. In such instances PMCs – for a fee – increasingly 'conduct tasks in the fields of logistics, maintenance and force application that were once thought to be the sole preserve of a state's security sector' (Spearin 2003: 27). 'Private' forms of organised violence are, of course, not entirely novel: the use of paid mercenaries has been common historically, and warlords routinely employ private forces to sustain their power against formal state authorities. Whereas those examples of privatised military force are often seen as illegitimate under international law, though, PMCs are a grey area. PMCs generally tend to be hierarchically organised corporations that operate as (military) service providers on the international market. And far from necessarily competing with states' security provision, in many instances states have actually encouraged the growth and operations of PMCs. Some argue that PMCs are a symptom not just of growing privatisation of state functions at a general level, but also a consequence of efforts by states in North America and Europe in particular to 'downsize' their militaries and 'outsource' military security functions in the post-cold war era. Abrahamson and Williams (2009), for example, argue that the privatisation of warfare and of states' security sectors should be viewed as part of a broader reconfiguration of global-local and public-private relations predicated in turn on the 'commodification' of military and physical security provision. They illustrate that case by detailing the development of a 'global security assemblage' (2009: 3) of oil companies, private security firms and state authorities in the Niger Delta to 'secure' the extraction of the region's oil resources for international consumption. The rise of PMCs thus raises the troubling prospect that, in some instances at least, 'security' is thought of as a commodity to be bought and sold.

military force today in terms of its technological superiority. It has consistently led the way in the development of new military technologies: predator drones – pilotless planes, which have been used not only for surveillance but also for destroying targets (see Box 12.3); 'precision-guided munitions' (PGMs) – missiles that can be used to destroy targets with increased accuracy and can be remotely targeted (often referred to as 'smart weapons'); stealth technologies such as stealth bombers, largely undetectable to radar; what are known as non-lethal technologies such as EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) weapons that can be used to disable an opponent's electricity supply without actually using physical force; battlefield missile defence systems such as the Patriot system; the use of GPS for reconnaissance and munitions guidance... and so the list goes on.

There is an extensive academic debate over whether US technological innovation does actually constitute a fundamental change in the way war is fought, whether it should be considered as an 'evolution' rather than a 'revolution', or whether the nature of warfare has remained essentially the same in spite of the RMA (see Gray 2004). What is less debatable, though, is the extent to which the idea of the RMA and its associated terminology has become a staple of American military and security policy discourse. At the core of this RMA idea is the belief that advances in information technology lead to far-reaching changes in the organisation, equipment and training of military forces resulting in an entirely new way of warfare. In the 1990s, US military planners began to look at ways in which the 'information

Box 12.3 A new way of war? The rise of the drones

One of the most prominent and controversial products of the US RMA is the Predator drone unmanned aircraft – a remotely piloted aircraft whose primary mission is 'interdiction and conducting armed reconnaissance against critical, perishable targets' (GlobalSecurity.Org 2009: 1). Equipped with Hellfire missiles (see weblink) and state-of-the-art targeting systems, the pilotless drone plane is flown by an operator in a ground control station. Cameras in the nose of the plane relay video images via satellite to the pilot on the ground and, with no human component in the plane itself. Predators can be kept airborne for much longer periods than manned aircraft. Drones operating over Afghanistan and Pakistan have been piloted from Nevada in the western US, and the same basic principle underlies the operation of other drones (or unmanned aerial vehicles – UAVs) available to the US, such as the Reaper and the Global Hawk.

Drones have now been in operation for several years. In 2008, these 'robot-craft' flew almost 400,000 combat hours in US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and generated an exponential increase in the amount of surveillance coverage available to US forces (Shackman 2009: 1). Drone planes have also controversially been used for purposes of 'targeted killing' by the US in its counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and its border regions with Pakistan, raising controversy over accusations of contravention of Pakistani sovereignty as well as allegations of the killing of civilians in several drone attacks.

UAVs essentially provide the US military with unprecedented potential for 'war at a distance' with enormous 'strike capabilities', but with no risk to a drone's human operator. As such they are a far remove (literally) from any traditional notion of face-to-face combat, and raise complex questions about the nature of contemporary warfare: is recourse to war more likely when the risk of human fatalities for the attacker is virtually non-existent? How similar or different are drones to other forms of 'remote' warfare from a distance, such as the use of cruise missiles or high-altitude strategic bombing?

revolution' – innovation in civilian computer technology and communication systems epitomised by the growth of the internet – could be used to enhance military effectiveness. For proponents of the RMA, information is key. With more information available, it is assumed, military decision-makers will be less prone to what Clausewitz called 'the fog of war': the lack of 'situational awareness' on the battlefield that arises from unforeseen events. The more we know about the battlefield, so the argument goes, the easier it is to control it by minimising the possibility that such unforeseen events will arise.

Technological innovation in areas such as satellite surveillance, communications and the 'information super-highway' are thus seen to promise avenues of greater control for American military planners. This technological optimism has arguably been dealt a significant blow by the actual nature of the US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, where technological sophistication did not prevent the US from becoming mired in long, drawn-out and bloody campaigns. However, it is also argued that the RMA is not simply about the incorporation of new technologies, but also the 'transformation' of US forces and tactics in a sense that outlasts individual military interventions. Consequently the concept of the RMA is often accompanied by a range of jargon that is still used to denote various aspects of this transformation, such as the concept of 'network centric warfare' (the idea that conflict will increasingly be organised around networks and nodes of information transfer), C4i (command, control, communications, computers and military intelligence) and 'cyber-war' (attacks directed specifically against computers and communications systems that include techniques such as 'hacking' and 'jamming'). The last term – also variously referred

to as 'netwar' and 'information warfare' – was identified in the 1990s as one of the key looming developments in conflict. Since the RMA is predicated on the centrality of information and information transfer, Pentagon planners quickly pinpointed the disruption of networks of information transfer as a key goal not only for US forces but also potential adversaries in the form of 'cyber-terrorism'. The prospect of a 'digital Pearl Harbour' – an unexpected attack by 'hackers' on either civilian or military infrastructure to disable the national grid, telecommunications systems or military satellites – has long been cited as a potential threat that has emerged simultaneously to the RMA. Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) argue that the increasing focus on 'cyber-security' in political and media discourse ends up replaying many of the features of securitisation (see Chapter 6). The fear of attacks on networked computer systems now often includes non-military systems such as communication and banking infrastructures, but represents the threat of cyber attacks via militarised language and metaphors to justify exceptional measures to protect the security of states, societies and economies as referent objects.

Mediation and war

The idea of the Western way of war and the RMA are both inherently linked to the increasing *mediation* of conflict as a feature of contemporary warfare – where the term mediation can be used to denote both increasing media coverage and the growing use of forms of visual media to direct and conduct conflict. Here the Gulf War of 1991 is commonly cited as a key event. The overwhelming success of the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein seemed to vindicate the argument that innovation in military technology would improve military effectiveness for the US, and its ability to intervene decisively (for a critique of this view see Biddle 1996). The US-led coalition deployed 795,000 troops, but suffered only 240 fatalities. During the campaign, US forces used technological superiority in the realm of air warfare to strike a decisive initial blow, using a six-week air campaign to destroy key Iraqi targets and to fatally damage the Iraqi command and control structure. In part the US success was based on the incorporation of satellite communications, targeting and reconnaissance technologies, such as GPS, leading some to dub the conflict as the 'first space war'.

Moreover, media coverage of the conflict seemed to show the decisive nature of US military systems, such as the Patriot anti-missile system, which was used to protect Kuwait from incoming Iraqi Scud missiles. Although the actual success of the Patriot in 1991 later came into question (see Postol 1992), television coverage at the time portrayed it as one of the technological successes of the conflict. Television viewers were also treated to 'real-time' recordings of smart bombs approaching their target, with images relayed from a camera mounted on the projectile itself, before the picture tuned blank as the bomb hit its target. As Martin Shaw notes, 'the idea that war could be fought *with* blanket media coverage but *without* many casualties, which were mostly not actually shown to the viewers, became mainstream with the Gulf War' (2005: 37).

Mediation of war has also become increasingly 'mainstream' in various military interventions that have followed in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, and the growth of this trend has led some analysts to speak of the phenomenon of *spectator-sport war*:

When Western states use force, they do so from afar, involving directly only a limited number of representatives on the field of battle. Society no longer participates; it spectates from a distance. Like sports spectators, Westerners demonstrate different levels of engagement, from those who watch unmoved and soon forget to those who follow

events, personalities, tactics, and strategies closely and empathize strongly with what is happening. But their experience is removed. They sympathise but do not suffer; they empathize but do not experience.

(McInnes 2002: 2)

Yet, with the rapid expansion of new forms of global media, the question arises as to whether we can speak of the mediation of warfare solely in terms of a straightforward (and ethnocentric) 'Western' way of representing and interpreting conflict.

Box 12.4 illustrates that the mediation of contemporary conflict is both increasingly pervasive, ethically complex and raises challenging questions about the way images of war are produced and consumed. As Shaw argues, media management is 'essential' and both state and non-state military actors attempt to achieve this as far as possible (2005: 92). But ensuring that the 'official' line is not disrupted is growing ever more difficult given the proliferation of media outlets, most notably via satellite television and the internet (see Robinson *et al.* 2005 and Goddard *et al.* 2008). The rise of military blogging (or 'milblogging') – through which individual soldiers post their own thoughts and perspectives via blogs, online forums and social networking sites – is one example how 'perception management' in war has become even more complex and challenging. As illustrated in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, milbloggers frequently post personal accounts and images of conflict that challenge or even deviate from official media representations. And in the multiple uprisings of the Arab Spring of 2011, social media were employed by protestors to organise demonstrations and to

Box 12.4 The war of images

Television is a key facet of the technological mediation of conflict. Indeed, for some policing the way that accounts of war are taken up has itself resulted in 'a struggle over representations' (Shapiro 1990: 337). With the proliferation of media outlets globally, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw different styles of representation of the conflict and different assumptions of what should be broadcast. During the 1991 Gulf War, the Middle East and the rest of the world largely relied on CNN and other Western broadcasters for breaking news. Since its launch in 1996, however, the Qatar-based media outlet al-Jazeera's coverage of global events has made it one of the most watched channels in the Arab world. On 23 March 2003, al-Jazeera raised the stakes in the struggle over representation of the invasion of Iraq by broadcasting footage of captured American prisoners of war. The footage took three forms: interviews (interrogations, according to the Pentagon) with three clearly distressed soldiers – two male, one female; pictures of a fourth serviceman, badly wounded and slumped on a stretcher; and graphic images of four dead US servicemen, who appeared to have been shot in the head at close range, lying in pools of blood on the floor of a concrete room (Whitaker 2003). Television news outlets in the US and UK seemed unsure as to whether their own codes of conduct allowed broadcasting of such images. After initially withdrawing the footage, Sky News was the first British broadcaster to run the footage; BBC News 24 followed, though chose to hold off from transmitting the footage on its international service BBC World. ITN opted to manipulate the footage into still pictures. Confusion as to how to deal with or even react to the images seemed to be the order of the day. When then US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared on the CBS *Face the Nation* programme on 23 March, the Pentagon had been denying reports that ten US soldiers were captured or missing in Iraq. Then, presenter Bob Schieffer switched to footage from al-Jazeera showing two confused American servicemen being questioned by an Iraqi interviewer. Asked what he made of the footage, Rumsfeld replied: 'I have no idea' (Wells and Campbell 2003).

disrupt and resist the efforts of state security forces. In this context, use of and access to such visual and digital media (and the securitisation of images – see Chapter 6 and Williams 2003b) constitutes one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary security studies, as does the issue of censorship of information on the web in the name of national security (see the weblinks to CitizenLab and the Center for Democracy and Technology).

Virtual wars

The abundance of forms of mediation of warfare in the information age has led several analysts to deploy the concept of *virtual war* to characterise this trend. The term virtual war implies that the increasing technological mediation of war creates a type of war that no longer 'physically exists as such' for the user (Der Derian 2000: 75). Scholars such as James Der Derian argue that, as in the case with UAVs (see Box 12.3), certain forms of contemporary warfare create a new (virtual) reality for the operators of these hi-tech systems.

Literature on virtual wars began to expand in the late 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in the wake of the US-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, which was seen by many as the first truly virtual war (Ignatieff 2000a). US supremacy in air power and its advanced missile and targeting technologies meant that NATO could intervene in Kosovo through airstrikes alone, without actually having to put troops on the ground or engaging its Serb adversary directly. Technological supremacy seemed to achieve the fantasy of what Robert Mandel (2004) calls 'Bloodless War' (for NATO forces at least – some have argued that the nature of the intervention actually facilitated the continuation of atrocities against civilians on the ground), and Michael Ignatieff defined this form of virtual war as 'war with death removed, waged in conditions of impunity' (2000b: 1).

Although the idea of virtual war has been picked up and used by a range of scholars in security studies, it has become most notable as a concern of those working from a post-structuralist orientation. In particular the theme has been treated extensively by James Der Derian. For Der Derian the virtual 'constructs worlds – not *ex nihilo* but *ex machina* – where there were none before' (2000: 75), and the key feature of 'virtuality' is not its ability to mimic reality, but to create new realities. These virtual wars create new realities of conflict through reliance on *information*, the ability to overcome physical distance through the *speed* of information transfer allowed by new technologies, and, crucially, through the prevalence of forms of *simulation*.

As reliance on *information* is crucial to the virtual war effort, scholars such as Der Derian point out that techniques of representation and forms of mediation increase in importance and need to be critically interrogated. The capacity to enact force accurately from remote locations is central to virtual war, but it also makes it dependent on accurate information and, increasingly, on accurate interpretation of signs, images and representations of data on a computer monitor. Hence the 'security of meaning' (as discussed in Chapter 5) comes to be of key importance. If representation and interpretation of information are not seamlessly aligned in modern conflict, disaster frequently results. As Ignatieff argues in the case of Kosovo, no one questioned whether the data the NATO coalition forces relied on actually corresponded to anything real on the ground, and this arguably contributed to several high-profile 'targeting errors' (Ignatieff 2000a) most notably the bombing of civilians and of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

Similarly, the ability to overcome physical distance through the *speed* of new technologies of information and force transference also raises critical issues. 'The power of virtuality', Der Derian argues,

lies in its ability to collapse distance, between here and there, near and far, fact and fiction [...] the virtual effect of bringing 'here' here in near real-time and with near-verisimilitude adds a strategic as well as comparative advantage in the production of violence. (2000: 75)

However, the ability to enact near-instantaneous force from a remote location raises a concern over whether prohibitions on the use of force become less restrictive as a result. For instance US army psychologist Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman has argued that for soldiers operating at long-range resistance to killing is much lower (see Grossman 1996), whilst others worry that:

As war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide. (Shurtliff 2002: 103)

In addition, it may be that the pace of information transfer can also outstrip the pace of human cognition. As more and more aspects of warfighting are delegated to technological systems there is the risk that such systems outpace the limits of human reaction times.

These themes are brought together in the discussion of the final characteristic of virtual war: *simulation*. Particularly in the form of computer-based battle simulations and virtual games, simulation is now a common feature of Western military training and formulation of strategy (see Der Derian 2009). Simulations are generally viewed by their users as mere preparations for or representations of worst-case scenarios; but several authors argue that they help to produce and delimit new practices of warfare through holistic training and 'hyperreal' modelling. According to Der Derian: 'Digitized, virtual wargames and peace-games, twice removed by scripted strategies and technological artifice from the bloody reality of war, take simulation into another realm [...] where distinctions between the simulated and the real begin to break down' (2000: 95). Here Der Derian draws upon the poststructuralist thinking of Jean Baudrillard, who argues that the increasing prevalence of forms of simulation 'threatens the difference between "true" and "false", between "real" and "imaginary"' (Baudrillard 1993: 344). Infamously Baudrillard took this logic to its extreme by declaring that 'The Gulf War did not take place' (1995), arguing that the heavily mediated nature of the 1991 Gulf conflict meant that for the vast majority of those not participant in the conflict (and even some of those participating on the US side) the war was experienced primarily as a series of images and representations that effectively superseded the 'reality' of the conflict (for a critique see Norris 1992).

Leaving aside the merits or otherwise of Baudrillard's provocative argument, there are instances where it might be said that simulation increasingly impacts upon both peace making and warfare in tangible ways. During the Bosnian peace talks of 1995 the negotiators for the US used state-of-the-art real-time computer simulation to bring a temporary halt to the genocide. At key points in the negotiations US officials took the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian presidents into the 'Nintendo' room where they could see a real-time three-dimensional map of the disputed territories, and 'they reduced heated arguments over territory to a kind of computer game [...] There, Milosevic and others manipulated a joystick to zoom along electronic displays of Bosnian terrain originally developed for NATO bombing rehearsals' (Mollins *et al.* 1995).

Less positively, some commentators argue that simulated training blurs the distinction between the virtual and the actual, sometimes with tragic consequences. A case in point examined by Der Derian (1990), Gray (1997) and Michael Shapiro (1998) is the shooting down of Iranian flight 665 by the American vessel the USS *Vincennes* in 1988. The incident, which resulted in the death of 290 civilians, has received sustained attention from those interested in the theme of virtual war because of the strong possibility that the simulated training undergone by the ship's weapons operators actually facilitated the mistaken identification of the passenger plane as a 'hostile' target. Indeed it has been argued:

The reality of the nine months of simulated battles displaced, overrode, absorbed the reality of the Airbus. The Airbus disappeared before the missile struck: it faded from an airliner full of civilians to an electronic representation on a radar screen to a simulated target. The simulation overpowered a reality which did not conform to it.
(Der Derian 1990: 302)

In a similar vein other scholars have examined the occurrence of 'friendly fire' incidents involving the use of battlefield missile defence systems in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, including the shooting down of a British Tornado aircraft and the death of its two crew members. As one commander of a Patriot battalion in Iraq told a subsequent enquiry:

when you train, you're taught to react so quickly because the Air Battles that we train on, in my opinion, are unrealistic [...] there are too many things going on at one time, so all it trains you to do is just react. And that is just fine, but out here it is more complicated than that.
(quoted in Peoples 2008: 26)

The merits of even the most 'hyperreal' simulation consequently come into question. As Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, one of the leading American commanders in the invasion of Iraq, admitted to reporters early on in the invasion: 'The enemy we're fighting is a bit different from the one we war-gamed against' (cited in Dwyer 2003 and Der Derian 2003: 37).

However the use of simulation in recruitment and training shows no signs of abating (see Box 12.5). The US military continues to encourage integration of both recruitment and training with battle simulations in a video game format most prominently in the development and promotion of 'America's Army Online', while the British army has recently used a series of interactive battlefield scenarios aimed at assessing the teamwork, decision making, leadership and fitness based on real missions from Iraq (entitled 'Start Thinking Soldier') as a means of attracting potential recruits (see weblinks).

Der Derian's work is frequently at pains to point out that virtual wars always have visceral, corporeal effects for those on the receiving end of modern military technologies. The grim realities of 'collateral' damage are frequently obscured or absent from slick media-military presentations of 'precision' weapons. This is why, he argues, we should pay greater attention to the incorporation of virtuality in modern military systems than to the much cited threat of 'cyberterrorism', the form of 'virtual' warfare that is more prominently referred to by military planners. Others, such as Chris Hables Gray, have also sought to reintroduce an emphasis on the corporeal, 'fleshy' humans that are the perpetrators and victims of hi-tech warfare (2003: 223). Thus, the suffering of the victims of, for example, drone attacks is obscured from the view of the general public; but, simultaneously, even for drone

Box 12.5 From virtual to 'virtuous war'

James Der Derian has now coined the term 'virtuous war' to describe the meshing of media and military technologies, and their virtual qualities, with a particular set of values. 'At the heart of virtuous war', he argues:

is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance – with no or minimal casualties. Using networked information and virtual technologies to bring 'there' here in near-real time and near verisimilitude, virtuous war exercises a comparative as well as strategic advantage for the digitally advanced
(2009: xxxi, emphasis in original)

In other words, new forms of Western warfare not only emphasise virtuality, but justify and legitimate the use of violence from a distance on the virtues of allegedly greater discriminatory capability of military technology and consequent minimisation of casualties. In this sense virtuous war is 'ethically intentioned and virtually applied' (Der Derian 2003: 39). Virtuous war is thus based not only on the capacity to exert extraordinary force, but also the capacity to keep its actual consequences out of sight lest they undermine the apparent virtues of this form of warfare. Consequently management of media representations – through, for example, 'embedding' journalists and television crews within military units – are key to maintaining the efficacy of this form of violence, as are the Hollywood blockbusters and computer games that replicate and even sometimes inform military security practices. With regard to the latter, Der Derian cites the example of the Institute for Creative Technologies at the University of Southern California (see weblinks), which brings together representatives of the US military and Hollywood for 'joint modelling and simulation research [...] for the army as well as for the entertainment, media, video game, film, destination theme park, and information technology industries' (2009: 162). This, Der Derian argues, is emblematic of an ever expanding 'military-industrial-media-entertainment network' that sustains virtuous war.

operators the use of drones may not be entirely 'risk free' (even as it avoids the risk of their own death in war), with an increasing number reporting post-traumatic stress as they struggle to 'process' the lethal effects of their actions after they enact them from a distance.

'Technostrategic' discourse and its critics

The sections above detail some of the ways in which the effects of technological innovation and the 'information revolution' have been treated within critical security studies. From a slightly different direction, however, other scholars operating within a critical framework have sought to reflect upon the seemingly unending infatuation with technology and military hardware, both within security practices and the academic study of security.

Feminist security studies

Although written during the last decade of the cold war, Carol Cohn's seminal work on 'Sex, Death and Defense Intellectuals' remains one of the most instructive and provocative studies in this regard. Operating from an avowedly feminist perspective, Cohn identified the prevalence of what she termed as 'technostrategic' discourse in the language of nuclear war planners and, by extension, the academic study of nuclear strategy in the 1980s. In a now seminal 1987 article Cohn coined the term 'technostrategic' to:

represent the intertwined, inextricable nature of technological and nuclear strategic thinking [...] strategic theory not only depends on and changes in response to technological objects, it is also based on a kind of thinking, a way of looking at problems – formal, mathematical modelling, systems analysis, game theory, linear programming – that are part of technology itself. So I use the term ‘technostrategic’ to indicate the degree to which nuclear strategic language and thinking are imbued with, indeed constructed out of, modes of thinking that are associated with technology. (1987a: 690)

Written from her experiences participating at a workshop run by ‘distinguished “defense intellectuals” in 1984, Cohn’s analysis focuses on one level on the highly gendered nature of the language used by American cold war nuclear planners (1987a: 687). One of the primary features of technostrategic discourse, Cohn argues, is ‘the ubiquitous weight of gender’ and the frequently sexualised nature of the terminology employed by military planners: ‘vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks’ are some of the recurrent examples picked out by Cohn of terms employed by the (almost exclusively male) strategists and planners to describe the merits and disadvantages of various nuclear missile technologies (1987a: 688, 693).

At another level, though, Cohn’s analysis speaks to the ways in which technostrategic language distances military planners from the visceral effects of nuclear weapons (see also Cohn *et al.* 2005), and frequently does so by rendering the weapons themselves as objects of desire or sexual anxiety. It is marked by ‘elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words’ (1987a: 690). Cohn picks out the example of ‘clean bombs’ – a term used in 1980s nuclear strategic parlance to describe bombs that use fusion rather than fission and hence have a greater destructive power. The metaphor of clean bombs, Cohn argues,

may provide the perfect metaphor for the language of defense analysts and arms controllers. This language has enormous destructive power, *but without emotional fallout*, without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering. (1987a: 691, emphasis added)

Though Cohn’s analysis was developed within a discussion of cold war strategic thinking, its implications and insights can as easily be applied both to contemporary discussions of nuclear weapons, and to the prevalence of euphemisms and acronyms such as ‘smart bombs’, ‘collateral damage’ and C4I within the discourse the RMA and post-cold war military planning. It also speaks to the increasing aestheticisation of weapons and weapons systems – the processes by which the latest weapons systems are represented as the height of invention in glitzy promotional videos and simulations (see weblink to Lockheed Hellfire II missile for an example) – and could in this sense overlap with at least some of the issues captured by the idea of virtual war.

In a sense, Cohn’s argument takes as its concern the distancing effects that many of those concerned with virtual war discussed previously also investigate, but where it differs slightly is in locating the source of these distancing effects not necessarily in the mediating features of the technologies themselves, but in the language used to describe and domesticate these

weapons and the potential consequences of their use. Hence, ‘the imagery that domesticates, that humanizes insentient weapons, may also serve, paradoxically, to make it all right to ignore sentient human bodies, human lives’ (Cohn 1987a: 699).

Here again, Cohn argues, the gender dimension is important to understanding in the manner in which weapons of mass destruction are rendered more familiar by use of domestic, feminised metaphors. Patterns of nuclear attack are referred to as the ‘cookie cutter’, weapons systems ‘marry up’, long-range plans for nuclear attack are termed a ‘shopping list’ (1987b: 18). As Cohn *et al.* have argued in a more recent discussion of the gender and proposals for eliminating WMD, the absence of emotions and human vulnerability, which are ‘marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse’, further illustrates the extent to which technostrategic discourse is gendered (2005: 5). Equally, the acronyms and abbreviations used to describe weapons systems, once learned, ‘are quick, clean, light, they trip off the tongue’ (Cohn 1987a: 704). All this renders technostrategic discourse all the more seductive, and potentially makes the process of forgetting the actual effects of such weapons easier. Charlotte Hooper has even gone so far as to question whether post-structuralist-oriented analysis of virtual war, such as Der Derian, are also ultimately complicit in the reproduction of technostrategic discourse by constantly quoting and imitating the jargon of military planners. Drawing on Cohn’s analysis, Hooper argues that Der Derian’s ‘fascination with “virtual” technology resembles the earlier “toys for the boys” fascination with missile technology exhibited by more conventional contributors to strategic studies’ (2001: 114).

Critical security studies

Scholars within the so-called Welsh School of CSS have also been closely concerned with the prevalence of technostrategic thinking within security discourse and practices. Although best known for its focus on the relationship between security and ‘emancipation’, as discussed in Chapter 2, the philosophical roots of CSS also lead it to a concern with the relationship between technology and security (see Peoples 2010). As with Cohn’s work, the CSS position on technology originally grew out of a discussion of nuclear weapons and critique of the dominance of traditional approaches to strategy and security. In particular, the work of Richard Wyn Jones sought to critique the way in which strategic studies simply tended to accept the development of ever-more sophisticated and destructive technologies as a ‘given’. ‘Critical Theorists and concerned citizens’ alike he exhorts, ‘must seek to intervene in this process [weapons development] in order to try to ensure that new technologies are not developed and imposed in ways which simply re-create and reinforce present patterns of domination and injustice’ (Wyn Jones 1995: 106). In tandem with its fixation with the state as the referent object of security, the traditional approach to security studies has also shown an alarming tendency to *fetishize* technology, specifically military hardware: that is, traditional approaches have a seemingly endless obsession with the development of new weapons, and assumes this development to be a ‘natural’ process. As a result:

the strategists’ conception of technology remains curiously underdeveloped. Though strategy texts discuss the relationship between strategy and technology, these discussions tend not to move beyond rather superficial speculation about the pace of technological change [...] The deeper issues concerning the nature of the relationship between technology and society are hardly ever addressed.

(Wyn Jones 1995: 93)

By assuming that new developments in weapons technology are simply inevitable, strategic studies/traditional approaches are routinely restricted to debates over whether new technologies fundamentally alter the nature of warfare (or not). Specifically, Wyn Jones (drawing on Freenberg 1991) sees the vast part of such studies dividing into one of two camps, neither of which addresses the relationship between technology and society (and hence technology and security) beyond a superficial level. In one camp are those who adopt an 'instrumental approach'. The instrumental approach to technology 'argues that technology does not affect the social, political and cultural fundamentals in either domestic or international politics' (1995: 100). It is, as Wyn Jones characterises it, the extension of the US National Rifle Association's argument that 'it's not the gun, it's the person holding the gun' to the level of international security. Politics and strategy dictate the use of weapons, no matter how powerful or 'revolutionary' those weapons might be. The other camp Wyn Jones describes as adopting a 'substantive' approach. This approach suggests that 'technology has an autonomous logic of its own which determines a particular form of social organization' (1995: 102). In other words, far from being simply a range of neutral tools we use to achieve certain ends, technology itself has a tangible, substantive impact in shaping social relations. In short, the debate becomes one of whether new technologies simply augment existing practices of warfare, or revolutionise its very practice. One side of the debate focuses on the role that human 'users' of technology play in determining the uses to which military technologies are put to; the other emphasises the ways in which human activities and behaviours in conflict are shaped by the tools used to conduct wars.

Most contributions to the literature on nuclear weapons, Wyn Jones argues as an example, fall into one or other of these two camps. This analysis can be extended to non-nuclear weapons technologies as well. Debates on the previously discussed RMA frequently break down into one group of scholars arguing that new technologies do not alter the fundamentals of strategy and are simply tools to be used to serve existing ends, versus those who argue that new technologies are not simply 'new tools' but require a radical rethink of strategic goals and organisation. Building upon Wyn Jones' analysis, Peoples (2010) argues that this dichotomous characterisation of technological development – as either being driven by strategic goals on the one hand or determining them on the other – is present not only in academic discourse but in the practical promotion and justification of hi-tech weapons systems such as US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). He examines the way in which proponents of missile defence simultaneously uphold the promise of new technology as tools to be used to achieve nuclear security whilst at the same time invoking the substantialist metaphor of 'technology out of control' to characterise the spread of nuclear weapons and justify investment in BMD. Rarely are these two understandings reconciled and, Peoples suggests, in some their discursive power actually emanates from their apparent irreconcilability.

A more critical approach to technology, Wyn Jones argues, should be based in an awareness that:

Technology *does* have a logic in that it simultaneously creates and constrains the choices available to society, yet technology *does not* predetermine which one of those particular choices is made. That decision is a social one, and as such reflects a whole series of social, cultural and power relations. The fact that these relations are contestable leads to the argument that technology is a scene of struggle.

(1995: 99, emphases in original)

Rather than assuming new military technologies simply as objects for the consideration of security scholars, the CSS approach suggests that we need to look into the decisions, processes and beliefs that create the perceived need for such 'products' in the first place. Hence, in place of the traditional approach, Wyn Jones argues for 'an alternative conceptualization of strategy that embraces ends, regarding normative issues as intrinsic to the study and [that] is based on a dialectical understanding of technology' (1999: 5).

In short, where feminist scholars like Cohn point to the dehumanising effects of technological discourse, those within CSS in a similar vein critique its frequently depoliticising effects. Rather than viewing (military) technology as something exogenous to society or simply as the instruments of military planners, CSS argues that one of the goals of a critical approach to security is to question the inherently social character of technology and its impacts. Although we need to acknowledge that the material aspects of technology 'create and constrain' certain security practices, CSS argues that we should also recognise the human factor in the design, development, promotion and use of particular military technologies. In doing so it seeks to guard against the technological determinism that often creeps into discussions of military technology and security.

Security, dataveillance and biopower

Often when we think of the relationship between technology and security, we tend to focus upon weaponry and battlefield technology, as if security pertains only to practices of battle as has been the case in the previous sections. With the onset of the war on terror and the growth of homeland security (see Chapter 9), however, attention has increasingly been paid to the ways in (homeland) security is also reliant on the new technologies that are now being deployed, often covertly, at a more societal, 'every day' level. Much of the scholarship in this vein has developed out of a Foucauldian-inspired concern with surveillance, biopower and the management of populations (see Chapter 5 and Box 5.1). Michel Foucault's later writing and lectures centre around an inversion of Clausewitz's famous dictum that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means'. By contrast, Foucault and the more recent work that draws upon his thinking seeks to investigate the extent to which politics is actually 'the continuation of war by other means' (Amoore 2009: 50; Dillon and Neal 2008; Dillon and Reid 2001; Foucault 2002, 2007): that is, the extent to which security practices are enmeshed into efforts to manage the movement of people and attempt to identify, monitor and contain elements of the population that might constitute a 'security risk'.

Technologies employed in such efforts include means of DNA fingerprinting and identification, electronic tagging, biometric ID cards, passports and facial recognition systems (see Box 12.6), and 'smart' CCTV systems, which in turn facilitate practices such as screening and risk-profiling. Although the phenomenon of surveillance is not particularly new (with Jeremy Bentham's idea of the panopticon dating back to 1785 – see Figure 5.1), the connection between surveillance and security has grown in tandem with the increased emphasis on international terrorism as a security threat. As Louise Amoore notes, a consensus emerged in post-9/11 US policy circles that 'had surveillance and profiling techniques been in place, the events of 9/11 "could have been predicted and averted"' and that in response 'technologies designed to classify populations according to their degree of threat – long available in the private commercial sector – should be deployed at the service of border security' (2006: 337). Indeed, border points – airports, checkpoints and border crossings – form the primary sites of deployment for such technologies of surveillance (see Chapter 11; Salter 2006, 2007).

Moreover, traditional modes of surveillance, represented emblematically by CCTV cameras, are now being supplemented by what has been identified as 'dataveillance': the monitoring and 'mining' of multiple forms of data – including financial transactions, patterns of international travel and even behavioural data (see Box 12.6) – by security professionals with the aim of identifying potentially 'risky' groups and individuals. In this sense, as with the discourse of the RMA, in *dataveillance information is key*, although this time with the focus very much on preventing the emergence of 'internal' threats rather than the 'external' application of force – as is well exemplified by the 2013 revelations of the US National Security Agency's PRISM programme.

The use of biometric technologies raises pressing questions about privacy, the storage and use of personal data and fundamental civil liberties; but, for critical scholars of security it also raises complex issues about the identification, prediction and pre-emption of security 'threats'. Amoore argues that 'The practices of this war by other means [...] are themselves productive of quite specific pre-emptive forms of war and violence' (2009: 65) that need to be critically interrogated, and others argue that given this security studies should shift its focus from geopolitics to biopolitics and its supporting infrastructures of scientific and technical knowledge (see Dillon and Reid 2001) at both the micro level of individuals and the macro level of populations.

Ultimately, Foucauldian scholars argue, these material technologies of surveillance generate what Foucault calls 'technologies of the self': 'a process of responsibilisation through which individuals are made in charge of their own behaviour, competence, improvement, security and "well being"' (Ajana 2005: 3). Amoore cites as an example the facility provided by one IT company to download the 'Most Wanted Terrorists' database to pocket PCs and mobile phones so that 'people can have the photos and descriptions at their fingertips at all times in case they spot a suspicious person, easily comparing the person to the photo without endangering themselves' (2006: 346). In this sense formal security and surveillance

Box 12.6 Biometric technologies and 'algorithmic war'

With the advent of biometrics, surveillance and risk-profiling have become focused on the body to a new degree in security practices. Giving tangible meaning to the connection between security and biopower, 'Biometric technology identifies individuals automatically by using their biological or behavioural characteristics' (POST 2001: 1). Examples of biometrics range from familiar techniques and technologies such as fingerprinting and the increasingly common biometric passports and ID cards, to retina scanners and face recognition technology. Biometric technologies are increasingly being used not only for purposes of identifying individuals, though, but also for identifying particular forms of 'suspicious behaviour'. Here biometrics relies on algorithms – essentially prefabricated mathematical models, frequently used in the commercial sector, for spotting the probability of particular actions or choices being made by individuals (Amoore 2009) – to identify security 'risks'. Such calculations may be based on the remote sensing of bodies on a railway platform, or on the monitoring of particular patterns of travel and use of a credit card. For security professionals, such technologies and techniques are justified on the basis of an enhanced ability to 'connect the dots' and predict the likelihood of, for example, terrorist attacks. Michael Chertoff, then US secretary of Homeland Security, justified the greater use of biometrics on the basis that 'After September 11 [2001], we used credit card and telephone records to identify those linked with the hijackers. But wouldn't it be better to identify such connections before a hijacker boards a plane?' (cited in Amoore 2009: 52).

technologies, such as those associated with homeland security, are seen to encourage and inculcate individual technologies of self-management (see Salter 2006, 2007), and citizens are urged to act as human supplements to formal surveillance technologies.

Conclusion

So how should the study of technology and warfare proceed from a critical perspective and what should its primary concerns be? Security professionals frequently speak of technologies that are 'over-the-horizon': that is, the next developments in technology that promise to radically change the nature of warfare. Looking to the future, some have identified space weapons and nanotechnology as potential new sources of military innovation that might provide the next 'RMA' (see Hirst 2002), while others argue that the proliferation of human-machine relationships on the battlefield portends a cultural-psychological shift towards 'post-human' soldiers (Gray 2003; Masters 2005).

Prediction, particularly in the realm of technological development, is always a dangerous pastime, and it can be argued that innovation does not in itself guarantee significance with regard to warfare. In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, the US-led forces scored significant initial military success thanks to overwhelming technological superiority, which was widely characterised as 'shock and awe'; but they still found it difficult to consolidate that initial success, and only began to do so by increasing the number of actual 'boots on the ground' to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. Similarly, the adversaries faced by US forces in Iraq have proven adept at blending guerrilla tactics with their own 'asymmetric' use of technologies ranging from rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to car bombs to use of the internet for propaganda and recruitment.

What this might suggest is that critical approaches to the study of warfare in the information age need to take account of the potential merging of 'old' and 'new' methods of warfare and their wider social context and impacts. Indeed, Barkawi (2011) has gone so far as to argue that this warrants the development of a separate and distinct form of 'critical war studies' in its own right. Various forms of critical security studies scholarship make a contribution to the understanding of how new forms of technology affect war and security in the information age: new forms of media, weapons technology and the pervasion of militarised logics into everyday practices. Scholarly opinion is divided as to the exact nature and significance of critical security scholarship in this respect, however. Barkawi argues that the field of security studies has 'widened' to such an extent, particularly in terms of its empirical foci, that its focus on the phenomenon of war has become irreversibly diluted. Conversely, Aradau (2012) makes the case that if the definition of 'war' is modified into a focus on organised political violence in its myriad forms, then the potential significance of critical approaches to the study of security becomes more apparent.

If the concept of postmodern war has any purchase, then it is in the characterisation of contemporary warfare as 'bricolage' – something that is made up of a multiplicity of divergent forms – with 'the proliferation of many different types of postmodern soldiers' (Gray 2003: 216). In the light of this, students and scholars of critical security studies might reflect upon whether a focus upon innovation in technology needs to be supplemented by greater analysis of the diffusion of 'old' technologies as well. It is worth considering whether the proliferation of small arms globally, for example, is not as important as the next development in nanotechnology, biometrics and cyber-warfare. But in thinking where critical approaches might go in future we might also reflect on whether the 'thrill of the new' constitutes its own type of fetishisation within critical security studies as well as its more traditional counterpart.

Key points

- The 1990s saw the rise of the discourse of the RMA (revolution in military affairs) in the US that focuses upon information and technological innovation as the key to military success, and of the term 'Western way of war' to characterise the emphasis placed on technological superiority and 'risk aversion' by Western militaries.
- Increasing mediation of warfare – media coverage of war and use of visual media in the conduct of war – as a result of this emphasis on technology has led to consequent discussion of the idea of 'virtual war' within critical security studies.
- Scholars drawing on feminist and critical theory critique the prevalence of 'technostategic discourse' within discussions of military technology and security.
- Recent work drawing upon theories of biopolitics have focused upon the growth of 'everyday' security technologies that focus on monitoring the body and identifying 'risky' elements of the population.

Discussion points

- How significant are the range of technological innovations associated with the RMA?
- What does it mean to say that war is becoming increasingly 'virtual'?
- Are poststructuralist scholars right to focus upon the role of simulation in contemporary conflict?
- Do traditional approaches to security 'fetishise' military technology, as argued by feminist and critical security scholars?
- Should critical scholars be more concerned with the innovation or the diffusion of military technology?
- What, if anything, do critical approaches to the study of security have to tell us about the phenomenon of war?

Guide to further reading

- Carol Cohn (1987) 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 12(4): 687–718. As noted in this chapter, this remains a seminal feminist contribution to discussions of technology and war.
- James Der Derian (2009) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military–Industrial–Media–Entertainment Network* (New York: Routledge). A semi-autobiographical account of Der Derian's investigation of the use of simulations and war gaming within the US military, and is worth reading for the firsthand observations of such simulations at work as well as the theoretical content. Those looking for a more condensed version of the latter might consult Der Derian (2000) and (2003) – see Bibliography for full details.
- Louise Amoore (2009) 'Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror', *Antipode*, 41(1): 49–69. An empirically rich illustration of the Foucauldian-inspired approach to biometric technologies and dataveillance as discussed in this chapter.
- Richard Wyn Jones (1999) *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Provides further detail on how a critique of traditional approaches to security and strategy can be located within a broader critical theory of technology.
- Robert Mandel (2004) *Security, Strategy and the Quest for Bloodless War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Combines an overview of several of the innovations associated with the RMA with a more substantive discussion of their potential effects in terms of the way wars are waged.
- Taraq Barkawi (2009) 'From War to Security: Security Studies, the Wider Agenda, and the Fate of the Study of War', *Millennium*, 39: 701–716 makes the case, as noted in the conclusion of this chapter,

for a distinct form of 'critical war studies'. Along with the ensuing response by Aradau (2012) and counter-response by Barkawi (2012) – see bibliography for full details – Barkawi's article opens up a debate about what it means to study war from a 'critical' perspective.

Weblinks

InfoTechWarPeace (The Watson Institute): www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/index2.cfm
 CitizenLab: www.citizenlab.org
 Center for Democracy and Technology (on security): www.cdt.org/security Institute for Creative Technologies: <http://ict.usc.edu>
 'America's Army Online' – US Army game/simulation site: www.americasarmy.com
 'Start Thinking Soldier' – UK Army recruitment site: <http://www.army.mod.uk/StartThinkingSoldier/>
 Lockheed Martin promotional site for the 'Hellfire II' missile: www.lockheedmartin.com/products/HellfireII.html

